Joesph Stilwell was originally going to command the Allied invasion of North Africa. However, Roosevelt and Marshall felt China needed a Western advisor to keep China in the war. Stilwell was then moved to China, against his will. How would Joseph Stillwell perform in North Africa and Europe?
Joseph Stilwell sent to Africa and Europe?
- Thread starter Admiral Bloonbeard
- Start date
He lacked Eisenhowers diplomatic skills. That alone would end any thought of making him SACMED or equivalent.
& a nitpick. He was a corps commander & selected as commander of US forces in Op GYMNAST , not commanding Allied forces. He departed for China before the command arraignments of Op TORCH were set.
& a nitpick. He was a corps commander & selected as commander of US forces in Op GYMNAST , not commanding Allied forces. He departed for China before the command arraignments of Op TORCH were set.
Thats a long discussion. Technically he commanded a corps in Burma, of three Chinese infantry divisions. But, the Chinese placed so many restrictions on his 'command' he had little independendance. He also commanded the US 10th Army in the closing few days of the battle on Okinawa. Neither a clear test of his tactical & operational skills.
Prewar he had consistently been rated ahead of his peers in his performance evaluations. But, of course that was not in combat. Generally inter war US Army officers were judged on their ability to plan, organize, and execute a task. Every thing from whitewashing the curbs, to acting as the operations officers for a field exercise was judged in that context. If you could not run a command staff, or act as a staff officer competently you were headed for retirement as a 2d Lt.
This is something the Generals of WWII had in common. They were nearly all repeatedly rated above their peers in organizational ability. Even show boat Patton had at each command level from cavalry troop, to squadron, regiment & brigade been rated highly in his performance in staff positions, and as a commander running a HQ staff. Stillwells selection to command a division & then a corps in was based on a stack of annual & biannual performance evaluations that rated him among the top 5% of his peers. Of course Fredendal had similar top ratings for three decades, & we know how he fell apart under the pressure of ops in Tunisia January-February 1943.
Prewar he had consistently been rated ahead of his peers in his performance evaluations. But, of course that was not in combat. Generally inter war US Army officers were judged on their ability to plan, organize, and execute a task. Every thing from whitewashing the curbs, to acting as the operations officers for a field exercise was judged in that context. If you could not run a command staff, or act as a staff officer competently you were headed for retirement as a 2d Lt.
This is something the Generals of WWII had in common. They were nearly all repeatedly rated above their peers in organizational ability. Even show boat Patton had at each command level from cavalry troop, to squadron, regiment & brigade been rated highly in his performance in staff positions, and as a commander running a HQ staff. Stillwells selection to command a division & then a corps in was based on a stack of annual & biannual performance evaluations that rated him among the top 5% of his peers. Of course Fredendal had similar top ratings for three decades, & we know how he fell apart under the pressure of ops in Tunisia January-February 1943.
Lucius Verus
Banned
On paper sure, but when Albert C. Wedemeyer replaced Stillwells after he tried to coup Chaing (really idiotic and arrogant) it was noted the sheer lack of staff and organization which he left the office in Chongqing.
Wedemeyer had his own political agenda arriving in China. & later echoed the same complaints Stilwell made about the Chinese lack of cooperation and inability to support any agreements. Hugh Drum was probably the smarter man refusing a appointment as CoS to Chiang Kai Shek
How did Stilwell perform without any restrictions from Chiang?
For that you have only his pre war US Army record , and his tenure as US 10th Army commander after the batlle of Okinawa. In the former he excelled at organizing and executing tasks. But of course that was without combat. In the latter case MacArthur stripped the 10th Army of it's units and sidelined it. Stillwell was not one of Macs inner circle of favorites.
Driftless
Donor
Was that because he viewed Stilwell as some level of threat to Mac's overall control? Or, was this one of those 20 year feuds between "Pershing" officers and "March" officers. Mac felt Pershing's Lieutenants treated him unfairly in WW1 in the AEF and Mac was one to hold a grudge. I'm guessing by his WW1 record, Stilwell was a Pershing guy (like Marshall, Patton, and many others)
Churchill gets on the phone to Washington and tells them that either they recall him or Britain will deport him.
