Japanese victory on the Kokoda Trail

[BlackMage]

I'm really surprised this doesn't come up more often.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kokoda_Track_campaign

A bunch of possible PODs; an earlier Japanese victory at Isavura, a continued Japanese advance from Ioribaiwa, more cohesive supply lines, a weaker 39th Battalion, or an Australian defeat at Milne Bay. So, what happens if the Japanese are able to take Port Moresby by crossing the Kokoda Trail?

 

[BlackMage]

...anyone?

Well, for starters, control of Port Moresby would effectively deny Australia Papua New Guinea, since it was Australia's largest base there. Which means that the island hopping campaign can be much delayed.

It can also counteract the negative effects of the loss of the Battle of the Coral Sea, by re-asserting Japanese naval control over the region, although this is doubtful. If the Japanese do gain greater power in the region, it could substantially weaken Allied attempts to take bases in the area.

There's also the morale effect; Papua was an Australian territory at the time, and having it completely occupied by 'the enemy' could cause mass hysteria. The Japanese could set up a puppet 'republic' to try and gain support from the Papuan population, which could cause problems for the Australians post-war dealing with Papuan nationalists.

However, it probably wouldn't affect the final outcome of the war by more than a few months, although Australia's position during 1942 would be much weakened. Port Moresby would probably be retaken some time in 1943 or early 1944. But the effects on the Papuan population post-war could be very interesting, especially if the Japanese set up a puppet republic. (Alternately, they could try setting up an Australian puppet republic, with local whites coopted into an administration designed as an 'Australian government in exile')

Thoughts?

 

[Riain]

Most immediaely the Japanese can focus completely on Guadalcanal, and maybe win there too. Australia is isolated and Macarthur is marginalised and his forces are given low priority. Curtin is overthrown in favour of a strong PM, who ruthlessly reorganises Australias defences much like Britain in 1940. The entire armed forces are concentrated in the north of Australia, while the Darwin railway is rapidly built. While Nimitz fights his way across the Pacific, Australia liberates PNG, East Timor and other near north islands by its own efforts. As a result of this harrowing experience Australia pursues as independent foreign and defence policies as possible postwar, and is courted as an ally and partner throughout the Asia-Pacific.

 

[BlackMage]

Well, Curtin was about as strong as you were going to get in 1942; we'd already disposed of our Chamberlain, Menzies, in favour of our Churchillian Curtin. Short of a military coup, you don't get stronger than Curtin.

 

[Hendryk]

IIRC that's the topic of James Bradley's piece, "The Boys who saved Australia", in What If? 2.

 

[Riain]

I'm not a fan of Curtin. Pig Iron Bob was an Anglopile through and through, but what was Curtin's excuse for letting Britain and Mac abscond with Australia's Sovereignty when the Japanese were knocking on the door?

 

[BlackMage]

I'm not a fan of Curtin. Pig Iron Bob was an Anglopile through and through, but what was Curtin's excuse for letting Britain and Mac abscond with Australia's Sovereignty when the Japanese were knocking on the door?

Well, having the Japanese knocking at the door certainly played as a factor...and he hardly let the Brits take our sovereignty, what with the whole dispute over the troops to Burma. He was probably too close to Macarthur, I'll grant you that, but given the circumstances how could he not have been?

 

[Amerigo Vespucci]

Forces the pouring of more resources into the South Pacific Theatre. If enough Japanese resources are freed for the fight on Guadalcanal, forcing an American evacuation. Ironically, I could see a quicker end to the war in that case. If American forces are pushed back from Guadalcanal, the idea of a central Pacific offensive gains momentum. This would (given the post-1943 American advantage in carrier strength) allow for a quicker gain of bomber bases in range of Japan, thus potentially forcing a collapse of Japanese forces. I don't think that particular scenario is likely, though.

Probably, we'd simply see more resources poured into the South Pacific, causing the war to last longer, much to the detriment of Korea and causing butterflies throughout the Cold War.

 

[Riain]

Curtins contribution to the war was getting the AIF sent home rather than to Singapore, Ceylon or Burma. After than he didn't do much. He didn't redirect EATS airmen to fight in the SWPac, he didn't bring others already in Europe home, or naval personell and ships. He didn't take steps to allow the chocos to fight outside of Australian territory, he gave command of Australian troops to Mac, who marginalised them after 1943. But the line which condemns him in my eyes was when in 1945 he said to Mac words to the effct of 'I don't know anything about war, I'll leave that up to you.' He was the leader of the oppostion and then the PM for the entire 6 years of the war and didn't, by his own admission, learn a thing. He didn't attempt to ensure Australian troops were deployed to advance Ausralian interests, what else should a wartime politican strive for?

