Jump Starting The LW Strategic Bomber Force

In the late 20s Junkers built the G38 airliner, an advanced design for a long range luxury people carrier, a sort of dieselpunk Boieng 747 ancestor.
Junkers developed a Bomber version, called the K51, that for obvious reasons couldn't be built in Germany.
This was sold to Japan, were it was built in small numbers as the Mitsubishi Type 92 heavy Bomber, later called Ki20.
These were later reengined, like the German G38s with Jumo 204 diesel engines, giving extended range.
Slow and ugly, they made up for that with long range and a heavy bombload.

very much an early 30s design, this could have been, if Junkers had built it after 1934 for the LW, the bomber that gave the Germans a taste for heavy bombers, allowing them to conduct operational tests and maybe paving the way for the Do19 or the Ju89.
Those built could serve in WW2, as night bombers first, then as long range MPA and as tranports.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mitsubishi_Ki-20

Mitsubishi_Ki-20.jpg
 

Deleted member 1487

The problem wasn't the airframe per se, though producing enough of them prior to 1940 is going to be expensive, the engines are the issue. Germany did not have powerful enough engines thanks to the ToV to power such an aircraft until after 1940, which compromised the designs of the Do 19 and Ju 89, as they became far too large to increase lift to make up for being underpowered and lacked the 'stretch' capability in the frames to make them valuable in the long run. As it was both the Do 19 and Ju 89 only had enough bomb bay space to carry fewer bombs than the He 111. They would need to be redesigned come 1938-40 to account for more engine power and a larger payload, which means they aren't ready until long after the war has already started and they've been superseded by events and other designs. Take the Ju290 as an example of what could have been for the Ju 89 (they better of the two Ural designs): it wasn't ready until 1943!

The LW already had strategic bomber fever in the 1930s, but lost it when the Ural Bombers proved so deficient. So they skipped them on order of General Wever, who wanted to focus on the Bomber A (He 177) project instead. All the LW commanders after him did was cancel the Ural Bomber prototypes that were supposed to be demonstrators for a potential strategic bombing unit. So you need to keep Wever alive to get the LW to have strategic bombers AND you need to keep the He 177 design from failing; that's pretty easy to do, as with Wever living as the POD a better staff is in charge of the Technical Brach, thanks to Udet not appearing in that role here (Goering was only able to insert him in that role because of Wever's death and the resulting chaos as the LW set up its General Staff). There won't be a delay in the ordering of the aircraft, nor a dive bombing requirement that set back the prototype a year. Udet is the cause of the LW botching the strategic bomber project.

So by November 1938 the first prototype is delivered. Assuming the normal two year development time, its ready for pre-production testing and all the assorted tasks associated with the introduction of a new model and class of aircraft in late 1940/early 1941, which starts serial production at the end of 1941. So by Spring 1942 Germany gets its first strategic bomber Geschwader ready for action. That's the best the LW can hope for and its pretty similar to what the British had as far as getting their four engine bombers into service:
http://duckduckgo.com/l/?kh=-1&uddg=https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Avro_Lancaster
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Handley_Page_Halifax
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Short_Stirling

In the meantime it makes no sense to build or really even develop the Ural Bomber designs, as the Ju 89 demonstrated that it was a total rebuild from the ground up. At best it would be ready for action around the same time as the He 177.

If you want an early German strategic bomber, have them get better engines earlier somehow (perhaps industrial espionage against the US, like how they got the Norden Bombsight). Or have the Germans design their bombers with more powerful engines in mind and wait for them to enter development until the Jumo 211A and DB601A come online. That sets things back, especially when those won't be very much better than what was available up to 1938. Come 1941 and the BMW 801 is ready, then Germany will have a decent strategic bomber engine.
Or have the DB603 stay in development instead of stopping in 1937-1940, which means it will be ready in the 1600hp range in 1941, while preproduction versions can be used for airframe development starting in 1940.

