Japanese sink US carriers at Pearl Harbor, what next?

  • Thread starter Deleted member 1487
  • Start date

Rubicon

Banned
IIRC, the Japanese carrier Ryuuhou

latest

Generally the accepted western way of spelling it is either Ryuho or Ryūhō. Otherwise someone just might mistake it for the above KanColle KanMusu Ryuuhou. :p

*Note* this is a silly post and not meant for serious discussions.
 
So does the attack take place before or after December 7 for this to occur, or are American deployments changed so it can take place on December 7?
 
So does the attack take place before or after December 7 for this to occur, or are American deployments changed so it can take place on December 7?

I have been thinking about this as well. My theory would be what if Lexington and Enterprise delivered Marine Fighters to Wake and Midway Islands earlier so that they are back in Pearl Harbor on December 7? If VMF 211 arrived on Wake earlier than December 4 would protective berms be finished for the Wildcat fighters? If this is the case then it is possible that more of VMF 211 aircraft survive the first day of the war. I know it won't stop the Japanese but hopefully the Marines are able to down more Japanese aircraft during the siege.

One more possible butterfly: If Enterprise is in port could Admiral Halsey be killed in the raid?
 
Agree in part. While Fiji and Samoa are difficult to defend, leaving them to the Japanese puts a major hole in the Air Ferry route to Australia. While the shipping route is fairly easy to move to the East, the air route is a different story. There is no good way to cross the gap between French Polynesia and Auckland (2,500 mi) if you lose Fiji and Samoa. So, I don't see much choice but to attempt a defense if the Japanese attack. In January 1942, there is a US Marine Brigade on American Samoa, a NZ Brigade on Fiji (replaced by a US Division in June), and a US infantry Brigade on Tonga. So, even without reinforcement, neither Fiji nor Samoa are easy targets for Japan in June 1942.

My thinking was that the same factors that keep the US from adequately being able to hold Fiji and Samoa (island size, on island LOCs, port sizes) would keep Japan from exploiting them, and the LOCs for Japan's maritime supply lines would be even worse with only 6m tons of merchant shipping to use.

AISI, the presence of the heavily defended New Caledonia prevents Japan from doing more than defending Samoa and Fiji, they won't be in a position to strategically exploit their gains in terms of cutting off the Allied shipping lanes.

The Japanese plans to take Port Moresby, Fiji, New Caledonia and Samoa were grandiose. They never had the shipping to adequately supply forces in these locations. Let's not forget their operations in the Solomon Islands.

AISI, Port Moresby, Fiji, and Samoa WERE doable. IF the Japanese were willing to do so on the cheap, and not try to build up for even further advances farther south that frankly would be impossible IMO. The Solomon Islands I believe were easily taken care of if the US doesn't challenge them, which ITTL I believe they won't.

A significant air base at Port Moresby would certainly expose more of Australia to air attack, but think of the supply difficulty for the Japanese; they would have been unable maintain adequate supplies of "beans, bullets and gas". They couldn't adequately supply their operations on the NE coast of New Guinea.

You're right. Too many needs ITTL in the Solomons, the rest of NG, Fiji, and Samoa. Maybe a few propaganda raids for Japanese morale though. Especially after Doolittle.

So, I guess the Japanese just put more trucks in place to move supplies from their new container port at Buna over the Kokoda autobahn, or perhaps they just whip-up a rail road across the Owen Stanley mountains.:p

*ahem* I've read Costello's "Pacific War" too...:rolleyes::rolleyes::rolleyes: And you forgot the bullet train tunnel between Gona and Port Moresby.:p

So that means an earlier attack on Milne Bay (impossible to believe they could wait until August under these circumstances). More troops, more supplies, more air and shipping assets required.

Maybe ITTL they cancel AO?:mad:

Facetious comments aside

No, I like them.

I have long been amazed that the Japanese planners were so detached from their logistical realities. Now holding Milne Bay, it is a mere 1,600 mi trip from Truk Lagoon to Port Moresby. Japanese merchants are relatively small in DWT and are definitely slow. It was a chore for them to maintain even 8 knots true distance gained. The fact is that shipping distance had as large an effect on Japanese shipping requirements as it did on Allied requirements. Ton-miles are ton-miles, and supplying even small forces over "Pacific distances" required an inordinate amount of shipping. Efficiency further dropped because most of those ships returned to the home islands empty. For some reason, the Japanese never exploited the possibilities of a triangular shipping route from Japan to the Mandates to the NEI to Japan. It would have had a positive impact on their logistics.

