Jeune Ecole: Littoral Soviet Navy during Second World War

11.2 Operation Barbarossa - German naval plans

"For the Navy the point of main effort will remain consistently against England, even while the Eastern Campaign is in progress."
...
(C) Navy

During the war with Soviet Russia it will be the task of the navy to protect the German coast line and to prevent any hostile naval force from breaking out of the Baltic. Since once Leningrad has been reached the Russian Baltic fleet will have lost its last base and will thus be in a hopeless position, major naval operations are to be previously avoided. After the destruction of the Russian fleet it will be the responsibility of the navy to make the Baltic fully available to carrying sea traffic, including supplies by sea to the northern wing of the army. (The sweeping of minefields!)"

Führer Directive No.21 Operation Barbarossa (OTL document)


"German planning did not make any use of the possibilities of the Baltic as a main road for attack and supply. Certainly, the submarine war against Great Britain had to be continued in full force but this did not preclude naval participation in the attack against the Soviet Union. Moscow was a main objective, and a look at the map will show that from the inner part of the Gulf of Finland the distance is 600 kilometers, as against 1000 kilometers from the frontier in Poland. But the German General Staff did not take that look. Neither did it realize that complete elimination of the Soviet Baltic Fleet would save considerable forces later on. As a consequence, the error of 1914 was repeated. There was no combined plan. The Navy remained on the defensive whilst the Army conducted rapid offensive operations over vast areas and great distances with barely sufficient forces and inadequate logistic capabilities."


Vice-Admiral Friedrich Ruge, Soviets as Naval Opponents (OTL book)


The Kriegsmarine role in initial offensive of Soviet Union was purely auxiliary, as can be seen from the tasking in directive for Operation Barbarossa. The main area where initial naval campaign would be fought was the Baltic Sea where Kriegsmarine could fairly quickly concentrate forces through it's use of both Danish Sound and Kiel Canal. The basic operational idea of Kriegsmarine in the Baltic was to blockade the Soviet forces, which were presumed to take fairly passive role, in their bases with use of offensive mining and to protect the trade between Sweden and Germany via use of large defensive minefield between Öland and Memel (Klaipeda). The breakout of Baltic Fleet to Great Britain in similar fashion to Polish Navy in 1939 was to be prevented by minelaying and coastal artillery units operating in Denmark.

As the Operation Barbarossa was scheduled to be a summer campaign no effort to protect iron ore shipping from Northern Sweden was made as this would require conquest of Åland isles. Thus trade protection was limited to running convoys between Southern Sweden and German-held southern coast of Baltic.

The forces initially available consisted of five Type II submarines from training duties, 10 minelayers converted from merchants, 28 motor torpedo boats (1.-3. Schnellbootflottille), three Sperrbrecher (magnetic mine sweepers), 20 Minensuchboote (Fleet minesweepers), about 50 Vorpostenboote, U-jägers and trawlers for minesweeping, 16 Räumboote and two sweper base ships. In dire need the units training and refitting in the Baltic could be also used, these included BB Tirpitz, CA Admiral Scheer, CL Köln, CL Nürnberg, CL Emden, CL Leipzig, three new fleet destroyers (Z25, Z26, Z27), 2. Torpedobootflottille (5 Torpedo Boats) could be used. Initial Luftwaffe support for the Baltic campaign was planned to include just some reconnaissance units.

Tasks for German Naval Forces in Norway were to support initial assault on Petsamo and the drive to Murmansk with protection of coastal convoy route. For this task a mixed force of U-Jägers (trawlers with ASW equipment), Vorpostenboote (large trawlers with slightly heavier artillery) and Minensuchboote (Fleet minesweepers) was detailed, together with small number of Räumboote (Motor inshore minesweepers) and a contingent of destroyers (6. Zerstörer-Flottille with five destroyers) for distant support.

In the Black Sea the Kriegsmarine forces detached for operations were inp practise non-existant. As the sea route from Germany to Black Sea was closed due to war the only way naval craft could reach Black Sea would be the Danube. Due to planned short duration of the conflict the Kriegsmarine forces deployed initially consisted of shore personnel and a training contingent to help out Romanian allies. The allied Romanian forces were tasked with defense of sea lines of communications between Romania and Turkey, vital for Romanian economy and oil deliveries to Italy. The Romanian Navy consisted of four small destroyers and one operable submarine.

In light of events to come the German lack of preparation would be considered to be fortunate or criminal depending on the viewpoint.
 
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12.1. Operations in the Baltic June - July 1941

In Baltic the German naval units taking part in Operation Barbarossa sailed out well before start of the hostilities. Submarines took up patrol positions outside Liepaja and in Gulf of Finland. Offensive minelaying was begun during the night before the operations in the mouth of Gulf of Finland by minelayers and by S-boats close to Liepaja naval base. Due to heightened alert status of the Navy the Operation Barbarossa was not as much a surprise for Soviet Navy but it was still a shock. Nevertheless, readiness by anti-aircraft units and dispersal of aircraft meant that not as much aircraft and their pilots were destroyed in the large scale Luftwaffe initial strike as with VVS.

