John Bell Hood's Charge - A Chickamauga Civil War AU

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The Third Battle of Murfreesboro - Action
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    Pulmonic_Consonant

    October 4, 1863

    Upon receiving news of the surrender of the Army of the Cumberland, and without having received orders to do so, Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, commanding 14,500 men, quickly began moving north from his position on the Manchester Pike back to Murfreesboro. Though he personally would have liked to engage in open battle the Confederate cavalry that had been harassing his corps for the last few days, it was clear that some degree of caution was now required to hold back the massive Army of Tennessee. He planned to hold Mufreesboro and block a potential Confederate campaign towards Nashville.

    Meanwhile, Maj. Gen. Nathan B. Forrest quickly became aware of this movement, hiding a portion of the cavalry under his command in positions on either side of Hoover's Gap. He then led the rest of his men on a charge against the Union force, striking the rear and causing a brief panic before Brig. Gen. John W. Geary was able to rally his division and repulse the attack. Due to earlier miscommunication, Forrest's men that lay in ambush leapt out and begun attacking the Union troops far earlier than Forrest had intended, causing momentary panic in the Union center before being repulsed. Forrest launched another assault just as exhausted elements from Lt. Gen. John B. Hood's corps began approaching from the south, far ahead of the rest of the corps (due mostly to the insistence of Brig. Gen. Jerome B. Robertson to follow his interpretation of a poorly worded order from Hood). Again, they were repulsed, but upon reinforcement by the 1st and 4th Texas regiments, Forrest launched a third assault which finally broke through weary Union lines. The falling back of Geary's division coincided with another attack launched from the woods by Forrest's cavalry on either side of the gap, causing the Union rear to collapse into a rout.

    The momentum of Forrest's charge swept through the unprepared Union center, who had believed the ambush to simply be another cavalry raid rather than part of a larger battle. Meanwhile, the front of the Union lines began quickly marching north towards Murfreesboro in an attempt to reach the city's defenses before Forrest's cavalry. As the fighting within Hoover's Gap died down, confusion among Forrest's corps broke out as more small elements from Hood's corps arrived. After around half an hour of reorganization, they set off again, towards Murfreesboro, capturing a large number of prisoners that were fleeing the battle or straggling behind the desperate Union march north. Forrest detached a portion of his troops to serve as an advance column, racing towards Murfreesboro in an attempt to cut off the Union north and trap them in the open.

    Meanwhile, the commander of the reduced garrison of Murfreesboro, having encountered deserters fleeing from the fighting in Hoover's gap, became convinced that all was lost, and quickly began making arrangements to pull out of the city in order to escape from the estimated 30-40,000 cavalry pursuing them. In reality, Forrest was only commanding around 18,000 men, only 14,000 of which were actually cavalry, and most of which were generally occupied with hunting down prisoners north of Liberty Gap. However, the orderly withdraw quickly turned into panic as Forrest's advance column neared the city. Much of the garrison had already fled across Stones River as a brigade under Col. John S. Scott collided with elements of Hooker's army near Woodbury Pike, dealing enormous casualties before being repulsed. The remainder of the garrison, along with the remainder of Hooker's army and Hooker himself, began streaming into Murfreesboro from the east and south, with Scott unable to prevent their entry after repeated assaults.

    At this time, the majority of Forrest's exhausted corps arrived, along with small pieces of Hood's command, including the 1st, 4th, and 5th Texas regiments under Brig. Gen. Jerome B. Robertson, and the 4th Alabama regiment under Col. Pickney D. Bowles. Forrest, desperate to seize the city before reinforcements from Burnside would make it nearly impossible, launched a series of assaults against the beleaguered Union forces. Still unable to break through, he sent a brigade under Col. George G. Dibrell to flank around the north side of the city and attack in conjunction with Forrest's main corps. By this point, the members of the garrison that had fled earlier began to trickle back into the city, reinforcing defensive positions along the east side of the city, where the fighting had been hottest. As the sun set, Forrest ordered a final assault, with his men charging once more into the entrenched Union lines before Dibrell suddenly collided with Hooker's line in the northeast, near Lebanon Turnpike. The force of this charge began to roll back the line, and as the brigade reached Woodbury pike, the hottest section of the line, forces under Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard broke and fell back into the city.

