12.1. Operations in the Baltic June - July 1941
In Baltic the German naval units taking part in Operation Barbarossa sailed out well before start of the hostilities. Submarines took up patrol positions outside Liepaja and in Gulf of Finland. Offensive minelaying was begun during the night before the operations in the mouth of Gulf of Finland by minelayers and by S-boats close to Liepaja naval base. Due to heightened alert status of the Navy the Operation Barbarossa was not as much a surprise for Soviet Navy but it was still a shock. Nevertheless, readiness by anti-aircraft units and dispersal of aircraft meant that not as much aircraft and their pilots were destroyed in the large scale Luftwaffe initial strike as with VVS.
The initial advance of the Heeresgruppe Nord was rapid. The naval base of Liepaja (Libau) was lost on 29 June 1941 after prolonged resistance with a large number of stores and some ships lost. Decision to station forces there had been clearly a mistake and the Baltic Fleet would feel the lack of torpedoes and mines for it's operations until Spring 1942. In retrospect the small scale of activity of Soviet Navy until August 1941 cannot be pinned upon logistical causes alone. Baltic Fleet command was relucant to risk it's units due to Stalinist repression which robbed it a chance of presenting an initial blow. On the other hand, the initial easiness of Baltic naval campaign provided Kriegsmarine a false sense of security.
12.2. Battles in Gulf of Riga -
July 1941
Initial German advance in the Baltic republics was very rapid. The advance was jouysly greeted by majority of local population who had been brutalizad by Soviet occupation. Locals did not yet know they were coming under control of another dictatorship, albeit one which had just one local ethnicity as target for it's cruelties. By 10 July 1941 the entire territory of Latvia had been occupied and the German Heeresgruppe Nord was preparing for the conquest of Estonia. German supply lines were already overextended and transportation of supplies to Riga and Pärnu would have aided German advances greatly. It was here that Soviet Baltic Fleet had the first significant impact on the Great Patriotic War.
The most convenient entrance to Gulf of Riga was the Irben Strait, some 13 nautical miles wide or too wide to be closed just from the Soviet occupied Saaremaa (Ösel) island. The Gulf of Riga could be additionally reached via much narrower straits between Saaremaa, Hiiumaa and Estonian mainland.
In this closed area for a limited time very bitter fights were fought first to prevent German supply route from opening, then to defend the aerial and naval base of Saaremaa and Hiiumaa commanding the entrance to Gulf of Riga and Gulf of Finland. The area was suitable for implementation of Soviet coastal defense doctrine, combined operations between coastal artillery, naval infantry, light surface forces and naval aviation.
The first attempt to break through the Irben straits showed the lack of respect Kriegsmarine yet had towards Soviet Navy. On 6 July 1941 the Kriegsmarine sent MRS-11 (Minenräumschiff, minesweeper boat mothership) and minesweepers M-23 and M-31 to clear the route to Riga harbor. The small force was sighted by Soviet naval aviation and the plan for an ambush was set into action. German force waited for additional supply ships and started the breakthrough. On the other side of Irben straits 1st Destroyer Division with four destroyers got into action. The destroyers quickly stopped MRS-11 and M-23 dead into water with accurate gunnery and closed into kill. M-31 fled the scene while MRS-11 was finished off with a beautifully executed torpedo attack from two directions. Finally destroyer Stereguschy performed a boarding action in which four supply barges were captured. This small action was one of those which in scene of Second World War can be seen as insignificant was an important break compared to lackluster performance of Imperial Russian Navy during the First World War. It was also widely propagandized and further raised the Navy's status within Soviet system. It was also the first sign for Kriegsmarine that Operation Barbarossa would not just be a pleasure cruise in the archipelagos.
The next German attempt on 14 July was much better prepared and involved use S-boats for distant support and much more M-boats for escort. A convoy of ten supply ships and one MRJ was escorted 7 S-boats, 4 M-boat, 4 UJ-escort trawlers and 6 R-boats. The operation was supported by Luftwaffe which performed a Stuka raid on Soviet 1st Destroyer division lying in Muhu straits. The Stuka unit used was not, however, drilled in anti-ship tasks and no bomb hits resulted.
This time the Soviets were also better prepared. Again, 1st Destroyer division supported by
CL Kirov was the main striking force but in addition a MTB division consisting of 4 S-type and 12 G5 -type MTB's was deployed. These effectively tied up the German S-boats and R-boats into running battle while destroyers and Kirov could concentrate on the convoy. In the quick battle one UJ-trawler was sunk, two M-boats seriously damaged and practically all German small craft had suffered minor damage. Germans withdrew under vast smoke cover. Damaged destroyer
Stereguschy was sunk by Stukas a few hours later.
OKM decided it could not give reinforcements for Barbarossa at time and thus the attempts to force the straits were postponed. Army buildup for attack towards Estonia was delayed but not at all cancelled. After taking Estonia Saaremaa and Hiiumaa could be attacked from land side and thus the problem would take care of itself. In light of events of August this was rather optimistic view. Nevertheless, OKM prepared the training units in the Baltic for possible deployement.
12.3. German co-operation with Swedish Navy
The convoy traffic was started with tacit co-operation of the Swedish Navy just days after the beginning of Operation Barbarossa. The Royal Swedish Navy escorted merchant traffic on it's own territorial waters and took care of the individually routed ships proceeding in Swedish coastal route. The actual convoy route was between Ystad and Stettin. While initially safe, routing the traffic through circuitous route took toll on actual transport capability.
As a minor naval episode Abwehr co-operated with Swedish Navy and Finnish refugees to conduct reconnaissance and harassment operations on Finnish territory. This potential, however, wasn't used as much as it might have been due to Finns being classed as sub-humans in Nazi racial hierarchy. Swedish Government was also reluctant to risk potential further maltreatment of Swedish-speaking minority located mainly on Western and Southern coasts of Finland. This attitude changed only in 1943 when Germany was already losing and the conditions for unconventional warfare were much more difficult, particularly due to some new Swedish political decisions.
12.4. Initial Soviet submarine operations
After losses of boats under repair in Liepaja and sank during subsequent operations the Baltic Fleet had a total of 60 submarines left on 1 July 1941. This number, more than amount of German operational submarines on 1 September 1939, was however larger than number of operational boats due to lack of spares, crew and torpedos. The number of boats ready to take out on operations on same day was 40, including 11 S-class boats, 2 Kalev-class boats and 27 ShCh-class boats. S-boats were deployed in Western Baltic mainly against German heavy units training in the area and convoy traffic between Sweden and Germany. Shch-boats were initially deployed in defensive patrolling and reconnaissance in which they did not find many targets. Two Kalevs, British built minelayers, laid their first "eggs" on 3 July 1941 on Bay of Stettin.
12.5. Soviet Naval Aviation raids Germany - July 1941
On night of 19-20 July 1941 Luftwaffe performed first of it's air raids on Berlin. Stalin ordered retribution raids by VVS flying PE-8 and Ye-2 aircraft. These aircraft taking off from Pushkin near Leningrad faced long and arduous journey. The Soviet Naval Aviation (AV-MF) units flying from Saaremaa (Dagö) and Åland isles also took part in these raids. Initial raids from Åland were particularly succesful as the aircraft took advantage of flying over neutral Gotland and Öland isles to cover their approach. These raids were performed to boost Navy profile on Stalin's eyes and in this respect were succesful. However, the true hitting power by AV-MF against Germany would be provided by different weapons later on.