The initial advance of the Heeresgruppe Nord was rapid. The naval base of Liepaja (Libau) was lost on 29 June 1941 after prolonged resistance with a large number of stores and some ships lost. Decision to station forces there had been clearly a mistake and the Baltic Fleet would feel the lack of torpedoes and mines for it's operations until Spring 1942. In retrospect the small scale of activity of Soviet Navy until August 1941 cannot be pinned upon logistical causes alone. Baltic Fleet command was relucant to risk it's units due to Stalinist repression which robbed it a chance of presenting an initial blow. On the other hand, the initial easiness of Baltic naval campaign provided Kriegsmarine a false sense of security.


12.2. Battles in Gulf of Riga - July 1941

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Initial German advance in the Baltic republics was very rapid. The advance was jouysly greeted by majority of local population who had been brutalizad by Soviet occupation. Locals did not yet know they were coming under control of another dictatorship, albeit one which had just one local ethnicity as target for it's cruelties. By 10 July 1941 the entire territory of Latvia had been occupied and the German Heeresgruppe Nord was preparing for the conquest of Estonia. German supply lines were already overextended and transportation of supplies to Riga and Pärnu would have aided German advances greatly. It was here that Soviet Baltic Fleet had the first significant impact on the Great Patriotic War.

The most convenient entrance to Gulf of Riga was the Irben Strait, some 13 nautical miles wide or too wide to be closed just from the Soviet occupied Saaremaa (Ösel) island. The Gulf of Riga could be additionally reached via much narrower straits between Saaremaa, Hiiumaa and Estonian mainland.

In this closed area for a limited time very bitter fights were fought first to prevent German supply route from opening, then to defend the aerial and naval base of Saaremaa and Hiiumaa commanding the entrance to Gulf of Riga and Gulf of Finland. The area was suitable for implementation of Soviet coastal defense doctrine, combined operations between coastal artillery, naval infantry, light surface forces and naval aviation.

The first attempt to break through the Irben straits showed the lack of respect Kriegsmarine yet had towards Soviet Navy. On 6 July 1941 the Kriegsmarine sent MRS-11 (Minenräumschiff, minesweeper boat mothership) and minesweepers M-23 and M-31 to clear the route to Riga harbor. The small force was sighted by Soviet naval aviation and the plan for an ambush was set into action. German force waited for additional supply ships and started the breakthrough. On the other side of Irben straits 1st Destroyer Division with four destroyers got into action. The destroyers quickly stopped MRS-11 and M-23 dead into water with accurate gunnery and closed into kill. M-31 fled the scene while MRS-11 was finished off with a beautifully executed torpedo attack from two directions. Finally destroyer Stereguschy performed a boarding action in which four supply barges were captured. This small action was one of those which in scene of Second World War can be seen as insignificant was an important break compared to lackluster performance of Imperial Russian Navy during the First World War. It was also widely propagandized and further raised the Navy's status within Soviet system. It was also the first sign for Kriegsmarine that Operation Barbarossa would not just be a pleasure cruise in the archipelagos.

The next German attempt on 14 July was much better prepared and involved use S-boats for distant support and much more M-boats for escort. A convoy of ten supply ships and one MRJ was escorted 7 S-boats, 4 M-boat, 4 UJ-escort trawlers and 6 R-boats. The operation was supported by Luftwaffe which performed a Stuka raid on Soviet 1st Destroyer division lying in Muhu straits. The Stuka unit used was not, however, drilled in anti-ship tasks and no bomb hits resulted.

This time the Soviets were also better prepared. Again, 1st Destroyer division supported by CL Kirov was the main striking force but in addition a MTB division consisting of 4 S-type and 12 G5 -type MTB's was deployed. These effectively tied up the German S-boats and R-boats into running battle while destroyers and Kirov could concentrate on the convoy. In the quick battle one UJ-trawler was sunk, two M-boats seriously damaged and practically all German small craft had suffered minor damage. Germans withdrew under vast smoke cover. Damaged destroyer Stereguschy was sunk by Stukas a few hours later.

OKM decided it could not give reinforcements for Barbarossa at time and thus the attempts to force the straits were postponed. Army buildup for attack towards Estonia was delayed but not at all cancelled. After taking Estonia Saaremaa and Hiiumaa could be attacked from land side and thus the problem would take care of itself. In light of events of August this was rather optimistic view. Nevertheless, OKM prepared the training units in the Baltic for possible deployement.