Is it possible that that had something to do with that one route did more to aid the IJN and the other the IJA?

What are the weekly supply requirements for significant base at Port Moresby and a sustained air campaign against Australia? Let's say they don't trans-ship through Truk or the Palaus to save time. That is a 7,400 mi round trip from Osaka, which translates into a 20-day voyage each way, and with loading, assembly and unloading time it is easily a 60-day round trip, probably more. In reality, one is talking about a minimum of 2 significant convoys at sea continuously and probably a 3rd loading, just to supply Port Moresby.

We'll just forget about anymore campaigns in China, Northern Burma, start stripping the Kwang Tung Army earlier, forget Alaska, forget Australia, and just concentrate on Operation: FS. Since I highly doubt with the feathers they'll lose at New Caledonia they'll be in any shape to do any strategic "offensive-offensives" for the rest of the war.

Absolutely correct! Which limits the plausibility of the carriers being at PH to begin with. If there is a "Post 1900" POD to put the carrier in PH on December 7, it must start with the decision to a) not deliver aircraft to Midway and Wake; and b) have the entire fleet in anchor at PH at one time. Concerning the latter, I do not believe this ever happened (i.e., someone was at sea pretty much all the time).

You'd need to have a more defensive minded admiral at Pearl. Then again, a more defensive admiral got canned for insisting to Roosevelt that the fleet stay in San Diego.

I agree that Fuchida could not have changed the plan in action, most especially early in the attack. However, what I talked about is the actual plan from OTL. All of the torpedo planes came in from the WNW, and Kaga's torpedo wing was in fact assigned to loop around the South of Ford Island to attack either Battleship row or carriers moored on the East side of Ford Island (which is precisely why they were exposed to more AA fire).

Hmm. Makes more sense.

Quite correct. However, you have to see it to hit it. Given the prevailing wind conditions and the fires in battleship row, Enterprise (in her usual position) would have been significantly obscured by smoke after the first wave attack. Not so for Lexington.

IDK. Seems to me that sighting an aircraft carrier while flying at 200 knots as opposed to a modern day 600 knots wouldn't be that hard. The green AA crews wouldn't KNOW they weren't being seen, and could hardly hold their fire while their black shoe brethren were being slaughtered before their very eyes. And once all those CV AA guns open up, the fire will lead the IJN aircrews right back to them no matter how thick the smoke is.

Quite correct. In spite of historical second guessing, KB had limited ability (and significant risk) to launch a third wave.

I suspect Midway may have had something to do with making a goat of Nagumo even in operations in which he was successful. The only positive portrayal I've seen of him done was in the film "Midway".

True, but it does not change the outcome of the war.

A worsening of the war for Australia = More Australian forces withdrawn from the UK and the Med

More Australian forces withdrawn from the UK and the Med = Slowing Monty, slowing 2nd El Alemain

Slowing Monty = Delayed meeting with Anglo-Franco-American forces in Tunesia

Delayed taking of Tunesia = Delayed Sicily

Delayed Sicily = Delayed Italian Surrender, delayed invasion of Italy

Delayed invasion of Italy = more hardened defense of Italy

More hardened defense of Italy = X2 delayed taking of Southern Italy

X2 delayed taking of Southern Italy = Delayed and bloodier Anzio/Monte Cassino

Delayed/bloodier Anzio/Monte Cassino = Delayed Liberation of Rome

Delayed Liberation of Rome = Delayed advance to the edge of Northern Italy

Delayed advance to the edge of Northern Italy = WWII ends before Northern Italy is liberated

WWII ends before Northern Italy is liberated = Mussolini flees to Spain.

Mussolini flees to Spain = Mussolini captured by Mossad, hung in Tel Aviv.

No effect on the war in Western Europe or the USSR.

You are probably correct, but the Doolittle raid is a significantly greater risk following the loss of 2 or more CVs in December 1941.

Its worth it though. It really is. A rare case of a politician knowing better than his military commanders (though AIUI Admiral King was ready to go for it). Doolittle really was a sucker punch to the stomach of the Japanese nation.

Well, we'll agree to disagree about DD and the "unsinkable aircraft carrier", due to the fact that Japan's grandiose Southern expansion does not make Australia any closer to the US West coast.

