Japanies Hv Bombers

Would it have mattered? Japan didn't exactly have much resources to depend on, even in the '30s.

Perhaps you will also realize that the Kamikazes were EMPLOYED as a LAST-DITCH ATTEMPT to stave off defeat, circa late 1944-1945.


true.... but the kamikazes were an organized group. However, the fanatical loyality of the Japanese led a number to make suicide attacks rather then risk capture or failure.
 
true.... but the kamikazes were an organized group. However, the fanatical loyality of the Japanese led a number to make suicide attacks rather then risk capture or failure.

Pretty wasteful if you asked me. Only thing they did was caused more casualties and prolonged the war. A bomber force as you suggested would be the same way and meet the same fate, unless Japan can (somehow, but that's pretty ASBish) produce and maintain fleets of them (numbering in the thousands).

Which isn't likely with all the resources in her hands.
 
Originally posted by talonbear01
Cal are you always this much of a smart ass??

The point I was trying to make is this. WHAT IF... in the 1930s, someone in Japan of power and influence had come to the realization that as an Island nation, Japan should have long range, heavy bombers, capable of being launched from the home island or other secure locations.

They did design the Ki-91 and the K100 heavy bombers..DURING the war. The prototype of the Ki-91 was destroyed in a bombing raid in 1945.

The Ki-91 had a range of 2800 miles, if fully loaded, but was capable of 6200 miles with a lighter load.

The K-100 had a range of 3450 miles if fully loaded and much longer if lightly loaded.

The point is, NOT what if they built these during the war, but had done so BEFORE the war started. The idea of operating long range bombers, not from bases close to the enemy, but from your homeland isn't something that was unthinkable. After all, the US Air Force all but called for the elimation of the US Navy in the late fortiesand early fifties, saying that their long range peacekeeper bomber made a navy, as well as allies nonesential in future US wars.

The point is.... Japan did realize they needed such a bomber... only it came too late. They designed and were building these aircraft at a time when factories, materials, skilled labor were streched far too thin. They also had not planned on stationing aircraft of this type or size. WHAT IF... they had built a good number of these large bombers BEFORE the war, and used them in conjunction with Naval attacks... such as Pearl Harbor or Midway, and they had stationed them in positions where attacks against US bases were possible.

Using them against targets in Mainland America would have been suicide.... but give the fact that the Japanese did employ suicide attacks during the war... these were called Kamikaze.... maybe you've heard of them, don't you think that, although usless in military terms, the attacks would have caused the public to demand protection, thus pulling vital resources from the frontlines to an all but usless defensive position on the west coast. Don't you think that the Japanese would have used such attacks to cause a civilian uproar and panic in the US, as well as to try and show their military might. Funny thing is... we did the same thing with the Doolittle raid.... are we the only ones smart enough to think of using one-way bombing missions to frighten the enemies population?
The British and US had no problems about sending out bombers over Germany without long range fighter escort. KNowing how the Japanese did like to plan and plot, It seems likely that if such aircraft had been built, they would have adopted the stragegy of night bombing missions, so as not to need fighter support. And they would have practiced long and hard to insure their bomber crews would ba able to do the job before the war even began.

Hmm, yes Cal use too much the sarcasm sometimes.

In fact I think that a Heavy Bomber Fleet could be interesting in japanese hands but I think as I say in a post before that Hawaii is too much dangerous for the japanese.

You are true that British and US send bombers at first without escort, because the losses of these bombers they decided that it was necessary some kind of escort.

Also we are talking of a very long range bomber, to hit the Western Coast or even Hawaii, hmm I am not sure that the japanese could make some kind of B-29 before the war, I think some kind like the Lancaster or B-17 would be more probable.

Objectives: I think Why to risk in attacks against Hawaii? Why not use Heavy Bombers to bomb chinese airfields in a combined Ichi Go operation but this time in 1942-43, also if I remember well there was some kind of industry in India and some important harbours well bomb India would be another interesting option.

Hawaii could be interesting at first, but it would be too much dangerous when the industrial capacity of US would give US lots and lots of fighters that would have too much losses to the japanese Heavy Bomber Fleet.
 

CalBear

Moderator
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Monthly Donor
Cal are you always this much of a smart ass??

The point I was trying to make is this. WHAT IF... in the 1930s, someone in Japan of power and influence had come to the realization that as an Island nation, Japan should have long range, heavy bombers, capable of being launched from the home island or other secure locations.

They did design the Ki-91 and the K100 heavy bombers..DURING the war. The prototype of the Ki-91 was destroyed in a bombing raid in 1945.