12.3. German co-operation with Swedish Navy

The convoy traffic was started with tacit co-operation of the Swedish Navy just days after the beginning of Operation Barbarossa. The Royal Swedish Navy escorted merchant traffic on it's own territorial waters and took care of the individually routed ships proceeding in Swedish coastal route. The actual convoy route was between Ystad and Stettin. While initially safe, routing the traffic through circuitous route took toll on actual transport capability.

As a minor naval episode Abwehr co-operated with Swedish Navy and Finnish refugees to conduct reconnaissance and harassment operations on Finnish territory. This potential, however, wasn't used as much as it might have been due to Finns being classed as sub-humans in Nazi racial hierarchy. Swedish Government was also reluctant to risk potential further maltreatment of Swedish-speaking minority located mainly on Western and Southern coasts of Finland. This attitude changed only in 1943 when Germany was already losing and the conditions for unconventional warfare were much more difficult, particularly due to some new Swedish political decisions.

12.4. Initial Soviet submarine operations

After losses of boats under repair in Liepaja and sank during subsequent operations the Baltic Fleet had a total of 60 submarines left on 1 July 1941. This number, more than amount of German operational submarines on 1 September 1939, was however larger than number of operational boats due to lack of spares, crew and torpedos. The number of boats ready to take out on operations on same day was 40, including 11 S-class boats, 2 Kalev-class boats and 27 ShCh-class boats. S-boats were deployed in Western Baltic mainly against German heavy units training in the area and convoy traffic between Sweden and Germany. Shch-boats were initially deployed in defensive patrolling and reconnaissance in which they did not find many targets. Two Kalevs, British built minelayers, laid their first "eggs" on 3 July 1941 on Bay of Stettin.

12.5. Soviet Naval Aviation raids Germany
- July 1941

On night of 19-20 July 1941 Luftwaffe performed first of it's air raids on Berlin. Stalin ordered retribution raids by VVS flying PE-8 and Ye-2 aircraft. These aircraft taking off from Pushkin near Leningrad faced long and arduous journey. The Soviet Naval Aviation (AV-MF) units flying from Saaremaa (Dagö) and Åland isles also took part in these raids. Initial raids from Åland were particularly succesful as the aircraft took advantage of flying over neutral Gotland and Öland isles to cover their approach. These raids were performed to boost Navy profile on Stalin's eyes and in this respect were succesful. However, the true hitting power by AV-MF against Germany would be provided by different weapons later on.
 

12.5. Soviet Naval Aviation raids Germany
- July 1941

On night of 19-20 July 1941 The VVS (Luftwaffe) performed first of it's air raids on Berlin...

Presumably, it was the soviets, rather than the germans, who began the first of their air raids on Berlin.
 
Mixed successes there..and yeah, cooperation with Sweden isn't at all out of the question.
 


  • Presumably, it was the soviets, rather than the germans, who began the first of their air raids on Berlin.


  • But Luftwaffe bombing Berlin might be truly alternate history! :D What I meant is that Luftwaffe bombed Moscow on night of 19-20 July...
 
13.1. Initial operations in the Black Sea - June - July 1941

In the Black Sea the Soviet fleet had unquestionable quantitative mastery over it's opponent, the Royal Romanian Navy. Qualitatively both navies might be considered equal and the bravery of Romanian naval units cannot be questioned. Like in the Baltic, the Naval Aviation air bases were subjected to an extensive air raid on the morning of 22 June. The Naval Aviation was ready and thus casualties were much less than those of VVS aerial units. Unlike in the Baltic no major fleet bases were threatened in the first days of the campaign and thus the Fleet could take offensive action just days after beginning of the war. On land the Romanian forces did not advance as fast as their better equipped German allies and by end of July were nearing Odessa.

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13.2. Raid on Constanta - 26 June 1941

The first major operation of the Black Sea Fleet was the raid on Constanta, the most important Romanian port and thus the most important Axis port in the Black Sea. The raid had already been planned in peacetime by an able young staff officer Captain 1st Rank Sergey Gorshkov and it's mission was threefold:

1.) Distruption of enemy advance on coast of the Black Sea by tying up reserves
2.) Distruption of enemy war economy by destruction of shipping and sizable oil storage in Constanta
3.) Breaking the will and means of the Royal Romanian Navy


The forces taking part in the raid included 50 DB-3 bombers operating from Crimean bases, both modern CL's of Black Sea Fleet (Molotov, Kalinin) and the 6th and 7th Destroyer divisions with 4 Gnevny's and 5 Gnevny Improved -class destroyers.

Forces defending the Constanta were Romanian submarine NMS Delfinul (650/900 tons, Italian built) on reconnaissance task and two Regele Ferdinand -class destroyers. In addition a German coastal artillery battery "Tirpitz" with 28cm cannons was based in the area.

