Not really warm, but pleasant.
Midway was not meant to be the Decisive Battle. It was designed to disable the USN's version of the Kido Butai (Mobile Striking Force). This would allow the time necessary to complete the territorial acquisitions necessary to ensure a defensive perimeter that would defend the Southern Resource Area while also degrading the American's ability to counter IJN mobile forces as the Americans advanced into the exact set-piece battle the Japanese had planned for them. The Japanese naval command saw Admiral Togo Heihachirō as a near-deity, they were obsessed with replicating Tsushima (Admiral Mahan also has to shoulder some of the blame here). Japanese naval cadets had this drummed into them literally from day one at Etajima (in fairness Togo was one of the truly brilliant naval officers of the steam era), and everything the IJN did on a strategic level was meant to replicate Togo's greatest afternoon.
You are correct in that the Combined Fleet was made up of different elements, the so-called "Main Body" was the battleship force (the four Kongo class BC, even though they had been reclassified as full BB, were considered to be part of the Mobile Striking Force for administrative purposes within the IJN).
There were two schools insode the IJN, one somewhat more realistic than the other. Yamamoto was the most prominent of the "realist wing". He understood that the Empire could not, in any circumstances hope to compete with the U.S. in a war of attrition. This wing's goal was to secure a strong epough defensive perimeter quickly enough to bring the war to a successful conclusion. This would avoid having to face the massive force approved by the 1940 Two Ocean Navy Act.
As an example: the Japanese laid down Mushahi on 29, March, 1938, she was commissioned on 5 August 1942. In that same time frame the USN built and commissioned five BB (Washington and the four South Dakota Class), commission a sixth (North Carolina) and had launched the Iowa (actually she was launched on 27 August, but close enough for this example) and had four more Iowa Class BB under construction. Six more BB (Illinois and five Montana class ships) were either ready to be laid down or planned once yard space cleared. All of the planned ships would have been in commission no later than November 1945, making a total of 21 BB commissioned by the end of 1945. Japan hoped to have one-two additional BB in commission in the same time frame, making a total of four modern ship of the Yamato class. What makes this even worse is that the IJN started out 40% behind the USN.
Despite this reality (and if you look at other ship types, from CA down to SS, the ration is actually WORSE than for the BB) the majority wing of the IJN command not only clung to the same basic belief in the Decisive Battle which Yamamoto shared, but firmly believed that, regardless of when it happened, the Japanese fleet would emerge victorious (one reason for the over bulked Yamato class and the never laid down lunacy of the A-150 class was the theory that a few very large would be better than a lot of almost as large; utterly insane).
The "Decisive Battle" obsession is an example of the difficulties that the Japanese military, both Army and Navy experience during the war. There brutal discipline experienced during officer training tended to create exceptional rigid officers, sometimes tactically brilliant, but in general unable to adapt to rapidly changing conditions. A more flexible mindset would not have saved the Empire once the War began, however it might have allowed the Supreme Command Staff to see the folly of their plans in time to avoid the war in the first place.
Pleasant, pleasant is good
Thanks for that history lesson. Always nice to get the deep insights into the psyche of the Japanese in those times. I knew they were unhealthy dedicated, but not to myths like that. Their inferiority was already clear to me, as was their hopelessness even with their powerful fleet. Now i know how deep that hopelessness went.
Kido Butai had no battleships at all. It was compromised of the CarDiv1, CarDiv2 and CarDiv5 only with regulary support from Sentai 8 (CruDiv8) Tone and Chikuma, as well as occasionally one, or two sections of Sentai 3 of the 1st fleet (Kongo, Haruna, Kirishima and Hiei)
Note Kido Butai was part of the 2nd fleet, as were all heavy cruisers of the IJN and most of the DesRon's, since this tactical fleetunit was supposed fto be teh expeditionary force, while the 1st fleet, or battlefleet with all battleships and a few DesRons as escorts was kept in homewaters for the decisive battle, hoped for by the battleship admirals.
Kidō Butai[edit]
The Kidō Butai (機動部隊, lit. Mobile Unit/Force) was the Combined Fleet's tactical designation for its carrier battle group.[4] The title was used as a term of convenience; it was not a formal name for the organization. It consisted of Japan's six largest carriers, carrying the 1st Air Fleet. This mobile task force was created for executing the attack on Pearl Harbor under Admiral Chuichi Nagumo in 1941.[5] For the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Kidō Butai consisted of six aircraft carriers (commanded by Chuichi Nagumo, Tamon Yamaguchi and Chuichi Hara) with 414 airplanes, two battleships, three cruisers, nine destroyers, eight tankers, 23 submarines, and four midget submarines. However, these escort ships were borrowed from other fleet and squadrons. It was considered the single most powerful naval fleet until four of the six aircraft carriers of the unit were destroyed in the disastrous Battle of Midway.[citation needed] On 14 July 1942, all carriers were moved to the 3rd Fleet.
Wel during the attack on Pearl they were accompanied by the Hiei and Kirishima. I knew that so i thought that they were always part of it. But if it was only temporary i get it, the Kido Butai had no Battleships. Also reading now that the remaining carriers were all moved to the 3rd fleet after Midway shows how little the Japanese actually valued them compared to the Battleships. Even whilst still having 2 fleet carriers that were superior to Lexington class and maybe even Yorktown class.
I still think it weird though. They were one of the first to build carriers. After Midway surely you could see their value... But, as Calbear explained, they didn't/couldn't.