Japanese victory in the pacific war - is it really ASB?

[Athelstane]

They didn't take a major Manchurian city until almost two weeks after the surrender in fact.

I don't have time to delve into the rest of your Manchuria discussion here yet, but: The First Far Eastern Front seized Mutanchiang (after the battle of the same name, in which they destroyed about half of the Japanese Fifth Army) on Aug 16. It was a city with a million plus population, which surely counts as a "major" city.

Anyhow, that's a lot sooner than two weeks after the surrender.

 

[BobTheBarbarian]

re. Manchuria: in the past I have seen a number of sources (for example: here and here) make the claim that prior to the Soviet invasion medical preparations were made for approximately 540,000 casualties including 160,000 dead; this was based on an analysis of Japanese paper strength and the assumption that they would fight to the death as they did on various Pacific islands.

Because I have never seen these numbers repeated in any Russian sources I haven't posted them before, but 540,000 casualties in 8 weeks of fighting is a higher casualty rate per day (c. 9,600) than was experienced during most eastern front campaigns; only a few, such as Operation Kutuzov (Orel), Bagration, and Berlin had higher specific rates, and especially Bagration involved more people than would be committed to the Far East. From this, it would strongly imply that the Soviets were not expecting a 'walk-over' at all but instead a tough, brutal campaign.

 

[M79]

Because Afghanistan, Vietnam, Algeria, Angola and Mozambique were not fought in response to any of those countries launching a surprise attack on Britian, the US, France or Portugal.

Respectfully, the first two saw prior powers beaten down and lessons were not learned or ignored for the sake of politics, the latter two involve a colonial war with populations who had no desire to stay under Lisbon's grip. In all cases being thousands of miles from friendly territory fighting determined opposition with horrific climate extremes/diseases/guerilla warfare are not often prerequisites for optimal morale.

Why do I always find these threads when they are well advanced...

Preach!

Anyway, let me just throw this brick in: production figures, Japan vs US.

It's stuff like this that prevents me to even look at stories like "Man in the high castle"...

I'd take a stronger look at them if the explanations were more plausible, but usually that means the US ignores Europe with Germany overrunning the USSR in 1941/1942 and the UK bowing to submission with a transatlantic invasion 5-10 years later. I have not seen a scenario where the Nazis and Japanese have a falling out after defeating Europe/USSR and court the US to gain the advantage in the next phase of World War which would be a more likely scenario, and under those circumstances I think Washington would align with Tokyo and connect boot to Nazi a**.

 

[History Learner]

Fatman had to be airburst fuzed, the 'laydown' versions were a decade in the future. Gun types could be made as ground penetrators, but none till.well after the War.

Gadget blew from 100ft tower shot, and even that low, had limited fallout, and that fell 30 miles away, not at Ground Zero.

Marching thru, days later, was very different from having one dropped on you.

It'd have no effect on the Japanese defenses then, as they were well fortified in mountain positions while the latent radioactivity within 24-48 hours of their use to the arrival of the U.S. troops would still induce casualties. As the cited bit from the wiki shows, you didn't have to be in the blast to get ARS.

 

[History Learner]

No, man, this doesn't work.

Unit 731 was not publicly known in 1945-46. Public coverage didn't really start until the 1950's. How can the American public be outraged about something they do not know about?

Likewise, the extent of the Emperor's involvement in the decision to go to war, and various other actions of the government, was also not known, and it's only become a matter of public knowledge in recent decades. The public generally bought into Mac's line that the emperor was detached from all that.

But the Bataan Death March? Everyone knew about that. And they were seething.

The Rape of Nanking? Everyone knew about that. And in China, they were seething.

Unit 731 was actually brought up in passing during the IMTFE while the role of the Emperor was public knowledge and a common facet in American wartime propaganda; TIME in January of 1944 ran an expose outlining this for public consumption.

From Wiki: "Soon after the war, the Allied powers indicted 25 persons as Class-A war criminals, and 5,700 persons were indicted as Class-B or Class-C war criminals by Allied criminal trials. Of these, 984 were initially condemned to death, 920 were actually executed, 475 received life sentences, 2,944 received some prison terms, 1,018 were acquitted, and 279 were not sentenced or not brought to trial. "

Why, in fact, that was more executions than happened for Nazi war crimes, if I am not mistaken...

Was it enough? No, it wasn't. I'm still angry that Masanobu Tsuji wasn' brought to trial and made to dance on air, for starters. But 920 executions is not nothing, either. I think it is fair to say that the American public perception in 1946 was that at least substantial justice had been done for war crimes.

Low level, yes, but for the most part the majors got off. I have no doubt several would still be prosecuted but the U.S. isn't to make this is an overall major deal; they didn't IOTL and a fail to see why they would here, given the onset of Cold War tensions all the same.

 

[History Learner]

I don't have time to delve into the rest of your Manchuria discussion here yet, but: The First Far Eastern Front seized Mutanchiang (after the battle of the same name, in which they destroyed about half of the Japanese Fifth Army) on Aug 16. It was a city with a million plus population, which surely counts as a "major" city.

Anyhow, that's a lot sooner than two weeks after the surrender.

For one, the Soviets did not destroy the Fifth Army and it remained a combat capable; to quote S.M. Shtemenko's The Soviet General Staff at War states, on page 354:

"To precipitate a real surrender and prevent unnecessary bloodshed, it was decided to land airborne forces at key points in the enemy's lines - Harbin, Kirin, Mukden, Changchun, and some other cities of Manchuria and Korea. After 17:00 hours on August 18th aircraft carrying the first group of 120 airborne troops under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Zabelin took off from Horol and set course for Harbin. This force had the task of seizing the aerodrome and other important military installations, protecting the bridges on the Sungari and holding them until the main forces of the First Far Eastern Front arrived. With the first echelon of the airborne force was Major-General G.A. Shelakhov, the Front's deputy chief of staff, who had been appointed special representative of the Military Council. His duties were to present a surrender ultimatum to the command of the Japanese forces in Harbin and dictate its terms to them. We had no precise information about the situation of the city and the Soviet Consulate there. All we knew was that the main forces of the First Front of the Kwantung Army were falling back on Harbin after their defeat at Mutanchiang. They formed a very considerable force."

