Japanese Use "Island Hopping" Strategy In 1941-42

ben0628

Banned
Island Hopping was a military strategy employed by the Allies in the Pacific against Japan during World War Two. The idea was to bypass heavily fortified Japanese positions and instead concentrate the limited Allied resources on strategically important islands that were not well defended but capable of supporting the drive to the main islands of Japan. The main reason why this was able to work later in the war was because of Allied naval dominance.

The Japanese however, had naval dominance in the early stages of the war. In otl, the Japanese pretty much just advanced in a regular fashion, starting in Japan and China and slowly expanding in each direction, not skipping over any territory in the process. I would make the argument that this strategy slowed them down and prevented them from capturing certain islands and strategic points such as Port Moresby, Midway, Guadalcanal, and other locations.

What if instead of this, the Japanese adopt the Island Hopping strategy, skip the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines and focus on securing the objectives furthest away first (Solomon Islands, New Guinea, Midway, Malaysia, Burma, etc). After securing these objectives, then the Japanese can invade the Dutch East Indies and Philippines. This option would INITIALLY free up almost two hundred thousand Japanese soldiers (according to Wikipedia) as well as countless ships and airplanes. Obviously the Japanese would need to keep some ships and planes in the rear to deal with the Philippines and DEI garrisons but I'd assume that they wouldn't cause that much trouble to the Japanese war effort (I could be wrong).

Is this idea bat shit crazy (alien bat shit more specifically) or is it possible this would help the Japanese tremendously. Please note, I am fully aware the Japanese really couldn't win in the long run, I am just curious if this strategy could have helped prolong the war.
 
kinda nuts. the DEI were a PRIMARY objective (oil) and the Phillipines HAD to be reduced as they straddled IJN lines of communications. the Solomonns offered no resources, just defensive positions at best; nd, Midway would have been a major liability
 

ben0628

Banned
kinda nuts. the DEI were a PRIMARY objective (oil) and the Phillipines HAD to be reduced as they straddled IJN lines of communications. the Solomonns offered no resources, just defensive positions at best; nd, Midway would have been a major liability

My Response to this is that a) The Japanese could go an extra few months without oil, b) New Guinea and the Solomon islands would offer defensive positions and act as a staging area for attacks against Australia. More importantly, I'd argue the Allies need these islands if they wish to counterattack, which is why it would be best for the Japanese to deny them the chance to hold these islands and strike them first. c) I don't see Midway as a liability. Yes it is hard to supply but the Japanese were into the idea of "hold that island as long as possible, regardless if its worth it." US needs midway to strike the central Pacific, might as well make them pay in blood if they want it back. As for the Philippines, that I believe is the only true problem. Surely though, can't the Japanese just surround the island with ships and take out MacArthur's naval and air capabilities without having to use ground forces?
 
The US would jump around that far easier, since Wake isn't on your list the US will be free to roam. Also Midway as a major base? Please. It was a atoll with an airstrip. The Japanese cannot afford to go without oil for too long hence capturing the DEI must be only priority.The Phillippenes are the closest a US battlefleet would have to a base and one wrong missed signal and you've got a better US fleet in your backyard unharrassed.
 

ben0628

Banned
The US would jump around that far easier, since Wake isn't on your list the US will be free to roam. Also Midway as a major base? Please. It was a atoll with an airstrip. The Japanese cannot afford to go without oil for too long hence capturing the DEI must be only priority.The Phillippenes are the closest a US battlefleet would have to a base and one wrong missed signal and you've got a better US fleet in your backyard unharrassed.

As said earlier, the Philippines are a problem with the plan. But (and no one has answered this yet), is it not possible for the Japanese to destroy American naval and air capabilities on the islands without invading with ground forces? Obviously the Philippines would later be invaded, but only after the furthest away objectives are secure. As said earlier, from what I have read in other posts is that the Japanese can go an extra few months without needing oil from the DEI so the invasion can wait a little. I never said Midway was a major base, however it IS a strategic island that the US will need to take back. As for the list, those were merely a couple of examples. What I am suggesting is the Japanese focus on ALL furthest away objectives first by skipping the DEI and Philippines (this includes Wake Island).

Now, as for the original question, can what I am suggesting be achieved, and would it help the Japanese long term, or make it worse?
 
