Japanese sink US carriers at Pearl Harbor, what next?

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The attack at Pearl was a RAID. As such it was best suited for the Mobile Striking Force (i.e. Kido Butai). The Japanese Naval command structure was devoted, to a degree that is nearly impossible to overstate, to the Concept of the Decisive Battle. The main battle fleet was to be preserved, at all costs, until that moment arrived. That battle was supposed to take place near Formosa, well inside land based air coverage and after the Kido Butai and submarine forces had reduced the American fleet (keep in mind that the U.S. was, based on 5:5:3, 40% larger than the IJN in the battleship category hence the decision to construct the ultimate manifestation of the super dreadnought). Everything prior to that battle was mere shaping of the battlefield.

Alright things are starting to become more clear. So the Kido Butai was not the main fleet, that would be a fleet with more battleships(Kido Butai had only 2), the "combined fleet". They saw the usefulness of flattops to raid, but not as part of a decisive battle. Of course, the Americans proved them wrong on that part.

Still, Midway was supposed to be the decisive battle right? They wanted it more close to their own lands, but their carriers gave the ability to fight it out over American territory(?). The Japanese hoped to lure the American fleet out from Pearl and meet their invasion force to defend Midway. At first i had thought they wanted to kill the American carriers with their own in a decisive battle, but there is actually a bigger picture wasn't there? the carrier battle was not the decisive battle they wanted. They used the 4 carriers to lure them, yet their destruction caused the cancellation of the battle the Japanese actually wanted, one that their first fleet and second fleet took part in, versus the American battleship fleet. But, by failing to surprise the Americans and get surprised and overwhelmed themselves they ironically gave the victory of the decisive battle to the Americans. I guess after Midway the Japanese were aware of the value of carriers though, but by then of course they had no hope of getting their numbers back. The Battle of Leyte gulf destroyed the image of the battleship permanently.

Am i warm?
 

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Alright things are starting to become more clear.
...
Am i warm?
No, the "decisive battle" was always supposed to be long lines of battleships brawling it out Jutland style.

Carriers, submarines and cruisers were supposed to attrition the enemy battleline prior to the battle.
 

CalBear

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Alright things are starting to become more clear. So the Kido Butai was not the main fleet, that would be a fleet with more battleships(Kido Butai had only 2), the "combined fleet". They saw the usefulness of flattops to raid, but not as part of a decisive battle. Of course, the Americans proved them wrong on that part.

Still, Midway was supposed to be the decisive battle right? They wanted it more close to their own lands, but their carriers gave the ability to fight it out over American territory(?). The Japanese hoped to lure the American fleet out from Pearl and meet their invasion force to defend Midway. At first i had thought they wanted to kill the American carriers with their own in a decisive battle, but there is actually a bigger picture wasn't there? the carrier battle was not the decisive battle they wanted. They used the 4 carriers to lure them, yet their destruction caused the cancellation of the battle the Japanese actually wanted, one that their first fleet and second fleet took part in, versus the American battleship fleet. But, by failing to surprise the Americans and get surprised and overwhelmed themselves they ironically gave the victory of the decisive battle to the Americans. I guess after Midway the Japanese were aware of the value of carriers though, but by then of course they had no hope of getting their numbers back. The Battle of Leyte gulf destroyed the image of the battleship permanently.

Am i warm?
Not really warm, but pleasant. :)

Midway was not meant to be the Decisive Battle. It was designed to disable the USN's version of the Kido Butai (Mobile Striking Force). This would allow the time necessary to complete the territorial acquisitions necessary to ensure a defensive perimeter that would defend the Southern Resource Area while also degrading the American's ability to counter IJN mobile forces as the Americans advanced into the exact set-piece battle the Japanese had planned for them. The Japanese naval command saw Admiral Togo Heihachirō as a near-deity, they were obsessed with replicating Tsushima (Admiral Mahan also has to shoulder some of the blame here). Japanese naval cadets had this drummed into them literally from day one at Etajima (in fairness Togo was one of the truly brilliant naval officers of the steam era), and everything the IJN did on a strategic level was meant to replicate Togo's greatest afternoon.

You are correct in that the Combined Fleet was made up of different elements, the so-called "Main Body" was the battleship force (the four Kongo class BC, even though they had been reclassified as full BB, were considered to be part of the Mobile Striking Force for administrative purposes within the IJN).

