July 1914- the Italians lay down an ultimatium

BooNZ

Banned
Cuut and paste is so boring especially when the source is something as discredited as Sleepwallkers. IN any event, nothing here changes anything. The Austrians were free to write a note with less outrageous demands, were free to accept the Serbian response and were also free to make proposals to the other powers to respect their interests. Austria choose to do neither but instead Declared War. Austria starts the war. Any other argument is childish

Sorry, some of us prefer arguments to be supported by reference to reputable sources, instead of your habit of making bold assertions unfettered by the facts. Can you clarify for us how a widely published work citing primary sources (Russian communications) has been discredited?

this thread is supposed to be about how the Austrians, Germans and others respond to a firm declaration by Italy that she will resist Austria. It is not another rehash o who started the war.
1. Given both Russia and France saw July 1914 as an opportunity for a wider war, why would Russia (in collusion with Italy) want A-H to back down?
2. Why would Italy have any expectation of getting Albania, when it is near the top of Serbia's shopping list?
3. Italy had a fine navy, but their army was very poorly prepared for war in 1915, let alone 1914 - why the rush?
4. Russia and France were firm allies, but it was only after protracted discussions at the highest level that those nations confirmed their support for Serbia and that was not initially public - why the rush?
5. The mindsets and OTL actions of various administrations are directly relevant to this rather curious POD

The Kaiser is referring to the diplomatic mission in Belgrade. He stated that if he had received such a response he would never have declared war and the Austrian mission remained.

Nope again. According to the Kaiser:

"Nevertheless this scrap of paper together with what it contains can only be regarded as of limited value as long as long as it is not translated into deeds. The Serbs are Orientals, therefore liars, deceitful, and master hands at temporizing. In order that these fine promises may become truth and fact, the exercise of gentle violence will be necessary. This will best be done by Austria’s occupying Belgrade as security for the enforcement and execution of the promises and remaining there until the demands are actually carried out….On this basis I am ready to mediate for peace in Austria…This I will do in my own way and thus in a manner sparing of Austrian national sentiment and the military honor of her army."

Sorry to bore you with facts again...
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
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The Russians thought they had a deal of Bosnia for passage through the straits. Austria just annexed Bosnia and left the Russians holding the bag on the straits. It was a stupid power play but typical of the Austrians at the time- they thought only short term

Why did the Russians think Austria could deliver the straits? While it was fully capable of occupying borderlands, Austria had neither means, tradition, nor motive to threaten the straits.

What specifically did the Russians expect Austria to do in support of them?

Was Austria supposed to call a conference where this was proposed? Demand straits passage as a concession from the Turks?

Or was Austria supposed to wink and nod if Russia made its own move?

Did Austria ever come out and say it opposed the straits in Russian hands?

I always thought it was first Ottoman, and then British objections to a Russian straits that was always a decisive factor in Russian frustration, prior to WWI.

----Also, on the Austro-Italian terms and compensation. Was Austria to be obligated to gather a territory for Italy in compensation, even to the point of war with a third power?
Or was Austria merely supposed to diplomatically approve of an Italian initiative to get a compensatory sphere in the Balkans (likely Albania). Could offshore Greece (Crete, the Dodecanese and Cyclades) be considered adequate "Balkan" compensation for Italy?
-----

Imagine these PoDs - Austria-Hungary has a change of attitude on Albania, but not Bosnia. It says in 1908 its happy for Italy to go get Albania if they want it.

Does the Italian parliament/government even move to do so? How many Italian politicians say, buckets of blood for the irredenta, not one lira for Albania?

If Italy made a unilateral move into Albania during the Bosnia occupation crisis - Would the Italians beat whatever forces the Ottomans have on hand, and overmatch any local resistance? If the Italians were doing that successfully, would Austria have gone to war against Italy?

Trentino has always been ethnically Italian and there were not even sensible defensive reasons for Austria to hold it.

The problem is that this is the logic of national/ethnic entitlement, anathema to a multinational empire like Austria-Hungary. And even when countries don't "need" some territory they do not look kindly on another country coveting it. Tyrol had been Austrian perpetually, remainder of Trentino had been Austrian since the secularization of the Bishopric of Trent, which happened no later than the 18th or 17th century.

