Japanese sink US carriers at Pearl Harbor, what next?

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Not really warm, but pleasant. :)

Midway was not meant to be the Decisive Battle. It was designed to disable the USN's version of the Kido Butai (Mobile Striking Force). This would allow the time necessary to complete the territorial acquisitions necessary to ensure a defensive perimeter that would defend the Southern Resource Area while also degrading the American's ability to counter IJN mobile forces as the Americans advanced into the exact set-piece battle the Japanese had planned for them. The Japanese naval command saw Admiral Togo Heihachirō as a near-deity, they were obsessed with replicating Tsushima (Admiral Mahan also has to shoulder some of the blame here). Japanese naval cadets had this drummed into them literally from day one at Etajima (in fairness Togo was one of the truly brilliant naval officers of the steam era), and everything the IJN did on a strategic level was meant to replicate Togo's greatest afternoon.

You are correct in that the Combined Fleet was made up of different elements, the so-called "Main Body" was the battleship force (the four Kongo class BC, even though they had been reclassified as full BB, were considered to be part of the Mobile Striking Force for administrative purposes within the IJN).

There were two schools insode the IJN, one somewhat more realistic than the other. Yamamoto was the most prominent of the "realist wing". He understood that the Empire could not, in any circumstances hope to compete with the U.S. in a war of attrition. This wing's goal was to secure a strong epough defensive perimeter quickly enough to bring the war to a successful conclusion. This would avoid having to face the massive force approved by the 1940 Two Ocean Navy Act.

As an example: the Japanese laid down Mushahi on 29, March, 1938, she was commissioned on 5 August 1942. In that same time frame the USN built and commissioned five BB (Washington and the four South Dakota Class), commission a sixth (North Carolina) and had launched the Iowa (actually she was launched on 27 August, but close enough for this example) and had four more Iowa Class BB under construction. Six more BB (Illinois and five Montana class ships) were either ready to be laid down or planned once yard space cleared. All of the planned ships would have been in commission no later than November 1945, making a total of 21 BB commissioned by the end of 1945. Japan hoped to have one-two additional BB in commission in the same time frame, making a total of four modern ship of the Yamato class. What makes this even worse is that the IJN started out 40% behind the USN.

Despite this reality (and if you look at other ship types, from CA down to SS, the ration is actually WORSE than for the BB) the majority wing of the IJN command not only clung to the same basic belief in the Decisive Battle which Yamamoto shared, but firmly believed that, regardless of when it happened, the Japanese fleet would emerge victorious (one reason for the over bulked Yamato class and the never laid down lunacy of the A-150 class was the theory that a few very large would be better than a lot of almost as large; utterly insane).

The "Decisive Battle" obsession is an example of the difficulties that the Japanese military, both Army and Navy experience during the war. There brutal discipline experienced during officer training tended to create exceptional rigid officers, sometimes tactically brilliant, but in general unable to adapt to rapidly changing conditions. A more flexible mindset would not have saved the Empire once the War began, however it might have allowed the Supreme Command Staff to see the folly of their plans in time to avoid the war in the first place.

Pleasant, pleasant is good :cool:

Thanks for that history lesson. Always nice to get the deep insights into the psyche of the Japanese in those times. I knew they were unhealthy dedicated, but not to myths like that. Their inferiority was already clear to me, as was their hopelessness even with their powerful fleet. Now i know how deep that hopelessness went.

Kido Butai had no battleships at all. It was compromised of the CarDiv1, CarDiv2 and CarDiv5 only with regulary support from Sentai 8 (CruDiv8) Tone and Chikuma, as well as occasionally one, or two sections of Sentai 3 of the 1st fleet (Kongo, Haruna, Kirishima and Hiei)

Note Kido Butai was part of the 2nd fleet, as were all heavy cruisers of the IJN and most of the DesRon's, since this tactical fleetunit was supposed fto be teh expeditionary force, while the 1st fleet, or battlefleet with all battleships and a few DesRons as escorts was kept in homewaters for the decisive battle, hoped for by the battleship admirals.