The raid was swift, impressive looking and not well executed on either side. After preliminary aerial reconnaissance the 6th Destroyer Division and CL Molotov approached the coast for bombardment. This bombardment force had been sighted by Romanian submarine "Delfinul" in advance and the defenses were further alarmed by the preliminary bombing raid. As the destroyers and CL Molotov (all with 130mm main armament) started bombardment they were well within the range of "Tirpitz" battery which began to straddle the ships with accurate fire. CL Molotov was hit while DD Bditelny ran into mines and quickly sank. The Soviet forces abandoned survivors of Bditelny and began to withdraw at speed of 10kts. The two Romanian DD's in the area, NMS Regele Ferdinand, NMS Regina Maria were ready to exploit the situation. Manouvering close to hilly coast they had not been seen by Soviet ships and closed in rapidly on withdrawing Soviet ships in order to conduct a torpedo attack.

However, the Romanian commander apparently had not noticed the reports of submarine Delfinul. The bombardment force was backed up by Soviet 7th Destroyer Division and CL Kalinin. This support force came into sight just as the Romanian destroyers were starting their attack run. With quick and accurate gunnery NMS Regele Ferdinand was sunk and NMS Regina Maria so badly damaged it was not repairde until end of the war. However, the torpedoes launched by the Romanians claimed the damaged CL Molotov.

Although the operation might be considered to be a tactical failure (one destroyer sunk and one seriously damaged for one destroyer and one CL sunk) it was a strategic success for the Soviet Navy. The combat power of Axis fleets in the Black Sea were practically halved. The campaign to interdict enemy sea communications would be much easier although challenged by Axis aircrafts and minelaying. In view of the short timeframe contemplated for the operation Barbarossa this initially seemed like a minor setback for the German SKL. However, the worrisome situation on the Black Sea was also reappraised in August 1941.

13.3. Operation Gorditsa

After initial raid on Constanta the commander of Black Sea Fleet, Admiral Oktyabrski made plans for rather more ambitious operation. As the enemy attention on naval operations was still slight and German pressure on land intense he started an operation intended to totally blockade and destroy Romanian seaborne commerce. Although the enemy could still reinforce his transport assets through Dardanelles and Danube this would take time, moreover it would prove to be a strain on the Mediterranean or Danube traffic. The operation was started on 4 July 1941 and initially focused upon capturing the merchant vessels as the convoying had not yet started.

Within a week of the start of the operation Axis seaborne commerce had stopped with some merchants captured, some sunk and some driven into Turkish harbors. Romanian Navy did not dare to venture to challenge the operation but rather waited for German aerial and naval reinforcements it had pleaded.

13.4. Air raids on Ploesti Oil Fields

(Note: This is OTL, but I don't see any particular reason why effects would be different in TTL)

As the VVS bombers were tied up on supporting the land forces the DB-3's of Black Sea fleet took the strategic bombardment role and made the first Allied air raid on Ploesti on 13 July 1941. This raid and the follow-up five days later destroyed some 11000 tons of fuel and set one refinery on fire. The military effect of these raids was quite minuscule but the political effect was enormous. Hitler now considered Crimea to be an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" which would have to be eliminated. Thus an addendum on Führer Directive 33 was written as follows:

"1. Southern Part of the Eastern Front:

The enemy forces which are still west of the Dnieper must be decisively defeated and dispersed. As soon as the state of operations and of supplies allows, Panzer Groups 1 and 2 will be concentrated under command of 4th Panzer Army and, with the support of infantry and mountain divisions will occupy the Kharkov industrial area and thrust forward across the Don to Caucasia.

The bulk of the infantry divisions will then occupy the Ukraine, the Crimea, and the area of Central Russia up to the Don. The security of the area immediately south-west of the Bug is to be left to the Romanian army."


Again, the Navy had helped the Army in it's defensive task by presenting an important flank threat to the attacker. Buried inside same directive was an another order with gruesome results for civilians.

"6. The troops available for securing the conquered Eastern territories will, in view of the size of this area, be sufficient for their duties only if the occupying power meets resistance, not by legal punishment of the guilty, but by striking such terror into the population that it loses all will to resist.

The Commanders concerned are to be held responsible, together with the troops at their disposal, for quiet conditions in their areas. They will contrive to maintain order, not by requesting reinforcements, but by employing suitably draconian methods."


War in the Eastern Front would not be a gentleman's war, not at land and not at sea. Nowhere but in the Black Sea would this be displayed better than during the bloody Crimean campaign.
 
14 Operations in the Arctic - June - July 1941

14.1. German plans and their implementation

The primary task of Armeeoberkommando Norwegen during Barbarossa was to secure Norway against possible British counter-attack. The initial offensives were limited to feints against Finnish Lapland and a small-scale operation towards Murmansk. This offensive in the Arctic had as it's initial target the securing of Petsamo nickel mines and their naval route approaches in quick order.

