John H. Coatsworth's "Counterfactual Mexicos"

"Abstract

For many generations, historians searched for deep and immutable structures, inexorable trends that persist over longues dureés, big pictures in which details do not matter very much. Now we live in a world of accidents, contingencies, and multiple meanings, so we have turned our attention to natural disasters, unique cultural expressions, and the idiosyncrasies of individuals both small and large. This is all to the good, but it does not go far enough. We already have so many history books that tell us so much about what really occurred in the past, that what we need now are books about what did not happen--but might have, or perhaps even should have happened: Counterfactual history, that is, history that is contrary to fact. Take the case of Mexican independence. Everyone knows the basic outlines of the story from Father Hidalgo in 1810 to General Iturbide's coup in 1821. Of course, there is still a lot for historians to squabble about, but they are all fighting about the causes or significance of what really happened. This is like a boxing match between fighters dressed in straightjackets. Mexico lost three opportunities to secure its independence from Spain, protect itself from the territorial ambitions of the United States, and propel its economy into the 'First World' between 1776 and 1812. These lost opportunities point to counterfactual 'histories' of Mexico that are much more interesting than the real history. "

http://disciplinas.stoa.usp.br/plug...ntent/1/COunterfactual Mexicos Coatsworth.pdf

Professor Coatsworth's three counterfactuals:

(1) Mexico declares independence in 1776 at the same time as the British colonies. "But suppose Mexico’s economic elite of unhappy Creole landowners and merchants, many of whom held minor posts in the civil bureaucracy, had decided to rebel in 1776 like their North American brothers. If Mexico had rebelled, neither France nor Spain would have intervened to aid the British colonists. Without foreign aid, the British colonists in North America would have lost their war for independence. Since the British government had little interest in assuming the costs of managing vast territories on the American continent, British North America would have been confined to the Atlantic seaboard and eastern Canada for at least a generation or two. With her North American colonies subdued by 1778 or 1779, Britain would have been in an excellent position to help Mexico consolidate its independence from Spain..."

I would question this. Of course *Spain* in this scenario would be too busy with its Mexican problems to help the British colonists, but why would *France* fail to help the Americans? Would France consider the American cause hopeless without Spanish help? I doubt this; after all, the Franco-American Treaty of Alliance was signed before Spain joined the war. True, Article 10 of the Treaty was a clear invitation for Spain to join http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Alliance_(1778) but AFAIK there was no *assurance* it would do so.

(2) A somewhat later Mexican bid for independence, between 1796 and 1808, would be less favorable to Mexico than the first scenario, but more favorable than OTL. "With Mexico in revolt, Charles IV would have been pressured to abandon the French alliance and seek a separate peace with Britain. The British, always willing to alter alliances for the right price, would have demanded Cuba, but would probably have accepted Louisiana to protect Canada. Even without British Louisiana as a buffer against the United States, Mexico would have been much more stable, unified, and economically dynamic by 1846 and thus much more likely to have successfully resisted the U.S. invasion." (There is a curious, rather mechanical, assumption running through the article that the sooner Mexico declares independence, the sooner it will achieve stability--that if in OTL it achieved it in the 1860's, had it declared independence X years earlier, it would have achieved stability X years before it did. "One or two generations is approximately what it takes for most new states to consolidate territory and resolve internal civil strife." I doubt that the time when Mexico will achieve stability can be calculated simply by the number of years or generations since whenever it declares independence...)

(3) The War of 1812--if the US had conquered Canada, it would have been too busy digesting it to expand to the southwest for decades to come. (Is Coatsworth being tongue-in-cheek when he suggests that in this scenario Sam Houston would go to Ontario instead of Mexico?) Again, I would question this. The conquest of Canada might make the South *more* determined to conquer territory in the Southwest and Caribbean to keep the balance between the free and slave states.

Coatsworth concludes: "The lessons to be drawn from these three lost opportunities are perfectly clear. First, Mexico’s economic and political elite should have revolted against Spain, the 18th-century imperial superpower, much sooner. Second, the Mexican government should have moved more quickly to exploit favorable international conjunctures that might have weakened this potential external enemy. And third, Mexican diplomats should have encouraged the United States to steal the territories it wanted from others. None of these lessons provide any guidance for the 21st century."
 
The assumption in scenario #1 would appear to be that France has limited resources for foreign intervention, and thus cannot support two foreign rebellions at once and would prefer Mexico's. I also question this, because France would be much less interested in providing real assistance to rebelling Mexicans; Spain is a rival ruled by a relative and coreligionist, Britain is the enemy who defeated it in the last war. France would much prefer to assist the American rebels, if indeed its resources are limited.

#2 seems interesting - does anyone else thing it plausible or implausible that Britain would accept Louisiana as apology for aiding the American rebels?
 
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