Japanese victory in the pacific war - is it really ASB?

[Lucius Verus]

I'm just curious, weren't the Kido Butai at the end of its logistical tether making the PH raid? How are they going to sustain operations around Hawaii while the invasion takes place? Or, is the IJN just going to dump the troops on the beach, say sayonara and steam off?

They were, they had to abandon ships on the return run. As for the troops, it wouldn't be much different from IOTL where they sent men without the means to supply them. The problem is, unlike South-East Asia the Japanese troops will NOT have air superiority nor the sea control needed to land troops anywhere and flank.

As for exhaustion, Vietnam was an entirely different beast. Vietnam didn't start off with a perceived surprise attack on Americans slaughtering over a thousand. Nor are the Japanese able to sustain naval warfare, which is primarily based on industrial and institutional strength. The idea that attrition would wear down the American morale was the excuse they rationalized to get into such an unwinnable war, a mistake they sacrificed several years, millions of Japanese lives, and decades of built up progress in denial.

 

[Cubert]

As late as 1944, the Japanese were making massive gains of territory in China even with the backing of the United States.

Gains which wound up meaning very little and cost Japan a whole lot of casualties. Japan lacks the logistical capabilities to win a final victory against China and for the most part lacks support from the Chinese people, meaning if Western support for China is available then Japan's loss is inevitable.

 

[Lee-Sensei]

Gains which wound up meaning very little and cost Japan a whole lot of casualties. Japan lacks the logistical capabilities to win a final victory against China and for the most part lacks support from the Chinese people, meaning if Western support for China is available then Japan's loss is inevitable.

That’s doubtful. Again, this was in 1944. Japans situation had deteriorated, they were heavily involved in a war against the United States, still guarding Manchuria against the Soviet Union while fighting the British in Burma and occupying millions of km2 of conquered lands. A stent the intervention of the United States, the Soviet Union or maybe Britain. Maybe. I don’t see any evidence that the Chinese would be able to dislodge them and force the Japanese to go home.

 

[Cubert]

That’s doubtful. Again, this was in 1944. Japans situation had deteriorated, they were heavily involved in a war against the United States, still guarding Manchuria against the Soviet Union while fighting the British in Burma and occupying millions of km2 of conquered lands. A stent the intervention of the United States, the Soviet Union or maybe Britain. Maybe. I don’t see any evidence that the Chinese would be able to dislodge them and force the Japanese to go home.

Japan being at war with the US and UK is a direct result of its policy towards China. As the US moves towards direct intervention in WWII, sanctions on Japan will be inevitable thereby necessitating the existence of the Pacific theater. Even if we allow for a near ASB-level Pearl Harbor success involving destruction of US carriers which convinces the US to stay out of the Pacific the sanctions are going back into effect in a year or two when the US has effectively rebuilt its entire fleet.

 

[Lee-Sensei]

Japan being at war with the US and UK is a direct result of its policy towards China. As the US moves towards direct intervention in WWII, sanctions on Japan will be inevitable thereby necessitating the existence of the Pacific theater. Even if we allow for a near ASB-level Pearl Harbor success involving destruction of US carriers which convinces the US to stay out of the Pacific the sanctions are going back into effect in a year or two when the US has effectively rebuilt its entire fleet.

We’re talking past each other. I acknowledged that they stood no chance of defeating the United States in a conventional war in my first post. The disparity in resources, manpower and production numbers was far to great. All I was saying is that, in an isolated war between Japan and China, the Chinese couldn’t dislodge them.

 

[Alexniko]

Japan was just revealed to a be a duplicitous backstabbing untrustworthy nation that killed over a thousand US servicemen in a surprise attack while they were negotiating with the state department why the fuck would anyone in the US take them at their word?

What I meant with "guarantees territorial integrity" was "give all the occupied american islands, uncluding Hawaii, back".

So they get chopped by the 24th and 25th Infantry and the several dozen odd USAAC aircraft on the island plus the litany of shore batteries

Ok, I admit that 2 Divisions are not enough. But with 3 to 4 japanese divisions plus air and naval superiority, you can't really say that the japanese stand no chance. Don't get me wrong, victory is never a certainity, but in this situation they got a good chance in my opinion.

