Historians agree on no such thing, it's not unanimous at all and extremely contentious.
John Bell Hood's Charge - A Chickamauga Civil War AU
- Thread starter Pulmonic_Consonant
- Start date
The Confederacy's best hope in 1864 is to outlast the will of the North to continue the contest. In 1862, there's the chance of a Cannae that forces the North to the peace table. The 7 days campaign had the best chance of that happening, and it might happen if you were to roll a 6 at a wargame. In 1863 your biggest hope is getting the UK or France to recognize you and break the blockade. Past 1863 that's unlikely. People in their bars and taverns need to be saying 'Why are we getting our sons and brothers killed for this, it just isn't worth it' for the CSA to have a good shot at a settlement.
I like how that's how the Confederacy "won" in TastySpam's ATL Civil War. They just bled the North to the point that they didn't deem it worth the effort anymore.
Yeah there were draft riots in New York in OTL basically about that. Do worse than OTL and you'll get more of those, and in more places. Get enough of that going on and you've got the potential to lose the 1864 election badly (Lincoln OTL was pretty sure he was going to lose until several things broke the Union's way mid 1864). But it needs to be pretty bad.
That’s what happened in his TL. The North takes some heavy losses, South doesn’t loose quite as many soldiers earlier in the war due to no Lee offensive into Pennsylvania in 1863, and McClellan wins the presidency but is assassinated and Pendleton becomes President and seeks peace.
Oh sure, a negotiated peace could happen after 62 that's true. But that is as previous posts stated; entirely dependent on the Union giving up rather than the South winning.
The South by this time could only win if the North was willing to talk. It indeed became feasible strategies talked about on and off again throughout the war, and ITTL might be viewed as a more reasonable option. But by their OWN power alone, the South could not win the war. All they could do was make the cost of winning to high for the Union to pay.
A true Southern victory (militarily speaking) can't occur after 62. A negotiated settlement (because the North threw in the towel) is an entirely different conversation and discussion.
The South by this time could only win if the North was willing to talk. It indeed became feasible strategies talked about on and off again throughout the war, and ITTL might be viewed as a more reasonable option. But by their OWN power alone, the South could not win the war. All they could do was make the cost of winning to high for the Union to pay.
A true Southern victory (militarily speaking) can't occur after 62. A negotiated settlement (because the North threw in the towel) is an entirely different conversation and discussion.
Here you go.
Dixieland: The Country of Tomorrow, Everyday (yet another Confederate TL)
(Flag of the Confederate States of America, 1867) [1] Chapter 0 Here ~~~ Chapter 1 Below: "Treaty of Paris (1867)" ...Confederate negotiators largely failed to accomplish most of their goals. American negotiators refused to budge on any major territorial concessions, including Confederate...
www.alternatehistory.com
The Fifth Battle of Murfreesboro - Preparation, Action, and Aftermath
As the winter began giving way to spring, the Union commander with the greatest degree of numerical superiority over his opponent began to grow restless. That commander was Ambrose Burnside, who had attempted immediately before winter set in to attack the smaller Confederate forces stationed in Murfreesboro. With the reinforcements he'd received over the winter, Burnside was eager to march south and quickly drive out Forrest, seizing the vital railway depot of Murfreesboro, relieving potential pressure on Nashville, and once more threatening Chattanooga.