So with ethnic logic not being compelling to Austria, and (recent) historic logic not particularly justifying a territorial transfer, that leaves transactional logic. But what is Austria going to get that is so awesome it justifies conceding Trentino? And will Italy actively help Austria get it?

Finally, did the Austrians ever "lead on" or hint or say to the Italians that the transfer of Trentino or any of the irredenta was an idea that Vienna would ever seriously entertain? Or did Rome just fill the space that said "compensation" with its hearts desire - the irredenta.


There have been plenty of examples where a nation has agreed to give up territory as compensation for support or against other acquisitions (Sardinia and France in 1859, UK and Germany in the swap Zanzibar for Heligoland, even Austria in 1815 swapping the Austrian Low Countries for Venetia just to make a few examples)

Helgoland-Zanzibar and Belgium-Venetia are not remotely comparable to what 20th century Italy was expecting. The territories Germany and Austria conceded were not as historically or geographically associated with the core German or Austrian territories.

the Sardinian-French deal is much more comparable. Sardinia made a real sacrifice, but that was with the promise of territory much larger elsewhere. It also helped that ethno-national logic, which was compelling to the Piedmontese, allowed them to view French speaking Savoy as not much of a concession.
 
The problem is that this is the logic of national/ethnic entitlement, anathema to a multinational empire like Austria-Hungary. And even when countries don't "need" some territory they do not look kindly on another country coveting it. Tyrol had been Austrian perpetually, remainder of Trentino had been Austrian since the secularization of the Bishopric of Trent, which happened no later than the 18th or 17th century.

So with ethnic logic not being compelling to Austria, and (recent) historic logic not particularly justifying a territorial transfer, that leaves transactional logic. But what is Austria going to get that is so awesome it justifies conceding Trentino? And will Italy actively help Austria get it?

Finally, did the Austrians ever "lead on" or hint or say to the Italians that the transfer of Trentino or any of the irredenta was an idea that Vienna would ever seriously entertain? Or did Rome just fill the space that said "compensation" with its hearts desire - the irredenta.
Trentino was put on the table by Germany, in an attempt to mediate between her two allies, as they had been doing for the last 30 years.
Austria was not going to play a fair game: their promises were always for the future and never for the present; their behavior had always been antagonistic, if not adversarial (I mentioned Conrad and Plan V for Venetia, didn't I?).
Austria never understood or accept that they had become a second-rank power, and FJ and his court lived in a delusional world where the solution to the many problems of the empire was to get into a "short, victorious war". That was the only solution.
In the end they got what they deserved: my only regret is that FJ did not survive to see the dissolution of his empire before going into exile.

Incidentally, the Prince Bishopric of Trento had never been a core territory of the Habsburg, actually had never been governed by them until it was gobbled by Austria when the HRE was abolished.
 
Trentino was put on the table by Germany, in an attempt to mediate between her two allies, as they had been doing for the last 30 years.
Austria was not going to play a fair game: their promises were always for the future and never for the present; their behavior had always been antagonistic, if not adversarial (I mentioned Conrad and Plan V for Venetia, didn't I?).
Austria never understood or accept that they had become a second-rank power, and FJ and his court lived in a delusional world where the solution to the many problems of the empire was to get into a "short, victorious war". That was the only solution.
In the end they got what they deserved: my only regret is that FJ did not survive to see the dissolution of his empire before going into exile.

Incidentally, the Prince Bishopric of Trento had never been a core territory of the Habsburg, actually had never been governed by them until it was gobbled by Austria when the HRE was abolished.

You know, these Triple Alliance stipulations regarding Italy have always bugged me, so I find myself repeating @raharris1973's question: Austria apparently got badgered about conceding Trentino repeatedly. What, exactly were they being offered in return? Italian aid in a war? Seems like the Triple Alliance was already about trading that for Austrian commitment to Italy's defense, so not for defensive wars. More than anything, it sounds like Italy's condition not to join a war against Austria at the first opportunity. That's not a reasonable request from a trusted ally, that's a shakedown.

