alternatehistory.com

The very same year Skylab-A was repaired, the first National Space Council was disbanded by Nixon.
The NSC was created again by Bush in 1989, but failed, and was "mothballed" by Clinton 4 years later. B. Obama recently talked about recreating it...


Skylab repairs and NSC scrapping by Nixon all happened in 1973.

Both events ruined US manned spaceflight in the 70’s.

Destruction of the NSC meant NASA lose political influence at a moment its budget was cut to the floor (FY74 was one of its lowest budget ever, barely above $3 billion)

Repairing Skylab A was a nice achievement, but after that there was no money and too few Saturn IB and CSM to launch Skylab B.

Repairing Skylab-A was difficult and risky.

http://www.astronautix.com/flights/skylab2.htm

At 6:45 p.m. EDT the Apollo CSM undocked and extravehicular activity was initiated to deploy the beam 1 solar array. The attempt failed.

Frustration of the crew was compounded when eight attempts were required to achieve hard docking with the OWS. The hard dock was made at 11:50 p.m. EDT, terminating a Skylab 2 first-day crew work period of 22 hours.

In OTL The solar array was deployed later. What if it had been stubbornely resisted to every atempt ?


http://www.thespacereview.com/article/163/2
Space policymaking at the White House
The history of both space councils, and the reasons for their elimination, provide ample evidence that such an organization at the White House level has only limited utility. High-level policy organizations only make sense if the decision makers want the advice in the first place or think that current methods and organizations are insufficient to provide such advice. As several observers have noted over the years, the reason that advocates want such an organization—to lobby for attention and funding for space activities inside the White House—is the same reason why presidential administrations oppose it. They do not want policy advocacy to be enshrined in a formal organization. President George W. Bush could have staffed a National Space Council in the first three and a half years of his presidency, but chose not to do so.
In addition, the previous experience of these organizations may serve as warnings to the current and future administrations. President George H.W. Bush was reportedly unhappy with the Space Council’s performance on the Space Exploration Initiative. He felt that they hastily advocated a policy that quickly became a political liability for him. A civilian space policy organization in the White House will naturally clash with NASA over the direction of the civilian space program.

It might make better sense to create a dedicated space exploration review committee at the NRC that can then provide advice to existing organizations.

The Space Exploration Steering Council would have only limited purview over the civilian space program. It would not have even the limited power that its predecessors had. Naturally, such an organization would seek to expand its purview to include other areas of civil and possibly even military space policy as the space exploration program required more funding and program changes.
Furthermore, much of the review and recommendation resources for the Vision for Space Exploration already exist in the National Research Council and its Applied Space Engineering Board and Space Studies Board. It might make better sense to create a dedicated space exploration review committee at the NRC that can then provide advice to existing organizations.
Even those who opposed the previous National Space Council have conceded that there is some value to such a body. As one former staffer explained, there are numerous cross-agency issues that simmer as problems for years but are unable to gain a hearing and get resolved because there is no centralized body to deal with them. A space council could provide a useful forum for such issues.
But a president who has not devoted much time or attention or political capital to space, and who has discovered that lunar and Mars exploration plans are a political liability, may not wish to have an organization dedicated to this subject occupying space in the White House bureaucracy. It is unlikely that the Aldridge Commission’s recommendation to create a Space Exploration Steering Council will actually be followed



Now, what if things happened differently ?

The NSC survive but, as suggested at the end of the article,

…much of the review and recommendation resources for the Vision for Space Exploration already exist in the National Research Council and its Applied Space Engineering Board and Space Studies Board. It might make better sense to create a dedicated space exploration review committee (SERC) at the NRC that can then provide advice to existing organizations.

So here it go, the NSC lost the VP (Vice President had an important role), but otherwise goes into the NRC, and become the SERC. It is now immune to political changes in Washington and, most importantly, backed by a well-respected institution, the NRC. :
The NRC- NSC combination (or SERC) quickly show its value in 1974: Hubble, known at the time as the Large Space Telescope, was not funded by Congress. It was only saved by a huge wave of petition and protest led by scientists such as Spitzer.
In 1974 Von Braun also took the lead of a non-governmental space advocacy group (the National space Institute). We can imagine that he join the new SERC.
So the SERC has now two strong figures to push it, Von Braun, and the NRC.
Not too much to face VP Mondale from January 1977…
L
The SERC push for the following moves
- A station builds around Skylab B, with an IMPROVED Spacelab module (more in the Colombus league) and something similar for Japan. These modules are launch by Titan III rocket, already in NASA service for Voyager, Viking, and Helios probes in the 1974-1977 era, from LC-40 or LC-41 USAF pads.
- Remaining Apollo CSM (there’s five of them) have to fill the gap before the Shuttle come. They use LC-37s pads, leaving LC-39 for the Shuttle.
- Skylab B will be launch around mid-1976, so that the five remaining CSM came close from each others, even if the Shuttle is late (it will)
- The Shuttle itself receive 2*Rocketdyne F-1 LRBs.


To achieve such program the SERC has to lobby for higher budgets, probably 3.5 billion per year over the 1975-1980 era… but the concept of a cheap, interim station is interesting.

ATSP happen as in OTL


Top