Forrest, meanwhile, had been preparing all winter for an inevitable attack from Burnside. He'd heavily fortified the town, as well as the heights to the north, and along much of the river. By early March, Confederates had established a deep series of trenches, palisades, and stone-covered dugouts throughout and near the city. The men themselves were the veterans of 3 years of fighting on the eastern front, and were relentlessly drilled over the course of the winter. There were some who had been in all four battles in Murfreesboro. Their federal counterparts consisted largely of inexperienced garrison troops and fresh recruits- however, they outnumbered Forrest's forces roughly two-and-a-half to one, and were receiving progressively advanced, powerful arms in comparison- Joslyn M1864 carbines, Moore M1864 revolvers among cavalry, and interestingly, two new Gatling guns purchased directly by Burnside. Union commanders had viewed the weapon with some interest since 1862, but it was not officially accepted by the upper command, and had yet to be tested in combat. Burnside had requested the government purchase a number of them to assist Union forces across all fronts, believing that it was in the Union's best interest to leverage its large economy and production capabilities to focus on overwhelming firepower and military hardware, rather than expending large numbers of men in combat, which would, and had, made the populous of the Union war-weary. When his request was refused, Burnside personally spent money to acquire two of them, hoping to prove in battle the effectiveness of the weapon.
Meanwhile, most of the arms among Confederate troops were about a decade old, with a small number even sporting ancient smoothbores from around the time of the Mexican-American war, though by this point they had nearly been entirely phased out of the Confederate military. The arms were inferior, but familiar to the men who wielded them, who generally possessed enormous experience in hunting prior to the war- in fact, a large number of men within the Confederate army under Forrest had been using the same weapons since the war started, and even before.
These were the circumstances leading into the Fifth Battle of Murfreesboro- Burnside, desperate to dislodge Forrest to turn the tide of the war, open up a path to Chattanooga, restore his reputation, and prove the value of not only the guns, but his doctrinal idea of hardware supremacy, and Forrest, desperate to repulse Burnside in order to leave a large buffer protecting the deep south, decrease the numerical advantage of Burnside, and keep federal morale low, with the hope of finally causing the Union to come to the negotiating table. Burnside held an overwhelming advantage in numbers and weaponry, but commanded inexperienced, demoralized men. Forrest was severely outnumbered and outgunned, but commanded hardened, experienced veterans, and occupied some of the best defensive fortifications of the war up to that point.
The battle would begin on the dawn of March 7th, with Burnside maneuvering a large portion of his forces to the northwest of the city. An artillery duel would begin at around 10:00 AM, and despite the larger number of superior Union pieces, Confederate artillery, stationed in high positions on the ridges north of the city, held a major advantage, and were able to delay a Union advance for hours, harassing Union engineers as they attempted to build pontoons to cross Stones River. Burnside, having learned from his failure at the Battle of Fredericksburg, would attempt to flank Forrest's fortifications and attack from multiple sides, preventing him from focusing his smaller forces on guarding a single lane of approach. Forrest, however, was prepared for the possibility of such an attack, and had stationed a large force under the command of John Bell Hood near the Lebanon Turnpike. They would encounter Union forces at roughly 1:30 PM, who had expected little resistance until reaching the city's fortifications, and would be quickly repulsed. Hood's men would pursue the retreating federal forces, inflicting a large number of casualties before halting at a position between two ridges to the northeast of the city.
Meanwhile, Burnside's forces would cross the shallower portion of Stones River to the north of the town. They were initially repulsed, but another assault allowed them to secure holds at multiple points on the Confederate side of the river. They quickly encountered Confederate trenches among the ridges north of Murfreesboro. By this point, the Union advances in the west and northeast had almost entirely stalled, and Burnside decided to funnel the majority of his forces to the north of the city, where they were making slow but costly progress. As Union troops troops crossed the river, Hood launched a sudden assault to cut off their retreat. Facing fire from both the south and east, Burnside was faced with the difficult decision to pull out or risk his troops being encircled. Desperate to secure a victory, he halted the advance from the east and pulled a large number of troops to reinforce his men that had crossed the river in the north.
As Burnside's lines in the east grew thinner and weaker, Forrest would launch a counter-attack. While it initially pushed Burnside's lines back, they quickly recovered, and with the Confederate forces outside of their fortifications, it dragged into a stalemate. Meanwhile, federal troops pushing southwards had stalled, as the Confederate trenches were proving immensely difficult to push through. As the fight devolved into a bloody, close-quarters affair on all fronts, all elements of strategy began to break down, and the battle simply became a brutal, violent contest of wills.