And if were talking long run here (i.e. 43, 44) it's unlikely the japanese are able to hold Hawaii anyway. It's not so much about holding Hawaii than about taking it in a decisiive battle that cripples the US navy.

They were, they had to abandon ships on the return run. As for the troops, it wouldn't be much different from IOTL where they sent men without the means to supply them. The problem is, unlike South-East Asia the Japanese troops will have have air superiority nor the sea control needed to land troops anywhere and flank.

Didn't the japanese have air superiority during the Pearl Harbour attack? And fun fact, over the course of the war, the japanese had 350k soliders on Papua New Guinnea (i.e. not the best place supply wise), which only surrendered after the central government in Tokio did so. Yes, New Guinea is not as far away as Hawaii, but it has a lot less infrastructure and means to sustain troops. If the japanese take Midway on top, they would have pushed their defensive perimetre a lot further east (as someone allready mentioned), so a shipping route to Hawaii should be secured for at least a year (of course there would still be harasment by american subs).

As for exhaustion, Vietnam was an entirely different beast. Vietnam didn't start off with a perceived surprise attack on Americans slaughtering over a thousand. Nor are the Japanese able to sustain naval warfare, which is primarily based on industrial and institutional strength. The idea that attrition would wear down the American morale was the excuse they rationalized to get into such an unwinnable war, a mistake they sacrificed several years, millions of Japanese lives, and decades of built up progress in denial.

So the japanese ruling class planed to collectively shoot itself in the head all along? I don't think so. And also 1.) It's not true that the war in the pacific was only or even mainly a naval conflict (both land and naval battles decided the fate of the conflict), and 2.) why should a naval conflict create less war exhaustion persé? People die there, too, and ships are expenisve aswell. Even in OTL, rationing existed in the US before it really got involved in Europe.

 

[BBadolato]

Okay, the thing is, Japan during the Pacific War suffered from a loss of focus on their goals. The Japanese plan for the Pacific was simple, gain resources to continue the fight in China, secure those resource area's and event hold out to sue for peace. The Japanese conducted some invasions that were strategically unnecessary, and they did suffer from the losses at Midway. In theory, Japan might have been able to hold a stalemate, or at least make U.S and British losses more miserable if they could contest the seas.

As for the Second-Sino Japanese War itself, U.S intervention up to the oil embargo sanctions was never guaranteed, the only reason why there was that much escalation was that Japan occupied northern Indochina to try and cut off the Chinese supply lines as the war had dragged down into a stalemate. A Japanese attack where else for resources was never fully in the cards, as Japan would have had to deal with managing whatever China would look like post-war.

Which brings us to the biggest problem of a Japan wins in WW2 scenario, the whole lead up of events really spiraled out of control for Japan, that it's hard to really ascertain what would be logical enough Japanese war goals to base a victory on. Marco Polo Bridge was more a skirmish by an unruly army, that became more with a misunderstanding than an out and out Japanese invasion.

 

[Scott Washburn]

I once took a graduate course on WWII taught by Dr. Russell Weigley, who is widely considered one of America's top military historians. It was a 15-week course with 3 hours per week in the classroom. It was a great course but focused entirely on the European theater. We were told at the start that there would be some stuff on the War in the Pacific, but as the weeks passed we remained in Europe. Finally the very last class arrived and with half an hour to go Weigley finally turned to the Pacific. He explained his lack of attention to the Pacific this way: 'A lot of fascinating stuff happened in the Pacific and there were heroes galore, but the bottom line is that it was Europe that mattered. If the Germans lose, the Japanese lose. Period. There is no way the Japanese can win if the Germans lose.' In the many years which have passed since I took that course nothing has come along to make me disagree with Weigley's assessment.

