From “The Deluge of Palestine” by Edward Said, Columbia University Press, 1991
…Initially, the establishment of a Jewish authority in Palestine was viewed with surprise by the Arabs, but not widespread alarm. Palestine had been under Turkish rule for centuries, and it had been ruled by Turkish mutasarrifs, few of whom even spoke Arabic. Some of the more liberal Arabs welcomed a greater Jewish presence, believing that the Jews would bring prosperity and modernization…
…By 1900, attitudes had changed. The Jews were coming in vast numbers, reshaping the country as they went. The Rothschilds bought land from Arab landlords (usually absentee landlords living in Beirut or Damascus) and proceeded to evict the Arab residents. Jewish firms maintained discriminatory policies, preferring to hire Jews rather than Arabs [1]. Families who had lived in the same land for centuries found themselves homeless…
…Many Arabs chose to leave Palestine entirely during this period. Most relied on tribal connections elsewhere, settling where they could (theoretically) rely upon their relatives for aid. Some participated in the population exchange program, but those Arabs who did so rarely prospered, finding themselves in unfamiliar lands without the benefit of local connections. Often their dialect of Arabic would mark them out as outsiders, assuming they even settled in an Arab region at all. It is hardly surprising that many who chose to participate in the exchanges were radicals for whom the exchanges were a welcome escape from the society they detested. In a particularly famous example, a group of Arabs who settled in a former Jewish neighborhood in Smyrna formed the Symrna Commune. Initially an attempt to implement Communism at a local level, the Smyrna Commune would form one of the key institutions of Greek Communism…
…Given Jewish deafness to Arab concerns, it was inevitable that some Arabs would choose resistance. Unfortunately, the first organized resistance to Jewish settlement came in the form of setting ambushes for Jewish travelers along the roads of Palestine. Some Arabist historians have painted this as a primarily political maneuver, but the truth is that most of the raiders were initially motivated simply by the prospect of looting carts. The large number of unemployed Arab men provided a substantial supply of manpower for these raids …
From “My Redemption” by General Alfred Dreyfus (ret.), Judean Military Academy Press, 1928 (translated from the Hebrew)
…While I was quite troubled by reports of Arab banditry I received almost immediately upon my arrival in Jerusalem, Governor Herzl had assured me that such incidents were scattered and unfocused. I was initially inclined to accept his assurances, but an attack on a convoy out of Tel Barzel in June of 1901 forced me to reconsider. I began collecting all records of bandit attacks, marking them on a map in my office. By September, it became clear that the number of attacks was increasing, and that they were becoming more organized. I ordered Major Giuseppi Arbib [2], a former captain in the Italian army, to oversee a system of cavalry patrols along our roads. I also directed Colonel John Monash [3], an Australian engineer, to come up with a plan for a Judean railway network, on the basis that trains would be easier to protect from raiders than carts…
From “The Affair: The Case of Alfred Dreyfus” by Jean-Denis Bredin, Plunket Lake Press, 2014 [4]
The departure of Alfred Dreyfus from France was a major blow to the Dreyfusard movement. Many anti-Dreyfusards saw it as a tacit admission of guilt – surely no loyal Frenchman would choose to serve in a foreign army! An editorial in La Libre Parole argued that all Jewish officers in the French military should be dismissed immediately, lest they pass on secrets to Dreyfus. Even those who believed in Dreyfus’ innocence were now certain that there would never be a revision. Technically, they were wrong, although it would take half a century for Dreyfus to be officially found innocent… [5]
…Some elements of the Dreyfusard press chose to follow his exploits in Palestine with great interest. Dreyfus’ induction into the Ottoman military received lavish coverage in the French press, and the People’s Daily reported regularly on the emerging Jerusalem Guard. The implication was that France had deprived itself of “one of the most capable and brilliant officers of our generation” in the words of Émile Zola. Years later, the British press would echo Zola’s sentiments, blaming the anti-Dreyfusards for British military failures in Palestine…
[1] Similar policies existed IOTL in the 1920s, although there it was a deliberate program of the Histadrut.
[2] A character invented for the narrative, as are most of Dreyfus’ officers.
[3] IOTL, John Monash remained in service with the Australian military (albeit as a reservist), served with distinction in World War I, and was eventually knighted. ITTL, he was inspired to join the Jerusalem Guard, and is Dreyfus’ top military engineer.
[4] This is a real book IOTL (although obviously with somewhat differing content) and has been my primary source for information about the OTL Affair.
[5] IOTL, France would conduct a revision of the Dreyfus Affair in 1906, finally exonerating Dreyfus and Georges Picquart and restoring them both to the French military. This is averted ITTL due to Dreyfus leaving France.