As is Germany made the right decision to focus on its medium bombers until a good enough strategic bomber was ready. Remember too that they weren't planning on a wider war until 1942 when the HE 177 was supposed to be in serial production and full operational status.
 
They did have better engines than the soviets, and that didn't deter the Russians from building quite a significant TB-3 force in the 30s. Without the pressures of the war and the purges, they would have replaced them with a large force of Pe8 quad engined bombers.
My reasoning is that once armed forces get a capability, be I submarines or long range bombers, they want to keep that capability. That was basically the reason Portugal bought new submarines. The navy said they always had subs, and therefore must keep on having subs. The fact that in eight decades no Portuguese sub ever launched a torpedo in anger didn't bother them one bit.
The Ki20, using only 1932 German tech, could carry a 5000kg bomb load or hit a target 2000km away. It did it at a slow pace, but had a lot of defensive firepower.
My reasoning is that once the LW has a small number of four engined long range heavy bombers they will want to replace them with next generation. So if the LW gets some experience running a force of, say, 30 to 40 Ju38A (my name for a German Ki20), they will run the Do19/Ju89 process better, and order a least enough of them to keep four engined bomber force going.
The RAF kept building small numbers of large bombers from the Handley Page 0/400 of WW1 to the Lancaster. Break continuity and you'll never have them back.
The idea of the big Junkers is to restore continuity to the German heavy bomber force ASAP...

And yes my affection for diesel punk machines means I'm biased.
 
Yeah, either keeping Ernst Udet from becoming head of the Air Ministry Technical Office, the people in charge of helping develop new planes, or have him fall down a flight of stairs seems like one of the best things you can do. IIRC since his background was in fighters and then later airborne acrobatics he was always more interested in the smaller more maneuverable bombers that would support the infantry, to the extent that he demanded that German medium and heavy bombers had to be designed with the ability to dive bomb. Which worked out about as well as you'd expect it to.
 

Deleted member 1487

They did have better engines than the soviets, and that didn't deter the Russians from building quite a significant TB-3 force in the 30s. Without the pressures of the war and the purges, they would have replaced them with a large force of Pe8 quad engined bombers.
The Soviets had a lot more manufacturing in the aviation sector than the Germans, thanks to the ToV and no enforced de-militarization of that industry either. That resulted in better Soviet aerodynamic design than the Germans had pre-war, that is until the Germans redeveloped the experience. Plus the Germans had to rebuild their warmaking potential virtually from scratch from 1933-39 and weren't to be finished until 1942 when they expected to start producing modern designs, which is why they skipped over the less useful Ural Bomber designs in favor of the modern He 177.

My reasoning is that once armed forces get a capability, be I submarines or long range bombers, they want to keep that capability. That was basically the reason Portugal bought new submarines. The navy said they always had subs, and therefore must keep on having subs. The fact that in eight decades no Portuguese sub ever launched a torpedo in anger didn't bother them one bit.
Germany couldn't have that capability because of the ToV for that exact reason. They wouldn't have had a 'modern' strategic bomber operational before 1940 if they adopted the distinctly unmodern Ural Bomber designs, which is why they abandoned them in favor of a new, modern design, the Bomber A project.


The Ki20, using only 1932 German tech, could carry a 5000kg bomb load or hit a target 2000km away. It did it at a slow pace, but had a lot of defensive firepower.
The frame could support up to 5000kg, but the engines couldn't get them aloft with it, nor could it reach the full range with that load. Be very careful of Wikipedia entries, as they list the full potential in each category for aircraft without stating that that full potential is possible in only one category at a time, not all at once. So while the aircraft could theoretically handle 5000kg, it couldn't get aloft with that load using the 750hp engines on its own; then it couldn't reach altitude or range with that, nor anywhere near top speed. If you want full range, you have to use minimal bomb load and economical cruising speed the whole way in a straight line. Same with maximum ceiling. So on and so forth. So using the normal 2000kg bombload of the He111, the Ki-20 is not even going to get anywhere near its range or speed.