 

[nbcman]

{snip}
Didn't the japanese have air superiority during the Pearl Harbour attack? And fun fact, over the course of the war, the japanese had 350k soliders on Papua New Guinnea (i.e. not the best place supply wise), which only surrendered after the central government in Tokio did so. Yes, New Guinea is not as far away as Hawaii, but it has a lot less infrastructure and means to sustain troops. If the japanese take Midway on top, they would have pushed their defensive perimetre a lot further east (as someone allready mentioned), so a shipping route to Hawaii should be secured for at least a year (of course there would still be harasment by american subs).
{snip}

Fun fact, the IJ didn't keep their forces in NG that well supplied. In fact, they turned to cannibalism during the late war when they were bypassed:

SYDNEY, Australia (AP) _ For six months, historian Toshiyuki Tanaka dug through Australian archives to tell his country that some Japanese soldiers were cannibals during the last desperate days of World War II.

Allied forces have known this for years. But Tanaka’s account, published in the Tokyo media Tuesday, represents the first Japanese investigation into the atrocities and the most extensive study of the subject to date.

Tanaka, an associate professor of political science at the University of Melbourne, said he uncovered more than 100 cases of Japanese Imperial Army soldiers eating the flesh of Australian troops, Asian laborers and indigenous people in Papua New Guinea.


″These documents clearly show that this cannibalism was done by a whole group of Japanese soldiers, and in some cases they were not even starving,″ Tanaka said Tuesday.

Some, their supply lines cut off, were genuinely hungry. But in other cases, officers ordered troops to eat human flesh to give them a ″feeling of victory,″ Tanaka said.

Born after his country’s defeat, the 43-year-old Tanaka wants to educate young Japanese ″who are not told anything″ about the war at a time when their leaders are considering erasing sections of its postwar constitution that prohibits sending troops overseas.

Tanaka said he tried several times to publish his work in Japan but it was deemed ″too sensitive.″

His account didn’t receive much attention Tuesday in Japanese TV and newspapers - the Mainichi newspaper placed it inside, on page six.

Tanaka’s findings are based on Japanese army documents seized by Australian troops, plus the testimony of witnesses and the confessions of Japanese soldiers at war-crime trials.

An English translation of a secret Imperial Army order - issued Nov. 18, 1944 - warned troops that cannibalizing anyone not an enemy was punishable by death.

The order described cannibalism as the ″worst human crime″ and blamed increases in murders and the possession of human flesh by soldiers on a ″lack of thoroughness in moral training.″

Another archive contained testimony by Australian troops to war-crimes tribunals.

An Australian army corporal recounted how he found the mutilated bodies of his comrades. One had only the hands and feet untouched.

An Australian lieutenant described finding the dismembered remains of several bodies, saying: ″In all cases, the condition of the remains were such that there can be no doubt that the bodies had been dismembered and portions of flesh cooked.″

Other witnesses reported they saw Japanese soldiers eating prisoners of war as well as Indian and Asian laborers and Papua New Guineans.

A Pakistani corporal, captured in Singapore and transported to Papua New Guinea for slave labor, claimed hungry Japanese soldiers killed and ate one prisoner a day, reaching a total of ″about 100.″

In Canberra, Australian National University war historian Hank Nelson said cannibalism took place in isolated fighting zones such as the Kokoda Trail, Sepik River and Bougainville Island.

Nelson had also uncovered evidence of cannibalism. One young Japanese soldier confessed at a war-crimes trial he ate the flesh of an Australian he had shot in battle.

″He simply said he did it out of intense hatred and intense hunger,″ Nelson said.

Bruce Ruxton, Victoria state president of the Returned Services League, which represents Australian veterans, said the atrocities had been ignored by the Japanese people for 50 years.

″Cannibalism did take place,″ he said, adding: ″But all of these sorts of things have been kept under wraps in Japan since then.″

Japan Hears of World War II Cannibalism A Half-Century Later

SYDNEY, Australia (AP) _ For six months, historian Toshiyuki Tanaka dug through Australian archives to tell his country that some Japanese soldiers were cannibals during the last desperate days of World War II. Allied forces have known this for years. But Tanaka's account, published in the...

apnews.com

 

[Alexniko]

Fun fact, the IJ didn't keep their forces in NG that well supplied. In fact, they turned to cannibalism during the late war when they were bypassed:

Japan Hears of World War II Cannibalism A Half-Century Later

SYDNEY, Australia (AP) _ For six months, historian Toshiyuki Tanaka dug through Australian archives to tell his country that some Japanese soldiers were cannibals during the last desperate days of World War II. Allied forces have known this for years. But Tanaka's account, published in the...

apnews.com

Never said they were well supplied. Never said that war wasn't absolute hell. I only said that they held out despite all odds.

