Joint soviet-western attack on nazi Germany 1940

Western Allies offer Stalin the rest of Poland and parts of Germany and a puppet Czechoslovakia in exchange for a joint attack on nazi Germany in spring or early May 1940
 
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No way, no how.

Poland was the reason why Britain declared war. Look at how upset Churchill will be about the fact there's nothing he can do for Poland once Stalin gets his hands on it OTL. To offer Poland to Stalin on a silver platter - after he helped invade it - will not go over well.

The same for Czechoslovakia, to a lesser extent. There was increasing guilt and "oops" about Munich, and although it won't totally bear fruit until the success of Operation Anthropoid (killing Heydrich), it would be unlikely that the west would want to hand that over, either.

That being said... feelers were put out by both sides for a united front against Germany, before war broke out, but Hitler moved faster and with more effort than the west, hence the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

Could you clarify which year this happens?
 
No way, no how.

Poland was the reason why Britain declared war. Look at how upset Churchill will be about the fact there's nothing he can do for Poland once Stalin gets his hands on it OTL. To offer Poland to Stalin on a silver platter - after he helped invade it - will not go over well.

The same for Czechoslovakia, to a lesser extent. There was increasing guilt and "oops" about Munich, and although it won't totally bear fruit until the success of Operation Anthropoid (killing Heydrich), it would be unlikely that the west would want to hand that over

Could you clarify which year this happens?
I had in the title but I can add it in the post. realpolitik Britian in my opinion did not go to war for Poland but used it as an excuse to go to war with Germany and keep the balance of power in Europe and Churchill is not prime minister
 

Deleted member 1487

No, the Allies saw the Soviets as enemies every bit as much as the Nazis; it was only the circumstances of war that forced Britain and the Soviets to work together against a common enemy; in 1940 they were bitter enemies and factions in the Allies wanted to fight the Soviets even more than the Nazis.
 
Even though that particular scenario would never happen. Let's look at the physical problems instead of the political ones.
The Winter War (War between Finland and the USSR) ended March 13th 1940 and cost the Soviet Union 323,000 Casualties, 3.5 thousand tanks, and 500 aircraft. The prestige and reputation of the Soviet Union was shattered, and most military minds rated the USSR as a third rate power. A hapless giant, unable to defend itself.

Starting on April the 9th was the Norwegian campaign and that lasted until June the 10th. Germany had 100,000 men (a quarter of that in Denmark) the bulk of her Navy, and about half of her aircraft being used.
The allies (British, French, and free Polish) deployed around 50,000, combined with large elements of both navies.

Britain and France don't see (nor does most of the world) the threat that the USSR can be to Germany, Their was still a non-aggression pact between the two nations and Stalin wouldn't break it if he could help it. An invasion of Germany also wouldn't work well. The time frame that you're giving is when Germany invades the Low countries and France. If the Allies tried to invade first they would be faced with ~3 million men, 7.7 thousand artillery batteries, 2.4 thousand tanks, and 5.5 thousand aircraft.
 
I had in the title but I can add it in the post. realpolitik Britian in my opinion did not go to war for Poland but used it as an excuse to go to war with Germany and keep the balance of power in Europe and Churchill is not prime minister

Churchill became prime minister on May 10. And the Chamberlain government was in chaos due to the fall of Norway, and the imminent invasion of France and the Low Countries wouldn't make things better.
 

Deleted member 1487

True, but the effects were already being felt... in particular the loss of trust in the Chamberlain government.

Speaking of Neville... this seems rather ASB for him, doesn't it?
Very, his entire policy was to court Hitler to use him as a proxy against the USSR; he would have been just as happy to let Poland be taken over if it meant Hitler was guaranteed to fight Stalin, but the public and French were having no more Nazi expansion.
 
Very, his entire policy was to court Hitler to use him as a proxy against the USSR;

Uh, no. His entire policy was to avoid a general war as best as possible in Europe and, failing that, ensuring no one power became the sole hegemon, as had been British policy for the past several centuries. Having Germany win a war against the USSR (and vice-versa, really) was a flat contradiction of this policy. After Hitler dismembered Czechoslovakia he personally realized that no agreement with the man was worth anything, as he stated at both his Birmingham speech on March 17th and the Cabinet meeting the day after.

Furthermore, and contrary to all the pop histories stating otherwise, Chamberlain clearly had not blindly clung to the hope of appeasement. Even before Munich he'd begun an expensive military build up that Churchill ultimately saw through to fruition.
 
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Deleted member 1487

Uh, no. His entire policy was to avoid a general war as best as possible in Europe and, failing that, ensuring no one power became the sole hegemon, as had been British policy for the past several centuries. Having Germany win a war against the USSR (and vice-versa, really)
I didn't say Chamberlain wanted Hitler to win, I said he'd be fine with the Nazis and Soviets bleeding each other out. He was trying to leverage Germany into an ally against Stalin to balance out the Soviets given how weak the French were and unreliable, of course enabling Hitler pushed the continent to war and by 1939 if war was inevitable he wanted it to be between the Nazis and Soviets, leaving the Allies to get relatively stronger as the two side beat each other senseless. What ended up happening was not at all what Chamberlain wanted.

was a flat contradiction of this policy. After Hitler dismembered Czechoslovakia he personally realized that no agreement with the man was worth anything, as he stated at both his Birmingham speech on March 17th and the Cabinet meeting the day after..
Except even Shirer noted that Chamberlain was set to give a very different speech on the 17th basically talking down the relevance of Hitler's actions, but found out the anger of the crowd and rewrote the speech on the train ride to Birmingham to match the expectations awaiting him. He still tried to salvage his Hitler policy right up to the war with Poland, but clearly that failed, otherwise why would he have even bothered to get the Polish to demobilize the day before the invasion to avoid provoking Hitler?