Also where is Germany going to keep this aircraft prior to 1933/34 when there were still military inspections and spies among German service personnel for the Allies? Sure they could build a horribly outmoded aircraft in 1933, but why? Also with what industry? 1933-36 saw Germany spend most of its efforts just building an aviation industry capable of producing 2 engine bombers, let alone a four engine bomber, which was too advanced a technology for the German aviation industry prior to 1935. When the Ural Bomber design started in 1934, it was almost too much for German industry, though the Ju 89 was a better design than the Ki-20. It even carried 10,000kg in some tests externally, but at a terrible range, speed, ceiling, and with no armament.

Waiting for the He-177 while Germany is still learning to produce 2 engine bombers. For example it took Junkers some 4-5 months to figure out how to make the Ju88 after it officially entered serial production in 1939 (!), producing less than 70 units in that timeframe despite having 50% of all German aviation production resource (manpower, material, floor space, machine tools, engineers, etc.).

By waiting on the He-177 to be production ready in late 1941 Heinkel then has a specially design and tooled facility in Austria just for it, plus all the experience it needed gained with the He-111 program. The only issue then is for Udet not to screw up the design in 1937-1941, which can be avoided by Wever living past 1936.

My reasoning is that once the LW has a small number of four engined long range heavy bombers they will want to replace them with next generation. So if the LW gets some experience running a force of, say, 30 to 40 Ju38A (my name for a German Ki20), they will run the Do19/Ju89 process better, and order a least enough of them to keep four engined bomber force going.
The RAF kept building small numbers of large bombers from the Handley Page 0/400 of WW1 to the Lancaster. Break continuity and you'll never have them back.
The idea of the big Junkers is to restore continuity to the German heavy bomber force ASAP...

And yes my affection for diesel punk machines means I'm biased.

The best thing for Germany would be to no waste resources building the Ki-20 and keep the planned pre-production Do-19s and Ju-89s on the construction plan for 1938-39. Test them, experiment with them, etc. as Wever wanted and by 1941 when the He-177 was ready the LW would be prepared for it.

Trying to build small numbers of outmoded aircraft with the limited resources Germany had was a waste; I even think keeping the Do-17 in production past 1938 was a bad decision that was made because Dornier bribed Udet and made a fuss about losing their valuable contract. If the Ju88 wasn't yet ready, cancel the Do-17 and focus on more He-111s, while keeping the small Do-19 and Ju-89 contract alive, while the Dornier company works on the Do-217 and Junkers works on the Ju-88. Heinkel then moves on to the He-177 in 1941, dropping the outdated He-111, while Junkers and Dornier pick up the medium bomber production role, as was planned pre-war.

Nothing about the Ki-20 is worthwhile. Now if you're into Diesel engines, let's talk about the Do-26 long range naval recon aircraft...
 
The Soviets had a lot more manufacturing in the aviation sector than the Germans, thanks to the ToV and no enforced de-militarization of that industry either. That resulted in better Soviet aerodynamic design than the Germans had pre-war, that is until the Germans redeveloped the experience. Plus the Germans had to rebuild their warmaking potential virtually from scratch from 1933-39 and weren't to be finished until 1942 when they expected to start producing modern designs, which is why they skipped over the less useful Ural Bomber designs in favor of the modern He 177.


Germany couldn't have that capability because of the ToV for that exact reason. They wouldn't have had a 'modern' strategic bomber operational before 1940 if they adopted the distinctly unmodern Ural Bomber designs, which is why they abandoned them in favor of a new, modern design, the Bomber A project.


The frame could support up to 5000kg, but the engines couldn't get them aloft with it, nor could it reach the full range with that load. Be very careful of Wikipedia entries, as they list the full potential in each category for aircraft without stating that that full potential is possible in only one category at a time, not all at once. So while the aircraft could theoretically handle 5000kg, it couldn't get aloft with that load using the 750hp engines on its own; then it couldn't reach altitude or range with that, nor anywhere near top speed. If you want full range, you have to use minimal bomb load and economical cruising speed the whole way in a straight line. Same with maximum ceiling. So on and so forth. So using the normal 2000kg bombload of the He111, the Ki-20 is not even going to get anywhere near its range or speed.