Kidō Butai[edit]
The Kidō Butai (機動部隊, lit. Mobile Unit/Force) was the Combined Fleet's tactical designation for its carrier battle group.[4] The title was used as a term of convenience; it was not a formal name for the organization. It consisted of Japan's six largest carriers, carrying the 1st Air Fleet. This mobile task force was created for executing the attack on Pearl Harbor under Admiral Chuichi Nagumo in 1941.[5] For the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Kidō Butai consisted of six aircraft carriers (commanded by Chuichi Nagumo, Tamon Yamaguchi and Chuichi Hara) with 414 airplanes, two battleships, three cruisers, nine destroyers, eight tankers, 23 submarines, and four midget submarines. However, these escort ships were borrowed from other fleet and squadrons. It was considered the single most powerful naval fleet until four of the six aircraft carriers of the unit were destroyed in the disastrous Battle of Midway.[citation needed] On 14 July 1942, all carriers were moved to the 3rd Fleet.

Wel during the attack on Pearl they were accompanied by the Hiei and Kirishima. I knew that so i thought that they were always part of it. But if it was only temporary i get it, the Kido Butai had no Battleships. Also reading now that the remaining carriers were all moved to the 3rd fleet after Midway shows how little the Japanese actually valued them compared to the Battleships. Even whilst still having 2 fleet carriers that were superior to Lexington class and maybe even Yorktown class.

I still think it weird though. They were one of the first to build carriers. After Midway surely you could see their value... But, as Calbear explained, they didn't/couldn't.
 
Admiral Kincaid would like a word with you. I always imagined him throwing darts at a Halsey dartboard.:mad: That Halsey got his fifth star and Spruance didn't...politics politics.

Halsey was like the USN's Patton; tough, ruthlessly aggressive, and with the ego and stubbornness to go with. He wasn't called "Bull" for nothing!

Though in his defense his decision to take the bulk of the 3rd Fleet northward to destroy Ozawa's carrier group could be justified in light of what was known at the time: the Southern Force was walking into a trap, the Center Force had just been hammered, and the Northern Force was still at large with (for all they knew) four fully-loaded out carriers and two BB-hybrids. Taking all the battleships with him is questionable, but the aim to crush the opponent's main striking power, his naval air arm, was fundamentally correct.
 
Taking all the battleships with him is questionable, but the aim to crush the opponent's main striking power, his naval air arm, was fundamentally correct.

Halsey didn't know the Japanese carriers had been reduced to a skeleton air group. He needed those BBs to provide AA cover for his carriers.
 
I still think it weird though. They were one of the first to build carriers. After Midway surely you could see their value... But, as Calbear explained, they didn't/couldn't.

Some senior IJN officers did, obviously (Yamaguchi springs to mind). Unfortunately, they weren't the ones who mattered.
 
But that isn't the way he used TF 34. He put them into a position to try and enable a surface strike against the Northern force.

Not excacly, as the first and most serious blow was deleivered by his aircraft, not the ships. The mopping up group consisted of cruisers and destroyers only, not battleships, as these remained with the carriers and later on were send to Samar to intercept Kurita, after he had attacked Taffy 3. Ozawa's forces were destroyed primarily by airpower and the chase after the remains was done by fast ships, not the battleships which were too slow at just 27 knots at best.
 
It buys them 3 extra months. Carriers can be moved from the Atlantic. however if the time is taken to consolidate said victory, maybe immediate attack and take midway and other key islands this would help to also buy time.

Agree, which is why I think they would make it a priority to hit the canal with some kind of strike or coordinate sub raiders to the area. I think they would try something to disrupt or damage the canal.
 
Agree, which is why I think they would make it a priority to hit the canal with some kind of strike or coordinate sub raiders to the area. I think they would try something to disrupt or damage the canal.

The logistics for the IJN in trying to mount any substantive operation at the Canal are...daunting, to say the least.

Probably their only bet would be to sneak a freighter loaded with explosives and blow it up in one of the locks. But that wouldn't be easy, either: the US stationed armed guards on every ship transiting the canal on both the bridge and in the engine room at that time. Also: the locks are in pairs. Even if the Japanese managed to disable a lock, the USN could still use the other lock for priority warship transit while it was being repaired.
 
IIRC, the reason Franklin wasn't reactivated after the war was that the Navy was holding her back for an "ultimate" modernization that ultimately never came.

Right. She was listed as in "excellent" condition after repairs were complete later in 1945 - all rebuilt from the hanger deck up - but the war ended and there was no pressing need to put her back in service. Had the war continued into 1946, she would have seen service again.
 