There were two schools insode the IJN, one somewhat more realistic than the other. Yamamoto was the most prominent of the "realist wing". He understood that the Empire could not, in any circumstances hope to compete with the U.S. in a war of attrition. This wing's goal was to secure a strong epough defensive perimeter quickly enough to bring the war to a successful conclusion. This would avoid having to face the massive force approved by the 1940 Two Ocean Navy Act.

As an example: the Japanese laid down Mushahi on 29, March, 1938, she was commissioned on 5 August 1942. In that same time frame the USN built and commissioned five BB (Washington and the four South Dakota Class), commission a sixth (North Carolina) and had launched the Iowa (actually she was launched on 27 August, but close enough for this example) and had four more Iowa Class BB under construction. Six more BB (Illinois and five Montana class ships) were either ready to be laid down or planned once yard space cleared. All of the planned ships would have been in commission no later than November 1945, making a total of 21 BB commissioned by the end of 1945. Japan hoped to have one-two additional BB in commission in the same time frame, making a total of four modern ship of the Yamato class. What makes this even worse is that the IJN started out 40% behind the USN.

Despite this reality (and if you look at other ship types, from CA down to SS, the ration is actually WORSE than for the BB) the majority wing of the IJN command not only clung to the same basic belief in the Decisive Battle which Yamamoto shared, but firmly believed that, regardless of when it happened, the Japanese fleet would emerge victorious (one reason for the over bulked Yamato class and the never laid down lunacy of the A-150 class was the theory that a few very large would be better than a lot of almost as large; utterly insane).

The "Decisive Battle" obsession is an example of the difficulties that the Japanese military, both Army and Navy experience during the war. There brutal discipline experienced during officer training tended to create exceptional rigid officers, sometimes tactically brilliant, but in general unable to adapt to rapidly changing conditions. A more flexible mindset would not have saved the Empire once the War began, however it might have allowed the Supreme Command Staff to see the folly of their plans in time to avoid the war in the first place.
 
Alright things are starting to become more clear. So the Kido Butai was not the main fleet, that would be a fleet with more battleships(Kido Butai had only 2), the "combined fleet". They saw the usefulness of flattops to raid, but not as part of a decisive battle. Of course, the Americans proved them wrong on that part.

Still, Midway was supposed to be the decisive battle right? They wanted it more close to their own lands, but their carriers gave the ability to fight it out over American territory(?). The Japanese hoped to lure the American fleet out from Pearl and meet their invasion force to defend Midway. At first i had thought they wanted to kill the American carriers with their own in a decisive battle, but there is actually a bigger picture wasn't there? the carrier battle was not the decisive battle they wanted. They used the 4 carriers to lure them, yet their destruction caused the cancellation of the battle the Japanese actually wanted, one that their first fleet and second fleet took part in, versus the American battleship fleet. But, by failing to surprise the Americans and get surprised and overwhelmed themselves they ironically gave the victory of the decisive battle to the Americans. I guess after Midway the Japanese were aware of the value of carriers though, but by then of course they had no hope of getting their numbers back. The Battle of Leyte gulf destroyed the image of the battleship permanently.

Am i warm?



Kido Butai had no battleships at all. It was compromised of the CarDiv1, CarDiv2 and CarDiv5 only with regulary support from Sentai 8 (CruDiv8) Tone and Chikuma, as well as occasionally one, or two sections of Sentai 3 of the 1st fleet (Kongo, Haruna, Kirishima and Hiei)

Note Kido Butai was part of the 2nd fleet, as were all heavy cruisers of the IJN and most of the DesRon's, since this tactical fleetunit was supposed fto be teh expeditionary force, while the 1st fleet, or battlefleet with all battleships and a few DesRons as escorts was kept in homewaters for the decisive battle, hoped for by the battleship admirals.