Also where is Germany going to keep this aircraft prior to 1933/34 when there were still military inspections and spies among German service personnel for the Allies? Sure they could build a horribly outmoded aircraft in 1933, but why? Also with what industry? 1933-36 saw Germany spend most of its efforts just building an aviation industry capable of producing 2 engine bombers, let alone a four engine bomber, which was too advanced a technology for the German aviation industry prior to 1935. When the Ural Bomber design started in 1934, it was almost too much for German industry, though the Ju 89 was a better design than the Ki-20. It even carried 10,000kg in some tests externally, but at a terrible range, speed, ceiling, and with no armament.

Waiting for the He-177 while Germany is still learning to produce 2 engine bombers. For example it took Junkers some 4-5 months to figure out how to make the Ju88 after it officially entered serial production in 1939 (!), producing less than 70 units in that timeframe despite having 50% of all German aviation production resource (manpower, material, floor space, machine tools, engineers, etc.).

By waiting on the He-177 to be production ready in late 1941 Heinkel then has a specially design and tooled facility in Austria just for it, plus all the experience it needed gained with the He-111 program. The only issue then is for Udet not to screw up the design in 1937-1941, which can be avoided by Wever living past 1936.




The best thing for Germany would be to no waste resources building the Ki-20 and keep the planned pre-production Do-19s and Ju-89s on the construction plan for 1938-39. Test them, experiment with them, etc. as Wever wanted and by 1941 when the He-177 was ready the LW would be prepared for it.

Trying to build small numbers of outmoded aircraft with the limited resources Germany had was a waste; I even think keeping the Do-17 in production past 1938 was a bad decision that was made because Dornier bribed Udet and made a fuss about losing their valuable contract. If the Ju88 wasn't yet ready, cancel the Do-17 and focus on more He-111s, while keeping the small Do-19 and Ju-89 contract alive, while the Dornier company works on the Do-217 and Junkers works on the Ju-88. Heinkel then moves on to the He-177 in 1941, dropping the outdated He-111, while Junkers and Dornier pick up the medium bomber production role, as was planned pre-war.

Nothing about the Ki-20 is worthwhile. Now if you're into Diesel engines, let's talk about the Do-26 long range naval recon aircraft...

I'm more into the whole diesel-punk thing (the 20s/30s equivalent to steam-punk) and we've talked about the Do26 as a MPA on other threads. (I went as far as suggesting a double hulled (Savoia S55 style) six engined version.)
The Ki20 is a Junkers design. The Ju89 (which I argued was more promising than the Do19 in your last Do19 thread) follows the trend set by the G38 in having a very large wing. The G38 could lift a lot to, for a 1920s aircraft. The passenger version would carry about 20 passengers, 7 crew and a lot of furniture, for 3800km. So wiki (and manufacturer) exaggeration apart I'd say taking a 2000kg bomb load to a target 2000km away would be doable. That's impressive for a plane in service in 1932. (1500kg to a target 1500km away would be pretty impressive too, if we are really sceptical on numbers)
Even if they only built a handful, having the experience of using them would potentially be an eye opener. I'm well aware of the ToV breaking continuity, that's why I'm suggesting a limited number of quads to restore continuity.
As for wasted production, most of the He46, Ar68, He51, and more to the point here, whole of the Do11 Do13, Do23 were not used.
An interesting thing is that with a cruising speed of about 200km/h, the range figures translates to close to 20 hours on air, which is great for naval surveillance uses.
 
TB3

For reference, in 1936 a TB-3 lifted a 5ton load to 8116m with four AM-34FRN engines. The same aircraft lifted a 10ton load to 6600m. (From Bill Gunston) accordingly to the same source G2 cargo conversions were still lifting 7ton loads on cargo missions in WW2.
 