Likewise, the name "Army" is deceptive; it was in actuality a Corps sized formation, with the difference being a different lexicon in the IJA. As previously stated, it was also a constituent element of the wider First Area Army, of which the Soviets had as a whole failed to inflict serious damage to. According the Japanese records, the First Area Army's 3rd Army retained two thirds of its original effectiveness, the 5th Army (The force at the Battle of Mutanchiang) was one half, the 128th Division (detached from 3rd Army) was also at one half and, finally, the 134th Division (under First Area Army HQ) was at two thirds effectiveness. The 122nd and 139th Divisions, meanwhile, had not been affected by the Soviet offensive to any real meaningful extent.

As for Mutanchiang, the IJA inflicted at least 10,000 Soviet casualties and destroyed hundreds of tanks; not an overall bad performance given the force disparities. Likewise, Mutanchiang itself was, at the time, a city of about 100,000 not 1,000,000 million and was not of strategic importance like Harbin or Port Arthur are/were.

 

[Marc]

Just a comment:
The notion that American morale could be broken hasn't read enough of American history. May I suggest to start with the campaigns of 1864?
We don't give up, particularly when we know we are winning, however hard it might be. A cultural trait.

 

[kmmontandon]

Never denied any of these. The question is if Japan could wear the US down and inflict so many casualties, that war exhaustion on the american homefront would become heavy enough for the people to demand peace, even if it means a peace favourable for Japan

A peace that leaves Japan somewhat intact is far, far different from one that's favourable, which implies they actually gained something from the war. Any peace that leaves Japan in an even infinitesimally better position than they were on Dec. 6, 1941, is not going to happen, even if it means a five year blockade (which, btw, wouldn't involved any significant American casualties, and would only require a peacetime economy). Not that it would come to that.

Also, you're really, really shifting the goalposts from your initial question/scenario to get to this point.

 

[Belisarius II]

Given the U.S. even IOTL allowed the Emperor to stay in power and, for one notable example, effectively shielded Unit 731 from prosecution in exchange for their data, I don't think this would be an issue. It's honestly bizarre how few Japanese were put on trial for warcrimes compared to the Nazis, despite similarly heinous crimes.



The Soviets had come nowhere close to taking 85% of Manchuria; they had, as I said, penetrated the frontier lines but that was it. They didn't take a major Manchurian city until almost two weeks after the surrender in fact. The Kwantung Army was in the process of withdrawing into the mountains and the Soviets had no ability to pursue them as their exploitation force-6th Guards Tank-was completely exhausted on fuel. Once in to the Tunghua Rebdoubt, there was no way no artillery or aerial bombardment would allow for a rapid closure of the campaign; see Iwo Jima and Okinawa for contemporary examples. Likewise, Tunghua was adjacent to the Korean border, meaning the nearly one million Japanese soldiers within it would be screening essentially all of Korea. As for China, the China Expeditionary Army was withdrawing into coastal redoubts, which would've required protracted fighting to eliminate.

As previously stated and quoting the Soviets themselves, STAVKA had set an eight week window before their logistics gave out, at which point things slow to a crawl. I have no doubt that, over the long run, they can reduce Tunghua but it's going to take rivers of Soviet blood and definitely multiple months of campaigning. In the Kuriles, victory is certain for the Japanese while I think it's likewise so in Korea and Karafuto. If the U.S. makes peace in late 1945 or early 1946, the Japanese can likely keep Karafuto and Korea; even until the very end, Gianreco notes U.S. submarines had failed to successfully cut off sea links between Korea and Japan that allowed for the transfer of forces.
hem
Most likely, though, I see the Japanese keeping Karafuto, the Kuriles and Formosa while Korea is placed under a UN trusteeship as was envisioned IOTL. The U.S. would insist, and the Japanese were ready to accept, Versailles like military limitations too. Turning over a few War Criminals was also likely, although nobody major I suspect.

Respectfully your appraisal of the situation of the Kwantung Army is completely unrealistic. Manchuria is a vast area larger then Western Europe, that extends as a salient into Soviet territory. The Red Army had a 50% manpower advantage, was vastly superior to the Kwantung Army in armor, artillery, and air power. They held the strategic initiative, so they controlled the tempo of operations. The Japanese had very limited motor transport, confining them to movement by rail lines, horse transport, or old fashioned foot marching. They were a WWI Army vs. a WWII Army, completely outclassed in mobile warfare. It's not like a small Pacific Island were the Japanese can sit in bunkers, and the Red Army has to take them out a bunker at a time. Like the Americans on Luzon, the Red Army would cut the Japanese Army in Manchuria to pieces, in mobile operations. I have no idea what kind of bottle neck your talking about, where the Japanese could hold the Red Army up for months.


In the Pacific I don't recognize the war your talking about. American Submarines, and Aircraft have sunk 98% of the Japanese Merchant Marine. Most Japanese shipping between the main Islands was being carried out by small coasters, ferries, and sampans. It was almost impossible to find a ship worth using a torpedo on. In August 1945 American Submarines were just starting to penetrate the mine barriers protecting the last Japanese bastion in the Sea of Japan. In the air war the Japanese could only put up sporadic resistance to U.S. Air Attacks. In 1945 Japan was running out of food, and fuel, industry, and transportation were collapsing. Civilian moral was rock bottom, with the average person just praying for peace. For their part the soldiers were griped by a grim fatalism, with no hope of any kind of victory, or even survival. The generals may have been hot to fight on for honor, but the common soldier had had enough.