DD =/= 100% wrong about all things. Sometimes even a broken clock is right. He was right about going for the Philippines, and ITTL he'd be right about using what the Russians call a "strategic direction" that could fully employ America's land-based air forces against the IJN and IJA air forces, rather than leaving it just to the USN's poor outnumbered flight decks.

The "pummeling" and potential loss of Fiji and Samoa only makes the supply route longer. I have no doubt that DD gets his two divisions in 1942, but any "island-hopping" campaign that far out is only further delayed. It is still essentially 8,000 mi from San Diego to Botany Bay (and the Port at Brisbane is exposed to Japanese air attacks).

Brisbane would be within Port Moresby air range for Betty bombers AND Zeroes?

I seriously doubt that Australia gets more in this 1942 than OTL, in spite of the impact of Port Moresby. Neither Britain nor the US took a Japanese attack on Australia seriously and I seriously doubt they take any move to re-allocate supplies destined for the UK to Australia. I can not see how SWPA gets more, faster than OTL; delaying the strategic bombing campaign is not going to happen IMHO.

OTL Australia's outer defenses were described by Aus. PM John Curtin as "rapidly vanishing". ITTL They. Would. Be. Gone. I liked one comment by DD (when asked by Curtin if the Japanese had the capacity to invade Australia): "I believe that Japan's supply lines are becoming over-extended. Strategically I believe it would be a blunder. But then, I thought the Germans would rule out an invasion of Russia on strategic grounds too."

As I explained above, IMO the Aussies get more goodies or they recall more forces home. And that'll be in the form of an ultimatum, with DD, the Republicans, and especially the Chicago Tribune (the Fox News of its day) beating the tom-toms.

Would they opt to attack Kwajalein? You are probably correct that they would not. My primary point (not fully explained) was based on the fact that given the "pummeling" it is the only reasonable place the USA could launch a counteroffensive in 1942. It is half the distance from California to Australia and the US could probably put the logistics together to attack there. If you want to contend that given these new circumstances 1st Marine Division goes elsewhere, I will not argue. A very reasonable argument could be made that it is sent to Australia or is used to reinforce New Caledonia or elsewhere.

One of the lesser reasons why I said New Caledonia was invincible was because the island was garrisoned by the best trained best led division in the United States Army, the Americal Division. By July 1942, the earliest that the Japanese could ever have expected to have landed on the island, Major General Alexander Patch (future 7th US Army commander) had his men whipped into not only the best trained division period, but the ONLY US Army division specifically trained in jungle warfare. I could go on and on about the difficulties of trying to invade that island, but the truth is that New Caledonia didn't even need the 1st US Marine with Patch's boys on the job.

IMHO for Dougie to get more, earlier a swarm of butterflies need to swoop in and eliminate Nimitz, King and Stark (and their replacements). For him to get more aircraft than OTL, Hap Arnold and his air planning staff need to all suffer at least a minor stroke. Marshall and his planning staff need to ignore the logistical realities and lose their commitment to Germany first. To say nothing of any influence Churchill has on FDR, or FDR's commitment to Europe. Frankly, what are the chances the loss of Port Moresby will have a greater influence on Allied planning than the Battle of the Atlantic?

It could easily turn out that Dougie is even more limited than OTL.

Politics. FDR was looking at the 1942 off-year elections. WE today may want to blame DD for the fall of the Philippines in every manner, but that wasn't the prevailing feeling in the US in 1942. Republicans believed that not only did Roosevelt deliberately abandon the Philippines to its fate but that he abandoned DD to HIS fate to insure that DD wouldn't be free or even alive:eek: to run against FDR in 1944. If not, that is, the pressure brought to bear on FDR by our True American Patriots on the editorial staff at the Chicago Tribune.:angel:

If the carriers are sunk the United States will simply sign an armistice with Japan in return for withdrawal from its territories and promise of non-intervention in China.

???

v8ccqht.jpg


You really don't get the mindset of 1940s America, do you?

Or for that matter the 1940s British Empire and the 1940s USSR. The Japanese Empire launched a sneak attack on the United States while simultaneously engaging in high level peace talks! Ambassador Nomura's communications alone could be considered normal diplomatic discussions, but sending Special Envoy Kurusu, the man who signed the Tri-Partite Pact, was supposed to signal that these were serious negotiations meant to produce a positive outcome. America's last communication to Tokyo was a proposal to have FDR and Hirohito to personally negotiate with one another as heads-of-state. By that time, the KB was closing in on Hawaii.