Deleted member 1487

I'm more into the whole diesel-punk thing (the 20s/30s equivalent to steam-punk) and we've talked about the Do26 as a MPA on other threads. (I went as far as suggesting a double hulled (Savoia S55 style) six engined version.)
The Ki20 is a Junkers design. The Ju89 (which I argued was more promising than the Do19 in your last Do19 thread) follows the trend set by the G38 in having a very large wing. The G38 could lift a lot to, for a 1920s aircraft. The passenger version would carry about 20 passengers, 7 crew and a lot of furniture, for 3800km. So wiki (and manufacturer) exaggeration apart I'd say taking a 2000kg bomb load to a target 2000km away would be doable. That's impressive for a plane in service in 1932. (1500kg to a target 1500km away would be pretty impressive too, if we are really sceptical on numbers)

Even if they only built a handful, having the experience of using them would potentially be an eye opener. I'm well aware of the ToV breaking continuity, that's why I'm suggesting a limited number of quads to restore continuity.
Which is why its more important to skip the Ki-20 period and just keep the plan to build about 30-40 Ju-89s and 10 Do-19s for the experience of industry and as test platforms for the LW and industry. Having any Ki-20s would just be most scrap material and less useful experience than the more modern Ural Bomber prototypes. The LW had no need for an 'eye opener', as it was already on the strategic bomber bandwagon in a big way by the 1920s; the reason for the Ural Bombers being cancelled had more to do with lack of resources for them (in the opinion of post-Wever commanders) after 1936 until the He-177 was ready, than no interest in having test beds around. Also German industry had little problem producing the Ural Bombers, with experience in producing a four engine aircraft being the only reason for making the Ki-20, but Wever's death prevented the continuation of the plan to have a small number of the passed over Ural Bomber around as test beds and learning platforms for their air and ground crews, as well as industry. Thank Goering for that. Of course there were funding concerns and a raw materials crisis that contributed to that decision, but Wever would not have outright cancelled the small number of units ordered, as he died right in the middle of the crises; if he hadn't cancelled them by the time he died, it would have been unlikely that he would have by 1937-39, as he saw their worth to the LW and He-177 project.


As for wasted production, most of the He46, Ar68, He51, and more to the point here, whole of the Do11 Do13, Do23 were not used.
An interesting thing is that with a cruising speed of about 200km/h, the range figures translates to close to 20 hours on air, which is great for naval surveillance uses.
Most were scrapped AFAIK by the Germans for aluminum. 20 hours in the air at that range is just that its slow and doesn't go very far from a MPA angle. I think diesel engines for a light aircraft are an excellent idea from a MPA angle, especial for a seaplane, as they don't take up scarce airfield resources, which were a problem for the Germans. They aren't good for bombers or recon over hot spots though because of their terrible acceleration and low speed; their good fuel economy only makes them useful for recon for naval purposes over long ranges or very high altitude recon work, such as with the Ju86P. The R-series did not do very well once modified Spitfires showed up and I would argue that the high altitude variants were a waste for Germany because of her lack of necessary raw materials for a working turbo supercharger to operate effectively above 30,000 feet. The Germans had trouble competing with the Allies by 1944-45 because they didn't have performance in their engines above that ceiling set by the Americans, who had unlimited raw materials for their turbo superchargers, which weren't anything the Axis couldn't have built for themselves, but they just didn't have access to the necessary non-ferrous metals in enough numbers.

Of course had they not wasted so many on the V-2 missile program, they could have built more durable engines, but that is another story.

For reference, in 1936 a TB-3 lifted a 5ton load to 8116m with four AM-34FRN engines. The same aircraft lifted a 10ton load to 6600m. (From Bill Gunston) accordingly to the same source G2 cargo conversions were still lifting 7ton loads on cargo missions in WW2.
How far though? They might have lifted them, but to what distance? I doubt more than a few hundred miles on those powered engines at that weight.
 