After 2 more hours of fighting, the inexperienced, demoralized recruits under Burnside broke, and fled. Hood's forces swept across the north, cutting off many of the federal forces that had advanced beyond Stones River. The remainder of Hood's men attempted to pursue Burnside, but were repulsed by a desperate, last-minute rearguard action. Meanwhile, the men that had been surrounded and trapped by the river and ridges surrendered, though by that point most of Burnside's army had escaped.
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The first major battle of 1864 had been a disaster for the Union. What had seemed as though it would be an easy victory to begin a successful offensive season, and swing momentum back in the Union's favor, had been a costly, pointless failure. Burnside, for yet another humiliating loss, would be demoted and sent out of service for the remainder of the war. Taking his place was Brig. Gen. Robert Brown Potter, who would rapidly fortify Nashville in preparation for a Confederate attack. The Gatling guns which Burnside had staunchly campaigned for had shown little value during the battle, and due to both pieces being captured by Confederate forces during the battle, would not get another chance for some time to prove their worth.
Meanwhile, Forrest's army was in absolutely no shape to advance. While they had dealt a hefty blow to Burnside's forces, inflicting roughly 10,500 casualties, most of whom were prisoners captured during the encirclement, in comparison to the 4,000 received by his own men, that left Forrest with a mere 7,500 men, a pale shadow of the roughly 19,000 men he'd commanded upon splitting from the greater Confederate Army of Tennessee. While regarded by some as a reckless butcher, the victories he'd won were stunning. He'd beaten larger Union forces time and time again, in offensive and defensive battles, seizing and holding Murfreesboro from a number of federal threats to southern and eastern Tennessee. He'd inflicted enormous casualties on a number of Union commanders, and captured thousands of prisoners. In a way, it felt to many like a return to the days of T.J. Jackson- a constant string of incompetent Union generals coming in, one after the other, only to be defeated and replaced by the next in line. While there were few who weren't at least somewhat wary of Forrest's small force being in such a vulnerable position, hopes remained high among the Confederacy, especially as Gen. Price continued to retake more of Arkansas from the skeleton garrison left there, and Confederate forces in the Indian Territories scored a decisive victory at Cabin Creek after launching a surprise campaign northwards.
As Forrest's men experimented around with their captured Gatling guns and continued to harden their defenses, the Union forces of the region simply diverted most reinforcements and supplies elsewhere, primarily to Grant's army. The hope among federal forces was that Grant would sweep through Tennessee, defeat Longstreet and force an unconditional surrender, re-unite with Sherman, and continue east, crushing the remains of Forrest's remaining army, seizing Chattanooga, and either move into Georgia and wreak havoc, or move into southern Virginia and force Lee to divide his men. Regardless of the ultimate decision of which route would be taken, the hopes of the west lay on Grant, and it seemed to many that little stood in his path towards ending the war.
Forrest, meanwhile, had been preparing all winter for an inevitable attack from Burnside. He'd heavily fortified the town, as well as the heights to the north, and along much of the river. By early March, Confederates had established a deep series of trenches, palisades, and stone-covered dugouts throughout and near the city. The men themselves were the veterans of 3 years of fighting on the eastern front, and were relentlessly drilled over the course of the winter. There were some who had been in all four battles in Murfreesboro. Their federal counterparts consisted largely of inexperienced garrison troops and fresh recruits- however, they outnumbered Forrest's forces roughly two-and-a-half to one, and were receiving progressively advanced, powerful arms in comparison- Joslyn M1864 carbines, Moore M1864 revolvers among cavalry, and interestingly, two new Gatling guns purchased directly by Burnside. Union commanders had viewed the weapon with some interest since 1862, but it was not officially accepted by the upper command, and had yet to be tested in combat. Burnside had requested the government purchase a number of them to assist Union forces across all fronts, believing that it was in the Union's best interest to leverage its large economy and production capabilities to focus on overwhelming firepower and military hardware, rather than expending large numbers of men in combat, which would, and had, made the populous of the Union war-weary. When his request was refused, Burnside personally spent money to acquire two of them, hoping to prove in battle the effectiveness of the weapon.