Also my "fun fact" formulation wasn't meant to be cynical. Sorry if it offended anyone.

 

[fester]

What I meant with "guarantees territorial integrity" was "give all the occupied american islands, uncluding Hawaii, back".



Ok, I admit that 2 Divisions are not enough. But with 3 to 4 japanese divisions plus air and naval superiority, you can't really say that the japanese stand no chance. Don't get me wrong, victory is never a certainity, but in this situation they got a good chance in my opinion.

And if were talking long run here (i.e. 43, 44) it's unlikely the japanese are able to hold Hawaii anyway. It's not so much about holding Hawaii than about taking it in a decisiive battle that cripples the US navy.

Didn't the japanese have air superiority during the Pearl Harbour attack?

How long can the six Japanese carriers stay off Oahu? If you strip every single tanker and dedicated it to supporting the fleet carriers, maybe those carriers can stay near Oahu for a week or two after Pearl Harbor? And if that is the case, then what oil reserves are left for future operations? The big problem is that the Japanese have enough strategic capacity to do a smash and grab against lightly defended targets and can't sustain corp or army sized operations against competently led western opposition that can shit shells like a man prepping for a colonoscopy from prepared positions for that long.

The logistics of keeping 50,000 to 100,000 men in the field with hundreds of guns firing tens of thousands of shells per day is an extraordinarily expensive thing to do even before we posit that force is being supplied over the beach and the nearest friendly supply depot is weeks away for a modern merchant ship.... The US could do that in 1944. The US can do that today for a month with preposition equipment and a little bit of luck. Anyone else has far stronger resource constraints.

 

[Alexniko]

I once took a graduate course on WWII taught by Dr. Russell Weigley, who is widely considered one of America's top military historians. It was a 15-week course with 3 hours per week in the classroom. It was a great course but focused entirely on the European theater. We were told at the start that there would be some stuff on the War in the Pacific, but as the weeks passed we remained in Europe. Finally the very last class arrived and with half an hour to go Weigley finally turned to the Pacific. He explained his lack of attention to the Pacific this way: 'A lot of fascinating stuff happened in the Pacific and there were heroes galore, but the bottom line is that it was Europe that mattered. If the Germans lose, the Japanese lose. Period. There is no way the Japanese can win if the Germans lose.' In the many years which have passed since I took that course nothing has come along to make me disagree with Weigley's assessment.

By god, I'm not a professional, nor even throughoutly educated on this topic. But ask yourself, if the two nukes were not ready by mid to late 45, and if Operation Downfall failed with hundreds of thousands of american casualties (actually not that unlikely if you look at the orriginal plan and the planed japanese countermeasures. There's a good video by "Military History Visualized" on that topic), would the americans really try a second time? Or a third time?

Yes, Japan was completely devastated at this point, but they fought on. There actually were plans by the US navy to starve Japan into surrender, yet the government rejected these (despite the assumption, that american losses would be minimal). That was, because they feared that the war would dragg on for an additional year or two, and that the american public wouldn't be willing to go on that way for that much longer. So they actually thought that a plan in which hundreds of thousands of american soldiers would've died, would harm domestic war support less, than extending the war for another year or two. There's actually a good video by "Military History Visualized" on this topic, aswell.

 

[SealTheRealDeal]

Good argument, but if 2 divisions arent enough, make it 3 or 4. Its not that Japan didn't have enough men or guns.

Actually they really didn't. IIRC that would require most of their sealift capabilities, and they need Singapore and the Indies far more than they need Hawaii.

 

[RamscoopRaider]

By god, I'm not a professional, nor even throughoutly educated on this topic. But ask yourself, if the two nukes were not ready by mid to late 45, and if Operation Downfall failed with hundreds of thousands of american casualties (actually not that unlikely if you look at the orriginal plan and the planed japanese countermeasures. There's a good video by "Military History Visualized" on that topic), would the americans really try a second time? Or a third time?

