I didn't say Chamberlain wanted Hitler to win, I said he'd be fine with the Nazis and Soviets bleeding each other out.
Chaimberlains statements before, during, and after Munich, both in public and private, are all consistent with the view that he wanted no war on the European continent, period. Whether between WAllies and the Germans, the Germans and the Soviets, or the WAllies and the Soviets.
Your in violation of Mortain's fork: the idea that Chamberlain's actions were some sort of conniving plan to deflect Germany towards the USSR rather then a fundamental missapreciation of Hitler's character are not consistent with his own statements and outlook on the world.
He was trying to leverage Germany into an ally against Stalin to balance out the Soviets given how weak the French were and unreliable,
So weak that he regarded them as a key ally above either the Germans or Soviets.
by 1939 if war was inevitable he wanted it to be between the Nazis and Soviets,
In offering the guarantee to Poland, Chamberlain clearly and overtly committed Britain to a path of war with Hitler should Germany have chosen to pursue it. He would have been well aware of this.
Except even Shirer noted that Chamberlain was set to give a very different speech on the 17th basically talking down the relevance of Hitler's actions, but found out the anger of the crowd and rewrote the speech on the train ride to Birmingham to match the expectations awaiting him.
Yeah, it was a speech of domestic trivialities. Of course, then as he explained to the cabinet the very next day:
"The Prime Minister said that up till a week ago we had proceeded on the assumption that we should be able to continue with our policy of getting on to better terms with the Dictator Powers, and that although those powers had aims, those aims were limited... He had now come definitely to the conclusion that Herr Hitler's attitude made it impossible to continue on the old basis... No reliance could be placed on any of the assurances given by the Nazi leaders... he regarded his speech [in Birmingham of March 17] as a challenge to Germany on the issue whether or not Germany intended to dominate Europe by force. It followed that if Germany took another step in the direction of dominating Europe, she would be accepting the challenge".
He still tried to salvage his Hitler policy right up to the war with Poland, but clearly that failed, otherwise why would he have even bothered to get the Polish to demobilize the day before the invasion to avoid provoking Hitler?
Well leaving aside that the Poles wound-up ignoring that pressure and remobilized right away, probably because he was hoping that a war could be avoided. This is not an indication that he was preparing to give-up Poland or seeking an alliance with Hitler rather then just trying to avoid a costly war that he thought Britain could ill afford.
No, but Chamberlain was certainly trying to make his Hitler policy work in some fashion, the work recently done by Paul Hehn uses all sorts of archival material to show what Chamberlain was saying even after March 1939:
Yeah, stuff like...
“Whatever may prove to be the nature of the German-Soviet Agreement, it cannot alter Great Britain’s obligation to Poland which His Majesty’s Government have stated in public repeatedly and plainly and which they are determined to fulfill.
It has been alleged that, if His Majesty’s Government had made their position more clear in 1914, the great catastrophe would have been avoided. Whether or not there is any force in that allegation, His Majesty’s Government are resolved that on this occasion there shall be no such tragic misunderstanding.
If the case should arise, they are resolved, and prepared, to employ without delay all the forces at their command, and it is impossible to foresee the end of hostilities once engaged. It would be a dangerous illusion to think that, if war once starts, it will come to an early end even if a success on any one of the several fronts on which it will be engaged should have been secured.”