Meanwhile, most of the arms among Confederate troops were about a decade old, with a small number even sporting ancient smoothbores from around the time of the Mexican-American war, though by this point they had nearly been entirely phased out of the Confederate military. The arms were inferior, but familiar to the men who wielded them, who generally possessed enormous experience in hunting prior to the war- in fact, a large number of men within the Confederate army under Forrest had been using the same weapons since the war started, and even before.
These were the circumstances leading into the Fifth Battle of Murfreesboro- Burnside, desperate to dislodge Forrest to turn the tide of the war, open up a path to Chattanooga, restore his reputation, and prove the value of not only the guns, but his doctrinal idea of hardware supremacy, and Forrest, desperate to repulse Burnside in order to leave a large buffer protecting the deep south, decrease the numerical advantage of Burnside, and keep federal morale low, with the hope of finally causing the Union to come to the negotiating table. Burnside held an overwhelming advantage in numbers and weaponry, but commanded inexperienced, demoralized men. Forrest was severely outnumbered and outgunned, but commanded hardened, experienced veterans, and occupied some of the best defensive fortifications of the war up to that point.
The battle would begin on the dawn of March 7th, with Burnside maneuvering a large portion of his forces to the northwest of the city. An artillery duel would begin at around 10:00 AM, and despite the larger number of superior Union pieces, Confederate artillery, stationed in high positions on the ridges north of the city, held a major advantage, and were able to delay a Union advance for hours, harassing Union engineers as they attempted to build pontoons to cross Stones River. Burnside, having learned from his failure at the Battle of Fredericksburg, would attempt to flank Forrest's fortifications and attack from multiple sides, preventing him from focusing his smaller forces on guarding a single lane of approach. Forrest, however, was prepared for the possibility of such an attack, and had stationed a large force under the command of John Bell Hood near the Lebanon Turnpike. They would encounter Union forces at roughly 1:30 PM, who had expected little resistance until reaching the city's fortifications, and would be quickly repulsed. Hood's men would pursue the retreating federal forces, inflicting a large number of casualties before halting at a position between two ridges to the northeast of the city.
Meanwhile, Burnside's forces would cross the shallower portion of Stones River to the north of the town. They were initially repulsed, but another assault allowed them to secure holds at multiple points on the Confederate side of the river. They quickly encountered Confederate trenches among the ridges north of Murfreesboro. By this point, the Union advances in the west and northeast had almost entirely stalled, and Burnside decided to funnel the majority of his forces to the north of the city, where they were making slow but costly progress. As Union troops troops crossed the river, Hood launched a sudden assault to cut off their retreat. Facing fire from both the south and east, Burnside was faced with the difficult decision to pull out or risk his troops being encircled. Desperate to secure a victory, he halted the advance from the east and pulled a large number of troops to reinforce his men that had crossed the river in the north.
As Burnside's lines in the east grew thinner and weaker, Forrest would launch a counter-attack. While it initially pushed Burnside's lines back, they quickly recovered, and with the Confederate forces outside of their fortifications, it dragged into a stalemate. Meanwhile, federal troops pushing southwards had stalled, as the Confederate trenches were proving immensely difficult to push through. As the fight devolved into a bloody, close-quarters affair on all fronts, all elements of strategy began to break down, and the battle simply became a brutal, violent contest of wills.
After 2 more hours of fighting, the inexperienced, demoralized recruits under Burnside broke, and fled. Hood's forces swept across the north, cutting off many of the federal forces that had advanced beyond Stones River. The remainder of Hood's men attempted to pursue Burnside, but were repulsed by a desperate, last-minute rearguard action. Meanwhile, the men that had been surrounded and trapped by the river and ridges surrendered, though by that point most of Burnside's army had escaped.
