So, the economy doesn't rebound from the early `80s recession. Perhaps a Grenada-like conflict happens early, but is an American tactical defeat. The October Surprise somehow surfaces in 83 or 84, reminding voters about Watergate and other mishaps.
The actual character of the "rebound" was limited enough that narrating it into a failure from the middle and poorer working class perspective, as a simple giveaway to the already rich, could have got traction. Probably not in the mainstream press though. I think you are right some sort of visible and painful making it even worse for the majority would be necessary.
Grenada itself could hardly have been a failure in the sense of the US invades not accomplishing their goals, eventually. It was actually quite a debacle for us relative to the massive disparity of forces involved. Things went badly wrong! But all the US military had to do was keep pouring on the firepower until the Grenandian regime was destroyed. There's no way the Soviets would have tried to extend their nuclear deterrent umbrella to protect them, and that's the only thing holding the US in check there.
So you didn't say "Grenada," you said "Grenada-like." Certainly Reagan wanted to crush the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, and aid the right-wing repression of leftists in El Salvador. And the latter was a bloody scandal OTL before the '84 election--to us lefty types who actually cared whether women and children in poor third world nations were being massacred on the US taxpayer's dime (oh, and the occasional US citizen nun too). These things happened, the leftist alternative media reported them, mainstream media acknowledged they were happening--and no outcry turned Reagan's apparent mandate around.
To be sure, in retrospect it is apparent that Reagan was very restrained in deploying US troops into situations where they were at risk of Vietnam-type death rates. Some were killed anyway, notably in Beirut, and rather than double down like the cowboy he was supposed to be, his response was to pull the Marines out of Lebanon. His supporters were outspoken about facing down and defeating the "Vietnam Syndrome" but it wasn't until the Bush Administration that we started to see lots of US troops shipped overseas into open combat. Reagan's military policy boiled down almost entirely to covert action, and Americans refused to get too worked up about it--in part to be sure because a lot of it was secret at the time.
In 1988, my major hope that the public would turn away from the Reagan legacy and deny Bush the election was based mainly on the sheer outrageousness of the Iran-Contra scandals. But it didn't work! We still elected G. W. Bush and considering the obvious depth of his personal involvement, not to mention the moral connection he had simply by being Reagan's VP, that was an obvious and (to bleeding hearts like me anyway) stinging endorsement of this sort of cowboy mentality. Which as I say, Bush then escalated out in the open, having clearly implied an agenda to put paid to the Vietnam Syndrome once and for all. (He specifically said "the statue of limitations on Vietnam is surely over." Funny thing, to hear a Law and Order Republican suggest that murder, torture and genocide have statues of limitations...)
So it is hard to imagine just what sort of debacle overseas could turn Reagan's numbers around--but his very reticence suggests what it might take, which is a debacle involving a major commitment of US troops, many of whom then start coming home in body bags. Now I am not even sure that would have done it, because they could easily turn it around to "support the troops!" But that is what Reagan was very very careful to avoid.
Therefore something like a foolhardy scheme to invade Nicaragua (which the Soviets just might have conceivably been moved to oppose) just might be the thing. But then you have to explain how and why Reagan decides to throw caution to the winds, in his first term yet.
In the context of a mismanaged and stalled invasion of Nicaragua, October Surprise and as much of Iran-Contra as had already happened coming out might have helped tip the balance. The problem, in retrospect, seems to be that the people who were most outraged by this sort of stuff were people who already were opposing Reagan anyway. His supporters could and did (later) rationalize every damn thing, to their satisfaction if no one else's.
What is needed is something to turn around blocs of voters who OTL knew this kind of stuff happened, or suspected it, and voted for Reagan anyway--or perhaps
because these things were being done!
Jackson's nomination would drive blue collar labor away from the Democrats in droves. No chance unless the economy tanked to 1932 lows, the Beirut bombing causes some huge controversy and Grenada fails or escalates and the US gets the short end of the stick. Jackson wasn't as exposed for corruption as he is now, but he would still drive all but African American voters and the most progressive to vote for Reagan. Mondull's OTL would look respectable in comparison.