Nether the American Government, or People would accept Versailles like terms, and they had no reason to do so. Only an insane pride was prolonging the suffering of the Japanese People. The fall of the Tojo ministry after the navy's defeat in the Battle of the Marianas was an admission that the war was lost. The civilian government was determined to find some way to end the war. Fear of assassination, stopped them from making overt moves, the Emperor was committed to an "early" end to the war, by 1944. So your suggesting the nihilistic generals were right, and that Japan just needed to fight one more battle, to obtain acceptable terms?

This insane hope was based on the idea that the Americans would land on Southern Kyushu, and fight a grinding land battle. The invasion force would be tied to the beaches, so Kamikazes could hit transports. After inflicting massive casualties the Americans would then talk to the Japanese, and settle on terms keeping the militarists in power. Japan would also be allowed to continue with the enslavement of the Koreans, and hold onto Taiwan as well, forgetting China's prior claim. All this was supposed to happen after the Battle for Kyushu was lost. What chips would they have after that?

The flaw in this strategy is, what if the Americans don't land where the Japanese expected them to? So they have to hold out against massive sea, and air, including more atomic attacks till December, and if Kyushu isn't invaded, what then? By December the Red Army has occupied all of Manchuria, and Korea. The Chinese are on the offensive. The British are retaking Malaya, and the Americans, and Australians are in the Dutch East Indies. Japan is facing starvation. The situation is worse then it was in August, so how do they get Versailles like terms, when they couldn't get them then? What your talking about mercifully wasn't in the cards.

 

[History Learner]

Respectfully your appraisal of the situation of the Kwantung Army is completely unrealistic. Manchuria is a vast area larger then Western Europe, that extends as a salient into Soviet territory. The Red Army had a 50% manpower advantage, was vastly superior to the Kwantung Army in armor, artillery, and air power. They held the strategic initiative, so they controlled the tempo of operations. The Japanese had very limited motor transport, confining them to movement by rail lines, horse transport, or old fashioned foot marching. They were a WWI Army vs. a WWII Army, completely outclassed in mobile warfare. It's not like a small Pacific Island were the Japanese can sit in bunkers, and the Red Army has to take them out a bunker at a time. Like the Americans on Luzon, the Red Army would cut the Japanese Army in Manchuria to pieces, in mobile operations. I have no idea what kind of bottle neck your talking about, where the Japanese could hold the Red Army up for months.

As I've repeatedly said, I have no doubt the Red Army could eventually clear the Japanese out of Manchuria; this would not be easy nor would it be fast however. The Soviets IOTL completely failed at the operational level, failing to achieve any of their goals as stated at the start of the campaign and Post-War analysis by them meshed with those of the West, in that they had decisively failed to defeat the Kwantung Army and, as Bob has noted, they were fully expecting the conflict to be an utter bloodbath only matched by the Eastern Front at its worst.

That casualties were nearly 1:1 for one despite the Soviets having the advantage in motorized forces, airpower and being a third larger than the Kwantung Army should really speak volumes not of just the Soviet lackings, but of the quality of the IJA as a fighting force.

In the Pacific I don't recognize the war your talking about. American Submarines, and Aircraft have sunk 98% of the Japanese Merchant Marine. Most Japanese shipping between the main Islands was being carried out by small coasters, ferries, and sampans. It was almost impossible to find a ship worth using a torpedo on. In August 1945 American Submarines were just starting to penetrate the mine barriers protecting the last Japanese bastion in the Sea of Japan. In the air war the Japanese could only put up sporadic resistance to U.S. Air Attacks. In 1945 Japan was running out of food, and fuel, industry, and transportation were collapsing. Civilian moral was rock bottom, with the average person just praying for peace. For their part the soldiers were griped by a grim fatalism, with no hope of any kind of victory, or even survival. The generals may have been hot to fight on for honor, but the common soldier had had enough.

This isn't really supported by the historical evidence; case in point is that in August of 1945 the IGHQ still had ~10,000 operational planes and 1 million barrels of fuel stockpiled in preparation for the decisive battle. Despite the situation, there was no real civilian unrest either and whether and the IJA was also fully prepared and desirous of the "decisive battle" they expected DOWNFALL to be.

Nether the American Government, or People would accept Versailles like terms, and they had no reason to do so. Only an insane pride was prolonging the suffering of the Japanese People. The fall of the Tojo ministry after the navy's defeat in the Battle of the Marianas was an admission that the war was lost. The civilian government was determined to find some way to end the war. Fear of assassination, stopped them from making overt moves, the Emperor was committed to an "early" end to the war, by 1944. So your suggesting the nihilistic generals were right, and that Japan just needed to fight one more battle, to obtain acceptable terms?