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The first major battle of 1864 had been a disaster for the Union. What had seemed as though it would be an easy victory to begin a successful offensive season, and swing momentum back in the Union's favor, had been a costly, pointless failure. Burnside, for yet another humiliating loss, would be demoted and sent out of service for the remainder of the war. Taking his place was Brig. Gen. Robert Brown Potter, who would rapidly fortify Nashville in preparation for a Confederate attack. The Gatling guns which Burnside had staunchly campaigned for had shown little value during the battle, and due to both pieces being captured by Confederate forces during the battle, would not get another chance for some time to prove their worth.
Meanwhile, Forrest's army was in absolutely no shape to advance. While they had dealt a hefty blow to Burnside's forces, inflicting roughly 10,500 casualties, most of whom were prisoners captured during the encirclement, in comparison to the 4,000 received by his own men, that left Forrest with a mere 7,500 men, a pale shadow of the roughly 19,000 men he'd commanded upon splitting from the greater Confederate Army of Tennessee. While regarded by some as a reckless butcher, the victories he'd won were stunning. He'd beaten larger Union forces time and time again, in offensive and defensive battles, seizing and holding Murfreesboro from a number of federal threats to southern and eastern Tennessee. He'd inflicted enormous casualties on a number of Union commanders, and captured thousands of prisoners. In a way, it felt to many like a return to the days of T.J. Jackson- a constant string of incompetent Union generals coming in, one after the other, only to be defeated and replaced by the next in line. While there were few who weren't at least somewhat wary of Forrest's small force being in such a vulnerable position, hopes remained high among the Confederacy, especially as Gen. Price continued to retake more of Arkansas from the skeleton garrison left there, and Confederate forces in the Indian Territories scored a decisive victory at Cabin Creek after launching a surprise campaign northwards.
As Forrest's men experimented around with their captured Gatling guns and continued to harden their defenses, the Union forces of the region simply diverted most reinforcements and supplies elsewhere, primarily to Grant's army. The hope among federal forces was that Grant would sweep through Tennessee, defeat Longstreet and force an unconditional surrender, re-unite with Sherman, and continue east, crushing the remains of Forrest's remaining army, seizing Chattanooga, and either move into Georgia and wreak havoc, or move into southern Virginia and force Lee to divide his men. Regardless of the ultimate decision of which route would be taken, the hopes of the west lay on Grant, and it seemed to many that little stood in his path towards ending the war.
The First Battle of Florence
Sherman's forces, which were heavily demoralized and nearing starvation in Florence, Alabama due to Longstreet's siege, began to grow increasingly desperate. They had received no reinforcements, and had no news of Grant's army approaching. With each day, the Union forces occupying the city grew weaker. Sherman found himself with few options. He was certain Grant was on his way and would eventually arrive- his faith in the general was enormous, and further, it only made sense for Grant to push east and relieve Sherman. However, he had no way of knowing when those forces would arrive. If they were to arrive soon, it was in Sherman's best interests to remain as-is, and let Longstreet's forces be entrapped like Caesar at Alesia. However, if they were not to arrive for a while, Sherman's forces would continue to starve and eventually be too weak to hold off an attack from Longstreet.
In that case, the better option might be to launch a massive sortie from the fortifications and try to drive off the Confederates. This was risky, however, as not only were they outnumbered, but Longstreet's men occupied high ground to the north of the city, and had an overwhelming advantage in artillery due to the large number of pieces captured from Union forces after the Second Battle of Shiloh. An attempt to retreat across the Tennessee river would be pointless, as the Confederates would easily spot it and attack their rear, and while Sherman was tempted to fake retreating across the river to draw Longstreet into attacking Sherman's fortified positions, this was also a risky move, as it would force him to split his forces and give Longstreet ample time to prepare and assault the city in the exact manner he wanted to.
