Japanese sink US carriers at Pearl Harbor, what next?

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Slight correction, but Spruance got a destroyer class, and not a cruiser class. (Still ashame we retired those...)

Another correction: Halsey got both a cruiser and a Burke class destroyer. And, uh, a field house.

No question which was more admired by the admirals, though.
 
Agree, which is why I think they would make it a priority to hit the canal with some kind of strike or coordinate sub raiders to the area. I think they would try something to disrupt or damage the canal.
While it would be worth while to attempt to damage the canal
1. The Canal Zone was heavily defended
2. The effect wouldn't have been as disasterous as you might think

I would have followed up with midway and operations from our timeline, this isn't buying the Japanese years, and in the overall picture they still face the same being bleed dry in China with no way out as they did on dec 6th
 
Well, you could easily argue that the Saratoga gets torpedoed and sunk in early 1942. But that's like supposing that the Nautilus sinks the Hiryu just as the other three CVs of the KB are being sunk in the Five Minutes of Midway..
No I was arguing that we go the whole hog and have it sunk at Pearl Harbour on 7th December 1941 along with Lexington and Enterprise. Though as it happened Saratoga missed most of the pacific battles of 1942 including the two most important ones anyway IOTL.
As to adopting a more extreme Europe First strategy in WWII, that means the Republicans sweep the US House of Representatives. Losing the Senate was never in the cards. FDR was always a politician first, and he never went far beyond the limits of public opinion. Going full bore on Europe First really just means shutting down the Pacific War completely to put every last DD against the U-Boats while flooding even more L-L to our allies while there is little to be done to get US troops or strategic bombers up against Nazi Germany any time sooner. A very VERY ugly situation back home for the Democrats and FDR himself, with facing a non-OTL US House and a Republican Party that hasn't had any control of any levers of power in America since they lost the Supreme Court in 1937, the White House and Senate in 1932, and the US House in 1930. You could easily see Republicans in the House refusing to appropriate funds for FDR's stupendous military buildup until he can show at least a temporary "Japan First" war strategy.
I didn't mean as extreme as that. I meant that as their aircraft carrier force is temporarily outnumbered by the Japanese the Americans send their two surviving good carriers to the Atlantic while the build their strength back up.
 
No I was arguing that we go the whole hog and have it sunk at Pearl Harbour on 7th December 1941 along with Lexington and Enterprise. Though as it happened Saratoga missed most of the pacific battles of 1942 including the two most important ones anyway IOTL.I didn't mean as extreme as that. I meant that as their aircraft carrier force is temporarily outnumbered by the Japanese the Americans send their two surviving good carriers to the Atlantic while the build their strength back up.

There's no reason not to keep the surviving carriers at Pearl. If FDR allows the stripping of Hawaii AND California of its strongest military assets then while he wouldn't be impeached he could find himself facing a nearly completely hostile Congress, regardless of political party. FDR would be crippled politically. And FDR would not be FDR to actually allow this to happen.
 
It wasn't the speed that killed Wasp it was the lack of of armour (and the complete and utterl bullshit salvo of I-19, best torpedo salvo OF THE WAR!, but that's beside the points). No carrier AFAIK would have survived the salvo Wasp took,

That last part is the key. No WWII carrier to include USS Midway would have survived that salvo at the moment Wasp got hit (in the middle of flight ops with fuel lines full).
 
That last part is the key. No WWII carrier to include USS Midway would have survived that salvo at the moment Wasp got hit (in the middle of flight ops with fuel lines full).

Actually post war research had pointed out USS Wasp was still not sunk directly as a result of the two torpedoes that hit her, but due to her secondary damage caused by detonnations of AFGAS tanks and aircraft on her hangardeck. There is a very accurate damagereport analysis of her last moments. See link: http://www.damagecontrolmuseums.org...orpedo/39 WASP CV7 Loss War Damage Report.pdf

B.t.w. The report only makes mention of two torpedoes hitting USS Wasp, not three, which is correct as of the same salvo of six type 95 long range oxigen kerosine torpedoes, one hit USS North Carolina and another sank USS O'Brien as well, making it four independent hits, not five out of six.
 