    The remainder of the Union line retreated back, set upon by Forrest's cavalry in the streets. Hooker managed to rally a portion of his men and fought a brutal close-quarters fight on the north side of the city as darkness fell. However, the majority of what remained of his forces fled across Stone's River, burning the bridges to cut Forrest off as he finished off the last pockets of Union resistance within the city. Nearly all of the Union commanders within Hookers army, including Hooker himself, were dead, with the few thousand Union survivors within the city would surrendering quickly after his death. Only around 3,500 men managed to escape the slaughters at Hoover's Gap and Murfreesboro, and under the temporary command of Col. Frederick Hecker, they limped their way towards Nashville.

    Murfreesboro had fallen back into Confederate hands, but at an enormous cost- 7,500 casualties, out of Forrest's 18,000 men. He was left with a skeleton force of 10,500 men to defend the city with, and while Hood's forces were travelling north, Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside was moving towards Murfreesboro with 16,000 men. His forces were also completely exhausted, after days of marching and a harrowing battle that had lasted the entire day. Too tired and starving to do much else, most simply collapsed on city streets or in private homes, shops, or whatever buildings happened to be nearby.
     
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    • The Third Battle of Murfreesboro - Aftermath
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    Pulmonic_Consonant

    With Maj. Gen. Forrest's stunning but costly victory at Murfreesboro, any hope of a quick Union counter-attack from the north had been quashed. The majority of Union forces in and around Nashville rushed to fortify the city, convinced that it was under threat of an immediate Confederate attack. Burnside, however, assumed (correctly) that Forrest's command had taken casualties too large to allow for another large-scale offensive, and would continue to press on towards Murfreesboro in an attempt to retake the city and open the path the Chattanooga back up.

    A major effect of the seizure of Murfreesboro was that Georgia was now safe from potential Union advances, and with the need of Longstreet and Forrest to perpetuate costly, lengthy offensives in order to retake as much of Tennessee as possible before Union reinforcements arrived, most garrisons across the state were further stripped of forces, leaving them nearly helpless. Meanwhile, Longstreet had continued his campaign west, attempting to defeat the Union forces under Grant and Sherman in detail. He had re-taken a number of towns scattered across southern Tennessee, such as Fayetteville, Pulaski, and Salem, and though he had only left dangerously small garrisons behind to defend them, his forces were waning, even as he drummed up townsfolk and integrated local militias. As the Army of Tennessee occupied Waynesboro, it was in possession of 34,000 men. By Longstreet's estimates, Sherman possessed something like 24-27,000 men. Sherman's forces, while smaller, occupied a good position opposite the Tennessee river near the town of Savannah.

    Longstreet, generally cautious, was wary of attacking such a position. However, Grant's forces were approaching. Were the two to unite, it would leave the Army of Tennessee heavily outnumbered without a solid means of defense. After meeting with his officers, D.H. Hill, Joseph Wheeler, and Patrick Cleburne, it was decided that an attack was necessary, but a straightforward assault would be insufficient to dislodge Sherman from his position. The plan eventually arrived at would involve a series of complex maneuvers in which Cleburne would cross the Tennessee River on a ford northwest of Waynesboro, marching southwest as Longstreet's center opened up an artillery barrage on Sherman's forces. Meanwhile, Wheeler's cavalry would cross further south, seizing Hamburg. Longstreet's center, under D.H. Hill, would launch an assault from the east in conjunction with Cleburne from the north, before a massive charge from Wheeler in the south would dislodge and rout Sherman, chasing them down and crushing them before an effective rearguard could be put up.

    In the east, a series of skirmishes had begun between Meade and Lee had begun, with Meade attempting to cover the movement of Maj. Gen. William H. French to Tennessee in order to reinforce Burnside, and Lee attempting to delay and buy the Army of Tennessee time to do as much damage to the Union effort in the west as possible. The numerous major Confederate victories in the west had severely depleted Union morale, and after stealing a march on Meade, a contingent of Lee's forces under the command of Lt. Gen. A.P. Hill scored a quick victory on the surprised, demoralized forces guarding Bristoe Station. Despite winning a number of skirmishes, and forcing Meade to continuously retreat until settling into a position in Fairfax, Lee was unable to draw out a decisive battle. With Meade's forces heavily entrenched within Fairfax, an assault was infeasible, and due to the proximity to Washington, Lincoln forced Meade to rescind his order for French to reinforce Burnside in Tennessee. Meade eagerly did so, as he had never wanted to send French's men out in the first place, though his failure to stop Lee's advance during what would eventually become known as the Bristoe campaign would stain his career permanently, as there were many who claimed he had purposefully avoided pushing back or starting a major engagement in order to avoid having to lose French's command, though today this is seen as unlikely.
     