I was wondering that myself last week. I was reading a bio of Chiang Kai-Shek that actually paints a very unflaterring image of General Stillwell and his dealings with the Chinese. He looked like a talented officer, but with a very limited outlook, a complete lack of flexibility and basic diplomatic skills necessary to provide a good job as a advisor. Speaking Chinese is not enough to make somebody a good advisor, and i think that it was a failure both of the US Government to have sent him and Chiang himself, because he lost several opportunities to free himself of Stillwell. To put him in a "normal" military job in the campaigns of the Western Front surely would mean a better use of his skills, but seeing how he acted in China, it would be for the best that his job be limited to a corps commander, at most.
I can only believe that he would perform badly. The problem wasn't just restrictions by Chiang, but the fact that Stillwell was a extremely difficult person to deal with that completely failed in establishing a good working relationship with his fellow chinese officers. I can not picture such a man having a good record in China, with all it's complexities that Chiang himself, who despite his historical reputation as the man who lost China was a pretty competent politician himself, failed to deal with it in the end.
Most US Army Generals in WWII were difficult to get along with. The few with diplomatic skills, like Eisenhower were rare exceptions. Stilwell did not suffer fools gladly & much of the Vinegar was aimed at failing subordinates. The US Army interwar was rough on underperforming officers and Stilwell followed that tradition. In that context Stilwell as a 'difficult man to get along with' does not actually show in his performance evaluations up through 1942, before he was sent to China. If he had been a seriously uncooperative as...hole interwar it would have show in his performance reports & probably prevented him from gain corps or division command 1940-1941.
To clarify here. Each US Army officer got a formal performance evaluation from his commander each year. A regimental commander wrote one on his battalion commanders & & principle staff officers. The battalions commanders did the same on their company commanders & staff & so forth. In addition, when a officer was transferred to another command he received a report as well, and if the regimental commander was leaving he had to write a complete set of reports again. In ten years a officer could accumulate a average of 13 to 14 of these. They were forwarded to the next senior commander for endorsement, actually a quality control check, and then went into the officers permanent record. They were primarily used by promotion boards to evaluate and sort the candidates from best to worst. At the generals ranks they were also used to sort the candidates for command positions. There were several sections in the performance evaluations. The two most important parts were: 1. Rating a officer vs his peers, listing them linearly from top to bottom. 2. A brief paragraph describing the officers performance during the evaluation period.
Bottom line is Patton, Fredendal, Stilwell & others were not selected for division & corps command 1940-41 by seniority but because they had consistently tracked ahead of their peers in the previous couple decades. Not a perfect system, but better than the politically driven system of the Red Army or nazi imposition on the Wehrmacht
To clarify here. Each US Army officer got a formal performance evaluation from his commander each year. A regimental commander wrote one on his battalion commanders & & principle staff officers. The battalions commanders did the same on their company commanders & staff & so forth. In addition, when a officer was transferred to another command he received a report as well, and if the regimental commander was leaving he had to write a complete set of reports again. In ten years a officer could accumulate a average of 13 to 14 of these. They were forwarded to the next senior commander for endorsement, actually a quality control check, and then went into the officers permanent record. They were primarily used by promotion boards to evaluate and sort the candidates from best to worst. At the generals ranks they were also used to sort the candidates for command positions. There were several sections in the performance evaluations. The two most important parts were: 1. Rating a officer vs his peers, listing them linearly from top to bottom. 2. A brief paragraph describing the officers performance during the evaluation period.
Bottom line is Patton, Fredendal, Stilwell & others were not selected for division & corps command 1940-41 by seniority but because they had consistently tracked ahead of their peers in the previous couple decades. Not a perfect system, but better than the politically driven system of the Red Army or nazi imposition on the Wehrmacht
Exactly how he would have performed in Op TORCH depends on his role. The idea he would have been the Allied commander is pretty much a nonstarter as Churchill came to favor Eisenhower early on & neither Roosevelt of Marshal could see a reason why not. Fredendals II Corps was already established in the UK & the logical choice for the Central TF, so Stillwells corps still in the US would have been the choice for the Western TF & Morocco. That leads to Stilwell taking over II Corps after Fredendals relief . As interim commander Stilwell would have been about as galvanizing as Patton in getting the corps moving again. He'd probably been as clear and direct as Patton was in describing the underlying problems of II Corps during the Axis spring offensive, Kasserine pass and all that. I can't say he would command 7th Army, but he'd be among the candidates.