And even if I buy into the narrative that Austrian perfidy had irreparably poisoned the well by the 1910's, and I also have to take issue with the notion that Italy was owed compensation for the Bosnia issue, when for practical purposes, Austrian rule in Bosnia predated the Triple Alliance altogether, am I really supposed to believe that if they'd gotten their lovely irridenta like they'd wanted, the Italians would have reciprocated had they taken, say, Albania? With what, exactly?
 
You know, these Triple Alliance stipulations regarding Italy have always bugged me, so I find myself repeating @raharris1973's question: Austria apparently got badgered about conceding Trentino repeatedly. What, exactly were they being offered in return? Italian aid in a war? Seems like the Triple Alliance was already about trading that for Austrian commitment to Italy's defense, so not for defensive wars. More than anything, it sounds like Italy's condition not to join a war against Austria at the first opportunity. That's not a reasonable request from a trusted ally, that's a shakedown.

And even if I buy into the narrative that Austrian perfidy had irreparably poisoned the well by the 1910's, and I also have to take issue with the notion that Italy was owed compensation for the Bosnia issue, when for practical purposes, Austrian rule in Bosnia predated the Triple Alliance altogether, am I really supposed to believe that if they'd gotten their lovely irridenta like they'd wanted, the Italians would have reciprocated had they taken, say, Albania? With what, exactly?
The Triple Alliance was a defensive treaty: it would be invoked if one of the signatories was attacked by a third party, not if the war was started by one of the Members. Is it so unusual or difficult to understand?
Bosnia was awarded to Austria to be governed by them for a limited time, but suzerainty rested always with the Sultan. In 1907 Bosnia was annexed tout court: this changed the situation in the Balkans, and triggered the clause that entitled the non-gaining partner to a compensation. Again no one forced Austria to sign this clause, maybe only Germany but gently, and there is no reason other than their hardheadedness in refusing to honor this commitment.
Using your terminology, that is not the behavior of a trusted ally, that's the equivalent of refusing to honor a promissory note.
I leave completely aside for the moment the will of the Italian-speaking large majority of the people who lived in Trentino, who did not want to stay under Austria.
 
The Triple Alliance was a defensive treaty: it would be invoked if one of the signatories was attacked by a third party, not if the war was started by one of the Members. Is it so unusual or difficult to understand?
Bosnia was awarded to Austria to be governed by them for a limited time, but suzerainty rested always with the Sultan. In 1907 Bosnia was annexed tout court: this changed the situation in the Balkans, and triggered the clause that entitled the non-gaining partner to a compensation. Again no one forced Austria to sign this clause, maybe only Germany but gently, and there is no reason other than their hardheadedness in refusing to honor this commitment.
Using your terminology, that is not the behavior of a trusted ally, that's the equivalent of refusing to honor a promissory note.
I leave completely aside for the moment the will of the Italian-speaking large majority of the people who lived in Trentino, who did not want to stay under Austria.

None of that seems to relate to the Italian demands for Trentino. My point was that the defensive nature of the Triple Alliance seems to be a separate issue from demands for territorial cessions between members. Italy wanted Trentino regardless of what was going on in Bosnia, from what I can tell, so in times besides 1907, what did they offer in return for it?

Also, something, something, Italy also wanted places without Italian majorities, who cares?
 
I always thought it was first Ottoman, and then British objections to a Russian straits that was always a decisive factor in Russian frustration, prior to WWI.

Right, the idea that Russia goes to Austria of all places for a deal on the Straights in the face of British opposition, being preposterous. Isvolsky figured that since Bosnia could be annexed at any time by Austria anyways, he'd get something for "free" from Austria for what he couldn't stop. He miscalculated the reaction in Russia and Serbia, then miscalculated again the reaction in Paris and London. I don't think he even got as far as the Germans telling him to pound it. Suddenly, Isvolsky looked like a complete fool - that he was selling the Serbians out in Bosnia for an Austrian popsicle at the Straights. Rather than admit his duplicity towards Serbia foundered in London, he stuck to a story about Austrian duplicity then agitated for conflict from Paris.