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Agree, which is why I think they would make it a priority to hit the canal with some kind of strike or coordinate sub raiders to the area. I think they would try something to disrupt or damage the canal.
The U.S. was about as paranoid about the Canal as it is possible to be outside the walls of a medical facility. Very large air contingent, large ground contingent (58,000 men, around 1/3 coastal Artillery and AAA artillery), and stout defenses, both against air attack and against warships.

The Canal is over 7,400 miles from the closest Japanese base in the Mandates. That is double the distance the Pearl Harbor fleet had to cover, and that Raid strained the IJN's logistics to the breaking point. Even subs would have a limited duration at that range. In 1941 the IJN had three boats that could launch aircraft (I-9, I-10, I-11). They all operated a single E14Y reconnaissance float plane. it could carry 2 76 kg bombs. The U.S. had several radar installation (some of the first SCR sets were in Panama, as I noted, paranoid) and two Pursuit Groups (5 squadrons, mainly P-40 but also P-36 and few P-26, along with an A-20 Squadron and three B-18 squadrons).

Unlike Pearl or the Philippines Panama's AAA was on 24 hour alert, manned an ready from July 1941 onward. Aircraft were also on 24 hour alert, guns loaded and fueled. The Canal Zone was, with the possible exception of the Iceland contingent of Marines, the most prepared and alert location in the entire American military. The place was cocked and locked.
 

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Right. She was listed as in "excellent" condition after repairs were complete later in 1945 - all rebuilt from the hanger deck up - but the war ended and there was no pressing need to put her back in service. Had the war continued into 1946, she would have seen service again.
Same thing happened with Enterprise after she was repaired following her final kamikaze hit. She was used for the "Magic Carpet" troop rotations to the U.S. from the ETO and then more or less thrown away.
 

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An Alaska-class conversion would certainly be more useful than the OTL cruisers.
Melt them back to ingots. Only way to be sure. :p

In any case the hull form didn't really have that much more room than the Cleveland class hulls and took much longer to build.
 
A lot of good discussion of how such an attack would play out, which carriers would be knocked out (Lex and Enterprise) and what the first 6-9 months of the war would play out like.

But now I'm interested in how losing two fleet carriers would affect U.S. ship construction plans. The U.S. had started out the war with 7 fleet carriers; the IJN with 6 fleet carriers and 4 light carriers (with another 8 light and escort carriers planned to come on line in 1942). Now, on Day One, the USN finds itself down two more fleet carriers - and yet still has obligations in both theaters.

As it is, the U.S. in OTL took a number of emergency steps to speed up availability of carrier decks:

1) 13 Essex class carriers had been ordered under the 1938 and 1940 Navy Acts. After Pearl Harbor, 19 more were ordered, and construction on in progress Essexes was accelerated. These were built in five shipbuilding yards.
2) To fill the gap between Essex availability, Roosevelt was able to get nine Cleveland-class light cruisers under construction converted into light carriers (the Independence class) starting in January (1 ordered in Jan, 2 in Feb., 3 in march, and 3 in June), all from the New York Shipbuilding Corporation
3) Expansion and acceleration of escort carrier production (Bogue, Casablanca, et al)

How would the loss of Lex and Big E - and by loss, I mean that both are at least taken out of service for at least a good 12 months, if not more (I'm more optimistic about the ability of the U.S. to save and rebuild them, the big danger being capsizing from their high center of gravity, which would complicate salvage efforts) - alter this program? What more would the U.S. do beyond these efforts?

A) Were there any more slipways available to devote to Essex class carriers? What would have to be delayed to make room for them if so?
B) Would more Independence class conversions be ordered up front, rather than spread out through June? Would more Cleveland-class cruisers be converted?
C) Would other cruisers under construction, like the Alaskas, become targets for emergency conversion? (The General Board actually commissioned a study on this; the result would have been second-rate Essex knockoffs with reduced range and plane capacity; they decided against it.)

The easiest fix is more Independence-class CVL's (perhaps as many as 12-15), and ordered more quickly. Of course, even so, none would have been available before early 1943. I think that would happen, but I'm less sure about what else might take place.
 
Melt them back to ingots. Only way to be sure. :p

In any case the hull form didn't really have that much more room than the Cleveland class hulls and took much longer to build.

Yup.