After Pearl Harbor, any US President who proposed an armistice with Japan would be impeached, tried, convicted, and removed. No matter HOW many seats in Congress were Democratic. Japan had done the national and diplomatic equivalent of facing America, both sides carrying white flags of truce, and then Japan shooting America. Only to drop the truce flag AFTER America was shot.:mad::mad:

Popular semi-historical programs and films (especially Tora, Tora, Tora) have left a less than accurate perspective of the Raid.

Don't forget Pearl Harbor, Pearl, Winds of War, War & Remembrance, and Victory At Sea's Pearl Harbor Special. And that's just comes to me off the top of my head.

EDIT: Forgot about a little flick called "From Here To Eternity". Oops. Sorry Burt. Sorry Frankie.

You might enjoy the 2011 Japanese film Admiral Yamamoto, just recently translated and subtitled into English and available free on the internet for streaming. It goes from just before WWII in Europe starts to his death and then jumps to August 14th, 1945. The fact that the delivery of Japan's "Declaration of War" (which it wasn't) being too late was far more highly played up than IRL [they played FDR's DoW speech on the radio-with Japanese subtitles(!)-while Yamamoto and his staff listened, appalled as Roosevelt mentioned that the Japanese Ambassador arrived a full hour after the PH attack had started], but then I suppose you would expect that. The Battle of Midway is surprisingly well done, if very chopped up and abbreviated by American standards.

The film pulls absolutely no punches in the way that Imperialism, bushido, and militarism crippled Japan's ability to think in the long term. Like Napoleon, for the Imperial Japanese it was always one more battle to be fought.

But the most decisive action in WWII as far as the Japanese were concerned (other than Pearl Harbor), was the Doolittle Raid. The film makers did their own film version of the attack on Tokyo (very accurate renditions of what I believe were B-25Bs). Basically, for the first time since the arrival of the Mongol/Korean Armada in 1281, war had become real for the Japanese People.

I have been thinking about this as well. My theory would be what if Lexington and Enterprise delivered Marine Fighters to Wake and Midway Islands earlier so that they are back in Pearl Harbor on December 7? If VMF 211 arrived on Wake earlier than December 4 would protective berms be finished for the Wildcat fighters? If this is the case then it is possible that more of VMF 211 aircraft survive the first day of the war. I know it won't stop the Japanese but hopefully the Marines are able to down more Japanese aircraft during the siege.

The problem for Wake was a lack of radar. Without that, the Japanese bombers will get tactical surprise every time. Indeed, the only real contribution the Wildcats were able to make was during the very last sortie of the last F4F left on Wake. It shot down a level-bomber coming in at low altitude. That was something that seriously spooked the Japanese aircrews when they returned to their carrier (Hiryu?). The aircrew killed were the very same men credited with dropping the bomb that destroyed the Arizona. Karma. One IJN veteran said: "It was as if the spirits of the Arizona dead had reached up from the sea and pulled them down..."

One more possible butterfly: If Enterprise is in port could Admiral Halsey be killed in the raid?

Wishful thinking?:rolleyes:
 
Last edited:
We are not speaking of fighters, but bombers mainly, as the sheer numbers of AXIS power bombers in the West Mediterranean Sea were vastl outnumbering the Allied fighters on Force H and Malta. long range Bombers are not so easy pickings in this time, as the difference in speed between a Ju-88 and Spitfire Mk-V, or so of the period was not that great, while the F4F was even slower than a Ju-88, as was the Fulmar. Since the slower He-111 and Ju87 were not so much a threat, being hampered by lesser range, were not likely to be deployed against the force, teh fighters still would have a hard time catching the fast bombers, besides them having troubles of their own in their low numbers.

The Club Run carrier can only be attacked if it has been located. This is certainly doable: Pedestal was located by aerial recon at 08.15 on 11th August, and Furious was flying off Spitfires when Eagle was torpedoed at 13.15, but this doesn't give much time for an attack mission to be organised and flown before the carrier is returning to Gibraltar. The first air attack agaisnt Pedestal came at 21.00, when the convoy was 370 km Sardinia. In particular, if the Club Run is just a carrier and escorts rather than a major fleet operation and secrecy is maintained as it leaves Gibraltar (heading into the Atlantic or Med?), then the chances of locating the Club Run carrier are much less. So, yes, it's doable, but I think it requires good intel and prompt reactions. I don't recall of any Club Run carrier being attacked from the air, so I suspect the practical difficulties were quite significant.