Also, on the Austro-Italian terms and compensation. Was Austria to be obligated to gather a territory for Italy in compensation, even to the point of war with a third power?
Or was Austria merely supposed to diplomatically approve of an Italian initiative to get a compensatory sphere in the Balkans (likely Albania). Could offshore Greece (Crete, the Dodecanese and Cyclades) be considered adequate "Balkan" compensation for Italy?

Balkan compensation for Balkan gains, I think. The Italians always wanted to claim Austria territory as a means to control Austria. The Austrians were too arrogant and stupid to make the deal with Russia and Serbia required to truly beat the daylights out of Italy - the annexation of Bosnia was Vienna burning a bridge that should never have been torched. (The suggestion of a different Austrian policy in 1914 towards Italy really belongs in an AH discussion in 1908 concerning the fate of Bosnia. Specifically, Bosnia as the vehicle to a détente with Serbia and Russia than a bone of contention for war).

If Italy made a unilateral move into Albania during the Bosnia occupation crisis - Would the Italians beat whatever forces the Ottomans have on hand, and overmatch any local resistance? If the Italians were doing that successfully, would Austria have gone to war against Italy?

Hard to say. Italy and Austria coming into the 1912 Balkans war would take a lot of thought on what might happen. (For all the talk of war between Italy and Austria, in this period there was a countertrend where Italy and Austria were discovering that a cooperative policy allowed them to collectively hit above their weight in the Balkans, even with Britain and Germany. Of all the Entente powers, it was Italy that had the least to gain from the elimination of Austria).


But what is Austria going to get that is so awesome it justifies conceding Trentino? And will Italy actively help Austria get it?

More demands for more territory from Italy is what Austria would get for that. Rome would calculate that if Austria is so weak and decrepit that it would surrender the easily defended Trentino without a shot, then Trieste and Fiume would just need the tree to be shaken harder. Italy pre-WW1 was not for Austria a target where appeasement might work. If anything, between Italy and Russia, the Tzar was more likely to be appeased, (fear of Germany).

Finally, did the Austrians ever "lead on" or hint or say to the Italians that the transfer of Trentino or any of the irredenta was an idea that Vienna would ever seriously entertain? Or did Rome just fill the space that said "compensation" with its hearts desire - the irredenta.

My impression is that the Italians demanded Austrian territory in part due to legitimately felt Italian nationalism, in part to control Austrian policy in the Balkans, in part to lay the foundations for an aggressive war against Austria at first opportunity. Like with Russia and the Straights, Austria made its own bed for Italy's ambitions in Bosnia, which pinned Austria against Russia but left Italy free to maneuver.
 
None of that seems to relate to the Italian demands for Trentino. My point was that the defensive nature of the Triple Alliance seems to be a separate issue from demands for territorial cessions between members. Italy wanted Trentino regardless of what was going on in Bosnia, from what I can tell, so in times besides 1907, what did they offer in return for it?

Also, something, something, Italy also wanted places without Italian majorities, who cares?
Maybe what you can tell should be based on some serious reading rather than a gut feeling.
I don't believe there is anything of interest in continuing this kind of discussion.
 
Maybe what you can tell should be based on some serious reading rather than a gut feeling.
I don't believe there is anything of interest in continuing this kind of discussion.

So, you contend that the Italians pushed to be ceded Trentino only twice at most, in 1907 and 1914? If you say so.
 
Sorry, some of us prefer arguments to be supported by reference to reputable sources, instead of your habit of making bold assertions unfettered by the facts. Can you clarify for us how a widely published work citing primary sources (Russian communications) has been discredited?

I refer you to Halagaz post in this thread for beginners

1. Given both Russia and France saw July 1914 as an opportunity for a wider war, why would Russia (in collusion with Italy) want A-H to back down?