Yes, Japan was completely devastated at this point, but they fought on. There actually were plans by the US navy to starve Japan into surrender, yet the government rejected these (despite the assumption, that american losses would be minimal). That was, because they feared that the war would dragg on for an additional year or two, and that the american public wouldn't be willing to go on that way for that much longer. So they actually thought that a plan in which hundreds of thousands of american soldiers would've died, would harm domestic war support less, than extending the war for another year or two. There's actually a good video by "Military History Visualized" on this topic, aswell.

And then the peace negotiations start and the US asks well what about those 27,000+ US POWs, we want them back. Then the Japanese have to explain that they executed them all, something that was ordered OTL but not carried out due to the end of the war, and you give the US enough rage to carry on for awhile longer

In any case there was considerable opposition to Downfall from the Navy, because new intel was showing that projections were wrong and that there was a possibility for it to fail. It was quite possible it would be cancelled, it had gone forward with united support of the services, with the Navy now dissenting it would be reevaluated. Downfall would have to be postponed, Typhoon Louise would smack into the staging areas on October 9th and the November 1st schedule could not be met after that. Of course even by that point Japan would be starving, Japan surrendered due to the triple shock of the nukes, Soviet Invasion (ending their hope of a Soviet mediated peace) and the Rice Harvest report being horrible

 

[Jellico]

By god, I'm not a professional, nor even throughoutly educated on this topic. But ask yourself, if the two nukes were not ready by mid to late 45, and if Operation Downfall failed with hundreds of thousands of american casualties (actually not that unlikely if you look at the orriginal plan and the planed japanese countermeasures. There's a good video by "Military History Visualized" on that topic), would the americans really try a second time? Or a third time?

Yes, Japan was completely devastated at this point, but they fought on. There actually were plans by the US navy to starve Japan into surrender, yet the government rejected these (despite the assumption, that american losses would be minimal). That was, because they feared that the war would dragg on for an additional year or two, and that the american public wouldn't be willing to go on that way for that much longer. So they actually thought that a plan in which hundreds of thousands of american soldiers would've died, would harm domestic war support less, than extending the war for another year or two. There's actually a good video by "Military History Visualized" on this topic, aswell.

Sure, but how does this win the war for Japan?

The only reason the Allies are going in to Japan in a hurry is to deny it to the Russians. Once that option is gone the urgency is gone. You are left with negotiated peace. While Japan is descending back into the stone age every day.

Starvation on the home islands was a thing otl. How long do you expect them to continue? What sort of bargaining power do they have. Surrender and let us keep our starting position and we promise not to starve to death on you.

 

[The Tai-Pan]

By god, I'm not a professional, nor even throughoutly educated on this topic. But ask yourself, if the two nukes were not ready by mid to late 45, and if Operation Downfall failed with hundreds of thousands of american casualties (actually not that unlikely if you look at the orriginal plan and the planed japanese countermeasures. There's a good video by "Military History Visualized" on that topic), would the americans really try a second time? Or a third time?

Yes.

 

[nbcman]

Plus the US was developing various chemical agents (such as the appropriately named chemical 2,4 dichlorophenoxyacetic acid = Vegetable Killer Acid or VKA) to attack the Japanese rice crop and to generally defoliate the area behind the landing zones. Japan would have been deep in famine by the time the US forces landed on the Kanto Plain in 1946 if they didn't surrender by then.

 

[Geon]

@Alexniko
RamscoopRaider above pointed out another factor that would have had to change in Japan before they ever attacked Pearl Harbor, in fact, before they even started the Sino-Japanese War. Japan needed to change their behavior regarding occupied peoples and the horrendous treatment of P.O.W.s. The Japanese record here was not good. I won't go into gory details but suffice to say the Japanese record on human rights in World War II was abysmal. That was one more reason for the Allies to fight on.

I'm going out on a limb here, but if you want your scenario to have a chance of succeeding the Japanese need to have a fundamental change in the way they treat prisoners and citizens in the occupied territories. We're talking no Nanking Massacre and no Bataan Death March among other things. A more humane Japan might, I say again, might, be able to negotiate a more reasonable peace.