Also, there must be a range difference between unarmed recon planes and armed bombers, although I don't know whether it's significant here.
 
Actually, they didn't see the carriers are the biggest threat.That is the classic myth. Nagumo was VERY worried about the absence of the carriers at Pearl, not because he had lost his primary targets but because he was worried about getting bushwacked, or, possibly worse, having his service fleet getting bushwacked. For all his reputation as a air power supporter Yamamoto, along with the rest of the IJN senior command staff, was a battleship proponent. He had a better vision for the use of carriers in preparation for the Decisive Battle than many of his peers, but he still believed that the last great engagement would involve the big gun ships.

Operation order No. 3 is specific in that it list battleships first and foremost, followed by carriers if conditions allowed. Cruisers and any remaining carriers, along with the air fileds were to be targets from that point forward, even if the was a third wave the assignments never moved to shore installations.

Popular semi-historical programs and films (especially Tora, Tora, Tora) have left a less than accurate perspective of the Raid.

Well that greatly confuses me. I agree that the Japanese still saw great value in their battleships, Musashi and Yamato were not build for prestige alone afterall. But building a carrier fleet and using said fleet to knock out the American battleship fleet at anchor clearly suggests that the japanese saw that carriers were the future of naval warfare and superior to battleships. Why command a carrier fleet and use that fleet optimally across the pacific if you think that battleships were the most dangerous of surface vessels?

Its true the flattops hadn't proven themselves yet, but by the actions of the Japanese i can only conclude they were the ones to put the carrier at the top, not the Americans.

If they still praised battleships so much, and i say again history does show that, why chose carrier battles with Pearl harbor, Coral sea and Midway? Or did the Americans force them into carrier battles?

Only after Midway the Japanese focussed o their battleships again, since that was all they hadleft. But American superiority and total understanding of carrier combat quickly destroyed that thought for good at Leyte Gulf.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
The attack at Pearl was a RAID. As such it was best suited for the Mobile Striking Force (i.e. Kido Butai). The Japanese Naval command structure was devoted, to a degree that is nearly impossible to overstate, to the Concept of the Decisive Battle. The main battle fleet was to be preserved, at all costs, until that moment arrived. That battle was supposed to take place near Formosa, well inside land based air coverage and after the Kido Butai and submarine forces had reduced the American fleet (keep in mind that the U.S. was, based on 5:5:3, 40% larger than the IJN in the battleship category hence the decision to construct the ultimate manifestation of the super dreadnought). Everything prior to that battle was mere shaping of the battlefield.
 
Well that greatly confuses me. I agree that the Japanese still saw great value in their battleships, Musashi and Yamato were not build for prestige alone afterall. But building a carrier fleet and using said fleet to knock out the American battleship fleet at anchor clearly suggests that the japanese saw that carriers were the future of naval warfare and superior to battleships. Why command a carrier fleet and use that fleet optimally across the pacific if you think that battleships were the most dangerous of surface vessels?

Its true the flattops hadn't proven themselves yet, but by the actions of the Japanese i can only conclude they were the ones to put the carrier at the top, not the Americans.

If they still praised battleships so much, and i say again history does show that, why chose carrier battles with Pearl harbor, Coral sea and Midway? Or did the Americans force them into carrier battles?

Only after Midway the Japanese focussed o their battleships again, since that was all they hadleft. But American superiority and total understanding of carrier combat quickly destroyed that thought for good at Leyte Gulf.

The point of Pearl Harbor was to knock out the American battleships long enough for Japan to build up its own battlefleet.
 
Carriers (along with the KONGOs) were ships that could be risked and were to a certain extent expendable in anything that was not the DECISIVE BATTLE. The reason the main battle line saw so little usage for most of the war was because they were being reserved for the big one. They were brought out at Midway because after the carriers did sufficient damage to the US Fleet, the battleships would come forth and finish the job.
 
The attack at Pearl was a RAID. As such it was best suited for the Mobile Striking Force (i.e. Kido Butai). The Japanese Naval command structure was devoted, to a degree that is nearly impossible to overstate, to the Concept of the Decisive Battle. The main battle fleet was to be preserved, at all costs, until that moment arrived. That battle was supposed to take place near Formosa, well inside land based air coverage and after the Kido Butai and submarine forces had reduced the American fleet (keep in mind that the U.S. was, based on 5:5:3, 40% larger than the IJN in the battleship category hence the decision to construct the ultimate manifestation of the super dreadnought). Everything prior to that battle was mere shaping of the battlefield.