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    • The Second Battle of Shiloh - Action and Aftermath
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    Pulmonic_Consonant

    October 12, 1863

    The opening maneuvers of what would eventually be known as the Second Battle of Shiloh (Second Battle of Pittsburg Landing), were, much like the Third Battle of Chattanooga a few weeks prior, marred by poor communication and lack of general coordination. Longstreet's plan, featuring a number of corps moving independently of one another in an attempt to flank and overwhelm Sherman's forces, was immensely complicated, and while he had improved considerably in independent command following the nearly disastrous opening stages of the Third Battle of Chattanooga, a number of delayed messages would prevent Cleburne from beginning his march southwest until 10:00 AM.

    Meanwhile, Wheeler's cavalry had already moved into a position in the woods south of Sherman, and had been harassing Union picket lines since 8:30 AM. However, the local Union commander, Col. Joseph R. Cockerill, was convinced that the cavalry he was encountering were simply a small diversionary unit, intended to draw Union forces away from an attack from the Confederate center, and only mentioned them in passing while reporting his status to the division commander, Brig. Gen. Hugh B. Ewing, who similarly disregarded the Confederate cavalry, but nonetheless shifted two regiments south on the chance that it was something larger.

    At 12:00 PM, Longstreet's center, under the command of D.H. Hill, began an enormous artillery barrage on Sherman's forces, causing much of the XV Corps to pull towards the center in preparation for a massive assault. This happened to coincide with a thrust by Wheeler's cavalry from the south, which, upon finding almost no resistance, continued sweeping forward, brushing aside the small force left behind by Ewing to protect the southern flank and sending them into a rout. They progressed nearly to the Union center before being stopped by a fierce counterattack by two brigades under Brig. Gen. John M. Corse and Col. John M. Loomis.

    With Wheeler's surprising and luckily timed attack stalling before it could deal serious damage to the Union lines, Sherman readjusted his forces to face towards the center and south. He moved a division under Brig. Gen. Morgan L. Smith around his right, with the hope of flanking Wheeler's isolated corps and killing a potential Confederate advance against his center before it could begin. As they arrived, Wheeler's cavalry began to get pushed east, allowing Sherman to reform much of his line into a more cohesive shape.

    As Wheeler began to make preparations to retreat towards the southeast, the forward elements of Cleburne's Corps collided with Sherman's northern flank, causing brief disarray before being repulsed by vastly larger numbers. Sherman, forced to shift some of the forces from his center yet again, sent a division under Brig. Gen. Peter J. Osterhaus to deal with Cleburne's advance from the north.

    While Cleburne's Corps began to materialize in the north, D.H. Hill dispatched three brigades under the command of Brig. Gen. Marcellus A. Stovall to ford the Tennessee River a ways north of Diamond Island and assault the weakened Union center. In conjunction with this, the remaining Confederate center made final preparations to cross the Tennessee on previously prepared pontoons.

    Meanwhile, Sherman was desperately shifting units around. While he had been prepared for an assault from numerous sides, the poor timing of Confederate appearances had made his position a dangerous one. Cleburne, having repulsed an attempted counterattack from Osterhaus, had begun advancing southwards, threatening to cut off Smith's forces and, along with the Confederate forces on the other side of the Tennessee, surround the Union center. Sherman attempted to attack Wheeler's forces from two sides, the Union center and Union far right, while Osterhaus held off Cleburne. While this movement saw initial success, quickly resetting the progress made by Wheeler during the disarray of Cleburne's initial attack, the forces under Stovall which had been fording the river would soon attack the Union center from behind, sending many of the forces guarding the rear into a rout. The remaining Confederate center would then launch a massive assault, crossing the Tennessee and easily defeating what little Union resistance remained nearby.

    Sherman, now aware of the attack from the Confederate center, quickly realized how dire the situation was, ordering Osterhaus back in an attempt to form a strong defensive line and slowly fall back to higher ground. However, this would fall apart as Cleburne took advantage of the withdraw to put Osterhaus's disorganized forces into a rout, circling around in an attempt to surround and trap Sherman himself. As Wheeler and D.H. Hill continued to pursue the south and center, Sherman's forces were nearly surrounded. Sherman, however, would launch an attack and break through part of Wheeler's line, retreating hastily through the gap towards the only open direction- southwards. A desperate, fierce rearguard action managed to prevent Wheeler's cavalry from forcing Sherman's forces into a rout, though they would continue pursuing and harassing the retreating Union army until well after nightfall.

