Japanese victory in the pacific war - is it really ASB?

[Belisarius II]

If it's stupid and it works, then it's not stupid.
On paper, the forts look good. In Practice, they never fired full charges from the 16s, as they would break windows. The Mortars never practiced against targets moving at 27 knots.
And that's assuming full crews, that would not be the case on the 7th.

Read on how long it took Rodney and KGV to blast away at Bismarck, a slow moving predictable target at near point blank range, before she stopped moving. Yamato is a far tougher nut to crack.
And she has one job, a suicide run into the entry, then fire away till the ship sinks.
Few nations had a crew that would follow an order like that in all history, and IJN crews would follow to the letter.

What's silly is sinking the most powerful battleship in the world, to block a harbor. If you wanted to do that, you could sail several old freighters, loaded with stones for ballast into the channel, and sink them there. The problem with your plan is the Japanese correctly understood that a surface ship couldn't approach the harbor entrance without being detected. It was supposed to be a surprise attack, that's why it was done by aircraft, and submarines. Your making a false assumption that since Yamato didn't engage in combat till the last year of the war she served no purpose. Even though the Americans underestimated her size she, and her sister battleships had a huge deterrent effect, and had huge combat power.

 

[Belisarius II]

Why not? It's not like there's no need to counterattack Japan.

OTOH, it might mean the Gilberts op (Tarawa) goes off, instead...

Because the Japanese Carrier Forces were too strong to confront directly, and the Japanese would have still been on the offensive. we couldn't attack the Gilberts, or Carolina Islands until we had a carrier force strong enough to neutralize the land based air power in the area. Trying to do that in 1942 would have been suicide. They were also too close to the Japanese main forward Fleet Base at Truk, the Japanese Pearl Harbor.

 

[steamboy]

The BT-7 is still basically a better tank than anything the IJA could field at the time.

 

[marathag]

sail several old freighters, loaded with stones for ballast into the channel, and sink them there.

They were not built to resist 16" guns, and little subdivision below decks. No you need something that could take more than a dozen torpedo hits and keep chugging along

 

[Garrison]

"Different decisions." Agreed! That's how many alt-timelines take off.
But what you haven't proposed is how the Imperial Japanese Army leadership ends making that different decision - when we know that, historically, they were unanimously and viscerally opposed. So you really need a pretty major point of departure, and it has to be plausible. I'm not saying it is *impossible*; but I think it extraordinarily difficult to come up with one, based on what I know.

Cannot agree strongly enough with this. The Japanese leaderships decisions about when and how to wage war were shaped by the cultural, political and economic realities of Imperial Japan. However crazy some of those decision seem to us they had their own 'mad logic' and if you want to change them you need to provide a context for those changes.

 

[CV12Hornet]

Thank you for the additional details of the ground defense. Anyone can make a typo. Yes you make a very good point about the IJA not wanting to go into the Indian Ocean. You also make a good point about the 8th Division, it could have been swapped for one in South China. What could have convinced them to change their minds? A stronger argument by the IJN. Agreeing to send troops to Alaska, and midway made a lot less sense, but they were talked into that. As for losing 20 aircraft over Ceylon, that was light, for the strategic return. Carriers would lose a plane every few days in training accidents. 20 planes out of 300 is negligible. If there'd been no Operation MO, or Midway, that's all to the good for the Japanese.

What your underestimating is land based Japanese air power, both Army & Navy. Their fighters were superior to the Fulmars, and Hurricanes availed in Theater. Japanese Bombers were deadly to Allied Ships. Even USN Carrier Groups needed to operate with great caution in range of Japanese air bases. Once in Ceylon the RN isn't getting too close to the Island, Their not going to be cruising east of the Island, hoping to intercept convoys. Your also underestimating the IJA. At this stage of the war the British Army didn't do well in this type of terrain, especially when operating under enemy air control. It wouldn't be the Japanese, but the British that would be suffering with serious supply problems.

Any relief forces would have to come from outside the CBI Theater. The bases people are talking about at the tip of India would have to be built, without anything being shipped in. The build up of bases, and forces in Assam would also have to be done without benefit of men, and material being shipped in from the Bay of Bengal. The RAF would need to commit several groups of the latest Spitfire MK-V's to begin to regain air superiority, along with a like number of modern bomber types.

To take Ceylon Back they'll need amphibious shipping for a couple of divisions. Historically they never had that in the Indian Ocean. Every time they planned an amphibious operation in Burma, or Sumatra the shipping was never available. There was always a higher priority for it somewhere else in the world, and they were only talking about shipping for 1 division. So taking Ceylon might have required a change in priorities for the Japanese, but it sure would have done the same for the Allies. Again I never suggested this was a war winner for Japan, but it would have thrown the Allies for a loop.