The Ki-91 had a range of 2800 miles, if fully loaded, but was capable of 6200 miles with a lighter load.

The K-100 had a range of 3450 miles if fully loaded and much longer if lightly loaded.

The point is, NOT what if they built these during the war, but had done so BEFORE the war started. The idea of operating long range bombers, not from bases close to the enemy, but from your homeland isn't something that was unthinkable. After all, the US Air Force all but called for the elimation of the US Navy in the late fortiesand early fifties, saying that their long range peacekeeper bomber made a navy, as well as allies nonesential in future US wars.

The point is.... Japan did realize they needed such a bomber... only it came too late. They designed and were building these aircraft at a time when factories, materials, skilled labor were streched far too thin. They also had not planned on stationing aircraft of this type or size. WHAT IF... they had built a good number of these large bombers BEFORE the war, and used them in conjunction with Naval attacks... such as Pearl Harbor or Midway, and they had stationed them in positions where attacks against US bases were possible.

Using them against targets in Mainland America would have been suicide.... but give the fact that the Japanese did employ suicide attacks during the war... these were called Kamikaze.... maybe you've heard of them, don't you think that, although usless in military terms, the attacks would have caused the public to demand protection, thus pulling vital resources from the frontlines to an all but usless defensive position on the west coast. Don't you think that the Japanese would have used such attacks to cause a civilian uproar and panic in the US, as well as to try and show their military might. Funny thing is... we did the same thing with the Doolittle raid.... are we the only ones smart enough to think of using one-way bombing missions to frighten the enemies population?
The British and US had no problems about sending out bombers over Germany without long range fighter escort. KNowing how the Japanese did like to plan and plot, It seems likely that if such aircraft had been built, they would have adopted the stragegy of night bombing missions, so as not to need fighter support. And they would have practiced long and hard to insure their bomber crews would ba able to do the job before the war even began.

To answer your question: Pretty much anytime somebody brings ASB quality issues to this part of the board, particularly involving impossible production feats during wartime, there is a decent chance of me responding. If the position posited is as full of holes as the one laid out here, the likely hood of a response that tends to the WTF side of the house is increased.

In other words I am a smart ass when some post or topic crosses the line from "What If" to "What the Hell, so what if it's utterly impossible, I'll throw it at the wall & see what sticks".

I am a huge fan of the ASB forum, and I really believe that items that defy historical fact, reasonable possibility, remote possibility, and even one chance in a billion, belong there.

I would recommend that you review the availability of proper manufacturing facilities, materiel availability, basing potential, Japanese Military doctrine, IJN/IJA rivalry, pilot training difficulties, fuel supply, and the myraid other items that would have made deployment of a reasonable IJN/IJA heavy bomber force remotely possible. At this same time I would suggest a review of the actual production capacity utilization of Japanese aircraft engine and airframe suppliers in the 1940-44 period. I would also suggest a review of aircraft designs from the mid-30's, from ALL nations. The level of perfomance required for the posited Japanese bombers simply did not exist in the mid 30's. B-17B's had to fly stripped from the West Coast to reach Hawaii. It is an ASB level leap of faith to imagine that Japan could have produced a B-29 level aircraft in the 1930s.

I would then suggest a review of Japanese basing & airfield construction techniques, supply issues, and actual base locations in 1941. I would then recommend a review of American & Japanese operations in the Bering Sea & Aleutian Island AO's during the 1941-45 period, as well as USN/USCG flight operation data during the Cold War & post Cold War Era, along with the analysis used by the USAAF in arriving at the decision to base B-29 bombers in CHINA instead of the Aleutians.

Finally I would suggest that any reasonable discussion of this issue requires a review of the logistical support available to both the IJN & IJA fron January 1944 onward with particular emphasis on fuel, including the impact that fuel shortage had in the training of pilots.

Regarding the Japanese usage of kamikaze tactics: Japan did not begin systematric use of suicide attacks until the war was lost. Had the Japanese been able to produce 1st line equipment & fully trained pilots in 1944 & 1945 the Kamikaze would never had reached serious, strategic usage. (Please note that this does not mean that the occasional Japanese pilot would not have chosen to crash his disabled aircraft into a target. This was something done by pilots from ALL nations involved in WW II. THe Marine pilot who had Henderson Field named after him (Major Lofton Henderson) was awarded a Navy Cross for exactly this type of ac`tion during the opening stages of the Battle of Midway.) The Kamikaze, and the reason behind its implementation at the strategic level, is perhaps the best argument AGAINST Japan's ability to create a heavy bomber force.