Seriously, your going to need a real reference on this one. There is absolutely no evidence that Russia or France sought war They were prepare to accept it but their preferred solution was peaceful. And I mean something that says Nicholas was trying to manuever the Austrians into declaring war not some vague comment from a lower rung

2. Why would Italy have any expectation of getting Albania, when it is near the top of Serbia's shopping list?

Parts may have been on Serbia's shopping list but keeping the Austrians out of Belgrade is a bit higher

3. Italy had a fine navy, but their army was very poorly prepared for war in 1915, let alone 1914 - why the rush?

In the thread timeline, the Italians think they can get it by bluff, that the Russians are ofering far more than Austria ever will

4. Russia and France were firm allies, but it was only after protracted discussions at the highest level that those nations confirmed their support for Serbia and that was not initially public - why the rush?

In case you didn't know: Austria sent a note with a 48 hour time limit. It kind of forces things to be "rushed"


Nope again. According to the Kaiser:

"Nevertheless this scrap of paper together with what it contains can only be regarded as of limited value as long as long as it is not translated into deeds. The Serbs are Orientals, therefore liars, deceitful, and master hands at temporizing. In order that these fine promises may become truth and fact, the exercise of gentle violence will be necessary. This will best be done by Austria’s occupying Belgrade as security for the enforcement and execution of the promises and remaining there until the demands are actually carried out….On this basis I am ready to mediate for peace in Austria…This I will do in my own way and thus in a manner sparing of Austrian national sentiment and the military honor of her army."

Sorry to bore you with facts again...

So sorry that the facts don't agree with you:

Willhelm Hollenzolleran, German Emperor and King of Prussia:

"A brilliant performance for a time limit of only forty-eight hours. This is more than one could have expected. A great moral victory for Vienna; but with it every reason for war drops away, and Giesl might have remained quietly in Belgrade! On the strength of this I should never have ordered mobilization."

July 28, 1914 See Lions of July, p. 147

So the Kaiser thought the Austrian ambassador should have remained quietly at his post and mobilization not ordered. It is this Austrian mobilization that puts the train on runaway tracks.

Where this becomes problematic is the terminology, you've used in the note.

I'm not going t oquibble over terminology and I'm sure the Italians would find the appropriate diplomatic formula to convey to the Germans that they think Austria should stand down and if the Austrians don't they will fight

I've always viewed the Italian-Austrian alliance as mainly an anti-French affair, held together by German 'mediation'. Rather than a friendship of equals, it was more of a case of "keep the other guy in, pissing out - not out, pissing in". A "keep your enemy closer than your friend", kind of deal.

There really was little basis for an Austian-Italian alliance. The Italians wanted one against France, Germany wanted one against France as well which is what brought the two of them together. The Germans were interested in ending Austro-Italian tensions which is why they insisted on a Triple Alliance instead of a dual alliance with Italy

As pointed out by others, OTL the Italian DoW was touch and go. If, as the OP has suggested in the thread, the King simply sends this note on his own initiative, then Italy will collapse into political chaos when the Germans publicise the note, as surely they will.

Political chaos but where? If the Germans publicize the note, the Italians would diplomatically state something like: "The Italian government is working with other powers to peacefully settle this dispute. We have of course made our views known but any discussions at this time are premature"

But what effect will it have in Germany when the Germans find out that they are about to be plunged into a war with their Italian allies on the other side? Panic in Berlin will be real

I doubt the Germans will force the Austrians to back down, but may well adjust their deployment plans.
The Austrians will have to "turn on" Italy, the threat (as pointed out in this thread and others - the "30 divisions") is too blatant for even Conrad to ignore.
I personally think that this will not change Britain's position, as it was the German violation of Belgium that did that. Splendid Isolation was still lingering sufficiently that most of the British political establishment didn't view themselves as part of the alliance blocks, one way or the other.