As defense of Petsamo and Finnish Lapland was task of the Finnish People's Army the resistance crumbled quite fast before Soviet troops could be deployed for defenses. When the land offensive met virtual standstill circa 21 July 1941 the German troops held a line Kolari-Sodankylä-Savukoski-Jänisjärvi-Litsa River. The offensive in Finnish Lapland was stopped more due to logistical difficulties than amount of resistance. Supplying the offensive through Norway was very hard. The offensive in coastal front initially captured Kalastajasaarento (Rybachi) peninsula and Petsamo but was stopped in Litsa river (Zapadnaja Litsa) by dogged Soviet resistance.

Initial Soviet naval operations can be considered to be failure despite fairly strong Soviet fleet. The Soviet Naval Aviation of the Northern Fleet responded quickly, valiantly and without effect. I-153's were wiped out of the sky, SB-2's were used in futile bombing raids against land targets in Finnish Lapland and reconnaissance aircraft were often shot down aer succesfully sighting German naval forces due to their orders to remain shadowing the formation sighted. Soviet surface forces were, from German perspective, surprisingly passive limiting their operations to occasional naval gunfire support sortie and transport of a raiding party. However, it must be remembered that Northern Fleet had also responsibility for a significant portion of Soviet naval transportation routes, the Northern Sea Route. During summer months, the only period when this route could be used, it was a strategically very important route both for extermination of undesirables who were transported in slave ships to various Siberian locations as well as transportation of valuable materials from Siberia.

Soviet submarine force available numbered 23 submarines and it's achievements during July were also very meager. This was partially due to deployment pattern of Soviet submarines which was based upon defending Murmansk from seaborne attack and prevention of enemy penetration of the White Sea. As German supply traffic was conducted via coastal routes and coastal defence required a lot of boats no German ships were sunk during this initial period. Various minefields laid also met no success as they were laid too far out. The only success in June-July were captures of some Norwegian trawlers.

On the other hand, the German naval forces in Norway did not have any spectacular successes. Destroyer squadron deployed to support the land offensive conducted some naval gunfire support operations and managed to sink a Soviet armed trawler.

14.2. Royal Navy gives a helping hand

In July the Royal Navy liaison staff also arrived, marking the beginning of a fruitful co-operation to last until the end of the war. The convoy operations were scheduled to begin in August, followed by deployment of RAF units in Murmansk airfields and some RN submarines to Arctic. In addition of military effect of these deployments the operations were to have propaganda value in the West and secret educational value for Soviet Navy. The Royal Navy was viewed from Stalin downwards to be the premier naval force in the world and exposure to it's new techniques and tactics was considered to be extremely valuable. In contrast, RAF and Army approaches towards Soviet Union were not at all that succesfull.

As more of a moral gesture HMS Furious and HMS Victorius struck Petsamo and Kirkenes on 31 July 1941. The raid was met with heavy resistance and was not considered a success.

15 German reappraisal on naval aspects of Barbarossa - August 1941

On 1 August 1941 the naval aspects of Operation Barbarossa were discussed between Raeder, Hitler, Keitel and Göring. The Soviet naval operations in the Baltic led to reinforcement of German naval forces primarily by utilizing units in training. This measure came not as a surprise. It is notable, however, that the naval campaign was still expected to end before end of the year or at least during the following winter when ice would seriously hamper naval operations in the Baltic.

The Soviet naval operations in the Black Sea were seen as more threatening primarily because of their influence upon Romanian and Bulgarian allies. Thus, on personal intervention of Hitler, strong light unit reinforcements were ordered to arrive in Black Sea although Kriegsmarine personnel wondered if they would come in time before the Soviet Black Sea Fleet was eliminated after downfall of Soviet Union itself. The reinforcements would take time to arrive as the transport route through Dardanelles was complicated by Turkish neutrality and the river route imposed severe restrictions upon ship size.

Measures to be taken were as follows:

Baltic:

Formation of Baltenflotte as distant cover for following tasks:

1.) Distant cover for conquest of Hiiumaa and Saaremaa
2.) Prevention of seaborne evacuation of Soviet troops from Estonia
3.) Prevention of breakout of the Soviet Baltic Fleet from Leningrad area
to bases in Finland or to an intervention in Sweden.

Baltenflotte would consist of BB Tirpitz, CA Admiral Scheer, four CL's,
three fleet destroyers
and five fleet torpedo boats.

The German submarines in Baltic would be reinforced by temporar
designation of 24th Training Flotilla as a combat flotilla, bringing the
number of German U-boats in the Baltic to twelve. Operations against
Soviet Navy were to be counted as live fire exercises.

In discussion with Göring it was decided that Luftwaffe's elite
Sturzkampfgeschwader 2 was to be deployed against Soviet naval forces
primarily in Leningrad area.