There was, of course, also the option of surrender. However, Sherman wanted to avoid that at all costs- the recent surrenders of numerous Union armies across Tennessee had left federal forces extremely demoralized, and the surrender of yet another large force might begin to lead to even more widespread desertion and straggling. Further, surrendering the city of Florence would be tantamount to ceding nearly the entire Tennessee river back to the Confederates. It was the last Union stronghold along the river, and if the Confederates were to control it, shipping supplies, reinforcements, and even entire armies from one part of Tennessee to the other would become possible. It would allow the Confederates to shuffle around their smaller forces to achieve momentary numerical advantages, as they had done numerous times so far in the war, particularly with the battle that had seemingly changed everything- Chickamauga. The Confederates had recently made enormous gains at the cost of enormous casualties. If Florence fell, this moment of weakness for them would be made much shorter.
Still, he had his men to consider. If his army was doomed to be lost during the siege anyway, sacrificing thousands of people to drag it out would be pointless, and he simply didn't have it in him to do so. Sherman made up his mind to launch a surprise sortie from the city, but rather than pour out in all directions, would instead concentrate virtually all of his forces on the western portion of Longstreet's line in an attempt to break through and escape to Grant's army.
The First Battle of Florence would begin on the early dawn of March 11th, with Sherman massing up a large force on the west side of town in preparation to sally out and surprise the Confederates before Longstreet's forces were arrayed. However, Confederate skirmishers spotted this movement and alerted their commander, who would then inform Longstreet of the buildup. The Confederate army was quickly scrambled into place as Sherman would begin advancing towards the northwest. Confederate artillery, however, would immediately begin firing an enormous barrage of shells before the Union forces could approach enemy lines, scattering them. They would continue advancing despite the heavy artillery fire, though as an incohesive mass, before a wall of Confederate infantry fired from close range, along with a number of smaller pieces of artillery loaded with cannister, dealing enormous casualties and blunting the attack. Confederate artillery fire came to a halt as the Union advance began to falter and fall back, and the Confederate forces on the western side rose from their lines and charged as the Confederates in the center and right moved to encircle the now routed Union forces. Pursued into the city, the Union forces would take immense casualties before surrendering in isolated pockets.
A small number escaped the Confederate encirclement during the gaps created after the first charge from the Confederate left, but the vast majority were either dead, wounded, or had surrendered. Sherman, who was killed during the chaos as Union forces fell back into the city, had severely underestimated the fortifications of the Confederate forces surrounding Florence, particularly in terms of artillery. This miscalculation, combined with the desperateness of the situation, had lead him to launch an attack which was virtually doomed from its inception, and would result in the effective loss of 12,300 men. A mere 600 Union troops would escape from the battle and arrive at the safety of Grant's army. Out of the 15,000 men which had arrived in Florence, 2,100 had died over the winter from disease, augmented by poor nutrition, 4,900 had died or been wounded during the sortie, and 7,400 had surrendered to the Army of Tennessee. Grant's army would arrive at Florence on March 15th, 4 days later.
This defeat would leave Union forces in Tennessee in a much worse position. Rather than the overwhelming numerical advantage which they'd possessed at the beginning of winter, with 73,000 Union men to 39,000 Confederate men, they now possessed a much closer edge of 46,000 men to the Confederate 34,000. Longstreet was also no longer threatened with overwhelming numerical superiority. The plan, which was to decisively defeat Longstreet with a much larger force, and then push west, defeating the other Confederate forces in detail, was no longer possible, and with nearly the entire Tennessee river now back in Confederate hands, it would be much harder to isolate and destroy Confederate armies. With the Union defeats at Florence and Murfreesboro, the hopes for a quick, easy Union victory in the west had been dashed, and the realization that yet more months of bloody, exhausting slaughter lay ahead set in on both sides.