As I've cited, it was exactly elements in the American Government and population at large that were pushing for peace by 1945 as "demobilization fever" took hold; Marshall, as Chief of Staff of the Army so certainly not a nobody, had predicted this in 1943 and envisioned it could lead to a compromise peace. It had yet to reach a sufficient mass to force a peace in August of 1945 but, if hundreds of thousands if not a million American casualties were suffered in late 1945, it very well could reach a critical juncture and as Cold War tensions were starting to set in; a partially defanged Imperial Japan is, strategically, better for the United States than a Soviet domination of East Asia. To quote Gianreco directly:

By the summer of 1945, however, pressure was building among some quarters of the press and the public to soften “unconditional surrender” demands in the hope that the Japanese might be enticed to throw in the towel if they were assured that their emperor could remain on the throne. Stimson and his colleagues, who were listening in on Japanese communications thanks to U.S. code breakers, knew better yet could not use the intelligence success to defend their continuing tough stance. Meanwhile war weariness was clearly growing in the aftermath of victory in Europe, and though not yet of much significance, it could result in untold consequences if the fighting dragged on too long. As Stimson said, the “country will not be satisfied unless every effort is made to shorten the war.” 23

Likewise, Before The Bomb: How America Approached the End of the Pacific War by John Chappell:

This insane hope was based on the idea that the Americans would land on Southern Kyushu, and fight a grinding land battle. The invasion force would be tied to the beaches, so Kamikazes could hit transports. After inflicting massive casualties the Americans would then talk to the Japanese, and settle on terms keeping the militarists in power. Japan would also be allowed to continue with the enslavement of the Koreans, and hold onto Taiwan as well, forgetting China's prior claim. All this was supposed to happen after the Battle for Kyushu was lost. What chips would they have after that?

The flaw in this strategy is, what if the Americans don't land where the Japanese expected them to? So they have to hold out against massive sea, and air, including more atomic attacks till December, and if Kyushu isn't invaded, what then? By December the Red Army has occupied all of Manchuria, and Korea. The Chinese are on the offensive. The British are retaking Malaya, and the Americans, and Australians are in the Dutch East Indies. Japan is facing starvation. The situation is worse then it was in August, so how do they get Versailles like terms, when they couldn't get them then? What your talking about mercifully wasn't in the cards.

D.M. Gianreco in Hell to Pay outlines that DOWNFALL was already in motion as planned, and the Japanese had accurately figured out the American gameplan and prepared for it. Japan was, without a doubt, going to lose the vast majority of her Empire but avoiding occupation of the sort seen IOTL as well as the retention of territory like the Kuriles and Formosa seems likely.

 

[TDM]

Respectfully, the first two saw prior powers beaten down and lessons were not learned or ignored for the sake of politics, the latter two involve a colonial war with populations who had no desire to stay under Lisbon's grip. In all cases being thousands of miles from friendly territory fighting determined opposition with horrific climate extremes/diseases/guerilla warfare are not often prerequisites for optimal morale.

My main point in the context of the post I was replying to was the motivation and more importantly the popular national motivation was different. I mean you are not wrong in what you also say about those conflicts but the list of reasons why those conflicts and WW2 were different isn't short. (however that said it not like there was a lack of horrific climate extremes/diseases/guerrilla warfare in teh Pacific theatre!

 

[Athelstane]

That casualties were nearly 1:1 for one despite the Soviets having the advantage in motorized forces, airpower and being a third larger than the Kwantung Army should really speak volumes not of just the Soviet lackings, but of the quality of the IJA as a fighting force.

Curiously, every thing you just said is also true of the Battle of Berlin.

(OK, with one exception: The Soviets had a 3 to 1 manpower advantage in Berlin, and a 2 to 1 advantage in Manchuria.)

The Kwangtung Army's sacrifice might have saved their honor, but it never had any chance of preventing the complete Soviet occupation of Manchuria and Korea in the final months of 1945.

D.M. Gianreco in Hell to Pay outlines that DOWNFALL was already in motion as planned, and the Japanese had accurately figured out the American gameplan and prepared for it.

No disrespect here, HL - you seem stubborn about this topic - but you've still failed to answer the objection that Typhoon Louise *would* have delayed X-Day for MAJESTIC - and delayed it by weeks, given the damage we *do* know it did to US ships and infrastructre on Okinawa. Delayed it enough that there *was* a risk that it might have pushed it into the prohibitive weather of the winter months.

And then there is the question of final presidental approval, which had not yet been given. Yes, there is no question that MAJESTIC was "in motion," in terms of preparations; but that doesn't mean that there was no chance that Truman couldn't delay it (beyond what Louise would do) or call it off.

 

[Athelstane]

I'm afraid I'm going to have push back harder on this point, which I find inexplicable that you insist on contesting.

Unit 731 was actually brought up in passing during the IMTFE while the role of the Emperor was public knowledge and a common facet in American wartime propaganda; TIME in January of 1944 ran an expose outlining this for public consumption.

Yes, "passing" is the word to use here. That's all it was. A brief mention of Unit 731 - NOT BY NAME - at trial, which the assistant prosecutor (David Sutton) mistakenly raised.

There simply was no popular knowledge of 731 or what it did in 1946. Seriously, you can go through all the contemporary media accounts of that year, and you're not going to find anything.

The Soviets put some personnel on trial in the Khabarovsk War Crime Trials, but that never reached popular consciousness in the West.

The failure to pursue the Unit 731 personnel for war crimes is a grievous moral failure, but it wasn't one that the American or other Allied publics were aware of at the time - so there was no way to perceive it as a failure to seek justice against Imperial Japanese officials.

Low level, yes, but for the most part the majors got off. I have no doubt several would still be prosecuted but the U.S. isn't to make this is an overall major deal; they didn't IOTL and a fail to see why they would here, given the onset of Cold War tensions all the same.

Hideki Tojo is low level? Koki Hirota is low level? Kenji Doihara is low level? Seishirō Itagaki is low level? Masaharu Homma (who was specifically tried for the Bataan Death March) was low level?

The point is not that there were no guilty men who got away - there were. The question is what the American and other Allied publics perceived at the time. And overwhelmingly, the evidence shows that in 1946 they felt there had been a reasonable amount of justice done for Japanese war crimes. The idea that they would accept having NO ONE put on trial, let along executed or imprisoned, without massive outcry, is just not possible to sustain.

The fact that MacArthur, Thompson et al felt the need to suppress information about Unit 731 at the time shows all too well that they appreciated how much of an outcry it would create if the American public became aware of it at the time.