As I mentioned above, the result would have been....not without value, but definitely inferior to an Essex in almost all respects...and they wouldn't have been available very quickly. Better off just giving their slipways to Essex class carriers (now I'm getting Calbear excited...).

________________________________________________________________________

"Aircraft Carrier, Converted from 12" Cruiser (Class CB 1-6)"

Preliminary design plan prepared for the General Board as part of an exploration of carrier conversions of warship hulls then under construction.
This plan, marked "Advance Print" and dated 3 January 1942, represents the conversion of Alaska class large cruiser hulls. It would have produced a ship similar in external appearance to the Essex (CV-9) class, but with lower freeboard, only two aircraft elevators, one catapult, and an 839' long flight deck somewhat offset to the port side. Aircraft capacity would have been lower than in the Essex design, with markedly reduced steaming endurance and modest anti-torpedo protection for the hull sides.

The original plan is in the 1939-1944 "Spring Styles Book" held by the Naval Historical Center.

s511-50.jpg
 

Rubicon

Banned
A) Were there any more slipways available to devote to Essex class carriers? What would have to be delayed to make room for them if so?
No the slipways were more or less full, you'll have to cancel battleships or Alaska-class.... ships if you want more Essex-class carriers. Maybe you can squeeze in one or two more
 

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A lot of good discussion of how such an attack would play out, which carriers would be knocked out (Lex and Enterprise) and what the first 6-9 months of the war would play out like.

But now I'm interested in how losing two fleet carriers would affect U.S. ship construction plans. The U.S. had started out the war with 7 fleet carriers; the IJN with 6 fleet carriers and 4 light carriers (with another 8 light and escort carriers planned to come on line in 1942). Now, on Day One, the USN finds itself down two more fleet carriers - and yet still has obligations in both theaters.

As it is, the U.S. in OTL took a number of emergency steps to speed up availability of carrier decks:

1) 13 Essex class carriers had been ordered under the 1938 and 1940 Navy Acts. After Pearl Harbor, 19 more were ordered, and construction on in progress Essexes was accelerated. These were built in five shipbuilding yards.
2) To fill the gap between Essex availability, Roosevelt was able to get nine Cleveland-class light cruisers under construction converted into light carriers (the Independence class) starting in January (1 ordered in Jan, 2 in Feb., 3 in march, and 3 in June), all from the New York Shipbuilding Corporation
3) Expansion and acceleration of escort carrier production (Bogue, Casablanca, et al)

How would the loss of Lex and Big E - and by loss, I mean that both are at least taken out of service for at least a good 12 months, if not more (I'm more optimistic about the ability of the U.S. to save and rebuild them, the big danger being capsizing from their high center of gravity, which would complicate salvage efforts) - alter this program? What more would the U.S. do beyond these efforts?

A) Were there any more slipways available to devote to Essex class carriers? What would have to be delayed to make room for them if so?
B) Would more Independence class conversions be ordered up front, rather than spread out through June? Would more Cleveland-class cruisers be converted?
C) Would other cruisers under construction, like the Alaskas, become targets for emergency conversion? (The General Board actually commissioned a study on this; the result would have been second-rate Essex knockoffs with reduced range and plane capacity; they decided against it.)

The easiest fix is more Independence-class CVL's (perhaps as many as 12-15), and ordered more quickly. Of course, even so, none would have been available before early 1943. I think that would happen, but I'm less sure about what else might take place.

The first Independence class CVL was ordered in January 1942 with the next two in February, three in March, and three in June. If two CVs are sunk/seriously damaged at PH, the US definitely accelerates and expands that program. You may also see proposals such as turning the liner Normandie into a carrier move forward. You may also see Ranger get a serious overhaul to make her more operationally suitable (King proposed that but it was later in the war and no longer necessary). I wonder if the US would try to get its hands on the Bearn. I'm not sure how but they might have tried something (yes I am aware of that ship's limitations).
 
No the slipways were more or less full, you'll have to cancel battleships or Alaska-class.... ships if you want more Essex-class carriers. Maybe you can squeeze in one or two more


Here is my reconstruction of the USN OTL capital ship program. Dates are laid to launched. Only time spent on a slip is tracked.
What I find interesting is how Newport News schooled everyone on building Essex hulls. The commissioned CV13 and CV14 in, respectively, 13 and 14 months!
http://imgur.com/a/zRqDz
 
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