Kidō Butai[edit]
The Kidō Butai (機動部隊, lit. Mobile Unit/Force) was the Combined Fleet's tactical designation for its carrier battle group.[4] The title was used as a term of convenience; it was not a formal name for the organization. It consisted of Japan's six largest carriers, carrying the 1st Air Fleet. This mobile task force was created for executing the attack on Pearl Harbor under Admiral Chuichi Nagumo in 1941.[5] For the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Kidō Butai consisted of six aircraft carriers (commanded by Chuichi Nagumo, Tamon Yamaguchi and Chuichi Hara) with 414 airplanes, two battleships, three cruisers, nine destroyers, eight tankers, 23 submarines, and four midget submarines. However, these escort ships were borrowed from other fleet and squadrons. It was considered the single most powerful naval fleet until four of the six aircraft carriers of the unit were destroyed in the disastrous Battle of Midway.[citation needed] On 14 July 1942, all carriers were moved to the 3rd Fleet.
 

CalBear

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I was always under the impression the Japanese wanted to carriers to be there. They themselves had focussed on carriers as early as anyone so they know the importance of them. They recognize the American carriers are a bigger threat than their battleships, logically since their own carriers were their prime vessels and enemy sea planes their greatest enemy. Of course they would target the carriers if they were there.

Like others said, them being in port would mean less too since they are weaker and the damage would be much more significant, probably irrepairable. They weren't Essex class. So, they were a sweet target, even only 1 or 2.
Actually raising the carriers, especially Lexington and potentially Saratoga, would have been no more of a challenge than the West Virginia (which absorbed SIX torpedo hits, including two that penetrated deep into the ship after entering the holes caused by earlier hits and two major bomb hits). All that would be necessary is for the ships to settle on an even keel (this is what finished off the Oklahoma, once she capsized, even in shallow water, she was a total loss) and for there to be enough hull intact to make it possible to patch the damage (this was what cause the Arizona to be written off, the magazine detonation vented through the sides of the forward hull more or less hollowing out that portion of the ship and damaging the hull beyond reasonable repair.

Several of the BB at Pearl would, in any normal world, simply have been written off, due to age and cost to repair. The U.S., uniquely, had the yard space, and much more critically materials and funding to more or less rebuild the ships.

West Virginia as she appeared in 1934

Uss_west_virginia_bb.jpg



As she appeared in 1944

1024px-USS_West_Virginia_%28BB-48%29_1944_7.jpg


It is difficult to believe she is the same ship. (both photos are from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_West_Virginia_(BB-48))
 
Also, be careful quoting Prange. A lot of good information but he and Fuchida developed a close friendship over the course of his research and he took everything Fuchida told him at face value when there is now pretty good evidence Fuchida may have been a little creative WRT his recollections of what transpired on Akagi's bridge post Pearl Harbor. It has been taken as an article of faith (at least in the US) for some time that Fuchida recommended a third strike that focused on infrastructure. Recent research by Parschal and Tully suggests he did not to that.
 
Also, be careful quoting Prange. A lot of good information but he and Fuchida developed a close friendship over the course of his research and he took everything Fuchida told him at face value when there is now pretty good evidence Fuchida may have been a little creative WRT his recollections of what transpired on Akagi's bridge post Pearl Harbor. It has been taken as an article of faith (at least in the US) for some time that Fuchida recommended a third strike that focused on infrastructure. Recent research by Parschal and Tully suggests he did not to that.

Thanks for pointing that out. I believe that Parshall makes a very good argument that Fuchida embellished the story about what happened on the Akagi after the attack. Parshall's contention is that Fuchida never requested to attack the oil tanks and did not have a heated argument with Admiral Nagumo. Personally, I believe Parshall's argument is probably correct that the "fuel tank" attack argument is a myth. Parshall makes three points on this - one, it was not a specific part of the plan (at best covered nonspecifically in the last priority of the actual OP order) - two, it is extremely unlikely that Fuchida would ever argue with the Admiral - three, there was no mention of the fuel tanks in Fuchida's post war interview. He also points out that IJN fleet officers did not study or appreciate logistical targets (well established throughout the course of the war) making it highly unlikely that Fuchida would have some flash of inspiration concerning oil tanks on his flight back to Akagi. Pashall does not have direct evidence that Fuchida lied about the now famous scene in Tora-Tora-Tora, but he makes an excellent case. He has more direct evidence concerning Fuchida's "other whoppers", and that certainly reinforces his logical arguments concerning the Pearl Harbor aftermath. Nevertheless, you are correct in questioning Fuchida's account and I, being aware of Parshall's argument, should have left it out; especially since I agree with it (and it is really irrelevant to the point I was making). My bad.

