Joe Chamberlain succeeds Salisbury as PM

perfectgeneral

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Imperial Preference and a Federated Empire
The end of the Boer War allowed Salisbury, in declining health, to finally contemplate resignation. The Prime Minister was keen that Balfour, his nephew should succeed him, but realised that Chamberlain's followers felt that the Colonial Secretary had a legitimate claim to the premiership. Chamberlain was the most popular figure in the government, and Leo Maxse, editing the National Review, argued forcefully that Chamberlain should be appointed Prime Minister when Salisbury retired. Chamberlain himself was less concerned, assuring Balfour's Private Secretary in February 1902 that 'I have my own work to do and…I shall be quite willing to serve under Balfour.' On 3 July, Salisbury's Private Secretary, Schomberg McDonnell, wrote to Lord Curzon informing him that Salisbury was about to retire. A few days later, 7 July 1902, Chamberlain was travelling in a cab from the Colonial Office to the Athenaeum Club when at Trafalgar Square, the horse drawing the cab slipped, pulling the carriage forward violently. Chamberlain was thrown out of his seat, and a pane of glass crashed onto his head, causing a deep three-and-a-half inch gash. Dazed, and having lost a pint of blood, Chamberlain was taken to Charing Cross Hospital. Refusing an anaesthetic, Chamberlain had three stitches administered and left hospital the next day, with a black silk scarf characteristically concealing his bandages. Returning to his house, Chamberlain was told by doctors to cease work immediately and remain in bed for two weeks. On 11 July, Salisbury went to Buckingham Palace without notifying his Cabinet colleagues and resigned, with the King inviting Balfour to form a new government later that day. Before accepting, Balfour visited Chamberlain's home at Prince's Gardens to consult the Colonial Secretary, who was informed of Salisbury's resignation. Chamberlain was satisfied to acquiesce in the King's choice, for although he had harboured ambitions to occupy Downing Street, he was content with the prominence presented by his post at the Colonial Office, in which he was regarded informally as the 'First Minister of the Empire'. Furthermore, despite Chamberlain's organisational skills and his immense popularity, many Conservatives still mistrusted him for his Radicalism, and Chamberlain was aware of the difficulties that would be presented by being part of a Liberal Unionist minority leading a Conservative majority.
Chamberlain and the new Prime Minister, Balfour, were very different men. According to Chamberlain, "Arthur hates difficulties. I love 'em." However, Balfour and Chamberlain were both aware that the Unionist government's survival depended on their cooperation.
POD: 11th July 1902 Joseph Chamberlain (aged 66) doesn't allow Balfour to assume the mantle of power uncontested. Knowing that Salisbury has resigned and can no longer help his nephew, Chamberlain calls for his rightful place as PM. Balfour concedes, knowing that the Conservative and Liberal Unionist government's survival depends on their cooperation. Chamberlain was aware of the difficulties that would be presented by being part of a Liberal Unionist minority leading a Conservative majority, but he loved difficulties and he had some Radical supporters within the Conservatives. This was a chance to further his Radical agenda. Chamberlain escorted Balfour back to the King, where Balfour refused to form a government and put forward Chamberlain as the obvious and popular choice. Reluctantly the King agreed. Joseph Chamberlain set about forming his first government.

We can expect Imperial Preference. His son(s) in cabinet. What/Who else?

I think the best doctors will treat the PM's neuralgia and gout with a plain diet, exercise and aspirin. (Winston Churchill take note)

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perfectgeneral

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'The Riddle of the Tariff' (1904) - A. C. Pigou M.A. (Camtab)

http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/pigou/Tarrif.pdf
VI. Conclusion
Before conclusion there had best come summary. The preceding chapters have been concerned with the four
principal ways in which it has recently been suggested that British tariff policy could advantageously be
modified. The proposed changes were: first, a return to old-fashioned general protection; secondly, some
form of limited and temporary protection; thirdly, a modification of the tariff, designed to facilitate bargaining
with other countries; and, lastly, a system of Imperial Preference. In the course of the discussion it was
noticed that general protection has been advocated only by irresponsible persons upon grounds implying an
imperfect understanding of economic analysis, but that the three other suggestions have been deemed worthy
at least of consideration by important members of His Majesty’s Government. The conclusion reached
concerning these has been that theoretically valid arguments can be used in support of each of them, but that,
under existing circumstances, these arguments are completely outweighed by others of an opposite tendency.
Though, in the abstract, it is conceivable that any one of the schemes in question might do a little
more good than harm, yet, when account is taken of the immense practical difficulties that they all present,
of the fallibility of Cabinets, and the frailty of Legislatures, of the danger that a policy, inaugurated for the
common good, may, through the pressure of interested parties, be continued and expanded much further
than is wise, we are driven—regretfully it may be, but none the less decisively — to abandon the hope of
bettering our condition in these ways.
There will, however, undoubtedly be a number of persons to whom this conclusion does not commend
itself. There will be many advocates of Protection against ‘dumping,’ of a bargaining tariff, and of a preferential
system, whose opinion it would be ridiculous either to ignore or to treat with disrespect. To them one
further consideration may be addressed. In the present confused state of opinion and of parties, there can be
little doubt that, if any change in tariff policy is adopted, it will eventually partake of the nature of a compromise.
The sentiment—or, as some would prefer to say, the prejudice—in favour of ‘the pure milk of the
Cobdenite word’ is too strong to be overcome except by a coalition between the supporters of more than one
kind of change. Neither Protection, nor limited Protection, nor Retaliation, nor Preference affords by itself a
battle-cry adequate to carry its champion forward to success. What we have to look for, therefore, in the
programme upon which the nation will have—perhaps at the next election but one—to pronounce its judgment,
is not any single one of these four things, but rather some more or less ingeniously constructed conglomerate
of them all—a little Protection, a little Retaliation, and a little Colonial Preference. Now, what I
want to urge is, that, while the proper course for anyone who distrusts each of the above kinds of change is
already decided, the supporters of any one or another of them are in a much more difficult position. It is not
The Riddle of the Tariff / 39