Jackson did a lot better with these demographics in '88. Another political ATL has opened my eyes to how amazingly well Jackson did that year, getting just under 30 percent of the primary votes and delegates that were up for grabs by primary election or caucus--1029, out of some 4160, only 85 percent of which were up for primary vote the rest being superdelegates.
I believe that the OP is specifically gainsaying you with "runs the table." He's saying Jackson gets together with union leaders well before the election, and with their support does win over rank and file. There are of course some strong arguments saying why he could never do this, but I guess that is what people just won't agree on. Some of the arguments--that white working people would never vote for a black guy for instance--seem to have been weakened by later evidence, and we'd have to argue over whether the potential to negate merely racist opposition already existed in the '80s or whether it is a reflection of some kind of deep transformation of the country over the subsequent 20 years.
The thing about labor is, they were the ones particularly screwed in the Reagan Revolution (and by Carter's late term choices as well). They were understandably angry, and the Reagan charm that won many of them over as Reagan Democrats OTL was partially hogwash and moonbeams, and largely based on negative factors (such as stirring up racist fears and legitimizing them). If Jackson and visionary labor activists get there firstest with the mostest, with a plan for victory that seems likely to work, I certainly think organized labor could be confident this means sure wins for them, and unorganized labor might, depending on the exact content of message and plan, be enticed to join in too.
Can it be done at all? Obviously you and the thread author are diametrically opposed on this. It is the main thing to do, the key to victory, and if it is not possible, of course Jackson could hope only to be a symbolic candidate. (And for the record, it was as a symbolic candidate who might possibly become kingmaker that I supported him, very minimally in '84 but energetically in '88).
I want it harder than that. Same double-dip recession in '80 and '82 (with recovery in '81).
And same recovery in '83 and '84.
A POD mid-Summer '83. Somehow the discussion shifts and the decline of the middle class really becomes front and center. And Jesse is the Democratic candidate who most effectively gets out in front of this.
In OTL, Jesse didn't announce till (?) late Fall. Maybe in this timeline, he's running earlier in all but name.
Well, GD, the harder you want it, the more amazing the Hail Mary pass it will take to put Jackson in front at all ever.
Personally I find it hard to see how he could win, in the sense of taking the party nomination, even in '88. Now in '84, in some ways Reagan is more vulnerable that Bush was in '88, so I can see why you'd want it this early. But I think in retrospect, it is clear that Jackson needed the experience of doing 1984 somewhat wrong, so that in '88 he had his ducks more in a row.
Perhaps we need a POD where Jackson had run for and held some important public office before '84--mayor of Chicago for instance.
Or, his stronger but not "successful" run in '84 paves the way for a run that really puts him over the top in '88.
My belief, and this is speaking as an active campaigner for Jackson in southern California in 1988, is that Jackson's appeal was strong but limited. That a solid majority of Democratic primary voters, and still more the general electorate in November, was simply not prepared to support a candidate who was both radical and black. It might also be that voters were subliminally perceptive of personal shortcomings that meant Jackson could not be the man, even if an outspokenly leftist black man could be.
But OTL, Jackson did command 30 percent of the popular primary vote and delegates at the convention, which I find pretty amazing. (I only focused on California where we did a lot better than the pundits predicted, at 35 percent statewide). Kick that up 50 percent and he'd trade places with Dukakis.
The thing is, I never believed he could quite do that, and considering how many negatives the Republicans had had explode on them and the strong sense of Democratic comeback in '86, and yet Bush winning so handily in '88, I find it hard to imagine just what sort of sensational revelations or ATL disasters that the Republicans could not simply spin against the Democrats it would have taken. If Jackson
could poll primary numbers 50 percent more than OTL, that might be a strong indication he could in fact win in November too. But I don't see it happening.