20 planes is not light when it means losing pilots that are functionally irreplaceable. And Nagumo isn't losing 20 planes, as Athelstane noted: that was with the OTL Indian Ocean raid, which encountered far less opposition and was a shorter carrier commitment compared to an invasion of Ceylon.

Midway involved the Army committing a single regiment to the operation, which is a much easier sell than two divisions. The Aleutian Islands operation was an Army brainchild and also involved less force than your Ceylon invasion. In fact, both operations combined amounted to less than a single division's worth of troops, even accounting for SNLF troops.

What land-based air units do the Japanese have available to fly in? Of course, that also depends on capturing Trincomalee and the surrounding areas ASAP, because those are the only airfields available on the eastern side of the island.

The Brits don't need dedicated bases to ship troops to Ceylon from India; Chennai is a major port and should be close enough to make night runs with transports to Colombo.

 

[Belisarius II]

Cannot agree strongly enough with this. The Japanese leaderships decisions about when and how to wage war were shaped by the cultural, political and economic realities of Imperial Japan. However crazy some of those decision seem to us they had their own 'mad logic' and if you want to change them you need to provide a context for those changes.

Like all debates they go according to a combination of the force of logic, and the force of personalities. The logic for Ceylon was it was a doable operation that could strike a heavy blow at the Allies. It kept both the IJN & IJA on the offensive, and the Allies off balance. It struck the enemy where, and when he was week. Their German Allies wanted them to do it, because it would have effects on the European War, in which Japan's fate also rested. The Japanese Army was more pro German then the Navy. It could be done at little risk, but it was time sensitive, they had to act before the British could strengthen their defenses. It took advantage of their combined Naval & Army Air Power, and their unmatched ability to self deploy land based air units, over great distances. The Allies had little near term ability to respond. Ceylon would extended Japan's defense zone away from the E Indies, and at the same time was an offensive base, so it would act as both a sword, and shield, at the same time.

Yamamoto had a very strong personality. He talked the Naval General Staff into supporting the Pearl Harbor Attack. He talked the Army into sending thousands of troops to Midway & Alaska, which made almost no sense. If he pushed Ceylon hard enough he might well have convinced the Army to go along, he hadn't been wrong yet, and his prestige was at it height after Pearl Harbor. His influence with the Naval General staff, and the Tojo regime was at it's strongest in early 1942. That gave him a heavy influence with the Imperial General Staff, which directed war planning, and strategy. If you push on a door hard enough, and long enough you can force it open.

 

[Athelstane]

Losing Ceylon and India would be a grave psychological blow to Britain. Churchill would be removed as PM.

Nah. If Singapore and Tobruk - within four months of each other - could not get Churchill removed, a Japanese invasion of Ceylon won't get him removed, either.

The July vote of confidence saw him losing only 25 votes in the Commons.

 

[Athelstane]

What could have convinced them to change their minds? A stronger argument by the IJN. Agreeing to send troops to Alaska, and midway made a lot less sense, but they were talked into that.

The troop commitments to the Aleutians and Midway were paltry, though.

Attu got what amounted to an army battalion and some engineers, and later a second battalion. Kiska was occupied by IJN SNLF forces. Midway was a combination of IJN troops and IJA troops, the latter being just a regiment. And these small units had already been detailed early on to IJN operations. The Army had very little to concede here.

Ceylon, by contrast, is a multi-division ground operation on the scale of Malaya.

As for losing 20 aircraft over Ceylon, that was light, for the strategic return. Carriers would lose a plane every few days in training accidents. 20 planes out of 300 is negligible.

The point is, it adds up. That's 20 on top of the losses sustained since the outbreak of war. And if Nagumo has to hang around Ceylon for a couple weeks, he's going to lose far more than 20 aircraft. IS it really worth it? How long will it take the IJN to replace the squadrons, given their practice in this regard?

Meanwhile, while he's getting whittled down off Ceylon, the Americans just bombed Tokyo.

And all that aside, we haven't even discussed the Southwest Monsoon season, which kicks in in June. That may make Somerville's life more difficult, but it will do the same to any supply runs attempted across the Bay of Bengal, to say nothing of the absolute *joy* it will be to the IJA in trying to pry the Australians and East Africans out of the central highland jungles, or air operations...