    Aftermath

    The Second Battle of Shiloh was, much like the Third Battle of Murfreesboro, a massive success that came at an enormous cost. Roughly 10,000 of Longstreet's 34,000 men, nearly a third, lay dead, wounded, or missing. Shiloh, and with it, much of the Tennessee river, had been seized, along with an enormous cache of supplies and munitions. Grant and Sherman were prevented from combining their forces, an act which would have left the Army of Tennessee in an impossible position. Sherman had been forced to retreat southwards, eventually settling his exhausted army in Florence, Alabama, which had served as one of the final major Union bastions on the Tennessee river. This, in conjunction with Forrest's victory in Murfreesboro, had effectively reset the Union position in Tennessee to roughly what it had been in mid-1862, essentially erasing an entire year and a half of Union progress.

    However, this had come at an enormous cost. The Army of Tennessee, which had peaked during the battle of Chickamauga in terms of total numbers, with roughly 65,000 men, had been reduced to 24,000 men, a little over a third of that. Even counting Forrest and Hood's isolated forces, that placed the Army of Tennessee at around half the size of what it had been. On top of that, the men of the Army of Tennessee were exhausted to the point of breakdown. They had been fighting and marching nearly nonstop for nearly an entire month straight. They had outrun their supply lines a number of times, and many sported uniforms and shoes that had been nearly torn to shreds with wear. Sherman still commanded roughly 15,000 men in Florence, while Grant approached from the west with 32,000 men. That, along with Burnside and the various garrisons across the state, meant that there were roughly 73,000 Union soldiers in Tennessee to 39,000 Confederate soldiers. While the Army of Tennessee was in a much better strategic position than it was prior to Chickamauga, in many ways, it was beginning to bleed itself dry. Longstreet himself would record in his journal on the day following the victory that he felt, "[M]uch like Pyrrhus after his victory at Heraclea... one more such victory, and we are undone."

    The reaction in the North, however, was far more bleak. While both sides had lost a little under half of their forces since peak strength in the fighting since Chickamauga, this amounted to far, far more casualties for the Union. Nearly 60,000 Union soldiers had been left dead, wounded, or missing in the last month in Tennessee, which was quickly becoming the bloodiest front of the war. In the east, the Army of the Potomac had been deftly outmaneuvered by the Army of Northern Virginia, and the two sat worryingly close to Washington. Though there hadn't been a major battle between the two, the skirmishes had been decisively in favor of the Confederate forces. Meanwhile, in the far west, Union forces had been stripped to provide reinforcements for Grant's army, allowing Maj. Gen. Sterling Price to regain ground in northern Arkansas, particularly near the Delta. It seemed to much of the Union that the war which they had just begun winning was already beginning to turn once more in the Confederate's favor.

    Lincoln would soon begin planning for a major multi-front offensive to begin in the spring. At the time, however, he ordered a general standing-down of Union forces to begin winter preparations, as he could not afford another major loss to Confederate forces. Union armies in Tennessee and Virginia entrenched and braced for a potential winter assault, though the Confederate forces were far too exhausted and weakened to even attempt such a thing. Burnside would march his army north to Nashville after a failed assault on Forrest's entrenched positions in Murfreesboro, the final noteworthy battle of the year.
     
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    • Winter 1863-1864
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    Pulmonic_Consonant

    The winter of 1863 to 1864 was, in stark contrast to the prior fall, largely uneventful, with both Union and Confederate forces far too depleted and overstretched to attempt any major offensive. With Confederate forces finally pinned down due to the harsh weather, Union forces were finally able to replenish much of their numbers with fresh reinforcements. These new recruits, while unprepared and inexperienced, allowed for the armies under Grant and Meade to plug many vital gaps and strengthen already strong defensive positions into nearly impenetrable ones.

    Confederate armies were not so lucky. Many areas had already been stripped bare in order to push the armies of Tennessee and Northern Virginia to their levels of strength they'd had earlier in the fall, and while the reinforcements that were arriving were generally far more experienced and proficient with aspects of the army such as firearms, camping, and horseback riding, there were vastly fewer of them. Particularly hurt by this discrepancy in reinforcements was the army under Forrest, still stationed in Murfreesboro. Over the winter, his forces received only 3,300 reinforcements in total, putting the size of his army at 11,900 men at the end of the winter, after the large number of deaths to disease. Meanwhile, Burnsides army had received 8,500 reinforcements in preparation for a spring offensive, and combined with his already larger army, as well as the garrison of Nashville, this put his total forces at 26,500 men. Other fronts saw similar disparities in troop counts, and while the average quality of soldiers in the Union army had decreased somewhat, the sheer numbers were enough to concern even the most optimistic Confederate generals and politicians, despite the incredibly successful campaign season prior.