How were the Japanese expecting the USN to be so obliging as to literally leap head first into the lion's jaws so fast and so hard that they didn't lose their momentum until they literally reached the lion's small intestines!? Granted, their strategic thinking in terms of what they expected the American reaction to be regarding an American invasion of Midway was spot on. But sailing to freaking FORMOSA after Pearl Harbor? I take it they were expecting the IJA's invasion of the Philippines to be a total failure?


The point of Pearl Harbor was to knock out the American battleships long enough for Japan to build up its own battlefleet.

THAT was not the idea. It was about use time to beat the enemy. Beating down the US Pacific Fleet, the Kriegsmarine keeping the US Atlantic Fleet busy, and then getting the decisive battle BEFORE the American Two Ocean Navy Act could be completed. Indeed, reasons it was never finished (canceling 14 Essex-class, three Alaska-class, two Iowa-class, and three Midway-class) included crippling steel shortages and and the needs of Europe First.

The Imperial Japanese Navy never saw the introduction of any new battleships in WWII (or any time after WWI) except the disastrously wasteful two ship Yamato-class. Put the entire IJN battle fleet (four fast converted battlecruisers/battleships, six old battleships, two Yamato-class-assuming NO losses to air attack, destroyer runs, or submarines) up against eleven USN WWI old battleships (not counting the two destroyed at PH), two North Carolina-class, four South Dakota-class, four Iowa-class; and sayonara.

Carriers (along with the KONGOs) were ships that could be risked and were to a certain extent expendable in anything that was not the DECISIVE BATTLE. The reason the main battle line saw so little usage for most of the war was because they were being reserved for the big one. They were brought out at Midway because after the carriers did sufficient damage to the US Fleet, the battleships would come forth and finish the job.

Pathetic. Five of Japan's battleships sunk at portside because they were "saved" right up until Japan lacked the fuel to operate them.
 

nbcman

Donor
How were the Japanese expecting the USN to be so obliging as to literally leap head first into the lion's jaws so fast and so hard that they didn't lose their momentum until they literally reached the lion's small intestines!? Granted, their strategic thinking in terms of what they expected the American reaction to be regarding an American invasion of Midway was spot on. But sailing to freaking FORMOSA after Pearl Harbor? I take it they were expecting the IJA's invasion of the Philippines to be a total failure?




THAT was not the idea. It was about use time to beat the enemy. Beating down the US Pacific Fleet, the Kriegsmarine keeping the US Atlantic Fleet busy, and then getting the decisive battle BEFORE the American Two Ocean Navy Act could be completed. Indeed, reasons it was never finished (canceling 14 Essex-class, three Alaska-class, two Iowa-class, and three Midway-class) included crippling steel shortages and and the needs of Europe First.

The Imperial Japanese Navy never saw the introduction of any new battleships in WWII (or any time after WWI) except the disastrously wasteful two ship Yamato-class. Put the entire IJN battle fleet (four fast converted battlecruisers/battleships, six old battleships, two Yamato-class-assuming NO losses to air attack, destroyer runs, or submarines) up against eleven USN WWI old battleships (not counting the two destroyed at PH), two North Carolina-class, four South Dakota-class, four Iowa-class; and sayonara.



Pathetic. Five of Japan's battleships sunk at portside because they were "saved" right up until Japan lacked the fuel to operate them.

Formosa was a bit too far. The IJN expected the decisive battle to be further east of that after the US fleet was damaged passing through the Japanese Mandate Islands.

There would have been 3; Shinano was supposed to be the 3rd of the class but her hull was converted to a CV build after Midway.
 
Hi Guys. Long time no post.
The biggest damage to USN war effort would come from the potencial loss of trained naval aviation personel if the two carriers on PH had sunk with significant loss of life. Even though the USN lost a few carriers in the war, it was usually able to recover most of the crews. For maximum efect, the IJN should have targeted barracks as well as ships, and losing the men of two CAG would have been a greater loss than the ships themselves.
Given the massive industrial capability of the US, its most vulnerable ressource was the limited number of trained personel. The USN was, of course, the strongest branch in that area, never having scaled down as much as the Army and the AF in the 20s and 30s.
 