 

[History Learner]

Curiously, every thing you just said is also true of the Battle of Berlin.

(OK, with one exception: The Soviets had a 3 to 1 manpower advantage in Berlin, and a 2 to 1 advantage in Manchuria.)

Closer to 1.5 to 1; the Japanese, after reinforcements from the CEA, would've been around 900,000 IIRC to 1.5 Million Soviets. As it was, however, the Kwantung Army held several advantages over the Germans beyond that of the lesser numerical odds; for one, despite being much reduced in quality from its heights, it was still a fairly strong entity with a strong sense of morale and would be retreating into well defended, protected ground. As the IJA had shown throughout the Pacific War, even when faced with impossible odds and disparities in artillery, air power and the like, it could and did inflict serious losses. As I said upthread, look at Iwo Jima and Okinawa for an idea of what was coming for the Soviets.

The Kwangtung Army's sacrifice might have saved their honor, but it never had any chance of preventing the complete Soviet occupation of Manchuria and Korea in the final months of 1945.

It most certainly did, if based on logistics if nothing else. According to Shtemenko, at the onset of operations STAVKA directed that the Kwantung Army be destroyed within 8 weeks or else the logistical situation would become "perilous". It's easy to see why they stated this, because the capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railway was limited to 13 million tons yearly in 1945 and of this only 9.3 million tons could be used for military needs; this is exactly why the Soviets requested MILEPOST deliveries from the United States. According to John R. Deane's "The Strange Alliance", on pages 263-264, the statistics provided by the Red Army to the United States as part of MILEPOST showed that they would be at a monthly deficit of 200,000 tons. Thus, the 1.25 million tons the U.S. provided in the three months between V-E Day and the Soviet invasion in August gave the Soviets a very limited window to achieve decisive results because after that it would become impossible. With official Soviet belligerency eliminating the ability of further MILEPOST shipments (The Japanese only allowed Soviet shipping through their waters while they were neutral) and the inability to expand rail capacity in the Far East (The Soviets started a project to do so Pre-War...and it took until 1984 to complete IOTL), we know the eight weeks limit is firm.

I should also add that eight weeks might also be way too generous. Their exploitation force was bingo on fuel and thus immobile by day three of combat operations:

Soviet sources do recognize severe short comings in their own logistical planning. The available supply transports were too few to cope with the demand. The road conditions were poor and, together with the rainy weather, caused severe delays in resupply operations. Estimates of fuel requirements were proved to be totally wrong. This severely affected the 6th Guards Tank Army in western Manchuria. This mobile army which was to operate deep behind enemy lines as an operational manoeuvre group (oMG) was in fact out of fuel already on the third day of the operation. It had to be resupplied with emergency air transportation of fuel. one peculiar fact is that the Soviet logistical planning relied heavily on the unrealistic assumption of using enemy railroads for troop and sup ply transports in Manchuria. This raises serious questions of the quality of the Soviet logistical planning. Another explanation is that the Soviet attack actually began before all necessary logistical preparations were in place. However, by launching an attack at an early stage it probably contributed to the creation of surprise.

No disrespect here, HL - you seem stubborn about this topic - but you've still failed to answer the objection that Typhoon Louise *would* have delayed X-Day for MAJESTIC - and delayed it by weeks, given the damage we *do* know it did to US ships and infrastructre on Okinawa. Delayed it enough that there *was* a risk that it might have pushed it into the prohibitive weather of the winter months.

And then there is the question of final presidental approval, which had not yet been given. Yes, there is no question that MAJESTIC was "in motion," in terms of preparations; but that doesn't mean that there was no chance that Truman couldn't delay it (beyond what Louise would do) or call it off.

Oh, I have no doubt that Louise would've engendered a significant delay and I apologize for missing that segment! But, that's going to be an advantage for the Japanese. To quote Gianreco:

If there had been no atom bombs and Tokyo had attempted to hold out for an extended time (a possibility that even bombing and blockade advocates in Washington granted), the Japanese would have immediately appreciated the impact of the storm in the waters around Okinawa. Moreover, they would know exactly what it meant for the follow-up invasion of Honshu, which they had predicted as accurately as the invasion of Kyushu. But even with the storm delay plus friction of combat on Kyushu, the Coronet schedule would have propelled U.S. engineers to perform virtual miracles to make up for lost time and implement Y-day as early in April as possible. Unfortunately the divine winds packed a one-two punch.

From March 27 to April 7, 1946, yet another typhoon raged in the Pacific. On April 3 Barbara struck Luzon, where it inflicted only moderate damage— ripping roofs off of Base M warehouses at Lingayen Gulf, grounding an Army tugboat, and sinking a ship in Manila Bay, where waves briefly reached an unusual thirty-five feet in the harbor—before pounding toward Taiwan. Coming more than six months after the war, it was of no particular concern. The Los Angeles Times gave it several short paragraphs on the bottom of page 2 and didn’t even mention the storm’s name. 27 But if Japan had held out, this typhoon would have had profound effects on the world we live in today. Barbara would have been the closest-watched weather cell in history. If the delayed invasion of Honshu was not already in the process of being launched, the typhoon’s long, lumbering approach to the Philippines would allow First and Eighth Army soldiers (many of whom would have lived in tents instead of barracks because it was expected that they would have moved north a month earlier) to make the best preparations they could under the circumstances. Ships and craft that could not be sent south would be secured and likely ride out the storm with minimal losses.