 

[Cockroach]

A bunch of possible PODs; an earlier Japanese victory at Isavura, a continued Japanese advance from Ioribaiwa, more cohesive supply lines, a weaker 39th Battalion, or an Australian defeat at Milne Bay. So, what happens if the Japanese are able to take Port Moresby by crossing the Kokoda Trail?

First it is moderatly unlikely in any scenario resembling OTL that the Japanese could push sufficient forces and supplies over the Kokoda trail to stand much chance of taking Port Morseby itself. Quite simply a muddy track through malaria infested jungle isn't the ideal means of shifting the artillary, shells, etc. needed to support a prolonged attack, and Port Morseby isn't some minor position that can be bypass or outflanked as the japs favoured in Malaya in earlier in the Kokoda campaign... that leaves the Japs with no option but to attempt to take Morseby by coup de main. Against prepeared postions that is effectivly suicidal.

Hence I would suggest a Japanese victory in the Battle of the Coral Sea would be a better choice for a PoD.

Now if Port Morseby falls what's the impact?
1. Fewer troops tied down in New Guinea. But this isn't all that major... the Japanese forces in the Kokoda campaign amounted to around 10,000 men, less than a third of the number deployed to Guadalcanal.
2. Threat to Australia. Rather minor actually... Probably limited to a few long-range nuisance raids by bombers; a few naval skirmishes in the Coral sea and perhaps one or two extreamly limited landings (nothing more than Company or Battalion strength).

 

[Melvin Loh]

(quote) First it is moderatly unlikely in any scenario resembling OTL that the Japanese could push sufficient forces and supplies over the Kokoda trail to stand much chance of taking Port Morseby itself. Quite simply a muddy track through malaria infested jungle isn't the ideal means of shifting the artillary, shells, etc. needed to support a prolonged attack, and Port Morseby isn't some minor position that can be bypass or outflanked as the japs favoured in Malaya in earlier in the Kokoda campaign... that leaves the Japs with no option but to attempt to take Morseby by coup de main. Against prepeared postions that is effectivly suicidal. (end quote)

Yeah, I'd agree- otl Horii's troops were so weakened by starvation & disease due to nonexistent logistics that they were stopped on the Kokoda Track from an all-out offensive against Moresby- same would've happened imho regardless of whether the Japs were more successful at Isurava or Iorobaiwa at some point sooner or later.

btw, have any of you fellas ever walked the Kokoda Track/Trail ? I'd like to, but I need to up my fitness, & find the finances since it's least $5000 for the cost of a decent tour alone.

 

[MarkA]

Curtins contribution to the war was getting the AIF sent home rather than to Singapore, Ceylon or Burma. After than he didn't do much. He didn't redirect EATS airmen to fight in the SWPac, he didn't bring others already in Europe home, or naval personell and ships. He didn't take steps to allow the chocos to fight outside of Australian territory, he gave command of Australian troops to Mac, who marginalised them after 1943. But the line which condemns him in my eyes was when in 1945 he said to Mac words to the effct of 'I don't know anything about war, I'll leave that up to you.' He was the leader of the oppostion and then the PM for the entire 6 years of the war and didn't, by his own admission, learn a thing. He didn't attempt to ensure Australian troops were deployed to advance Ausralian interests, what else should a wartime politican strive for?

Curious statement.

Curtin did more to change Australia on the home front than any politican before or since. As a civilian leader his statement is entirely appropriate and sensible. Waging war in the field is the job for the generals not the politicians.
It was the overrated and largely silly MacArthur who was the problem but what could any Australian PM do?

Bringing the ships and all Aussies serving abroad home is ridiculous. Germany First was the official policy of the Allies. Aircrew and pilots serving in GB were members of the RAF not the RAAF. The ships operating in the Med were of more use to the overall war effort than they could possibly be in the Pacific.

 

[Riain]

Politicans set strategy, in line with national war aims, which differ between allied combattants. How was Australias interest served by scattering its efforts so far and wide that they were swallowed up and unrecognised in the great scheme of things? How is Australia's interest served by giving control of our national defence to foreign Generals who have motivations other than the defence of Australia at heart, especially when a great power is directly threatening Australia? I think Curtin did a good job on the home front, but there was much he left in the hands of others when it came to the strategic direction the armed forces themselves.

 

[MarkA]

Politicans set strategy, in line with national war aims, which differ between allied combattants. How was Australias interest served by scattering its efforts so far and wide that they were swallowed up and unrecognised in the great scheme of things? How is Australia's interest served by giving control of our national defence to foreign Generals who have motivations other than the defence of Australia at heart, especially when a great power is directly threatening Australia? I think Curtin did a good job on the home front, but there was much he left in the hands of others when it came to the strategic direction the armed forces themselves.

We had a population of 7 million. Our industrial base was destroyed by the Great Depression. Our troops were overseas because we were at war with Germany before Japan attacked Pearl Harbour over two years later.