improbable, I suppose, that the next Government will be formed from the Liberal party. So long as it holds
office, all kinds of ‘tariff reformers’ will naturally be banded together as opponents of its policy of laissez
faire, But to be against standing still is by no means the same thing as to be in favour of moving in any one
particular direction. Therefore, when, towards the close of the Liberal administration, which I am supposing,
the situation has begun to shape itself, and the programme of the party of ‘reform’ has been authoritatively
defined, it will be necessary for these men to carefully reconsider their position. One of the gravest dangers
of the present situation is that those who would like to see some change introduced into our fiscal policy,
may, through the influence of associations formed during their period of opposition, be swept up among the
supporters of a complex scheme of compromises to which their reason has never really given its assent.
This point is worth insisting upon because an admixture between two or more of the different policies
which have been suggested, would, in many cases, be much more harmful than either of them taken by itself.
It is plain, for example, that a Preferential system, coupled with general protection, would be far worse than
Preference alone. Nor is this all. For, in a number of possible combinations, the evils to be reckoned with
considerably exceed the sum of those involved in the various policies which are combined.
There are dangers in the compound, additional to those in the elements from which it is formed. In the
first place, if general protection was combined with a system of tariff bargaining, great insecurity would be
introduced into the position of the protected British industries; for every bargain with a foreign country, and
every resort to retaliation, would mean a modification in the amount of the protection which some or all of
them received. The result would be an unstable and incalculable situation, bad for enterprise, conducive to
crises, and proffering great inducements to dishonest political wire-pulling. Secondly, the difficulty of a
satisfactory association between protection against ‘dumping’ and a bargaining system is even more pronounced.
For, when a tariff is used for bargaining, it has to move up and down in accordance with the swing
of diplomatic relations and the commercial policy of foreign States. In order, however, to be an effective
remedy for the evil of ‘dumping,’ it must fluctuate in accordance with the conditions under which particular
foreign goods are, for the moment, being produced and sold. It is impossible, therefore, that any tariff could
be effectively utilized both as an instrument of bargaining and as a means of providing limited temporary
protection for industries threatened by foreign monopolists.
Lastly, there is the case of a combination between a retaliatory and a preferential system. Of course, it
would be possible for us to set up for bargaining purposes a number of duties additional to those on which
preference to the colonies could really be effective. If, and when, this was done, there would be no extra
difficulty. But suppose that an occasion for negotiation with the United States should chance to arise. Is it
not certain that our diplomatists would be sorely tempted to make play with the taxes upon imported food?
Any suggestion of this kind would, however, seriously imperil the efficiency of the preferential system as an
instrument of Imperialism. For, even though we never bargained away the whole tax on American wheat, the
recognition of our right to bargain about it at all would make the amount of the differential advantage
accorded to the colonies variable and uncertain, and would, consequently, render the position of the Canadian
and Australasian agriculturists dangerously unstable. It can hardly be supposed that this state of affairs
would be other than prejudicial to the friendly feelings entertained by them towards the mother-country.
I have only one other remark to make in bringing this discussion to a close. What has been said is liable
to the criticism that it is merely negative in result. I have deliberately refrained from attempts to avoid that
reproach, not from any conviction that everything is for the best in the best of all possible worlds, but simply
because it appears to me well to debate one question at a time. Certain proposals have been sketched in
outline, and are at present engaging the attention of the country. It is upon these proposals, and not upon
certain others which might be—but, as a matter of fact, have not been—brought into prominence, that the
40 / Arthur Pigou

country is required to make up its mind. When it has accomplished that task and given effect to its decision,
other schemes for promoting national prosperity and imperial consolidation will probably come up for debate.
Since, however, for the present, these lie outside the sphere of practical politics, they are not relevant to
the inquiry towards which it has been the aim of these pages to make some slight contribution.
Trouble ahead for Chamberlain. Tariffs are an economically flawed policy. Can he backtrack from a limited application of Imperial Preference? What will be the glue to bind his Imperial Federation if not this?
 

perfectgeneral

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Triple alliance, triple rejection.