However, if Coronet was in the midst of its execution from the twenty-five-day window Y-15 to Y+10, chaos would ensue because the storm’s track and intensity could only be guessed at within the parameters of the limited data available. Would slow, shallow-draft landing craft be caught at sea or in the Philippines, where loading operations would be put on hold? If they were already on their way to Japan, how many would be able to reach the Koshiki Retto anchorage and Kyushu’s sheltered bays or get back to Luzon? And what about the breakwater caissons for Ironhorse, the massive artificial harbor to be assembled east of Tokyo? The 1945 construction of the harbor’s prefabricated components carried a priority second only to the atom bomb, and the first packages of this precious towed cargo would have begun arriving in the western Pacific at this time. They could not be allowed to fall victim to this and other seasonal storms and be scattered across the Philippine Sea.

Whatever stage of deployment U.S. forces were in during those first days of April, a delay of some sort—certainly no less than a week and perhaps much, much more—was going to occur. A delay that the two U.S. field armies invading Honshu could ill afford and that Japanese militarists would see as yet another sign that they were right after all. And while much of the land around Tokyo today contains built-up areas not there during the war and deceptively smooth terrain, thanks to the delays over which the United States had absolutely no control, any soldier or Marine treading this same flat, dry “tank country” in 1946 would, in reality, have been up to their calves in muck and rice shoots by the time the invasion actually took place.

Likewise, Gianreco, as I cited upthread, outlines how the U.S. was already committed to the policies as envisioned. The JCS, led by Marshall, had committed to the necessity of an invasion of Japan in order to win the war as quickly as possible, as the the cross-military and civilian opinion was that a long war was out of the question at this point.

 

[History Learner]

Also, on the matter of starvation that's been brought up, I again quote Gianreco:

The potential problems relating to keeping the population of occupied Kyushu fed and relatively healthy during an invasion, however, paled in comparison with those faced elsewhere in Japan after the surrender, and began as early as the winter of 1945–46. Agricultural experts within the U.S. Military calculated in 1944 that there would be enough food available to sustain the population on a subsistence level but had correctly foreseen that “the possibility of localized famines beginning within the first few months of 1946 was a very real possibility.” 15 Some factors, such as the willingness, or unwillingness, of Tokyo and the prefectoral governments to feed millions of “excess mouths” not directly contributing to the war effort, could not be known. U.S. military and civilian officials privy to Magic intercepts duly took note, however, that the anguished warnings by the Japanese ambassador to Moscow, Sato Naotake—including that if the fall 1945 harvest failed the nation would face “absolute famine”—were disdainfully rejected by his superiors. 16 It was also clear that a disruption of the rail system by U.S. air power plus the growing number of refugees would likely collapse the system and that “we’d eventually have to pick up the pieces.” 17

Some today assert, in effect, that it would have been more humane to have just continued the conventional B-29 bombing of Japan, which in six months had killed nearly 178,000 people and displaced or rendered homeless more than 8 million, than to have dropped the atom bombs or launched an invasion. 18 They also imply that the growing U.S. naval blockade would have soon forced a surrender because the Japanese faced imminent starvation. U.S. planners at the time, however, weren’t nearly so bold, and the whole reason why advocates of tightening the noose around the Home Islands came up with so many different estimates of when blockade and bombardment might force Japan to surrender was because the situation wasn’t nearly as cut and dried as it appears today, even when that nation’s ocean supply lines were severed. 19

Japan would indeed have become “a nation without cities,” as urban populations suffered grievously under the weight of Allied bombing, but over half the population during the war lived and worked on farms. 20 Back then the system of price supports that has encouraged Japanese farmers today to convert practically every square foot of their land to rice cultivation did not exist. There was more food available in rural areas than is generally understood as wheat was widely grown, and large vegetable gardens were a standard feature of a family’s land. 21 Food reserves existed that were largely unaccounted for immediately after the war because responsibility for the storage and distribution of strategic stocks had been moved from national to principally prefectoral control in April due to the anticipated destruction of the transportation system (see chapter 7), and farmers had begun to hoard their crops in contravention of government directives.

The idea that the Japanese were about to run out of food any time soon was largely derived from exaggerated interpretations of the “Summary Report,” to the 104 reports in the United States Strategic Bombing Survey for the Pacific war, and the well-documented fear among some Japanese leaders that shortages could lead to severe unrest. 22 The idea that the Japanese were on the brink of starvation is usually (and rather loosely) attributed to the USSBS and the official Army Air Force history. However, using survey findings, what editors James Lea Cate and James C. Olson did in the multivolume history The Army Air Forces in World War II, was to detail the successful U.S. mine-laying efforts against Japanese shipping, which essentially cut Japanese oil and food imports, and they stated only that by mid-August “the calorie count of the average man’s fare had shrunk dangerously.” 23

Obviously some historians enthusiasm for the point they are trying to make has gotten the better of them since the reduced nutritional value of meals is somewhat different than imminent starvation. But the life-and-death question for a family that might well find itself in one of the areas of “localized famine” within as few as six months was how would the militarists in charge of their prefecture or district, who essentially believed that the population was expendable, allot the dwindling food supplies in the midst of an invasion? One indication of what likely would have transpired came from future prime minister Yoshida Shigeru, who before war-surplus food stocks from across the Pacific were rushed to Japan stated in January 1946 that as many as 10 million might die of starvation and malnutrition in “spot famines” that were forecast to begin by the summer of that year. 2

 

[Bkmeister]

Beyond BobTheBarbarian, History Learner, and a few others, some of those taking part in this discussion would be able to carry out a more realistic discussion of this matter if they were familiar with the works of Richard B. Frank, D.M. Giangreco, and David M. Glantz. There are many scholars who have made valuable contributions in this area. So much, in fact, that it is almost impossible to catch up with it all. However, anyone studying the books and articles of this trio will come away with a strong grounding in the factors determining how the war actually played out and why. Naturally very few of the people commenting here are going to have the time (and a few, possibly the inclination) to plow through their work any time soon, but I hope that if this or a similar subject comes up in the future -- and it undoubtedly will -- that more correspondents will have had a chance to check out these historians who have a comprehensive understanding of the endgame in the Pacific and East Asia.