Actually post war research had pointed out USS Wasp was still not sunk directly as a result of the two torpedoes that hit her, but due to her secondary damage caused by detonnations of AFGAS tanks and aircraft on her hangardeck. There is a very accurate damagereport analysis of her last moments. See link: http://www.damagecontrolmuseums.org/WWII/ww2v1/39 WASP CV7-Loss, torpedo/39 WASP CV7 Loss War Damage Report.pdf

B.t.w. The report only makes mention of two torpedoes hitting USS Wasp, not three, which is correct as of the same salvo of six type 95 long range oxigen kerosine torpedoes, one hit USS North Carolina and another sank USS O'Brien as well, making it four independent hits, not five out of six.

I think that is why it is generally viewed as the most successful torpedo salvo ever. I-19 sank a carrier, sank a destroyer, and sent a battleship back to Pearl Harbor for repairs. Not bad for government work...
 
I think that is why it is generally viewed as the most successful torpedo salvo ever. I-19 sank a carrier, sank a destroyer, and sent a battleship back to Pearl Harbor for repairs. Not bad for government work...

Especially when you consider that no American submarine ever managed such a feat, despite the ludicrous amount of IJN warship tonnage U.S. subs sent to the bottom (though Archerfish's salvo beat it in absolute tonnage.)

Honorable mention: I-168, which also managed to sink a carrier (USS Yorktown) and a destroyer, but with no battleship chaser.

Second honorable mention: Italian submarine Axum, which off Bizerte in August 1942 succeeded in sinking the Royal Navy anti-aircraft cruiser HMS Cairo, and damaging the light cruiser HMS Nigeria and the oil tanker SS Ohio with one salvo of 4 torpedoes.

Third honorable mention: U.S. submarine Barb, which achieved (like I-19) 5 hits for 6 torpedoes, sinking both the aircraft carrier IJN Unyo (3 hits) and the tanker Azusa Maru (2 hits). (The Barb also has the very unique distinction of destroying a Japanese train via landing party on her last war patrol - which made for a unique addition to her battle flag.)
 
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There's no reason not to keep the surviving carriers at Pearl. If FDR allows the stripping of Hawaii AND California of its strongest military assets then while he wouldn't be impeached he could find himself facing a nearly completely hostile Congress, regardless of political party. FDR would be crippled politically. And FDR would not be FDR to actually allow this to happen.
I think that's a very strong political reason to keep the surviving carriers at Pearl.

Which is a pity because I still maintain that in the context of the OP the Americans would have been better off lending the Yorktown and Hornet to the British Home Fleet and Force H for the first half of 1942, which is a good military reason not to keep the surviving carriers at Pearl. Hawaii and California would still have strong shore based air forces to defend them. Plus the Hornet and Yorktown were in the Atlantic when Pearl Harbour was attacked so strictly speaking they would be kept in the Atlantic in my proposal and not be kept at Pearl.
 
I think that's a very strong political reason to keep the surviving carriers at Pearl.

Which is a pity because I still maintain that in the context of the OP the Americans would have been better off lending the Yorktown and Hornet to the British Home Fleet and Force H for the first half of 1942, which is a good military reason not to keep the surviving carriers at Pearl. Hawaii and California would still have strong shore based air forces to defend them. Plus the Hornet and Yorktown were in the Atlantic when Pearl Harbour was attacked so strictly speaking they would be kept in the Atlantic in my proposal and not be kept at Pearl.

The other political reason is that Admiral King would personally strangle you with your own entrails if you tried to move most of the USN carrier assets out of the Pacific. You'd probably need to find yourself a new CNO to carry that out.
 
The other political reason is that Admiral King would personally strangle you with your own entrails if you tried to move most of the USN carrier assets out of the Pacific. You'd probably need to find yourself a new CNO to carry that out.
But at the start of World War II the carrier assets I was referring to (Yorktown and Hornet) were in the Atlantic, so I'm proposing to keep them there for 6 months rather than move them to the Pacific immediately after the raid on Pearl Harbour. All the ships in the Pacific on 7th December 1941 would stay there.

IOTL F.D.R. did loan some American warships to the British Home Fleet in the first half of 1942 including the aircraft carrier Wasp and some of the new battleships. Out of interest, how livid was King about that?

If the loan of Yorktown and Hornet did result in the sinking of Tirpitz when it attempted to attack PQ12 in March 1942 then then its likely that Churchill and F.D.R. would think it was safe to transfer them and the battleships to the Pacific. Would that be enough time for them to take part in the Battle of the Coral Sea?
 