In that case, the better option might be to launch a massive sortie from the fortifications and try to drive off the Confederates. This was risky, however, as not only were they outnumbered, but Longstreet's men occupied high ground to the north of the city, and had an overwhelming advantage in artillery due to the large number of pieces captured from Union forces after the Second Battle of Shiloh. An attempt to retreat across the Tennessee river would be pointless, as the Confederates would easily spot it and attack their rear, and while Sherman was tempted to fake retreating across the river to draw Longstreet into attacking Sherman's fortified positions, this was also a risky move, as it would force him to split his forces and give Longstreet ample time to prepare and assault the city in the exact manner he wanted to.
There was, of course, also the option of surrender. However, Sherman wanted to avoid that at all costs- the recent surrenders of numerous Union armies across Tennessee had left federal forces extremely demoralized, and the surrender of yet another large force might begin to lead to even more widespread desertion and straggling. Further, surrendering the city of Florence would be tantamount to ceding nearly the entire Tennessee river back to the Confederates. It was the last Union stronghold along the river, and if the Confederates were to control it, shipping supplies, reinforcements, and even entire armies from one part of Tennessee to the other would become possible. It would allow the Confederates to shuffle around their smaller forces to achieve momentary numerical advantages, as they had done numerous times so far in the war, particularly with the battle that had seemingly changed everything- Chickamauga. The Confederates had recently made enormous gains at the cost of enormous casualties. If Florence fell, this moment of weakness for them would be made much shorter.
Still, he had his men to consider. If his army was doomed to be lost during the siege anyway, sacrificing thousands of people to drag it out would be pointless, and he simply didn't have it in him to do so. Sherman made up his mind to launch a surprise sortie from the city, but rather than pour out in all directions, would instead concentrate virtually all of his forces on the western portion of Longstreet's line in an attempt to break through and escape to Grant's army.
The First Battle of Florence would begin on the early dawn of March 11th, with Sherman massing up a large force on the west side of town in preparation to sally out and surprise the Confederates before Longstreet's forces were arrayed. However, Confederate skirmishers spotted this movement and alerted their commander, who would then inform Longstreet of the buildup. The Confederate army was quickly scrambled into place as Sherman would begin advancing towards the northwest. Confederate artillery, however, would immediately begin firing an enormous barrage of shells before the Union forces could approach enemy lines, scattering them. They would continue advancing despite the heavy artillery fire, though as an incohesive mass, before a wall of Confederate infantry fired from close range, along with a number of smaller pieces of artillery loaded with cannister, dealing enormous casualties and blunting the attack. Confederate artillery fire came to a halt as the Union advance began to falter and fall back, and the Confederate forces on the western side rose from their lines and charged as the Confederates in the center and right moved to encircle the now routed Union forces. Pursued into the city, the Union forces would take immense casualties before surrendering in isolated pockets.
A small number escaped the Confederate encirclement during the gaps created after the first charge from the Confederate left, but the vast majority were either dead, wounded, or had surrendered. Sherman, who was killed during the chaos as Union forces fell back into the city, had severely underestimated the fortifications of the Confederate forces surrounding Florence, particularly in terms of artillery. This miscalculation, combined with the desperateness of the situation, had lead him to launch an attack which was virtually doomed from its inception, and would result in the effective loss of 12,300 men. A mere 600 Union troops would escape from the battle and arrive at the safety of Grant's army. Out of the 15,000 men which had arrived in Florence, 2,100 had died over the winter from disease, augmented by poor nutrition, 4,900 had died or been wounded during the sortie, and 7,400 had surrendered to the Army of Tennessee. Grant's army would arrive at Florence on March 15th, 4 days later.