    The only major movement to occur during the winter began slightly prior to its' onset, and involved the majority of Longstreet's remaining forces moving south to lay siege to Sherman's army, which had retreated to Florence, Alabama following the Second Battle of Shiloh. The remainder of his men remained north, occupying the heights along various parts of the Tennessee river and preventing supplies or reinforcements from arriving to aid Sherman. Over the winter, the men began to run out of food, and with Grant nowhere in sight, morale was low.

    In the east, the Army of the Potomac had been reinforced heavily to contain 105,000 troops in comparison to the Army of Northern Virginia's 62,000. Meade sat impatiently over the winter, wishing to strike at Lee while he possessed an enormous numerical advantage, and despite Lincoln's orders not to launch an offensive until later in the spring, Meade ordered French's corps to perform reconnaissance in force, in the hope that such a maneuver would draw Lee out into a major battle, something which had escaped Lee throughout the Bristoe Campiaign. However, this movement, performed with little cover during the daytime, was almost immediately spotted by a large contingent of the Army of Northern Virginia in Centreville, and quickly repulsed after a brief skirmish. Casualties on both sides were low, but upon Lincoln receiving word of French's movement, Meade was ordered directly, in no uncertain terms, not to attempt any kind of offensive maneuver against any Confederate army until the spring.

    Meanwhile in the west, Grant was stationed miles away from the nearest army, friendly or otherwise. Sherman's forces were under a desperate siege, and by now the majority of the Tennessee river lay in Confederate hands. Shiloh, the location of what was possibly Grant's most important victory ever, had seen his trusted subordinate beaten by a Confederate army and driven into retreat, making combining the two armies impossible for the time being. Dozens of important towns had been recaptured by Confederate forces, resetting nearly all of the progress of the last year over the course of a few months. In Arkansas, Maj. Gen. Sterling Price, who had previously been pushed back with ease, had begun seizing a number of small forts and towns in Northern Arkansas, particularly in the Delta, as many Union troops were pulled out of the area to reinforce Grant. His forces were edging dangerously near the Mississippi, and while they were small, it was yet another thorn in Grant's side. With the sources of frustration seemingly endless, no solution apparent until the spring, and no movements that required his management, Grant would begin to spend long stretches of time alone in his tent, drinking. Over the course of the winter, his habits would grow continuously worse.
     
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    • TheRockofChickamauga

    TheRockofChickamauga

    Ficboy said:
    You're named after the nickname of George Henry Thomas. I wonder if you are a descendant of him or just happen to really like him.
    Click to expand...
    To my knowledge I’m sadly not even closely related to George H. Thomas:oops:. He just is my favorite general of the war, who I have a great admiration for. I also like to think that I have a similar character to him, but that might just be self-flattery.
     
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    Steelers94

    So I was reading this because it seemed interesting but then it got to Grant drinking. I'm sorry but Grant drinking during the war is nothing but pure Lost Cause BS.
     
    Pulmonic_Consonant

    Pulmonic_Consonant

    Steelers94 said:
    So I was reading this because it seemed interesting but then it got to Grant drinking. I'm sorry but Grant drinking during the war is nothing but pure Lost Cause BS.
    Click to expand...
    He did drink, but nowhere near as often as often characterized, and only when there weren't any things that required his oversight such as manuevers or planning a campaign or battle. In a situation where's he's sitting restlessly, unable to do anything, pissed off and feeling despair from all the progress lost... I think it's pretty safe to assume he would drink.
     
    Old1812

    Old1812

    Pulmonic_Consonant said:
    He did drink, but nowhere near as often as often characterized, and only when there weren't any things that required his oversight such as manuevers or planning a campaign or battle. In a situation where's he's sitting restlessly, unable to do anything, pissed off and feeling despair from all the progress lost... I think it's pretty safe to assume he would drink.
    Click to expand...
    It's possible Grant went on a bender while on a steamboat not long after Vicksburg.
     

    JonKenobi

    Interesting timeline. Consider me subbed.

    It looks bleak for the union. Key word is
    LOOKS BLEAK.

    The Union out numbered the South more than two to one as mentioned with the disparity of reinforcements. All this does is extend the war.

    Historians agree that after 62 the Confederacy was on borrowed time. The only exception is foreign intervention over something such as the Trent affair.

    But by this time in fall of 63, Gettysburg has happened, Emancipation Proclamation has happened, and foreign interest was all but non-existent.

    My best guess is the war ends later in 65 or at worst *shudders* 66.
     
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