The other political reason is that Admiral King would personally strangle you with your own entrails if you tried to move most of the USN carrier assets out of the Pacific. You'd probably need to find yourself a new CNO to carry that out.

Another way to deal with it would have been to get rid off Admiral King at all. He was not the brightest sort of commander and certainly had major strategic flaws in his thinking, such as the complete ignoring of ASW, despite two and a half years of experience by the new allies in the UK. Perhaps there would have been a purge of some kind against him, considering him an agent of the enemy, not willing to do what had to be done?
 
But at the start of World War II the carrier assets I was referring to (Yorktown and Hornet) were in the Atlantic, so I'm proposing to keep them there for 6 months rather than move them to the Pacific immediately after the raid on Pearl Harbor. All the ships in the Pacific on 7th December 1941 would stay there.

Hornet was only there for her shakedown cruise. After that, she's headed to take on B-25s. ITTL she'll have Yorktown as her escort rather than the sunken Enterprise.

IOTL F.D.R. did loan some American warships to the British Home Fleet in the first half of 1942 including the aircraft carrier Wasp and some of the new battleships. Out of interest, how livid was King about that?

Not TOO livid, as he had not yet been skunked by the Admiralty over the usage of any of the RN carriers in the Western Indian Ocean. The Wasp could be used as a special favor for the British to help save Malta (making the Admiralty's refusal over their carriers all the more enraging from King's POV). As to the new BB's, they weren't up to quite keeping up with the Yorktowns and at this point in the war lacked a decent destroyer screen, with so many Atlantic Fleet DDs fighting the U-Boats.

If the loan of Yorktown and Hornet did result in the sinking of Tirpitz when it attempted to attack PQ12 in March 1942

They couldn't know this was going to happen. Having the Tirpitz as a threat in being worked to the better.

then then its likely that Churchill and F.D.R. would think it was safe to transfer them and the battleships to the Pacific. Would that be enough time for them to take part in the Battle of the Coral Sea?

No. You're talking about a redeployment of what? 13,000 miles? And that's assuming after they'd seen action against the Tirpitz. By the time they got to the Coral Sea, they'd be needing a refit!

Another way to deal with it would have been to get rid of Admiral King. He was not the brightest sort of commander and certainly had major strategic flaws in his thinking, such as the complete ignoring of ASW, despite two and a half years of experience by the new allies in the UK. Perhaps there would have been a purge of some kind against him, considering him an agent of the enemy, (1) not willing to do what had to be done?

:confused:Smilies are your friend. BUT, I'm going to pretend you're serious.

The "Europe First" Admiral Stark was lucky he wasn't cashiered himself post-PH rather than being kicked downstairs to commanding the Tenth Fleet. As a Japan First admiral, politically King's sacking would have sent a signal of defeatism to the Japanese, telling them that they could expect to have free reign in the Pacific. And canning King so quickly after the "semi-canning" of Stark would be hard to justify. Its not like anyone foresaw that America's entry into WWII would happen because Japan suddenly threw any sense pf grand strategy out the window. And there were many good reasons beyond King's inability to recognize the threat (like his not understanding that the U-Boats could reach the US East AND Gulf Coasts) for the early failure to deal with the U-Boat menace. Among them was a lack of dedicated land-based ASW aircraft and the failure to immediately enforce a strict lights out policy on the US East Coast shoreline (though that was very tough to do since the Bos-Wash region is the brightest single area on Earth).

1) :rolleyes::rolleyes::rolleyes::rolleyes::rolleyes:
 
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But at the start of World War II the carrier assets I was referring to (Yorktown and Hornet) were in the Atlantic, so I'm proposing to keep them there for 6 months rather than move them to the Pacific immediately after the raid on Pearl Harbour. All the ships in the Pacific on 7th December 1941 would stay there.

Right - I got that.

With Lex and Enterprise taken off the board, it's really hard to imagine King settling for anything less than an immediate transfer of Yorktown and Hornet to the Pacific, since he wouldn't see a CINCPAC reduced to one usable fleet carrier (Saratoga) as an acceptable risk.

IOTL F.D.R. did loan some American warships to the British Home Fleet in the first half of 1942 including the aircraft carrier Wasp and some of the new battleships. Out of interest, how livid was King about that?

Livid. But then Ernest King was in a perpetual state of lividness, especially where the Royal Navy was concerned. :) "He is the most even-tempered person in the United States Navy. He is always in a rage."