Furthermore, and contrary to all the pop histories stating otherwise, Chamberlain clearly had not blindly clung to the hope of appeasement. Even before Munich he'd begun an expensive military build up that Churchill ultimately saw through to fruition.
No, but Chamberlain was certainly trying to make his Hitler policy work in some fashion, the work recently done by Paul Hehn uses all sorts of archival material to show what Chamberlain was saying even after March 1939:
http://www.amazon.com/Low-Dishonest...=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1245276579&sr=8-1
 
Barbarossa in 1940

If this scenario really took place [and for the sake of discussion, we assume that if takes place in 1940, without the Western Allies attacking], would the Germans just go on the defensive on the Western Front and attack the bigger and more important enemy, the Soviets? This scenario brings the effects of the Barbarossa or Reverse Version in May 1940. Aren't there several threads about Barbarossa or reverse in 1940 and a detailed timeline about the consequences of a June 1940 reverse Barbarossa? [Storm of Steel and Fire.]
Of course, the joint attack would have Soviets attacking Germany or vice versa, with the British and French waiting for the Germans to lose the battles and the Soviets cross the Vistula before attacking the Siegfried Line, crossing the Rhine and reaching Bavaria and the North Sea Coast. The concessions are unrealistic and only Soviet wishes to defeat Germany as early as possible would do. But it is more likely the Germans attack the Soviets to defend themselves from the attack or prepare defenses and launch a counteroffensive. The Allies sit at their defensive positions until tactical changes and reinforcements, combined with the combination of American entry and victory in other theaters allow the offensive. WW2 probably ends within a year more or less of reality if the Allies win [including the Soviet Union].
 
I didn't say Chamberlain wanted Hitler to win, I said he'd be fine with the Nazis and Soviets bleeding each other out.

Chaimberlains statements before, during, and after Munich, both in public and private, are all consistent with the view that he wanted no war on the European continent, period. Whether between WAllies and the Germans, the Germans and the Soviets, or the WAllies and the Soviets.

Your in violation of Mortain's fork: the idea that Chamberlain's actions were some sort of conniving plan to deflect Germany towards the USSR rather then a fundamental missapreciation of Hitler's character are not consistent with his own statements and outlook on the world.

He was trying to leverage Germany into an ally against Stalin to balance out the Soviets given how weak the French were and unreliable,
So weak that he regarded them as a key ally above either the Germans or Soviets. :rolleyes:

by 1939 if war was inevitable he wanted it to be between the Nazis and Soviets,
In offering the guarantee to Poland, Chamberlain clearly and overtly committed Britain to a path of war with Hitler should Germany have chosen to pursue it. He would have been well aware of this.

Except even Shirer noted that Chamberlain was set to give a very different speech on the 17th basically talking down the relevance of Hitler's actions, but found out the anger of the crowd and rewrote the speech on the train ride to Birmingham to match the expectations awaiting him.
Yeah, it was a speech of domestic trivialities. Of course, then as he explained to the cabinet the very next day:

"The Prime Minister said that up till a week ago we had proceeded on the assumption that we should be able to continue with our policy of getting on to better terms with the Dictator Powers, and that although those powers had aims, those aims were limited... He had now come definitely to the conclusion that Herr Hitler's attitude made it impossible to continue on the old basis... No reliance could be placed on any of the assurances given by the Nazi leaders... he regarded his speech [in Birmingham of March 17] as a challenge to Germany on the issue whether or not Germany intended to dominate Europe by force. It followed that if Germany took another step in the direction of dominating Europe, she would be accepting the challenge".
He still tried to salvage his Hitler policy right up to the war with Poland, but clearly that failed, otherwise why would he have even bothered to get the Polish to demobilize the day before the invasion to avoid provoking Hitler?
Well leaving aside that the Poles wound-up ignoring that pressure and remobilized right away, probably because he was hoping that a war could be avoided. This is not an indication that he was preparing to give-up Poland or seeking an alliance with Hitler rather then just trying to avoid a costly war that he thought Britain could ill afford.

No, but Chamberlain was certainly trying to make his Hitler policy work in some fashion, the work recently done by Paul Hehn uses all sorts of archival material to show what Chamberlain was saying even after March 1939:
Yeah, stuff like...

“Whatever may prove to be the nature of the German-Soviet Agreement, it cannot alter Great Britain’s obligation to Poland which His Majesty’s Government have stated in public repeatedly and plainly and which they are determined to fulfill.

It has been alleged that, if His Majesty’s Government had made their position more clear in 1914, the great catastrophe would have been avoided. Whether or not there is any force in that allegation, His Majesty’s Government are resolved that on this occasion there shall be no such tragic misunderstanding.

If the case should arise, they are resolved, and prepared, to employ without delay all the forces at their command, and it is impossible to foresee the end of hostilities once engaged. It would be a dangerous illusion to think that, if war once starts, it will come to an early end even if a success on any one of the several fronts on which it will be engaged should have been secured.”
 
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