My Response to this is that a) The Japanese could go an extra few months without oil,

Actually they couldnt. The six or twelve month reserve (depends on how you calculate) as predicated on shutting down large swaths of industry. Japans industrial sector was collapsing for want of fuel and lubricants. The flow of fuel was restored to Japan at a barely adaquate level. In the second half of 1942 naval operations were curtailed due to the inability to rebuild reserves. ie the main battle line sitting at Truk while the light cruiser squadrons were shot to pieces in the Solomons.

b) New Guinea and the Solomon islands would offer defensive positions and act as a staging area for attacks against Australia. More importantly, I'd argue the Allies need these islands if they wish to counterattack, which is why it would be best for the Japanese to deny them the chance to hold these islands and strike them first. c)

large swaths of those islands were bypassed, pluss there is a strong argument the S Pacific offensive was unecessary

I don't see Midway as a liability. Yes it is hard to supply

The japanese discovered it was impossible to supply these islands by 1944.

but the Japanese were into the idea of "hold that island as long as possible, regardless if its worth it." US needs midway to strike the central Pacific, might as well make them pay in blood if they want it back.

Midway had only a minor role in the central pacific offensive. It served as a minor reconissance base, and a refuel stop for submarines.

As for the Philippines, that I believe is the only true problem. Surely though, can't the Japanese just surround the island with ships and take out MacArthur's naval and air capabilities without having to use ground forces?

In 1941 the Japanese had no idea if that were possible. It also leave the Phillipines in US hands when the expected peace negotiations start.
 

ben0628

Banned
Actually they couldnt. The six or twelve month reserve (depends on how you calculate) as predicated on shutting down large swaths of industry. Japans industrial sector was collapsing for want of fuel and lubricants. The flow of fuel was restored to Japan at a barely adaquate level. In the second half of 1942 naval operations were curtailed due to the inability to rebuild reserves. ie the main battle line sitting at Truk while the light cruiser squadrons were shot to pieces in the Solomons.

large swaths of those islands were bypassed, pluss there is a strong argument the S Pacific offensive was unecessary

The japanese discovered it was impossible to supply these islands by 1944.

Midway had only a minor role in the central pacific offensive. It served as a minor reconissance base, and a refuel stop for submarines.

In 1941 the Japanese had no idea if that were possible. It also leave the Phillipines in US hands when the expected peace negotiations start.

Thank you. So if the Japanese tired this plan, you think it would leave them in a worse predicament than in otl?
 
as long as the supplies hold, THe phillipines will be used as a base for subs, which have the potential to be a PITA at the least, and an outright menace at the most ( I think older sboats with working torps were stationed there)
 
What if instead of this, the Japanese adopt the Island Hopping strategy, skip the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines and focus on securing the objectives furthest away first (Solomon Islands, New Guinea, Midway, Malaysia, Burma, etc). After securing these objectives, then the Japanese can invade the Dutch East Indies and Philippines. This option would INITIALLY free up almost two hundred thousand Japanese soldiers (according to Wikipedia) as well as countless ships and airplanes. Obviously the Japanese would need to keep some ships and planes in the rear to deal with the Philippines and DEI garrisons but I'd assume that they wouldn't cause that much trouble to the Japanese war effort (I could be wrong).

Is this idea bat shit crazy (alien bat shit more specifically) or is it possible this would help the Japanese tremendously. Please note, I am fully aware the Japanese really couldn't win in the long run, I am just curious if this strategy could have helped prolong the war.

Allied choose the Island Hopping strategy because their final objective is to reach the Japanese Home island, bomb it to oblivion, and force Imperial Japan to capitulate. So they didn't have to take and hold much of territory. They just need bases for securing the supply route from Mainland USA to Japan.

Japan final objective on the other hand is to conquering territories for their resources or strategic location. DEI have to be taken for their oil, rubber, foodstuffs, etc. so does Northern Borneo. Singapore have to conquered because that is the main port of British Royal Navy in the Pacific, Malaya have to be taken in order to choke Singapore, Phillipine's so the Americans can't cut their communication line to Japanese home island, Papua and Solomon island have to be attacked so Australia can be isolated. Burma were invaded to stop Allied supplies reaching China.

The conclusion is an island Hopping strategy was not suited for Japan overall strategy.
 
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