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Introduction: As most of the military oriented timelines feature more powerful forces than available historically I'm trying to do otherwise and still have some rather positive features for the victim of these Alien Space Bats changing their history. I'm trying to keep this short and simple so I'll actually finish this... As Soviet Navy hasn't been particularly written about in AH scenarios I decided to try myself... The POD here is that the decisions about what kind of navy to built during late 1920's and 1930's take a different direction. This will not be wankery, so resources devoted to Navy will either be similar or smaller than in OTL.



1. Bays or straits? The debate about naval role of Soviet Navy during late 1920's

The conference was already going on for several hours and everybody was tired. The audience wondered what Mukievich would say. He was jotting down notes in his notebook. Once in a while he would raise his hand to cool the passions. He was not in a hurry to speak. Finally, when the list of speakers was exhausted, Rornuald Adamovich took the floor. He approached the rostrum in a deliberately slow step and opened his notes. Silence set in immediately.

"So, what will it be: bays or straits?" he puzzled us from the outset. Then taking his time he smoothed out the corners of his papers and started to explain what he meant. Those who favoured the "strategy of straits", he said, proposed to build only big ships disregarding the country's economic potential. They, so to say, reflected the ambitions of the tsarist government to seize the straits and to secure an outlet to the Mediterranean. Those who wanted to build small ships and craft, he said, supported the "strategy of bays". These, so to say, limited the fleet's missions to the Gulf of Finland, to the passive defence of the home shores.

After this witty introduction Mukievich set forth the official view on the Navy's future. It is necessary to have a strong navy, but its construction should be geared to the industry's capabilities. He said:

"We shall build various types of ships that will be needed for the country's defence, but not for achievement of supremacy on the seas and oceans. Therefore, there is no need for battleships and so-called Washington class cruisers with a displacement of more than 10,000 tons and a big endurance."

Mukievich set forth the solution we had long sought for in vain. In clear cut terms he formulated a definite purpose and logically substantiated the tasks confronting the sailors and the shipbuilders.

When Mukievich finished, the audience applauded loudly in approval.
"He has the mind of a statesman," we said as we walked out of the hall.

What did subsequent experience and particularly the experience of the war reveal?

(An exceprt from Admiral Kutznetsov's memoirs, available from

http://admiral.centro.ru/memor00.htm )

The build-up of the Soviet Navy from the shambles of Revolution and Civil War started during late 1920's when also a debate was being made about the future direction of Soviet Navy. As displayed by the excerpt above, there was a debate between those willing to construct a navy in Mahanian lines and those who believed somewhat similar to Jeune Ecole that the new technology would promise means to defend Soviet Union with smaller craft.
Historically a compromise was made, and during 1930's Stalin started to dream about an ocean-going fleet capable of bringing Soviet Union to the major league of nations. This timeline is set to explore what might have happened if Soviet Union had rather sticked to Jeune Ecole thought, or more moderate goals of a littoral fleet.

2. Jeune Ecole wins

During late 1920's when debate about future role of the Soviet Navy was being made it must be remembered it was not demilitarized Germany which was thought to be the major threat. The major threats were the large imperialistic powers of Great Britain, France and Japan most probably assisted by minor powers. Due to inadequacies of Soviet industry it was widely felt that Soviet Union could not create a battle fleet which could rival the experienced fleets of major imperialistic powers. On the other hand, minor powers such as Poland or Finland could not afford to build a major battle fleet. Thus building of a major battle fleet was felt to be irrelevant for any realistic naval tasks. One practical reason not really said but on the background of the decision was something which was summed up in Britain by saying "It takes three years to build up ship but three hundred to build up a tradition". While new Soviet Union did not officially believe in this the naval leadership recognized that mere manning of large surface ships efficiently would demand years of practice by the officers and ratings decimated by turmoil of 1917-1922. On the other hand reports from both Britain and Germany fully recognized the value of naval reservists and mobilized men who had been adequately trained in just a few years to man submarines, destroyers and other smaller naval craft.
Building of a major battle fleet was also opposed on idealistic grounds. It was widely felt that a battle fleet consisting of cruisers and battle ships was a symbol of past, and also a symbol of imperialistic arms race which had caused the World War.

Thus tasks of the various fleets were evaluated and a construction program planned. The Basic tasks of the Fleets, both existing and those planned, as formulated in 1927 for purposes of First Five Year Plan, were as following:

(Soviet Navy was, like it predecessor [and successor] the Russian Navy and somewhat similarly to United States Navy, a force which included not only fleets but also naval infantry and naval aviation. This is important to be remembered.)


Baltic Fleet:

1.) Preventing amphibious landings on Soviet territory
2.) Destruction of enemy commerce
3.) Support for defense of world proletariat*

-Support of naval flanks of the RKKA, including seizure of advanced bases and harbors

Northern Fleet:

1.) Prevention of amphibious landings on Soviet territory
2.) Harassment of enemy commerce

Black Sea Fleet:

1.) Prevention of amphibious landings on Soviet territory
2.) Destruction of enemy commerce
3.) Support for defense of world proletariat

Pacific Fleet:

1.) Prevention of amphibious landings on Soviet territory
2.) Destruction of enemy commerce
3.) Support for defense of world proletariat



* An euphemism for support of land offensive operations

...

Chapter 3 will be about build-up plan during Second Five Year plan (1933-1937)

For comparison here's the historical build-up up to Operation Barbarossa:

Historical buildup:

Submarines:

99 M-class submarines / 200 tons surfaced
6 K-class submarines / 1500 tons surfaced
80 ShCh-class submarines / 577 tons surfaced
6 D-class / 950 tons surfaced
19 L-class / 1000 tons surfaced
3 P-class / 950 tons surfaced
18 S-class / 850 tons surfaced

Surface ships:

Guard Ships:
26 Uragan-class / 500 tons
44 Fugas-class minesweepers / guard ships / 500 tons

Destroyers:
6 Leningrad-class / 2150 tons
26 Type 7-class / 1700 tons
15 Type 7U-class / 1700 tons

Cruisers:
4 Kirov-class / 7900 tons

Total surface ship tonnage: 146 000 tons
Total submarine tonnage: 119 000 tons
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