EDIT: Usertron is probably right that there's a fair chance Wasp is still loaned to the British for a spell, so long as Yorktown and Hornet are sent west promptly. But the pressure to bring her back would be higher in this situation than it was in ours. The loss of any more carriers in the Pacific, even for extended repair, would make it difficult to resist.

If the loan of Yorktown and Hornet did result in the sinking of Tirpitz when it attempted to attack PQ12 in March 1942 then then its likely that Churchill and F.D.R. would think it was safe to transfer them and the battleships to the Pacific. Would that be enough time for them to take part in the Battle of the Coral Sea?

I actually think there's something to be said for this idea: as much as this leaves the Pacific bereft of carrier power, we know Japanese logistics were going to constrain its ability to extend its defense perimeter much beyond what it was already, and there was a limit to what could be done by way of counteroffensive until the surge of new shipbuilding could make its first appearance in the Pacific in 1943. (Of course, there's no guarantee that Hornet and Yorktown would actually result in the elimination of Tirpitz....the question would be how long FDR could justify loaning them for the effort, if it proved to be prolonged.)

But politically, that was going to be a non-starter, both on Capitol Hill and within the Navy Department. In OTL, Hornet was moved out to the Pacific as soon as was practicable (march) as it was. Wasp was moved out once Coral Sea and Midway had reduced CINCPAC to three carriers. In a world where Chester Nimitz is down to one operational fleet carrier, it's just really hard to see FDR and King agreeing not to reinforce him immediately with more decks.
 
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Hornet was only there for her shakedown cruise. After that, she's headed to take on B-25s. ITTL she'll have Yorktown as her escort rather than the sunken Enterprise.



Not TOO livid, as he had not yet been skunked by the Admiralty over the usage of any of the RN carriers in the Western Indian Ocean. The Wasp could be used as a special favor for the British to help save Malta (making the Admiralty's refusal over their carriers all the more enraging from King's POV). As to the new BB's, they weren't up to quite keeping up with the Yorktowns and at this point in the war lacked a decent destroyer screen, with so many Atlantic Fleet DDs fighting the U-Boats.



They couldn't know this was going to happen. Having the Tirpitz as a threat in being worked to the better.



No. You're talking about a redeployment of what? 13,000 miles? And that's assuming after they'd seen action against the Tirpitz. By the time they got to the Coral Sea, they'd be needing a refit!



:confused:Smilies are your friend. BUT, I'm going to pretend you're serious.

The "Europe First" Admiral Stark was lucky he wasn't cashiered himself post-PH rather than being kicked downstairs to commanding the Tenth Fleet. As a Japan First admiral, politically King's sacking would have sent a signal of defeatism to the Japanese, telling them that they could expect to have free reign in the Pacific. And canning King so quickly after the "semi-canning" would be hard to justify. Its not like anyone foresaw that America's entry into WWII would happen because Japan suddenly threw any sense pf grand strategy out the window. And there were many good reasons beyond King's inability to recognize the threat (like his not understanding that the U-Boats could reach the US East AND Gulf Coasts) for the early failure to deal with the U-Boat menace. Among them was a lack of dedicated land-based ASW aircraft and the failure to immediately enforce a strict lights out policy on the US East Coast shoreline (though that was very tough to do since the Bos-Wash region is the brightest single area on Earth).

1) :rolleyes::rolleyes::rolleyes::rolleyes::rolleyes:


Hi there.

I agree, sacking King was a bit over the top, though his possition was not invulnerable, as he still was under the president as chief of the USA, as well as the C&C of the united military forces combined. If required, he could still become a victim of politics, no matter what Japan would think of it. Politics seem to have their own way from time to time and FDR certainly had his own reasons for his close Anglo-American ties, King, or no King.
 
Hi there.

I agree, sacking King was a bit over the top, though his possition was not invulnerable, as he still was under the president as chief of the USA, as well as the C&C of the united military forces combined. If required, he could still become a victim of politics, no matter what Japan would think of it. Politics seem to have their own way from time to time and FDR certainly had his own reasons for his close Anglo-American ties, King, or no King.

FDR still wanted King around, though. When King submitted his age-mandated resignation letter at the end of 1942, FDR chose to keep him on until war's end. He had an excuse to ease him out, and he chose not to take it.
 