Black Sea:

Creation of Black Sea Naval Staff (Admiral Schwartzes Meer)

One S-bootflotilla was to be transported to the Black Sea immediately via
Danube

Equipment and personnel to fit two U-jäger flotillas (ASW trawlers) was to
be transported to Romania immediately. The equipment and personnel
would be fitted to captured Yugoslavian trawlers passed through
Dardanelles as civilian trawlers.

Italian aid was to be asked immediately as their small MTB's and coastal
submarines might be ideal for the theater and might come to the theater
before end of the campaign.

Arctic Sea:

The forces would be reinforced by one Schnellbootflotilla which was to
conduct offensive operations against Soviet coastal shipping
 
Note: Thanks for all the comments!
Note2: This chart has present day borders. In text I'm using the Russian form Nikolayev instead of Ukrainian Mykolayiv

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16.1 Operations in the Black Sea - August - September 1941

In early August the Soviet successes in the Black Sea were in dire contrast to what was happening on land. Soviet submarine D-2 sank the large new Romanian minelayer NMS Amiral Murgescu while a skillfull torpedo attack by DB-3 torpedo planes sank minelayer SMR Regele Carol I. Without their large minelaying capability for the time being the Romanian coast was wide open for Soviet attacks. This advantage was somewhat robbed by necessity of using most naval sorties to securing the supply lines to Odessa.

The naval successes yet seemed quite insignificant compared to gigantic losses on shore. The most serious blow to Soviet fortunes in the naval mastery of Black Sea throughout the war came from capture of Nikolayev on 16 August 1941. Much of the material was evacuated but the losses were grave. The Nikolayev had been second most important shipbuilding center in the Soviet Union right after Leningrad. As a result the Black Sea Fleet as well as Soviet transport tonnage in the Black Sea could be only reinforced with either ship components put together in the floating dry docks or by very light craft capable of being ferried over land by rail or by truck throughout the rest of the war.


16.2. Siege of Odessa - August - September 1941

(Note: Fairly similar to OTL battle)

Although Odessa was not a fortified city the Soviets exploited the possibility of keeping this as a thorn on the enemy's side. The city was surrounded on the landward side by advance of Romanian 4th Army on 8 August 1941. As Odessa was an important port town it could be well supplied by sea as long as Soviet Black Sea Fleet was able to keep the sea lines of communications secure. This was easily achieved against feeble Romanian surface and underwater threat but the growing German air threat was an entirely different matter.

The defense of Odessa was trusted to Soviet Separate Coastal Army, composed initially of two rifle divisions, one cavalry divisions and a number of independent infantry, NKVD and marine outfits. The formations were depleted and initially consisted of some 34 000 men.

Romanian naval strength was further eroded by destruction of two and capture of one Romanian MTB's in a battle near Crimea on 13 August 1941. The Romanian MTB's had been deployed in an attempt to strike against supply convoys running from Sevastopol to Odessa. Being of Vosper design they had high spurt speed but lower running speed than Soviet S-boats inspired by German design. As a result, they could not run away from Soviet torpedo boats which finished them with their heavier armament. For time being the Axis had virtually no offensive or defensive naval capabilities in the Black Sea. But the Axis had the air superiority which they were about to use with deadly effectiveness.

The Romanian advance was slow and the siege force was constantly reinforced. By 10 September 1941 the Romanian force consisted of 12 infantry divisions, separate outfits equivalent of one additional division and a German force with strength of one division. Soviet Separate Coastal Army had received also some 16 000 men in reinforcement. With overwhelming advantage in numbers by 20 September 1941 the Romanian 4th Army was preparing for the final assault on Odessa. But Soviet Black Sea Fleet was about to serve them a surprise.

On night of 21-22 September 1941 after heavy artillery barrage the Soviet 2nd Naval Infantry Brigade made an attack on rear of the siege forces. Before the actual landing two paratrooper platoons had landed close to a Romanian field headquarters and severed their communications links further aiding to the chaos. The landing was a complete success and caused a panic within Romanian 4th Army. The advance was further supported by attack from Odessa. While the operation ultimately just delayed the 4th Army it was yet again example on how combined arms strike from the sea could have a vast effect on land. The operation stabilized the situation for the time being which was next influenced by German 11th Army attack towards Crimea.

The operation also yet again showed how air power would have an effect upon sea power. When dawn broke the Stukas of StG 77 struck sinking Gnevny-class destroyers Bezuprechnyy and Besposchadnyy and damaging a number of landing craft.