I would love to know what adjustments would be possible. The Germans are hoping for Italian help. Now they'd have to plan for Italian hostility. The French forces on the Alps will be free, the Mediterannean will be a Franco-Italian lake and nobody knows if the Italians are moving into France to help the French or East to the Austrian border

Moltke wasn't all that keen on his chances with Italy. He's really not going to like fighting them as well

Conrad even told Franz Joseph that there was no "Italy + Balkan + Russia" plans. He simply can't cope with that alliance

@Glenn239

I would argue that before the war is the perfect time for Italy to act. Italy, like Britain, would prefer the basic power structure of europe to remain. Italy is weak and gets its strength by playing the power blocs off against each other


No one has mentioned what effect this would have on the Romanians. In OTL, the Grand Council was divided and rejected King Carol's efforts to join Austria and Germany. Knowing the Italians have jumped ship would end any hope the Germans have of Romanian help as well. Romanian hostility would increase with the likelihood of an early Austrian shellacking
 
I would argue that before the war is the perfect time for Italy to act. Italy, like Britain, would prefer the basic power structure of europe to remain. Italy is weak and gets its strength by playing the power blocs off against each other.

You said,

There is absolutely no evidence that Russia or France sought war They were prepare to accept it but their preferred solution was peaceful.

If France and Russia were, as you say, peacefully inclined, then would Italy not be quite rash to act in the manner you suggest? If Italy made threats towards Austria while Austria had yet to break relations with Russia, then couldn't Austria alter its course with Russia to isolate Italy? Alternatively, if France and Russia were less inclined to peaceful solutions than you suggest, then your ideas for an aggressive Italian policy would hold less risks for Italy, correct? Because then Italian aggression would stir up Russian aggression and the walls would come down on Austria.

So I guess my question is, which is it? Was Russia peacefully disposed or not?
 
You said,

There is absolutely no evidence that Russia or France sought war They were prepare to accept it but their preferred solution was peaceful.

If France and Russia were, as you say, peacefully inclined, then would Italy not be quite rash to act in the manner you suggest? If Italy made threats towards Austria while Austria had yet to break relations with Russia, then couldn't Austria alter its course with Russia to isolate Italy? Alternatively, if France and Russia were less inclined to peaceful solutions than you suggest, then your ideas for an aggressive Italian policy would hold less risks for Italy, correct? Because then Italian aggression would stir up Russian aggression and the walls would come down on Austria.

So I guess my question is, which is it? Was Russia peacefully disposed or not?

I said that neither sought war but they were prepared to risk war. That's what they are doing: they are, with the help of the Italians, laying down a clear line. If Austria disturbs the peace, there will be war and Italy is siding against Austria. If what they want is war, they would let Austria attack and then jump her

What deal is Austria making with Russia to "isolate Italy"? There is no better opportunity for Russia than an Austrian invasion of Italy. Austria gets shellacked in OTL. If they take anything out of Galicia then they are really doomed There's just no way that Austria can cope with the three of them (Russia, Italy, Serbia) and even Conrad knows it. Are the Germans
really inclined to join Austria in national suicide?
 
If Italy threatens Austria prior to war, and the Entente Powers are as peacefully inclined as you suggest, Italy might get into a conflict with Austria where Russia stays neutral. If Russia was the aggressor and Sarajevo was the stalking horse, then Italy can threaten Austria and Russia will attack Austria with Italy. It's like you're assuming Russia is peaceful while blaming Germany and Austria for the war, then assuming Russia was aggressive while proposing this idea of aggressive Italian warnings. But it was one or the other. Not both. I'm asking - which Russia?

The deal Austria could make with Russia in response to the cold rage your Italian policy will trigger in Vienna is to go nice with Serbia in exchange for Russian neutrality if Austria goes after Italy. This, again, goes back to which Russia we are talking about? If it's your peaceful Russia, Italy is in trouble. If its the Russia that wants war with Austria, Italy has nothing to fear from the offer.
 
Or you could simply state that it was not so.
Don't go with your gut feeling either and leave the discussion.
I've explained at least three times how and why certain things happened.
The answer has always been something like "but, but, but Trentino core territory, bad ally,shakedown, something, something..".
It is not a discussion in which I am interested.
 