I apoligize if I personnally offended you, that was not my intention.
 

CalBear

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Monthly Donor
Hmm, yes Cal use too much the sarcasm sometimes.

In fact I think that a Heavy Bomber Fleet could be interesting in japanese hands but I think as I say in a post before that Hawaii is too much dangerous for the japanese.

You are true that British and US send bombers at first without escort, because the losses of these bombers they decided that it was necessary some kind of escort.

Also we are talking of a very long range bomber, to hit the Western Coast or even Hawaii, hmm I am not sure that the japanese could make some kind of B-29 before the war, I think some kind like the Lancaster or B-17 would be more probable.

Objectives: I think Why to risk in attacks against Hawaii? Why not use Heavy Bombers to bomb chinese airfields in a combined Ichi Go operation but this time in 1942-43, also if I remember well there was some kind of industry in India and some important harbours well bomb India would be another interesting option.

Hawaii could be interesting at first, but it would be too much dangerous when the industrial capacity of US would give US lots and lots of fighters that would have too much losses to the japanese Heavy Bomber Fleet.

Scarcasm? Moi?:eek: Well, maybe a once in a while. :p

It is worth noting that the reason the British & Americans were willing to send in unescorted bombers (something the British quickly chose to modify in hopes of reducing losses) was that their pre-war doctrine was based on the idea that bombing would, almost instantly, destroy the enemy's ability to resist. That they chose to keep this belief after the evidence of the Blitz shows the power of doctrine. Japan's pre-war doctrine had no similar platform. Japan's doctrine, due in no small part to the lack of a Japanese Mitchell, was based on different beliefs. The IJN believed, to exclusion of all else, in the "One Great Battle", this was, in the main, due to slavish devotion to the lessons of Tsushima (while ignoring the lessons of Jutland). The IJA saw it's enemy as China, and, to a lesser extent, Russia, and looked (perhaps because of its isolation from the horrors of the Western Front) to carrying the field because of superior elan. In both cases, the usage of STRATEGIC bombing (the only real use for heavy bombers) was not indicated. Tactical bombing, by light and meduim bombers, as an intergal part of Japanese tactics, as is demonstrated by the wide rage of medium bombers produced by both the IJN & IJA.

It is also interesting to note that the country that was most heavily invested in long-range heavy bombers was the United States, where the bomber was, in the 1930's, seen as a DEFENSIVE weapon meant to be used against enemy fleets while still far out to sea. This was a reasonable viewpoint for the era, and was common throughout the military world. Since Japanese military doctrine (and in 1930's Japan, military doctrine WAS national policy) was completely geared to the OFFENSIVE, it is breathtakingly unlikely that Japan's leadership would decide to devote huge amounts of scarce resources to a defensive system, especially when the same resources could be used to increae offensive systems (including carrier aircraft and tactical bombers to support ground troops in their attacks).

A decent way to look at the Heavy Bomber, from the resource perspective, is that every 24 bomber wing would equal about 1.5 - 2 aircraft carrier strike wings. Another way to look at it is that a minimal force of 100 heavy bombers, which would be of minimal usage in supporting either IJN or IJA goals, would have left the Kido Butai of the Combined Fleet without any aircraft to attack Pearl Harbor. While this is, obviously, a massive over simplification or the logistics involved, it does illustrate the reality of Japan's production capacities & the enormous obstacle facing the rouge Admiral or General who wanted to produce a bomber force.
 
Heavy Bombers v Warships

The American armed forces may not have had much success against ships with heavy bombers but the Luftwaffe made effective use of the Fock Wulf Condor. Then of course the RAF did destroy Tirpitz and damage Gneisnau beyond economic repair using "heavys".
 
The American armed forces may not have had much success against ships with heavy bombers but the Luftwaffe made effective use of the Fock Wulf Condor. Then of course the RAF did destroy Tirpitz and damage Gneisnau beyond economic repair using "heavys".

I'd argue that the Condor was primarily a reconnaisance aircraft, rather than a heavy bomber for the purposes to which it was assigned. Yes, it did have a 3,000kg bombload, but after June 1941, no bombs were loaded and pilots were expressly forbidden from attacking shipping. If you want one of those, design a purpose-built recon aircraft. It'll do much better.
 
The American armed forces may not have had much success against ships with heavy bombers but the Luftwaffe made effective use of the Fock Wulf Condor. Then of course the RAF did destroy Tirpitz and damage Gneisnau beyond economic repair using "heavys".

Both Tirpiz and Gneisnau were at anchor in port. Heavy bombers can certainly hit immobile targets, its mobile targets that's the problem. Even the Condor mainly hit unarmored, unarmed, and slow merchant ships, not warships.
 