First, see Frank’s book Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire, https://www.amazon.com/Downfall-End-Imperial-Japanese-Empire/dp/0141001461, Although the book is now a little behind the curve because of subsequent scholarship, it is nevertheless an absolutely essential work and here is his superb presentation at the Harry S. Truman Library, https://www.c-span.org/video/?327055-1/discussion-fall-japanese-empire where he spoke about the events leading up to Japan’s surrender. Giangreco’s Hell to Pay: Operation Downfall and the Invasion of Japan, 1945-1947, https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1682471659/ref=dbs_a_def_rwt_bibl_vppi_i0 , is regularly described as the definitive work on U.S and Japanese plans for both the invasion and defense of Japan. And the esteemed Gerhard Weinberg, who BobTheBarbarian has mentioned elsewhere, has cited Giangreco’s studies in his own works and praised Hell to Pay on the pages of the AHA journal Pacific Historical Review. Here's a view of Giangreco’s output and experience, somewhat different than his standard Naval Institute Press bio, which appeared on reddit,

https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/9ieegj

.

David Glantz (Colonel, US Army, ret.) was the founding director of the Soviet Army Studies Office (SASO), at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, an organization that continues to do important work today under the name Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO). Glantz is also the founder and long-time editor of the Journal of Slavic Military Studies and has written dozens of authoritative books and articles on the military of the former Soviet Union. His “August Storm” volumes on the Soviet offensive against Japan at the end of World War II are absolutely priceless.

Anyone looking to purchase used copies of his “August Storm” volumes should, however, be aware that there are two different sets available that have very similar names. They’ll want to make sure that they are getting the 2003 volumes, Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria, 1945: August Storm and Soviet Operational and Tactical Combat in Manchuria, 1945: August Storm from Frank Cass Publishers. The earlier and less comprehensive 1983 volumes -- which are nevertheless rock-solid works -- are titled August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria (Leavenworth Papers No. 7) and August Storm: Soviet Tactical and Operational Combat in Manchuria, 1945 (Leavenworth Papers No. 8).

There’s another important thing to remember about his deep body of work. By the time that Glantz produced the 2003 set he’d been able to benefit greatly from the upsurge in archival material that became available after the breakup of the Soviet Union. And it was a good thing that he took advantage of this while he could because the "openness" started to close off almost as quickly as it had begun and now comes in the form of periodic, official spurts instead of through independent research of primary source materials. The result is that his knowledge has broadened since publication of the 2003 set, prompting Glantz to modify his opinion in some areas. For example, while he formerly expressed that the Soviets might have been able to conduct a successful operation in Northern Hokkaido, he has since come to the conclusion that "any military operations against Hokkaido were infeasible, even if Stalin had decided to challenge Truman -- which he didn’t." (Hell to Pay, p258)

Giangreco notes that: "When producing the 2003 book [Glantz] had less information available to him and his knowledge of the Japanese situation was largely limited to how it was characterized in the Russian after-action reports. The piecemealing out of documents from the former Soviet Union has been an ongoing frustration for Glantz. He notes that the material available to researchers is still limited and that this is unlikely to change significantly any time soon. Said Glantz: ‘The mail’s still out. There’s one more -- maybe three, four, five more -- rounds [of document releases to come] before we’re through'." (Hell to Pay, p509)

Here is Glantz speaking on “Stalin and the Soviet Union's Pacific War Strategy” at the Navy Memorial event in Washington, DC, marking the 70th anniversary of the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, https://www.c-span.org/video/?327355-3/discussion-josef-stalin-soviet-unions-pacific-war-strategy. Giangreco’s presentation later that evening on U.S., Soviet and Japanese operational plans for combat on Hokkaido can be found at, https://www.c-span.org/video/?327355-5/strategies-invasion-defense-japan, and includes Frank and Glantz who were invited on stage by Giangreco during the Q&A to elaborate on Soviet intentions and capabilities. The two additional chapters in Hell to Pay on the secret and extensive U.S.-Soviet cooperation against Japan, 11 and 17 in the recent expanded edition, are a must read. Chapter 17 covers U.S., Soviet, and Japanese plans for the invasion -- and defense -- of Hokkaido and Chapter 11 the massive U.S. support to Soviet operations in the Far East.

Giangreco also has some interesting thoughts on how and why this support remained essentially unknown for so long at a shortened text version of a Pritzker Military Museum presentation here, https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/169567. There’s a superb Austrian MHV interview with him, “D.M. Giangreco on the Invasion of Japan, Lend Lease & much more” at

-- but it’s nearly two hours long! Thankfully, they went to the trouble of creating a timestamp table of contents and bite-size outtakes were also provided as separate videos.

Although it was apparently on the Web at one time through the U.S. Army’s Foreign Military Studies Office, I have been unable to locate the paper on the secret Project Milepost deliveries by Jacob W. Kipp and former Soviet general Makhmut Gareev at an Intelligence panel chaired by Giangreco at Penn State University around 1999. It is, however, heavily cited in chapter 11 of Hell to Pay. In addition, while Richard A. Russell’s Project Hula: Secret Soviet-American Cooperation in the War Against Japan (U.S. Navy Historical Center, 1997) is out of print, it can be easily obtained on the Web.

Kipp has a long association with SASO/FMSO, including serving for a time as its director after Glantz moved on, and Gareev, who passed away not two months ago, was the president of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences, Moscow. Russell is currently with the U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis.

Hope this is helpful.