Deleted member 1487

My point is that by the time Germany would have the industry capable of building the Ki-20 it would nearly be ready to start building the much more advance Ural Bomber prototypes. So it would just make sense to go ahead with the Ural Bombers in small numbers, rather than build some Ki-20s at the same time as the Ural Bomber prototypes are being built; Germany would gain the industrial experience it needed by building modern (for the time) aircrafts, while the Ki-20 was already out of date, even as a test aircraft. So the LW gets the Ural Bombers as planned by 1938-40: 10 Do-19s (IIRC 4 prototypes and 6 pre-production models), and around 30 Ju89s (10 prototypes and 20 pre-productions). Have Wever live as a POD this happens. Also the He-177 is ready in 1942 for combat, the Ju88 is in serial production by early 1939 and is faster and easier to make, while being in full service by September, replacing all Do-17s and starting to replace the He-111. Tons of butterflies result from Wever living, none that I can think of actually hurting the LW.
 
Which is why its more important to skip the Ki-20 period and just keep the plan to build about 30-40 Ju-89s and 10 Do-19s for the experience of industry and as test platforms for the LW and industry. Having any Ki-20s would just be most scrap material and less useful experience than the more modern Ural Bomber prototypes. The LW had no need for an 'eye opener', as it was already on the strategic bomber bandwagon in a big way by the 1920s; the reason for the Ural Bombers being cancelled had more to do with lack of resources for them (in the opinion of post-Wever commanders) after 1936 until the He-177 was ready, than no interest in having test beds around. Also German industry had little problem producing the Ural Bombers, with experience in producing a four engine aircraft being the only reason for making the Ki-20, but Wever's death prevented the continuation of the plan to have a small number of the passed over Ural Bomber around as test beds and learning platforms for their air and ground crews, as well as industry. Thank Goering for that. Of course there were funding concerns and a raw materials crisis that contributed to that decision, but Wever would not have outright cancelled the small number of units ordered, as he died right in the middle of the crises; if he hadn't cancelled them by the time he died, it would have been unlikely that he would have by 1937-39, as he saw their worth to the LW and He-177 project.



Most were scrapped AFAIK by the Germans for aluminum. 20 hours in the air at that range is just that its slow and doesn't go very far from a MPA angle. I think diesel engines for a light aircraft are an excellent idea from a MPA angle, especial for a seaplane, as they don't take up scarce airfield resources, which were a problem for the Germans. They aren't good for bombers or recon over hot spots though because of their terrible acceleration and low speed; their good fuel economy only makes them useful for recon for naval purposes over long ranges or very high altitude recon work, such as with the Ju86P. The R-series did not do very well once modified Spitfires showed up and I would argue that the high altitude variants were a waste for Germany because of her lack of necessary raw materials for a working turbo supercharger to operate effectively above 30,000 feet. The Germans had trouble competing with the Allies by 1944-45 because they didn't have performance in their engines above that ceiling set by the Americans, who had unlimited raw materials for their turbo superchargers, which weren't anything the Axis couldn't have built for themselves, but they just didn't have access to the necessary non-ferrous metals in enough numbers.

Of course had they not wasted so many on the V-2 missile program, they could have built more durable engines, but that is another story.


How far though? They might have lifted them, but to what distance? I doubt more than a few hundred miles on those powered engines at that weight.

Their endurance record with just fuel and a few passengers was about 18 hours IIRC.


The K51 (Junkers designation for the Ki20) does not collide with later program's. It gives them a more solid base. Junkers would go into the Ju89 program with more experience. This would be one of the LW 1934 build what you have program's. All of those led to better planes. The He46 led to the Hs126. The He50 to the Ju87, etc. The one area were they didn't jump start the program by ordering an existing type to gain building and operational experience was heavy bombers, and it was the one that got nowhere. The He177 is the kind of aircraft only an airforce that had never run a heavy bomber force would select.
 