Both Tirpiz and Gneisnau were at anchor in port. Heavy bombers can certainly hit immobile targets, its mobile targets that's the problem. Even the Condor mainly hit unarmored, unarmed, and slow merchant ships, not warships.

So what is at question here is the tactics of how to use "heavys" against naval targets. They aint at sea 24/7.
 
What about being based on the Kawanishi H8K flying boat.
Could this design be converted to a bomber or not ???
Yes. A rather good one, possibly, seeing how good the H6K & H8K both were. It didn't occur to Japan... And using even the H6Ks or H8Ks simply for reconaissance, rather than the stupid nuisance raid of OpK,:confused: was contrary to the IJN doctrine of "attack", apparently...:rolleyes:
 
This _is_ an interesting idea. But building them during the war is both impossible and futile, they have to be built pre-war. Their production will reduce the production of other aircraft and I don't see losses being able to be replaced.

A serious problem is that these aircraft will drink avgas, which is something the Japanese don't have a lot of. This will mean that each use will have to be carefully planned out.

I can't see Wake being able to handle these aircraft, much less enough to make any attack on Pearl worthwhile. But attacking US airbases in China and any others they build after they take islands would delay the B-29 strikes on Japan proper.

If these aircraft exist, I see them being prime targets for destruction.

As for the kamikazes, the Japanese were used to making such attacks during the Russo-Japanese War and the War in China (although not organized). So such a spirit could emerge. And one of these bombers with a full load of bombs hitting a carrier would be interesting...
 

Markus

Banned
If the point being made that Japan simply could not have produced an effective longrange bomber fleet any easier than match the US production of A/C carriers, this is clearly wrong. Depending upon the goals of long-range bombing, an effective bomber fleet could be as few as 50-100 aircraft in 1941-42(well within the capability of the Japanese aircraft industry without significantly shortchanging fighter and medium bomber production).

Errr, they were short of Zeros even before Coral Sea and the fight the US, Dutch and British air forces had put up in SEA untill then was not what I would call "tough and effective".

Your 50 to 100 very long range bombers might be most useful for recon, like revealing the US CV had already departed PH before Kido Butai hit Midway, but given the massive extent and the limited returns of the allied bomber offensive on Germany I don´t think 100 Japanese B-24 would make a difference as bombers.
 
Oddball operation

Suppose that, by whatever means, the Japanese have a fleet of heavy bombers at the start of Th Big Mistake, ie World War II. (And they could have, if they'd wanted to, but at the cost of other things, I'm confident.)

Unescorted missions would prove costly, even by night, and fighters don't have the range to fly escort.

So, move the bombers to a jumping off point--perhaps Midway for a few raids on Pearl. Also move a carrier or two into position part way between Midway and Pearl..but the carriers have all fighters on them. Escort launches to join the bombers, while the second CV uses its fighters as CAP.

Raid returns to base, and carriers hi-tail it OUT of there.

Do this once, and the Americans have to plan for it happening again.

Could heavy bombers fly in support of the Guadacanal garrison when the US was invading, once again with carrier fighter support?

These aren't things you'd likely plan pre-war, but might put into play once some lessons were learned.

(Incidently, the Doolittle raid's bombers were two engine bombers, not the 4 engined heavys)
 
Scarcasm? Moi?:eek: Well, maybe a once in a while. :p
:rolleyes:
The IJN believed, to exclusion of all else, in the "One Great Battle", this was, in the main, due to slavish devotion to the lessons of Tsushima (while ignoring the lessons of Jutland).
I don't think it was even "ignoring". If Peattie & Evans are right (& I think so), it was a flat inability to grasp them, to understand the strategic & geopolitical realities that enabled Japan to win in RJW. This inability ultimately sparked the PW, based on a faulty, or utter lack of, understanding they faced very differed circumstances against the U.S. &/or Britain.
Since Japanese military doctrine (and in 1930's Japan, military doctrine WAS national policy) was completely geared to the OFFENSIVE, it is breathtakingly unlikely that Japan's leadership would decide to devote huge amounts of scarce resources to a defensive system, especially when the same resources could be used to increae offensive systems (including carrier aircraft and tactical bombers to support ground troops in their attacks).
Exactly.
a minimal force of 100 heavy bombers, which would be of minimal usage in supporting either IJN or IJA goals, would have left the Kido Butai of the Combined Fleet without any aircraft to attack Pearl Harbor.
Hmm... An interesting perspective indeed.:cool:
 
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