What your underestimating is land based Japanese air power, both Army & Navy. Their fighters were superior to the Fulmars, and Hurricanes availed in Theater. Japanese Bombers were deadly to Allied Ships.

Yeah, man, but you got to get them there. Sure, some of these are long-ranged enough that you can bridge them in from Port Blair. But where are you getting them from? The Burma Campaign? And what about ground crews? What about petrol? Spare parts?

Once in Ceylon the RN isn't getting too close to the Island, Their not going to be cruising east of the Island, hoping to intercept convoys.

Why not? The RAF already has ten squadrons of Hurricanes, for starters, in India proper. Any IJA air force on the island will have to deal with that, I mean, when they're not providing CAS for the battles against the Australians and East Africans. They can't spare much to go haring off deep into the Bay of Bengal looking for Somerville's forces.

 

[Athelstane]

The Brits don't need dedicated bases to ship troops to Ceylon from India; Chennai is a major port and should be close enough to make night runs with transports to Colombo.

Yeah. If the Japanese could make 800 mile night runs down the Slot in destroyers, the British can surely manage a 100 mile dash down to Jaffna from Madras. Or even run lighters with troops over from Ramaswaram, which is, like, 20, 30 miles, depending on where you're disembarking them.

Allied garrisons in Malaya and Bataan had no such advantages.

 

[Belisarius II]

20 planes is not light when it means losing pilots that are functionally irreplaceable. And Nagumo isn't losing 20 planes, as Athelstane noted: that was with the OTL Indian Ocean raid, which encountered far less opposition and was a shorter carrier commitment compared to an invasion of Ceylon.

Midway involved the Army committing a single regiment to the operation, which is a much easier sell than two divisions. The Aleutian Islands operation was an Army brainchild and also involved less force than your Ceylon invasion. In fact, both operations combined amounted to less than a single division's worth of troops, even accounting for SNLF troops.

What land-based air units do the Japanese have available to fly in? Of course, that also depends on capturing Trincomalee and the surrounding areas ASAP, because those are the only airfields available on the eastern side of the island.

The Brits don't need dedicated bases to ship troops to Ceylon from India; Chennai is a major port and should be close enough to make night runs with transports to Colombo.

The loses of Carrier Pilots didn't become critical till late 1942. How many planes, and flight crews do you think Yamamoto expected to lose at Midway? 100? They lost about 70 at Corral Sea. So the Army wanted to invade Alaska? That's a real dead end.

Here is a list of IJA Air Units fighting over Burma, and the Bay of Bengal from Dec 25, 1941, to till late March, 1942. http://www.fireandfury.com/orbats/pacburmaairorbats.pdf

Any of these units could have flown to bases in Ceylon, and shuttled between Ceylon, Burma, or the East Indies. The Genzan Naval Air Group, which sunk the Repulse, and Prince of Wales was also available.

You can't ship troops without ships. There were no troop transports in the Bay of Bengal. That's the point of taking Ceylon, it closes off the Bay of Bengal to Allied Shipping. Nagumo sunk 100,000 tons of shipping in the Bay of Bengal, during the raid in the Indian ocean. It seems most of the British Troops were around Columbo, not defending Trincomalee, so the Japanese should have little trouble capturing it. With air control, and a little sea lift the Japanese can move overland, and around by water to attack Columbo, and secure the rest of the Island.

The situation of the British troops on Ceylon would be grim. If Summerville tried to take the troops off the Island on destroyers, like the RN did at Crete, their loses would be even heavier. The Luftwaffe didn't have torpedo bombers in that battle, and the Japanese were better at ship attacks, then the Germans, or Italians were. If he wanted any aircover he'd have to bring his carriers in range of attack. Would he risk them? This is why Churchill was so worried the Japanese would invade Ceylon. He knew the Island was vulnerable, and the strategic consequences of losing it would be very serious. Again it wouldn't win the war, but it would be a major setback, and disrupt Allied Strategic Plans.

 

[Athelstane]

They lost about 70 at Corral Sea.

And that kept Zuikaku from being available to go to Midway. What kind of difference could that extra carrier have made?

Here is a list of IJA Air Units fighting over Burma, and the Bay of Bengal from Dec 25, 1941, to till late March, 1942. http://www.fireandfury.com/orbats/pacburmaairorbats.pdf

Any of these units could have flown to bases in Ceylon, and shuttled between Ceylon, Burma, or the East Indies. The Genzan Naval Air Group, which sunk the Repulse, and Prince of Wales was also available.

Well, if you're using them in the Bay of Bengal, you're not using them to support the offensive in Burma.