16.3. War against Axis trade in the Black Sea - August - September 1941

During August - September 1941 the Axis seaborne traffic in the Black Sea was in virtual standstill except for traffic transshipped through Bulgarian port of Varna. This traffic was tolerated due to fact that despite being member of the Axis Bulgaria had declined to declare war on Soviet Union. Bulgaria was too valuable as a diplomatic and espionage toehold to lose over fairly insignificant volume of traffic. On 15 August 1941 two older destroyers (Dzershinski, Shaumyan of Novik-class) were sunk by Ju-88's. This led into reconsideration of blockade operations and afterwards the blockade patrols were conducted merely by submarines and light surface craft.

The standstill in traffic did not yet have a significant impact upon Axis war effort but it's effect would be felt quite soon. Much of the important trade with Turkey had been conducted via Danube-Black Sea route instead of overcrowded rail connection. On the other direction, much of the Ploesti oil had flowed from Constanta through Dardanelles and Greek archipelago to Italy.


17. Adoption of Emergency Shipbuilding Program - 1 September 1941

While industries had been distrupted by evacuation to the Urals and the main focus of German threat was on land the shipbuilding sector was not to be ignored. The main focus of Emergency shipbuilding program was to complete the ships already under construction while the focus of new building was on small combatants suitable for inshore waters and minesweepers. In completing the ships under construction the ruthless standardization effort of 1930's was to prove it's worth. For example, compared to Royal Navy which had four different medium guns (4", 4.5", 4.7", 5.25") the Soviet Navy had just two, with 100mm gun both for submarines and surface ships having similar simple mounting and 130mm turret model being about similar for all ships which were using it.

The only exception to building process was the fate of two battlecruisers under construction in Leningrad as the difficult supply chain for them had been distrupted. The ships were shelved and their construction was not to continue until end of the war in Europe.

However, it must be remembered that main focus of German threat was on land. Thus about 50% of shipbuilding capabilities were used for land armament efforts. Perhaps the most spectacular adaptations were use of naval guns for land combat use. Very late in the war Soviet SU-100 tank destroyer used modified S-34 naval gun as it's main armament. The six completed battlecruiser 16" (406mm) guns were used as railroad guns starting from February 1942.
 
As an update to answer some private enquiries, some very positive RL issues have taken much time from this project, but I think I'm able to post some updates over this weekend.
 
18.1. Operations in the Baltic - August 1941

The war in Baltic took a less dramatic form than in June and July. OKH and KM had decided to take the Saaremaa, Hiiumaa and Muhu commanding the entrance to Gulf of Riga (Unternehmen Beowulf) from the land side, not with dramatic seaborne descent as in 1917. Meanwhile, the Luftwaffe took more active part in the naval war. This effort was spearheaded by offensive minelaying. Kriegsmarine units had not been as succesfull in minelaying as expected due to short summer nights, lack of fog and Soviet defensive efforts. MO-boats had proved themselves to be able to fight S-boote and R-boote used for minelaying tasks. In the air, however, Soviet Air Forces were outclassed and thus Luftwaffe bombers could lay their "eggs" quite easily. Minelaying was especially effective as Soviet Navy had not fully appreciated the difficulties presented by magnetic and acoustic mines. Baltic Fleet lost two minesweepers and one destroyer sunk due to mines in August not to mention damaged ships and innumerable operational opportunities wasted.

The more dramatic effort was the employing of elite Sturzkampfgeschwader 2 "Immelmann" against Soviet naval targets in the Baltic. The aerial attacks sank numerous ships in Soviet naval bases, the worst loss being Soviet monitor "Mariehamn" which suffered a catastrophic magazine explosion. These air strikes led into immediate project to reinforce anti-air defense of the ships.

18.2. Operations in the Baltic - September 1941 - German conquest of Estonia and the evacuation of 8th Army

Delayed by long supply lines the German Heeresgruppe Nord started it's assault on Estonia on 1 September 1941. Soviet troops had not only used the brief respite to carry slaves to the Urals but also to improve the defenses of Estonia and also to demolish the Estonian infrastructure. Behind the Soviet lines the Estonian partisans fought against Red Army troops believing that Germans would arrive as liberators. Operational plan of Heeresgruppe Nord was to isolate the Soviet forces defending Estonia by cutting their land route of communications running through Narva Isthmus between Peipsi Järv and Gulf of Finland. This was achieved on 14 September 1941. The main portion of Soviet 8th Army was entrapped in Estonia while German troops were closing in on Leningrad.

On 15 September Baltic Red Banner Fleet received the order to evacuate the Soviet 8th Army from Estonia. For the Baltic Fleet this meant that naval route between Tallinn, Paldiski and Helsinki had to be sealed against German naval forces, the powerful Baltenflotte. The sealing was made with deep defensive zone. On the outer ring were the Baltic Fleet submarines (mainly S-type) employed in reconnaissance and harassing positions between Estonian island of Saaremaa and Swedish territorial waters near Stockholm. The first major defensive minefield was between Utö island in Finland and Hiiumaa island of Estonia. The second major defensive minefield was between Osmussaare in Estonia and Finnish Hanko peninsula. Between these two major mine barriers was the hunting ground for a patrol line of Soviet ShCh -class submarines and Soviet S-type motor torpedo boats. Finally, as far as for fixed defenses, the narrowest part of Gulf of Finland was covered by coastal artillery batteries on Estonian Naisaare and Finnish Porkkala peninsula.