If there were any bridges to Germany after three attempts at forging an alliance, then they were surely burnt by his public favourable comparison of the conduct of British soldiers in South Africa to that of troops in the Franco-Prussian war. Von Bülow, never warm on an alliance with perfidious Albion, demanded and an apology, but Chamberlain stuck by his condemnation of German soldier's conduct.

The entente cordiale, triple entente and the anglo-japanese alliance that broke the splendid isolation preceding 1902 need not occur, but Britain will not join the triple alliance. Chamberlain's focus on consolidating the empire might lead to Britain sitting out the first world war.
 

Thande

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It's the kind of thing I'd like to see EdT write a timeline about, though maybe it's too similar to his current work.
 
Originally posted by perfectgeneral
His sons in cabinet. What/Who else?

His cabinet would probably be similar to that of Balfour's in OTL, though Bonar Law (Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade in OTL) might have been promoted to President of the Board of Trade.

In this ATL, surely the Unionists [Conservatives and Liberal Unionists] would still be split over tariff reform and free trade. Unionist Free Traders would still cross over to the Liberals from 1902 to 1905 as they did in OTL.

Although a general election need not place until 1907, it was customary for a parliament not to run for a seven year term and for a general election to be in the sixth year after the previous election: 1868, 1874, 1880, 1885, 1886, 1892. So it is likely the next general election would be in 1906.

It is unlikely that in any ATL, the Unionists could win a general election in 1906 or 1907. In OTL, they won a large majority in 1900 to a large extent because of the Boer War. Also in 1906 tariff reform was unpopular over most of the country, and the Liberal vote was energised by the issue of "Chinese Slavery" in South Africa and the Balfour government's education policy. In this ATL would a Chamberlain government have a non-conformist friendly education policy? Because the Liberals had the support of the Irish Nationalists and the Labour Party they did not need to obtain a majority over all parties to form a government, unlike the Unionists. In OTL in the 1906 general election, they had neutralised the issue of Home Rule for Ireland, and they won middle-class suburban and rural seats for the first time.

In OTL, Joseph Chamberlain had a stroke on July 13, 1906 which paralysed his right side and made him unable to take any further active part in politics.
 

perfectgeneral

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In OTL, Joseph Chamberlain had a stroke on July 13, 1906 which paralysed his right side and made him unable to take any further active part in politics.

I think the best doctors will treat the PM's neuralgia and gout with a plain diet, exercise and aspirin. (Winston Churchill take note)
Even if he dies in 1906, that is still almost a full term in office. A successor would come from a different power base from OTL.

Would Churchill still leave the Conservatives...?
Do we still see the rise of the Labour party, with a Radical party already supporting and enfranchising the working man?

Education and local government generally would be more secular. School boards might be retained instead of LEAs.

The Imperial Federation might include a form of Dominion for Australia and NZ (one dominion?), South Africa, a united Ireland and India. Chamberlain knew Gandhi quite well.

The Elgin Report will still recommend a Committee of Imperial Defence in 1903.

Some of these 'hats' are still too young, but here is my entry for the 'ring':
Leo Amery
Neville Chamberlain (BSA - armaments?)
Winston Churchill
Austen Chamberlain
Arthur Chamberlain (Kynoch Ltd - a new Cordite factory at Gretna?)
George Cadbury - Council housing?
Charles Richard John Spencer-Churchill
William Waldegrave Palmer, 2nd Earl of Selborne - First Lord of the Admiralty
Admiral Sir John Arbuthnot Fisher, GCB (the immortal memory)- First Sea Lord (less resistance to submarines and submarine warfare)
Alfred Milner, 1st Viscount Milner - Milner's Kindergarten - permanent deliberative imperial council
 
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Even if he dies in 1906, that is still almost a full term in office. A successor would come from a different power base from OTL.

Would depend on how much he achieved or possibly the stroke might be butterflied.

Would Churchill still leave the Conservatives...?

I think it likely as he left the Tories OTL because they adopted tariffs. If they not only did it but came into power a desire for power might stay his hand but suspect he would still go.

Do we still see the rise of the Labour party, with a Radical party already supporting and enfranchising the working man?

Would depend on how radical the Tories were. Ideology would mean some preferred Labour or some other Socialist option. Also given that even a Chamberlain led Tory party would still have strong vested interests in business and the established order while it would get stronger working class support than OTL probably not enough to totally negate the creation of a Labour party. [Not unless the Liberals also reform their stance which is unlikely as they will probably be fiaxated on the fight for free trade as they were OTL].

Steve
 

perfectgeneral

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Quote:
Would Churchill still leave the Conservatives...?
I think it likely as he left the Tories OTL because they adopted tariffs. If they not only did it but came into power a desire for power might stay his hand but suspect he would still go.
Yes tariffs is the fly in my otherwise glorious Radical ointment. I wonder if Joe can be changed on this?

I have to agree with Thande that someone like EdT would make a good timeline out of this. I'm a stranger to narrative, characterisation and a close personal friend of the ASB.
 
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