Based on the Maximally Effective PH Attack thread, assuming that there is a maximally effective strike on PH that include the sinking of the majority of BB and all the Pacific Fleet's carriers, who in this scenario are in port, what happens next? Clearly in the long run the US fleet building program would replace any losses and more, but in the meantime the Pacific Fleet is out of commission and the Japanese have no carrier opposition in the Pacific, what do they do? Clearly the carrier battles of 1942 aren't going to be happening.

Also could the US carriers be refloated and repaired or were they pretty much done for?
depending on damage, they will be raised and sent back out like the battleships
 
Formosa was a bit too far. The IJN expected the decisive battle to be further east of that after the US fleet was damaged passing through the Japanese Mandate Islands.

There would have been 3; Shinano was supposed to be the 3rd of the class but her hull was converted to a CV build after Midway.

There would have been four: Hull #111 was scrapped on the slipways without ever being named, much less completed as anything that could float.

I wasn't counting carriers that were not Fleet sized nor any that never had any aircraft and never completed its sea-trials. That's why my numbers didn't include the Essex-class CVs Oriskany & Reprisal. One completed postwar to service for decades, the other completed postwar and THEN scrapped. Your tax dollars at work.
 
Hi Guys. Long time no post.
The biggest damage to USN war effort would come from the potential loss of trained naval aviation personnel if the two carriers on PH had sunk with significant loss of life. Even though the USN lost a few carriers in the war, it was usually able to recover most of the crews. For maximum effect, the IJN should have targeted barracks as well as ships, and losing the men of two CAG would have been a greater loss than the ships themselves.
Given the massive industrial capability of the US, its most vulnerable resource was the limited number of trained personnel. The USN was, of course, the strongest branch in that area, never having scaled down as much as the Army and the AF in the 20s and 30s.

Agreed. Even w/out heavy loss of life on our carriers, the level of greenness of our aircrews was very serious in 1942. Even veteran squadron leaders found themselves getting lost and not finding naval targets. Take them out earlier...
 
Might I suggest At Dawn we Slept by Gordon Prange as a very detailed account of Japanese and American planning.

The stated, written Japanese objective for the Pearl Harbor Attack was to damage the US Battle Fleet to an extent sufficient to keep said battle fleet from launching a counter attack against the "Southern Operation" for at least 6 months. In Naval terminology of the 1940s, the "battle fleet" is composed of battleships, which may or may not include one or more aircraft carriers as part of the escort group. This is true for both IJN and USN doctrine. YAMAMOTO DID NOT REJECT IJN DOCTRINE CONCERNING THE DECISIVE BATTLE AND HE PLANNED ACCORDINGLY! The attack Pearl Harbor was, in his mind and by his plan, aimed at delaying the decisive battle by six months and moving the location of that battle farther East.

So, the attack was unambiguously aimed at sinking or damaging the US battleships to a sufficient extent to keep them out of the war for at least 6 months. The US "Battle Fleet" was the target; meaning precisely that any attack on infrastructure (e.g., repair facilities, dry docks or fuel farms) was secondary at best. The sinking or damaging of anything else was secondary. The attack on the airfields was initiated solely to protect the attack on the fleet.

By tradition, all IJN strategic and operational planning was the sole province of the IJN General Staff. As a result, Yamamoto's plan to attack PH was well outside channels, and it required Nagano's approval to proceed. This approval was not easily obtained because it was developed in an inappropriate fashion, it was not part of "the plan" and it was outside IJN doctrine. Therefore, adoption of this plan was a "battle amongst Admirals" of the highest rank, and lower ranks (RADM and below) had no place at the table. CDR Genda advised ADM Yamamoto, and Yamamoto rejected Genda's broader concepts to the extent that sinking the US carriers (had they been in port) was secondary to the attack on battleship row. Ergo, don't confuse the ideas of a CDR (Genda), a LCDR (Fuchida) or anyone else below the rank of Admiral as being part of "the plan". As you know, Yamamoto had to risk his career to get the plan approved.

In addition, BOTH SIDES were substantially influenced by the success of the British attack on Taranto. This includes the fact that the damage inflicted on the Italian battleships at anchor in Taranto harbor was not permanent. Ironically, USN officers (up through ADM Stark) recognized the threat of an air attack of the fleet at Pearl Harbor at about the same time Yamamoto proposed his plan.