After re-reading Chapter 65, I was struck with the fact that Fuchida's sudden insight concerning fuel tanks was not (IMHO) his most incredible statement. Fuchida (I am paraphrasing) relates that after landing and having a conversation with Genda he is handed a message stating that "Nagumo wanted to see Fuchida immediately". But "he decided to wait", reviewed the blackboard, listened to the reports of 15 pilots and had a cup of tea. ARE YOU KIDDING ME? Either he had the biggest set of balls ever hung on an LCDR in any Navy or... Hell, everyone knows that "at your earliest convenience" from an Admiral means "right f**king now", but this guy decides "immediately" means listen to some reports and have a cup of tea first.

That being said, I contend that At Dawn we Slept is a rich and valuable source of information concerning the prelude to and aftermath of the Pearl Harbor attack. Fuchida's self aggrandizement is a trivial part of the book, and he is an extremely minor source of information. Aside from the part about the third wave attack on fuel tanks, I am not aware of any other place in the book where something important stems from Fuchida as a single, un-verified source. Prange interviewed Genda as the source of Genda's recommendations to Nagumo (and Parshall does not question Genda's veracity).

In Prange's account, Genda is the source for "Nagumo would have been a standing joke for generations if he had attacked Pearl Harbor again" (without knowing the location of the US carriers). The account of the post-strike interchange also relies on RADM Kusaka (1st Air Fleet Chief of Staff) and many other sources. Prange's most important point concerning the decision making is that they accomplished their stated objectives and the Japanese had no contingency plan to cover the case where "the first- and second-wave attacks succeeded beyond expectations".

I would argue with "be careful quoting Prange". Parshall's case is perhaps better stated as "don't quote Fuchida".
 
I hope that's not the Franklin, because if it is "fixed" is a relative word. Got any photos of this ship repaired and back in full commission?

IIRC, the reason Franklin wasn't reactivated after the war was that the Navy was holding her back for an "ultimate" modernization that ultimately never came.
 
Alright things are starting to become more clear. So the Kido Butai was not the main fleet, that would be a fleet with more battleships(Kido Butai had only 2), the "combined fleet". They saw the usefulness of flattops to raid, but not as part of a decisive battle. Of course, the Americans proved them wrong on that part.

Still, Midway was supposed to be the decisive battle right? They wanted it more close to their own lands, but their carriers gave the ability to fight it out over American territory(?). The Japanese hoped to lure the American fleet out from Pearl and meet their invasion force to defend Midway. At first i had thought they wanted to kill the American carriers with their own in a decisive battle, but there is actually a bigger picture wasn't there? the carrier battle was not the decisive battle they wanted. They used the 4 carriers to lure them, yet their destruction caused the cancellation of the battle the Japanese actually wanted, one that their first fleet and second fleet took part in, versus the American battleship fleet. But, by failing to surprise the Americans and get surprised and overwhelmed themselves they ironically gave the victory of the decisive battle to the Americans. I guess after Midway the Japanese were aware of the value of carriers though, but by then of course they had no hope of getting their numbers back. The Battle of Leyte gulf destroyed the image of the battleship permanently.

Am i warm?

The Battle of Leyte Gulf was as close as the IJN got to the "Decisive Battle"; where five of the six US battleships participating in the night action at Surigao Strait were casualties of the Pearl Harbor attack (including West Virginia as pictured above). Ironically, the IJN went "all in" at pretty much the same place they predicted in 1940.

One can also state that the Battle of the Philippine Sea was their first real attempt at a "Decisive Battle" but they didn't get nearly as close as they did at Leyte Gulf.
 
The Battle of Leyte Gulf was as close as the IJN got to the "Decisive Battle"; where five of the six US battleships participating in the night action at Surigao Strait were casualties of the Pearl Harbor attack (including West Virginia as pictured above). Ironically, the IJN went "all in" at pretty much the same place they predicted in 1940.

One can also state that the Battle of the Philippine Sea was their first real attempt at a "Decisive Battle" but they didn't get nearly as close as they did at Leyte Gulf.

Oh it was absolutely a Decisive Battle as far as both sides were concerned. It was the largest naval engagement in history and saw IGHQ betting all their chips and losing hard. After that Japanese surface forces would cease to be a serious threat while the USN reigned supreme; Mahanian thinking at its finest.