If Italy threatens Austria prior to war, and the Entente Powers are as peacefully inclined as you suggest, Italy might get into a conflict with Austria where Russia stays neutral. If Russia was the aggressor and Sarajevo was the stalking horse, then Italy can threaten Austria and Russia will attack Austria with Italy. It's like you're assuming Russia is peaceful while blaming Germany and Austria for the war, then assuming Russia was aggressive while proposing this idea of aggressive Italian warnings. But it was one or the other. Not both. I'm asking - which Russia?

The deal Austria could make with Russia in response to the cold rage your Italian policy will trigger in Vienna is to go nice with Serbia in exchange for Russian neutrality if Austria goes after Italy. This, again, goes back to which Russia we are talking about? If it's your peaceful Russia, Italy is in trouble. If its the Russia that wants war with Austria, Italy has nothing to fear from the offer.

Your argument has become a pretzel. The Austrians have received what everyone in Europe considers sufficient satisfaction and are being offered a peaceful solution: accept the reply

You now suggest that Russia allow Austria to crush Italy on the off chance that Austria won't then turn on Serbia. Don't see that one happening at all especially since the Italians are operating with the Russians to check the Austrians. The choice of war and peace lays clearly with Austria as it does in OTL If she accepts the reply, there is peace. She gets nothing more than token cooperation but is allowed to survive. If not, then she's likely to be destroyed in weeks. The choice is hers

Italy claims Albania as its reward for the service it has rendered to humanity
 
...<snip>...The Austrians have received what everyone in Europe considers sufficient satisfaction and are being offered a peaceful solution: accept the reply.

The Italians in this scenario are making threats against Austria before the Austrians have broken relations with Serbia. That allows the Austrians to decide what to do in reaction to those threats, whereas in real life the Italians were careful to only start threatening Austria after Austria had been at war with Russia for quite some time. Why do you think the real Italians were more careful than the AH Italians here?

You now suggest that Russia allow Austria to crush Italy on the off chance that Austria won't then turn on Serbia. Don't see that one happening at all especially since the Italians are operating with the Russians to check the Austrians.

You, not I, suggested the Russians were peacefully inclined in 1914. Now you're making some argument that no matter who Austria gets into a war with Russia will attack Austria. That does not sound like peaceful intentions. That sounds more like Russia as an aggressive, opportunistic, power waiting to strike and willing to use any excuse.

The choice of war and peace lays clearly with Austria as it does in OTL If she accepts the reply, there is peace. She gets nothing more than token cooperation but is allowed to survive. If not, then she's likely to be destroyed in weeks. The choice is hers

Italy claims Albania as its reward for the service it has rendered to humanity

A peacefully inclined Russia is not going to war with Austria if Italy gets into a war with Austria over Italian pretenions in Albania, regardless of any Italian actions in the Sarajevo Crisis. An opportunistically aggressive Russia will get into a war with Austria over Albania. It's like you think Russia was an innocent Power while blaming Austria for the war, but then you discard your own pretensions and assume it was much more violently inclined as soon as any opportunity to attack Austria came along.

Will the real Russia please stand up?
 
The Italians in this scenario are making threats against Austria before the Austrians have broken relations with Serbia. That allows the Austrians to decide what to do in reaction to those threats, whereas in real life the Italians were careful to only start threatening Austria after Austria had been at war with Russia for quite some time. Why do you think the real Italians were more careful than the AH Italians here?

This entire thread seems to be premised on Italy bandying about threats that for some reason aren't interpreted as threats. If we can't even reach basic agreement on what these remarks are, let alone how they'd be received, I don't know what else to do here.
 
I think the next step is to decide whether the Entente was an aggressive alliance seeking to attack Austria or a defensively inclined looking not to give the Austro-Germans an excuse. Personally, the idea that Russia gives Italy a blank cheque to start a world war in Albania doesn't strike me as likely, regardless of any support Italy gave to ward off war in the Sarajevo Crisis. Serbia coveted Albania from 1912 and would not want to see the Italians take it and the French and British from 1912 had established Albania as being outside the scope of the Entente obligation. So what may happen, assuming the Entente is not aggressively bent on war, is that the Austrian army defeats the Italian army in Albania with the rest of Europe doing nothing to assist Italy, provided the Austrians themselves do not annex it after dealing with the Italians.
 
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