The representative of the US arrives with orders from the President and the Chiefs of Staff to fight Japan using Australia as a base. The potential troop strength and industrial might of the US was going to be used in the defence of Australia. True this was because of US war aims but the defence of the country was assured nontheless. So what do you want the Australian PM to do? Rebuff the aid? Antagonize the only ally powerful enough and willing enough to defend us?

 

[Riain]

I want the PM to gather Australian forces together and use them as a large part in campiagns, where their contribution is a recognisably large part in success. This was done in WW1 and Hughes was able to get his vioce heard at Versailles. Did Australia get any specific references in the peace settlements of WW2 as a results of their efforts, remembering that like the USSR, Australia over-mobilised?

 

[DMA]

Just a couple of comments:

I agree with Melvin Loh that the Japanese logisitcal arrangements were woeful to say the least. If anything, this would ensure that they couldn't take Port Moresby. It's speaks well of their fighting abilities that they got so close, but it's no surprise that, when they were finally stopped, they were pushed back in the manner of the OTL.

I'll also agree with Cockroach who identifed a reversal of the Coral Sea battle is probably the best option for a POD with the capture of Port Moresby.

Maybe an Australian loss at Milne Bay, could be another option, but the Japanese were even more so isolated at Milne Bay than on the Kokoda Trail. So it could very well be a short lived victory leading to nothing.

As for Curtin: his first duty was to ensure that Australia was safe from invasion. That really didn't become obvious until 1943. By then the bulk of the Australian army was committed to New Guinea. Likewise, even though some airforce & naval personnel maybe deployed in Europe, the bulk of the RAAF & RAN were deployed in the South Pacific - those that hadn't been shot down or sunk yet that is. But the Japanese can certainly testify to the effectiveness of the RAAF.

Whatever came later in the war, whether they be dreams of grandure or whatever, are frankly too little too late. The Americans far outnumber Australians, both in manpower & resources, whilst the Japanese are basically on the run by 1944. Of course it doesn't help the Australian military to have a drunkard yoboo as its chief, in the form of Blamey, who was completely useless for all & sundry & acted like a huge anchor ensuring virtually nothing was done until very late in the war ie operations in Borneo etc. So if we're going to have a blame game going, pick on Blamey, not Curtin who inherited the war from Menzies in October 1941 & thus was only PM for 4 years of the war NOT 6

 

[Larrikin]

RAF & RAAF

Aircrew and pilots serving in GB were members of the RAF not the RAAF. The ships operating in the Med were of more use to the overall war effort than they could possibly be in the Pacific.

Unless the Australian in question enlisted in the RAF in the Uk the Australians over there served with the RAAF. They wore their own uniforms, were disciplined and promoted by the RAAF, and annoyed the crap out of the Brit stuffed shirts. My father was in BC and he and all his mates would be quite astounded to learn that they were members of the RAF.

What Curtin could have and should have done is made damn sure we got and Australian Group ala the Canadians.

 

[Roddoss72]

Well, Curtin was about as strong as you were going to get in 1942; we'd already disposed of our Chamberlain, Menzies, in favour of our Churchillian Curtin. Short of a military coup, you don't get stronger than Curtin.

Exactly right, while that limp wrist Menzies allowed Churchill to dominate him to the point that Churchill refused to allow any Australain troops to return home to defend our homeland, Curtin defied Churchill and recalled our toops home.

Regards

 

[Roddoss72]

One major point and that is if Port Morsby had fallen to the Japanese then what, it is one thing to land a major force of Japanese in say Darwin or say North Queensland it is another to have a supply column of up to 2,000 kilimetres long through inhospitable desert (Darwin senario) or 1,200+ kilometres through harsh rain forest just to make contact and engage a military force along the Brisbane Line of Defense.

Also supply convoys from the US would not be that overly affected as most convoys came through from Hawaii-New Zealand-Australia and could avoid most of the Japanese Fleet, or could have taken a longer route from US-Chile-Easter Island-New Zealand-Australia. I know that resupplying Australia with PNG in Japanese hands would be very difficult it could be somehow be maintained.

 

[Riain]

Sorry about the rant, I just think WW2 was a bit of a lost opportunity for Australia. I don't have delusions of granduer, but postwar status and position are decided by the size and effectivness of the wartime contribution, if ustralia had played a recognisably large part it would have gained in the peace settlement, perhas a formal alliance with the US earlier than the 50s. Curtin was leader of the opposition before he became PM, he had 2 years to formulate ideas about Australia's direction in the war before he became responsible for it himself. People are dead right about Blamey, but Curtin should have replaced him with someone better. US forces in SWPac weren't so huge that 5 Australian divisions wouldn't be noticed, and could provide a bit of a say about this theatre of war if Australian pollies were so inclined.