 

[CV12Hornet]

Lets say the japanese actually decide that, on top of attacking the US naval base at Pearl Harbour, an actual ground invasion of Hawaii would be neccessary (there supposedly were such suggestions inside of the Mikado in OTL, yet they were scraped). A lot of people believe that this would've been impossible, yet the japanese had naval superiority at this stage of the war and they definetly had the troops and ressources to pull it off (in OTL they actually kept 18 fully maned and equipped Divisions in Siberia to monitor the soviet border, despite the fact that the USSR obviously was not willing nor able to wage war against Japan before 1945).

Okay, no, let me stop you right here. An invasion of Hawaii by Japan founders on three insurmountable problems:
1. Lack of oiler capacity
2. Lack of transport shipping
3. Lack of available troops

To the first: Japan devoted eight oilers to the Pearl Harbor operation OTL. This was half their available fast oiler capacity. Despite all the oilers made available fuel shortages were so acute in the First Air Fleet that conducting a third strike likely would've meant abandoning their destroyers for lack of fuel. Japan could make all their oilers available, and that gets them another two refuelings. Just under three weeks of additional operations - except that's just for the Kido Butai and not any of the invasion transports, their escorts, and their fire support. Overall, Japan does not have the at-sea refueling capacity to conduct sustained operations off of Hawaii.

This on top of the fact that the carriers have limited ammunition stores and no way to replenish them, and that the Japanese were sustaining increasingly severe losses over Pearl Harbor. Sticking around and launching more sorties is a good way to gut the Kido Butai's irreplaceable pilot corps right at the start of the war.

To the second: You cited Japan's Manchurian divisions sitting on the border with the Soviets as if they can be magically moved into the overseas operations. They cannot. Japan started the war with 6.5 million tons of shipping. Almost half of that, over 3 million tons, was earmarked solely to move the eleven divisions and their supporting naval elements already dedicated to attacking the targets in the Southern Resource Area. Added with other requisitioned Army shipping, and this gives the Japanese economy 2.5 million tons to play with - and they needed 10 million tons. There is simply no extra shipping to even move these troops outside of Manchuria.

And as pointed out, diverting tonnage from those attacks is to miss the entire point of the war in the first place. Japan is on an extremely strict timetable, and any delays would mean failure of the entire operation. The Japanese could, maybe, divert a division and a third from Burma operations, but that's it, and against two American divisions on Oahu is a recipe for a slaughter.

To the third: Leaving aside shipping constraints, politically the Army would have never released the necessary six divisions to invade Hawaii, which leads me to my last point.

Operationally, invading during the Pearl Harbor invasion is a disaster waiting to happen before they even land troops. The OTL raid depended on Japan being able to dash in and out beyond strike range of aircraft on Pearl - and they still expected to lose two carriers. If the Kido Butai has to babysit an invasion convoy that's not going to happen; the convoy is going to be extremely slow and at great risk of being spotted and attacked. Even if the raid happens first and then the invasion convoy goes in, there's still not-inconsiderable strike capability left on Oahu, and more importantly, Enterprise and Lexington are charging in. While the two wouldn't be able to take on the Kido Butai by themselves the invasion convoy would be an excellent target for them, as well as for the thirty-odd destroyers and several light cruisers that escaped damage.

Further, even assuming landed troops the invasion is no sure thing even with six divisions. Oahu is one of the most fortified places on the planet, bristling with fortifications and coastal artillery. Only two American divisions, but those fortifications are a major force multiplier.

And the final nail in the coffin, and the biggest reason why abandoning the Southern Resource operations was a no-go: how in the name of the flying spaghetti monster is Japan supposed to keep Hawaii supplied and invade the East Indies with eleven divisions? Multiple divisions, at that distance, is going to eat up all the shipping resources that you claimed could be redirected back toward taking the East Indies. This before American submarines go to work. Congrats, Japan just played themselves.

And then, and then, even if Alien Space Bats descend and make all this work - the US is going to be back. They are not going to be in the mood for negotiating. Not when Japan is almost certainly going to be treating its POWs and the population of Oahu with the same loving, tender care they did everywhere else. And Japan is back to square one except with no oil stockpiles.

 

[VanOwen]

I suggest the OP looked at Jon Patshall's post on combinedfleet.com. He puts paid to this scenario quite eloquently.