Behind the inner mine belt the main portion of Soviet Baltic fleet was organized both for air and antisubmarine defense of convoys and for a roving reserve force capable of intervening against probable intrusion of Baltenflotte. In effect, the whole arrangement was revamp of Imperial Russian defense scheme for Gulf of Finland which had held until Revolution broke the ranks of Imperial Russian Army and Navy.

The combined Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe effort to prevent evacuation of Soviet 8th Army from Tallinn and Paldiski to Helsinki, Kotka and Hamina was a failure. Baltenflotte did not dare to interveve as an intervention would have risked the beloved heavy combat units against mine threat. The submarines and S-boats gave a spirited effort, however. S-boats engaged in combat with their Soviet counterparts and the MO-boats. Unlike in the English Channel, the Soviet patrol units were stronger in firepower although less trained. In the end the German Schnellboote managed to sink ten coasters for a total of some 10,000 tons. German submarines managed to sink a total of twenty small coastal schooners for a total of some 6000 tons. On the side of casualties German U-141 was sunk by Soviet ShCh-204 and U-137 by a joint effort of three MO-boats. While the first submarine sinking was a result of a chance ambush, the second one was made by good application of group tactics. The MO-boats did not have active sonars at this stage of war but mere passive listening devices which were not very accurate in direction. Thus the training was directed towards using the a group of three boats in a tactical formation. While to reader this may sound not surprising it must be remembered that in many navies the focus on light crafts had been rather on improving the skills of the individual ship, not a predetermined group of ships.

The Luftwaffe effort was slightly more succesfull in sinking a total of eight merchants for a total of 18,000 tons. This has to be compared to the mauling RN had around Crete earlier in 1941. In comparison to RN ships the Soviet ships had a working, if not spectacular, dual-purpose main armament and already a number of the Soviet copy of 40mm Bofors, the 37mm AA-gun.

The last Soviet ships left Tallinn in somwhat chaotic circumstances on 28 September 1941. After loss of Estonian mainland the fate of Hiiumaa and Saaremaa was clear. Despite accepting the loss of Estonia the Stalin was perhaps overtly enthusiastic for the abilities of the Navy he had created. Hiiumaa and Saaremaa were ordered to be held as heroic fortress islands. Thus the stage was cleared for the first major combat between Kriegsmarine and Soviet Navy ships. The X-day for Unternehmen Beowulf was set on 1 October 1941.

18.3. Operations in the Baltic - Before Typhoon

By end of September the German forces had reached Narva River between Peipsi Järv and Gulf of Finland. German forces had to stop for reorganization as their supply lines were far too long. Significant supplies had started to reach Riga only after Unternehmen Beowulf and German Navy was just planning to send convoys to Tallinn. Ivangorod fortress, established during reign of Ivan III stood between Germans and Russians. The fortress was quickly destroyed during the fighting but the propaganda opportunity was not lost on Soviet propagandists who were already using the name Great Patriotic War, originally invented for defense against Napoleon, on Soviet propaganda.

The front line had now settled roughly between Lake Peipsi and Lake Ilmen. Heeresgruppe Nord now had to send it's mobile units to German bid to end the war before Christmas - Operation Typhoon. Leningrad was under threat but this major industrial center could still function.

18.4. Soviet submarine campaign in the Baltic - August - September 1941

The Soviet submarines started to make their effect felt in August 1941. While most Soviet submarine captains lacked the drive to press their attacks against defended convoys the renewed submarine campaign forced Germany to abandon independent sailings in the whole of Baltic in mid-August 1941. During this time the Soviet submarine laid mines had actually more effect than torpedoes. With German air defenses preventing airborne minelaying (which was often noticed and thus prevented of it's surprise effect) the submarine minelaying presented the best offensive mine capability available. However, as most submarines were still tied to rigid patrol routes which were exposed by lavish radio traffic decoded by Germans the results were still not what they could have been and losses were heavy.

By start of the September the German antisubmarine effort greatly increased in it's ferocity but on the other hand the white nights of August were over and submarines could operate under cover of the darkness. Kriegsmarine surface combatants did not employ radar and no surface search radars for Luftwaffe aircraft were yet available. The deployment of Soviet submarines to static defense positions for covering the Tallinn evacuation and later on for defense of Saaremaa and Hiiumaa robbed their chances of success yet, especially as the patrol positions were very exactly given in orders.
 
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