As far as defensive-minded commanders at Pearl Harbor are concerned, requests by Short and Kimmel in early 1941 included significantly more fighter (pursuit) aircraft, more patrol aircraft (to maintain a 600 mi, 360 degree arc), 3 x more AA guns, several hundred hardened aircraft bunkers, torpedo netting, barrage balloons and smoke generators in the harbor and a 360 degree early warning radar network. All aimed at protecting "the fleet" from air attack. With the exception of the torpedo netting (rejected because the harbor was deemed too shallow for a successful torpedo attack), the Army and the Navy could not meet the supply requests due to availability, budget and competing demands (not the least of which was the acceptance of Dougie's notion that the Philippines could be successfully defended).

With respect to torpedo netting, when Yamamoto proposed the use of torpedo planes (in fact he proposed an attack composed solely of torpedo planes at one point) the response he received (indirectly) from Muramoto (and later by Genda) was that Pearl Harbor was too shallow for a successful aerial torpedo attack. Genda persisted (because the torpedo was his most destructive weapon and the British were somehow successful), conducting numerous trials until they started to get some success (requiring both changes in tactics and the torpedo resulting in an air crew dependent success rate) in October 1941. Water depth was the primary reason why ADM J. O. Richardson insisted that the fleet stop using Lahaina as an anchorage, and he later wrote that he accepted the fault for a lack of torpedo defenses within the harbor. When asked about the need for torpedo netting, Kimmel basically just repeated Richardson's assessment (i.e., too shallow).

Furthermore, Kimmel wanted to keep 2/3 of the fleet at sea at all times for two reasons: a) they were at risk to a surprise air attack when in harbor; and b) at sea they could be in position to launch a counterattack. His request was denied due to a lack of fuel and UNREP capabilities. However, he was allowed to keep 1/3 of the fleet at sea and did so throughout 1941, including 7 December. So, one needs ASB intervention to have everybody home for the Japanese attack.

Based on post-war interviews, after the strike aircraft had landed and Fuchida delivered his report Nagumo asked Fuchida if they had done enough damage to keep the US battle fleet out of the war for six months and Fuchida answered yes. The attack was a done deal at that point; Nagumo's mission had been accomplished. Nagumo then asked Fuchida and Genda for their opinions concerning an additional attack. Fuchida recommended another attack to hit infrastructure. This was rejected by Nagumo for several very good reasons: a) it was not part of the objective; b) the attack could probably not be landed before dark; c) the fleet would be at risk to the US carriers during the turn-around period (can you spell Midway) and while the strike was ongoing; and d) nobody was certain how much the US air defense had been degraded. So, because retrospective history knows that taking out the fuel farm would have further damaged the US war effort Nagumo is questioned because he did not risk an already successful mission by going off plan. Genda wanted Nagumo to stay in the area for an additional 3 days to hunt the US carriers. Now note that Genda outranked Fuchida, he was clearly the "air planner" of this operation from beginning to end, he did not endorse Fuchida's idea and he wanted to go on a carrier hunt. Therefore a third wave against Pearl Harbor is dead on arrival. Now one could argue that Genda's statement that he would relish an attack by the US carriers (and destroy it) under any circumstances was an endorsement of Fuchida. As I read the story, it was more a defense of the carrier hunt idea in that he did not care who found who first. Genda's desire to stay and hunt carriers is impossible due to a lack of fuel and it is also contrary to the mission plan. Done deal, mission accomplished! They achieved exactly what Yamamoto wanted.

How were the Japanese expecting the USN to be so obliging as to literally leap head first into the lion's jaws so fast and so hard that they didn't lose their momentum until they literally reached the lion's small intestines!? Granted, their strategic thinking in terms of what they expected the American reaction to be regarding an American invasion of Midway was spot on. But sailing to freaking FORMOSA after Pearl Harbor? I take it they were expecting the IJA's invasion of the Philippines to be a total failure?

No, they did not expect to fail. Crazy as it might seem, that is where the IJN expected the US counterattack. Primarily because it is where they would have attacked knowing their own plans. If the US fleet launched an early counter attack the IJN expected that Guam would already be in their possession and that the Philippine battle would be underway. If the Americans attacked with their battle fleet it is reasonable to assume they would try to defend the Philippines and further that attack would be most damaging to their plans if it was aimed that the choke point between the Philippines and Formosa. They discounted an attack via the San Bernadino or Surigao Straits (or further South) as way too restrictive a space for the US to attempt, but would have been quite happy to oblige if that had been the route.
 
Last edited:
According to CalBear, there are technical reasons why a strike against the oil farms would have been unsuccessful. Apparently they weren't as "soft" a target as assumed.
 
Top