My point is that by the time Germany would have the industry capable of building the Ki-20 it would nearly be ready to start building the much more advance Ural Bomber prototypes. So it would just make sense to go ahead with the Ural Bombers in small numbers, rather than build some Ki-20s at the same time as the Ural Bomber prototypes are being built; Germany would gain the industrial experience it needed by building modern (for the time) aircrafts, while the Ki-20 was already out of date, even as a test aircraft. So the LW gets the Ural Bombers as planned by 1938-40: 10 Do-19s (IIRC 4 prototypes and 6 pre-production models), and around 30 Ju89s (10 prototypes and 20 pre-productions). Have Wever live as a POD this happens. Also the He-177 is ready in 1942 for combat, the Ju88 is in serial production by early 1939 and is faster and easier to make, while being in full service by September, replacing all Do-17s and starting to replace the He-111. Tons of butterflies result from Wever living, none that I can think of actually hurting the LW.

That's we're we don't agree. Junkers could have started building the Ki20 at once. They had built the G38 (two) and assisted the IJA in building the Ki20. They could build a limited series at once, while expanding facilities for later Ju89 production. We are talking small numbers, of course, lets say the Lufthansa orders four G38 for 1934 that turn up as Ki20 followed by 12 per year up to the point were the Ju89 is the natural candidate to replace it. That gives 40 aircraft to be used as a threat at Munich followed by a larger number of Ju89s.
 

Deleted member 1487

That's we're we don't agree. Junkers could have started building the Ki20 at once. They had built the G38 (two) and assisted the IJA in building the Ki20. They could build a limited series at once, while expanding facilities for later Ju89 production. We are talking small numbers, of course, lets say the Lufthansa orders four G38 for 1934 that turn up as Ki20 followed by 12 per year up to the point were the Ju89 is the natural candidate to replace it. That gives 40 aircraft to be used as a threat at Munich followed by a larger number of Ju89s.

For the sort of numbers that we're talking about they would have been hand made, rather than machine produced as one would for serial production.
That's enormously expensive per unit and in the 1933-36 period every Mark is needed for the expansion of the aircraft production industry and various make-work programs to get Germany to full employment to bolster Hitler's political position. So the LW did not have the funding to spend on such an aircraft before 1936, which was the year the Do-19 and Ju-89 entered prototype production.

I highly recommend reading Edward Homze's 'Arming the Luftwaffe', Hooton's 'Phoenix Triumphant', and James Corum's 'Creating the Operational Air War' to get an idea of the contraints the LW was under during the 1933-36 period when it came to producing a military bomber. While technically possible for Germany to produce the Ki-20, it would have been enormously costly at a time that both Germany and the LW could ill afford it; when they prepared their industry militarily, they were more focused on getting their air men trained on medium bombers before jumping to the next generation of strategic bombers, the Ural Bomber project.

Even if they mass produced them, which would be enormously costly at a period where Germany had little experience with military aircraft either with their military pilots, ground crews, or in the majority of their aviation industry, they would have fewer overall aircraft. At the time more aircraft was viewed as more threatening as part of the 'Risiko Luftwaffe' doctrine. 400 Ju86s and Ju52s was more threatening than 40 Ri-20s in 1935.

Also remember that politically Germany was still under the threat of the West invading the Rheinland if Germany was caught violating the terms of Versailles by producing such a bomber; at least the others could be disguised as civilian aircraft, which they essentially were. The Ki-20 was a known military aircraft and Hitler was still more concerned about consolidating power than building up the LW, while the LW, which didn't exist officially until 1935, was more concerned with putting together a staff. There wasn't even a real staff hidden in the RLM until 1933, as Hitler dismissed the former clandestine head of the LW, Helmuth Wilberg, for being half-Jewish. Wever came in at the end of 1933 to replace him and needed time to figure out what he was doing before he could seriously start ordering anything to be built.