The thing is, when Japanese military accounts speak of "decisive battle" they don't, to paraphrase Giangreco, necessarily imply the same degree of finality the phrase might conjure up in a Westerner. The culminating action of any given campaign was always referred to as a 'decisive battle' in and of itself, outside of THE decisive clash naval theorists hoped could bring a swift end to the war.
 
IIRC, the reason Franklin wasn't reactivated after the war was that the Navy was holding her back for an "ultimate" modernization that ultimately never came.
To be fair, West Virginia was perhaps the single most heavily modified of all the Standard-type battleships. Few if any ever received such lavish refits, all the more impressive considering WeeVee had to be dredged up from the muck of Pearl Harbor first!

West Virginia's congressional delegation must have been as powerful as Rhode Island's was back then.

Considering what they wound up doing to the Reprisal, "restoring and renewing" the Franklin would have been sentimental foolishness.
 
Oh it was absolutely a Decisive Battle as far as both sides were concerned. It was the largest naval engagement in history and saw IGHQ betting all their chips and losing hard. After that Japanese surface forces would cease to be a serious threat while the USN reigned supreme; Mahanian thinking at its finest.

The thing is, when Japanese military accounts speak of "decisive battle" they don't, to paraphrase Giangreco, necessarily imply the same degree of finality the phrase might conjure up in a Westerner. The culminating action of any given campaign was always referred to as a 'decisive battle' in and of itself, outside of THE decisive clash naval theorists hoped could bring a swift end to the war.

Admiral Kincaid would like a word with you. I always imagined him throwing darts at a Halsey dartboard.:mad: That Halsey got his fifth star and Spruance didn't...politics politics.
 
2) Are the carriers sunk so as to be unrecoverable?

This is an excellent question.

The USN made heroic efforts to salvage as many of the battlewagons as they could; the fate of the two that they couldn't tells you how bad the damage had to be for them to write them off. Being sunk in such shallow water next to dock makes a lot things possible.

And the desperate need for decks would make attempted recovery of Lex and the Big E a high priority. Unless they were capsized or had their keels broken, they'll very likely salvaged - though they won't see action before 1943. Which still leaves Nimitz shorthanded for the short term.
 
I agree with NHBL. The ships are likely to be damaged beyond repair

Enterprise, perhaps. But Lexington kept her main armor belt after having been converted from a battlecruiser.

The answer may depend in part on just how lucky the Japanese get in terms of hits, and how much avgas and munitions are on board, along with their storage status.
 
Admiral Kincaid would like a word with you. I always imagined him throwing darts at a Halsey dartboard.:mad: That Halsey got his fifth star and Spruance didn't...politics politics.

I agree that Spruance got a very raw deal. Spruance is the most successful US Admiral and Halsey skates past Samar. E. B. Potter, who was a Halsey biographer certainly seemed to be of the same opinion concerning the two (I am remembering from his lectures many years ago).

Another bit related to Halsey. Is it possible that "The World Wonders" was not just an unintentional and random quote from the "charge of the light brigade" (unsubstantiated speculation alert)? No doubt it was part of the padding, but it seems that the practice of sending "barbs" as part of the padding occurred within the fleet. IIRC the practice originated in communications between the Naval Intelligence sections in Hawaii and Washington (who did not get along all that well). The very text of the message "where is repeat where is TF 34" seems to indicate that CINCPAC suffered from the same unfortunate misreading as Kincaid with respect to Halsey's earlier communication.
Might someone have overheard some degree of displeasure when the message was drafted?:rolleyes: Did that someone then add a few words at the end to reflect the mood in Pearl Harbor? I am not trying to attribute this action to Nimitz, no basis for that (if not random, it could have occurred in several places and a coding clerk took the rap). Speculation for sure, but knowing the practice existed has always led me to wonder how random those words actually were; the particular language just seems too convenient a way to express a WTF sentiment. "Just popped into my head", surely the innocent choice of a closet Tennyson fan. Strikes me as a clever clerk reflecting what his boss can not say in an official communication.:openedeyewink:
 

CalBear

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To be fair, West Virginia was perhaps the single most heavily modified of all the Standard-type battleships. Few if any ever received such lavish refits, all the more impressive considering WeeVee had to be dredged up from the muck of Pearl Harbor first!
The really amazing thing is that they did it with a 20 year old ship that was obsolescent before the Raid.

Always nice to have the most skin in the game.
 
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