Politically alone it would be impossible to not reinforce the Pacific Fleet. Add on firing King for wanting to reinforce the Pacific Fleet. Plus no victory at Midway and a draw at Coral Sea. I would imagine that the Democratics were pointing out the victiry at Midway during the election. The Republicans would have a field day hammering Roosevelt and the Democrats for their total failure to reinforce the Pacific Fleet and with no Decisive Victory to point to. The Democrats ended up 222 to 209 in the OTL election it could have been much worse and while the control of the Senate would have never been lost. The number of lost Senate seats could have gone into double digits. It would have been a real blow to Roosevelt politically.
 
Politically alone it would be impossible to not reinforce the Pacific Fleet. Add on firing King for wanting to reinforce the Pacific Fleet. Plus no victory at Midway and a draw at Coral Sea. I would imagine that the Democratics were pointing out the victiry at Midway during the election. The Republicans would have a field day hammering Roosevelt and the Democrats for their total failure to reinforce the Pacific Fleet and with no Decisive Victory to point to. The Democrats ended up 222 to 209 in the OTL election it could have been much worse and while the control of the Senate would have never been lost. The number of lost Senate seats could have gone into double digits. It would have been a real blow to Roosevelt politically.

Remember too that the Republicans post-PH went from the Party of Isolationism to the Party of Japan First, with a LOT of Democrats joining with them on that subject. The great bulk of Americans didn't become "Europe First" until D-Day. As has been said above, stripping the Pacific down to the torpedo magnet Saratoga couldn't be justified to the layman's mind , and the US Congress of the American public any more than stripping the British Home Fleet could to Parliament. FDR was getting enough political grief as it was for "not doing more" to reinforce the Pacific War. If FDR had lost the 1940 elections, in this situation President Wendell Willkie would have been eaten alive.
 
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So they get two decks. Enterprise and Lexington. Sara was en route to San Diego from Bremerton, scheduled to pick up her VF squadron which had just been checked out on the F4F while she was in refit.

That leave Sara, Ranger, Yorktown and Wasp, along with Hornet, which is still shaking down. At least two of the Atlantic fleet ship will have to stay put, probably Wasp and Ranger.

First thing that goes is the Wake relief effort. No chance. The early Marshall Islands strikes may be scrubbed. The Doolittle Raid just went from risk to unacceptable risk. Without the Doolittel Raid the U.S. will have three decks for Coral Sea. That might turn into a major U.S. victory or could remain that tactical draw of OTL.

From there forward it is likely close to business as usual. There is a chance that the Midway operation is taken off the table, since at least part of the justification for the operation was to prevent a re-occurrence of that Raid.

I keep coming back to Calbear's post here: I really think this is close to the likely mark, setting aside shipbuilding priorities.

Wake reinforcement is off the table, and so are the Marshalls raids. Ranger stays in the Atlantic, and (this is a close call) Wasp as well, at least for a spell. That leaves Nimitz with only three effective decks, and trying to rush as much land-based air to bases in the Pacific. With three fleet carriers, Nimitz can still stage real operations, but he now has no margin for error...beyond an eventual hope that he gets Wasp by summer.

Does the Doolittle Raid still happen? Roosevelt was an effusive supporter, and King gave it his support, too. But it's one thing to risk 40% of your carrier strength on a high risk raid meant purely for morale purposes, and another to do it with one using 67% of it, leaving you only one single carrier to cover the South Pacific and Hawaii. Maybe King still takes the risk, and generations of historians marvel at the gamble. But it's hard to say. It's a different calculus.

Otherwise, the rest plays out as here: Nimitz still has Rochefort's codebreaking, still knows about MO and, yes, Midway, and he sends all three carriers to try to stop the IJN in the Coral Sea. If it works out, he could still do Midway, hopefully with similar results (though there are many butterflies here: does Halsey come down with his skin rash?). But most likely, Nimitz will by summer be too weak in carrier strength (figure he has to lose at least one deck, maybe even two, in these battles) for King to be willing to take the risk of launching WATCHTOWER, even with Wasp arriving. Which might butterfly the entire Solomons campaign away, leaving Nimitz to play defense until mid-1943, when he has enough firepower to start out his Road to Tokyo in the Gilberts. Which would mean that all the attrition of IJN naval air and surface combatants that happened in the Solomons would now happen some months later in the Gilberts and Marshalls, most likely.
 
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