Similarly Erhard Milch was brought into the RLM when the ministry formed in April 1933, which took time to get organized before they could even exert control over the aviation industry:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reichsluftfahrtministerium
Beyond that Germany needed to build military airfields, of which there were virtually none in 1933, so they had no place for military aircraft even if they had any. Prior to 1934 there was no way that any authority or even means existed to order military aircraft to be built, thanks to the sidelining of Wilberg, promoting of Wever, splitting of the Reichswehr, creation of the RLM, expansion of the aviation industry into the military realm, and building up of the infrastructure in Germany of an air force from the very basic levels. Basically it was impossible for a coordinated policy to exist to produce the Ki-20 in 1933.

By 1934 the LW ordered the Ural Bomber project. So they decided that they needed to develop the technology domestically at the industrial level first, while they focused on getting the LW, as much as it yet existed, familiarized with militarized civilian aircraft that lacked even bomb bays. These were two engine aircraft, which were still as yet beyond the experience of all but a handful of men that had been to the USSR at the Lipetsk air station. So the LW was busy using its limited funds building airfields, expanding industry, training ground crew and airmen, setting up training establishments, and in general trying to recruit and train officers and every other rank, as there had been very little preparation by the Reichswehr for the LW to even exist. It seems that Wever waited for the Ural Bombers, rather than jumping in with the Ki-20, because he needed time to get his service ready to even be able to handle such an aircraft; at this point only civilian pilots even knew how to handle a four engine aircraft and they were all on duty training combat pilots how to handle two engine aircraft. By the time the LW was ready to handle the technology of the four engine bomber, the Ural Bombers would have been ready to set up a training establishment for a four engine aircraft. However of course Wever's plan went out the window with his death in 1936 and his successors and Goering killed it with very little forethought. Of course by then there was experience with the FW200 and Geschwader 200, so the He-177 would have been an aircraft with a waiting training establishment, but of course the technology was bungled by Udet and his technical team.

So it seems that the LW was in no position to handle such an aircraft as the Ki-20 until it would have been supplanted by the Ural Bombers, which meant there was no point in bothering with ever even making it.
The POD you're looking for is Wever living past 1936 and sticking to his strategic bomber plan. The Ki-20 is unfortunately an aircraft without a place in the LW.
 
Also where is Germany going to keep this aircraft prior to 1933/34 when there were still military inspections and spies among German service personnel for the Allies?

Following the Treaty of Paris as an addendum to the ToV, the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission ceased its activities in Germany on February 2nd, 1927. Officially, the League of Nations was responsible from there on in ...

The Weimar Government used the chance to put the 1st Armament Program (1928-1932) into place, developing new weapons and procuring gear and ammunition for 16 divisions, up from the 7 allowed for by the ToV.

After the failure of the Geneva Disarmament Conference in 1932, Germany was essentially free to rearm as they liked, without any serious need for secrecy.
 
The RAF kept building small numbers of large bombers from the Handley Page 0/400 of WW1 to the Lancaster. Break continuity and you'll never have them back.

I was just trying to think of all the RAF heavy bombers between the H-P V-1500 and the Short Stirling. It wasn't continuity. It was a perceived necessity.
 
I was just trying to think of all the RAF heavy bombers between the H-P V-1500 and the Short Stirling. It wasn't continuity. It was a perceived necessity.

My argument is that its the pre existence of a capability that generates the perception of necessity leading to continuity. Give an airforce a new type of toy, and they'll want new ones of that type when the old ones are worn out, regardless of real use.( Up until the big 2010+ financial awakening at least.)
The HP 1500 had been built for a role that wasn't really needed in the 20s. But the RAF kept ordering improved replacements because once they had them, they wanted newer ones. If they had shelved the concept in the 20s they would have a lot more trouble restarting it in the late 30s.
 
The artillery case

German artillery making firms were ready for rearming because they had been developing designs, ostensibly for export, and in 1933 they were ready to put the "18" series of weapons in mass production. The aircraft companies had their own version of the 18 program, developing designs for export, that were rapidly put into production in 1933/4. Unlike the artillery these were quickly made obsolete and replaced. My idea is to get a four engined bomber in the "18" family so that its replacement will be run properly.
 
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