 

[Belisarius II]

As I've repeatedly said, I have no doubt the Red Army could eventually clear the Japanese out of Manchuria; this would not be easy nor would it be fast however. The Soviets IOTL completely failed at the operational level, failing to achieve any of their goals as stated at the start of the campaign and Post-War analysis by them meshed with those of the West, in that they had decisively failed to defeat the Kwantung Army and, as Bob has noted, they were fully expecting the conflict to be an utter bloodbath only matched by the Eastern Front at its worst.

That casualties were nearly 1:1 for one despite the Soviets having the advantage in motorized forces, airpower and being a third larger than the Kwantung Army should really speak volumes not of just the Soviet lackings, but of the quality of the IJA as a fighting force.



This isn't really supported by the historical evidence; case in point is that in August of 1945 the IGHQ still had ~10,000 operational planes and 1 million barrels of fuel stockpiled in preparation for the decisive battle. Despite the situation, there was no real civilian unrest either and whether and the IJA was also fully prepared and desirous of the "decisive battle" they expected DOWNFALL to be.



As I've cited, it was exactly elements in the American Government and population at large that were pushing for peace by 1945 as "demobilization fever" took hold; Marshall, as Chief of Staff of the Army so certainly not a nobody, had predicted this in 1943 and envisioned it could lead to a compromise peace. It had yet to reach a sufficient mass to force a peace in August of 1945 but, if hundreds of thousands if not a million American casualties were suffered in late 1945, it very well could reach a critical juncture and as Cold War tensions were starting to set in; a partially defanged Imperial Japan is, strategically, better for the United States than a Soviet domination of East Asia.



D.M. Gianreco in Hell to Pay outlines that DOWNFALL was already in motion as planned, and the Japanese had accurately figured out the American gameplan and prepared for it. Japan was, without a doubt, going to lose the vast majority of her Empire but avoiding occupation of the sort seen IOTL as well as the retention of territory like the Kuriles and Formosa seems likely.

Downfall wasn't written on stone tablets. Kyushu wouldn't have happened for 3 1/2 months, after the historical VJ day. A lot would have happened in the intervening time. The Americans were becoming aware of the strength of the IJA on Kyushu, and were getting cold feet. Marshal was a good strategist, not an idiot. The Navy was very skeptical about Kyushu, which they considered to be at least twice as tough a nut to crack as Okinawa. The Navy wanted blockade, and bombardment. The USAAF was sure they could do the job by themselves, and with the atomic bomb they have what Churchill called "The second coming in wrath." The Americans can land somewhere else, or not at all. If they change plans all the troops in Kyushu are useless. The Japanese were putting all their eggs in one basket.

1,000,000 barrels of fuel for 10,000 aircraft is 5,500 gallons a plane. A Zero carries a fuel load of 230 gallons. Assuming all that fuel is saved, and all aircraft simply stay on the ground till the Americans land, they should have enough for the operation. After 14 weeks of hunting Japanese aircraft, and fuel stores how much would still be there in December? And if the landing doesn't happen what do these planes do?

So in this 14 week period waiting for Kyushu what's happening among the Japanese leaders? The emperor still want's peace, along with the civilian leadership, the military situation continues to get worse, the collapse of the economy continues, along with the suffering of the people. So what can the generals say? Just wait, at some point the Americans will run out of atomic bombs, and land in Southern Kyushu, then we'll inflict massive casualties, but still lose the battle. After that the Americans will be so despondent they'll let us stay in power, and keep our empire. The death of millions of Japanese is an acceptable price for the honor of the general staff, and to keep us in uniform, holding political power.

In 2,500 years Japan has never been defeated, if we keep faith the gods will save us from our fate. Remember death is lighter then a feather. Majesty you are a god, but the barbarians don't recognize this fact. If we surrender the people will no longer believe this to be true. If we're defeated Communism will rise up, and destroy the national character. The Americans will introduce decadent ideas, like popular rule, women's suffrage, and sexual promiscuity. If we hold out the Americans will want us as allies against the Soviets. Just how long will this crazy thinking prevail?

 

[Alexniko]

Also, you're really, really shifting the goalposts from your initial question/scenario to get to this point.

In which way? My question/scenario is and has been if a japanese victory in WW2 id really ASB. Yes, I gave my idea of a japanese invasion of Hawaii up, because people gave me convincing arguments that its impossible/unfeasable. But the question remains.

 

[Ian_W]

In which way? My question/scenario is and has been if a japanese victory in WW2 id really ASB. Yes, I gave my idea of a japanese invasion of Hawaii up, because people gave me convincing arguments that its impossible/unfeasable. But the question remains.

Some bloke who went to both the US Naval War College and the Imperial Japanese Naval Academy said this about what would need to happen for a Japanese victory.

"Should hostilities once break out between Japan and the United States, it is not enough that we take Guam and the Philippines, nor even Hawaii and San Francisco. To make victory certain, we would have to march into Washington and dictate the terms of peace in the White House. I wonder if our politicians, among whom armchair arguments about war are being glibly bandied about in the name of state politics, have confidence as to the final outcome and are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices "

 

[kmmontandon]

In which way? My question/scenario is and has been if a japanese victory in WW2 id really ASB. Yes, I gave my idea of a japanese invasion of Hawaii up, because people gave me convincing arguments that its impossible/unfeasable. But the question remains.

The question has been answered. At this point, your definition of "victory" seems to be: "The US doesn't invade and occupy the Home Islands, just signs an armistice that leaves them a bombed out, half-starved husk as the IJN rusts on the bottom of the sea and the IJA rots in shallow graves across the South Pacific and East Asia" That's a pretty fucking weird definition of victory. If the US decided to throw in the towel in '46 out of war weariness and accept a peace ... what's left of Japan is going to be much smaller, and much, much worse off than it was on Dec. 6, 1941.