You can't ship troops without ships. There were no troop transports in the Bay of Bengal.

Use whatever merchie hulls there are sitting in port in Calcutta, Madras, etc.. As the saying goes: "Needs must."

That will make transporting heavier equipment more difficult, to be sure. But if you just need infantrymen, those can be transported on just about anything that floats. The IJN proved that at Guadalcanal. The British proved it at Dunkirk.

 

[CV12Hornet]

You can't ship troops without ships. There were no troop transports in the Bay of Bengal. That's the point of taking Ceylon, it closes off the Bay of Bengal to Allied Shipping. Nagumo sunk 100,000 tons of shipping in the Bay of Bengal, during the raid in the Indian ocean. It seems most of the British Troops were around Columbo, not defending Trincomalee, so the Japanese should have little trouble capturing it. With air control, and a little sea lift the Japanese can move overland, and around by water to attack Columbo, and secure the rest of the Island.

The situation of the British troops on Ceylon would be grim. If Summerville tried to take the troops off the Island on destroyers, like the RN did at Crete, their loses would be even heavier. The Luftwaffe didn't have torpedo bombers in that battle, and the Japanese were better at ship attacks, then the Germans, or Italians were. If he wanted any aircover he'd have to bring his carriers in range of attack. Would he risk them? This is why Churchill was so worried the Japanese would invade Ceylon. He knew the Island was vulnerable, and the strategic consequences of losing it would be very serious. Again it wouldn't win the war, but it would be a major setback, and disrupt Allied Strategic Plans.

See, this is your problem: you keep presuming that the Japanese can just yoink Ceylon before the Brits can do anything besides defend with the forces on the island. That is an extremely dangerous assumption. All other problems aside, the mere fact that they'd have to march to and take Colombo after taking Trincomalee means the British have more than enough time to plan a response, time enough for the Kido Butai to run out of fuel and have to return home.

 

[Athelstane]

All other problems aside, the mere fact that they'd have to march to and take Colombo after taking Trincomalee means the British have more than enough time to plan a response, time enough for the Kido Butai to run out of fuel and have to return home.

No matter how much fuel he's got on hand, Nagumo will have to leave the moment they get the transmission that Doolittle's bombs have fallen on Tokyo (April 18). Though my rough estimation is that he'll be just about bingo fuel at that point anyway.

 

[Anti-GrammarNazi]

Well apparently it is easier for Germany to attain a permanent territory that goes from Calais to the Urals, that it is for Japan to win the Pacific War.

Ultimately Germany vs Britain and the USSR was a battle of Great Powers. Japan vs the US was a regional power pretending to be a Great Power vs a Great Power that is transforming into a superpower.

 

[dmg86]

In one book I had it was put this way if Japan was a little giant the US was Godzilla.

 

[Athelstane]

For those curious, by the way, we had a thread on a Ceylon operation a few years ago, one which turned into another one of those long scrums with Glenn239. Glenn didn't convince anyone else to buy into his Bengal Sea Mammal, but it's a helpful thread for having an abundance of data and links that are relevant here.

 

[Garrison]

Almost 20 pages and no one has offered up ideas that would change my view that the answer to the question the OP posed in the title is still essentially yes. Once Japan is at war with the USA defeat is inevitable and all the proposals for somehow tiptoeing around that by attacking the possessions of the Colonial powers remain as unconvincing as ever.

 

[Look More Closely Later]

My understanding of the historical Imperial Japanese actions in the Aleutians and against Midway and 1942 was that they were meant to protect the Home Islands from a repeat of the Doolittle Raid, by closing gaps in the approaches/defences.
I do not see how Imperial Japan conquering (or at least trying to conquer) Ceylon directly prevents the Americans from sneaking carriers and bombers towards the home-islands in the Pacific Ocean. (Or indeed helps Imperial Japan to win the Pacific War which this thread was ostensibly originally about.)
But maybe I'm overlooking something...

 

[Athelstane]

Almost 20 pages and no one has offered up ideas that would change my view that the answer to the question the OP posed in the title is still essentially yes. Once Japan is at war with the USA defeat is inevitable and all the proposals for somehow tiptoeing around that by attacking the possessions of the Colonial powers remain as unconvincing as ever.

At the least, certainly not in the Pacific War that kicked off on December 7, 1941. (Which is what the OP is really asking.)

You need a muuuuuuch earlier point of departure, getting you a very different history and a very different war in a very different context to even have a hope of it.

There are things Japanese leadership could do make the Allied victory a bit more painful and maybe a bit longer in coming for the Allies. But that's it.