This defeat would leave Union forces in Tennessee in a much worse position. Rather than the overwhelming numerical advantage which they'd possessed at the beginning of winter, with 73,000 Union men to 39,000 Confederate men, they now possessed a much closer edge of 46,000 men to the Confederate 34,000. Longstreet was also no longer threatened with overwhelming numerical superiority. The plan, which was to decisively defeat Longstreet with a much larger force, and then push west, defeating the other Confederate forces in detail, was no longer possible, and with nearly the entire Tennessee river now back in Confederate hands, it would be much harder to isolate and destroy Confederate armies. With the Union defeats at Florence and Murfreesboro, the hopes for a quick, easy Union victory in the west had been dashed, and the realization that yet more months of bloody, exhausting slaughter lay ahead set in on both sides.
It's sad to see Sherman go like that, but that really was his only decent option. Grant is probably just beside himself with the loss of so much manpower and one his top guys gone.
Yeah, there just weren't many options for him. If he'd been aware of just how overwhelming the Confederate artillery advantage was, he probably would've tried sticking it out for another few days for surrendering. Grant arrived on the 14th, so if he'd just waited, they probably could've surrounded and crushed Longstreet- he just had no way of knowing that. Between George Henry Thomas and William Tecumseh Sherman's deaths, the state of Union command in the west isn't looking great. Could be a lot worse, though. At least Rosecrans is out of the picture, and Grant is leading the principle Union army in the region... for now.
With Grant remaining in the west, the chance for Lee to conduct his war of maneuver rather than attrition is much better, so he could very well replicate his early war successes against Meade.
What would be ironic in this TL, with so many good commanders dead or disgraced, is having Ben Butler end up one of the heroes that saves the Union
What would be ironic in this TL, with so many good commanders dead or disgraced, is having Ben Butler end up one of the heroes that saves the Union
I wouldn't discount Rosecrans so lightly. He may have made a terrible mistake at Chickamauga (which in my opinion you can hardly blame him for), but he served with almost uniform distinction throughout of his time of active involvement in the war. Personally, I think it would be pretty funny if after the loss of so many senior Union officers in the Western Theater, Grant has to come groveling back to Rosecrans (and maybe even McClernand and Buell, just imagine!) and ask him to take over command of one of the Union's armies because of a lack of any better options. Knowing Grant though, he'll probably just assign it to one of his subpar favorites, like McPherson, or even worse Schofield!
You have a point there - Grant made sure McPherson, Sherman Sheridan, Wilson, and Schofield were always doing well for themselves.
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Given Grant's presidential history, this is a very 'Grant' type move.
Yeah, I will admit that Rosecrans isn't really by any means subpar... just in comparison to some of the great Union generals surrounding him, like Grant, Thomas, and Sherman, he was mediocre. Which brings me to...
With Lee being in a fantastic position against Meade, appearing to threaten Washington with his proximity (though in reality, obviously he can't just flank Meade and somehow seize Washington's defenses), and being both well-entrenched and well-prepared for a campaign of maneuvering against the less-than-stellar (at maneuvering, anyway) Meade, along with Meade being antsy and desperate for a major offensive after his numerous aborted attempts from 1863, it's obvious that things are about to go very poorly for the Army of the Potomac in Spring 1864(things are about to go "south" for the "north" in the "east"(ern front). Perhaps Lincoln's frustration with Meade, and Meade's terrible relations within politics and the press, finally get him booted out, and Grant replaces him... with Sherman and Thomas dead, only to leave McPherson in command, along with Schofield, Potter, Rosecrans, and McClernand(as a necessary political favor to Illinois Democrats) to fight an offensive campaign against Longstreet, Cleburne, Hood, Hill, and Forrest. Even with the poor condition of Confederate forces in Tennessee as of Spring 1864, that would be a disaster for the Union tantamount in extremity to Jackson's valley campaign, but over a much greater scope.With Grant remaining in the west, the chance for Lee to conduct his war of maneuver rather than attrition is much better, so he could very well replicate his early war successes against Meade.
What would be ironic in this TL, with so many good commanders dead or disgraced, is having Ben Butler end up one of the heroes that saves the Union