Agree in part. While Fiji and Samoa are difficult to defend, leaving them to the Japanese puts a major hole in the Air Ferry route to Australia. While the shipping route is fairly easy to move to the East, the air route is a different story. There is no good way to cross the gap between French Polynesia and Auckland (2,500 mi) if you lose Fiji and Samoa. So, I don't see much choice but to attempt a defense if the Japanese attack. In January 1942, there is a US Marine Brigade on American Samoa, a NZ Brigade on Fiji (replaced by a US Division in June), and a US infantry Brigade on Tonga. So, even without reinforcement, neither Fiji nor Samoa are easy targets for Japan in June 1942.
My thinking was that the same factors that keep the US from adequately being able to hold Fiji and Samoa (island size, on island LOCs, port sizes) would keep Japan from exploiting them, and the LOCs for Japan's maritime supply lines would be even worse with only 6m tons of merchant shipping to use.
AISI, the presence of the heavily defended New Caledonia prevents Japan from doing more than defending Samoa and Fiji, they won't be in a position to strategically exploit their gains in terms of cutting off the Allied shipping lanes.
The Japanese plans to take Port Moresby, Fiji, New Caledonia and Samoa were grandiose. They never had the shipping to adequately supply forces in these locations. Let's not forget their operations in the Solomon Islands.
AISI, Port Moresby, Fiji, and Samoa WERE doable. IF the Japanese were willing to do so on the cheap, and not try to build up for even further advances farther south that frankly would be impossible IMO. The Solomon Islands I believe were easily taken care of if the US doesn't challenge them, which ITTL I believe they won't.
A significant air base at Port Moresby would certainly expose more of Australia to air attack, but think of the supply difficulty for the Japanese; they would have been unable maintain adequate supplies of "beans, bullets and gas". They couldn't adequately supply their operations on the NE coast of New Guinea.
You're right. Too many needs ITTL in the Solomons, the rest of NG, Fiji, and Samoa. Maybe a few propaganda raids for Japanese morale though. Especially after Doolittle.
So, I guess the Japanese just put more trucks in place to move supplies from their new container port at Buna over the Kokoda autobahn, or perhaps they just whip-up a rail road across the Owen Stanley mountains.
*ahem* I've read Costello's "Pacific War" too...



And you forgot the bullet train tunnel between Gona and Port Moresby.
So that means an earlier attack on Milne Bay (impossible to believe they could wait until August under these circumstances). More troops, more supplies, more air and shipping assets required.
Maybe ITTL they cancel AO?
No, I like them.
I have long been amazed that the Japanese planners were so detached from their logistical realities. Now holding Milne Bay, it is a mere 1,600 mi trip from Truk Lagoon to Port Moresby. Japanese merchants are relatively small in DWT and are definitely slow. It was a chore for them to maintain even 8 knots true distance gained. The fact is that shipping distance had as large an effect on Japanese shipping requirements as it did on Allied requirements. Ton-miles are ton-miles, and supplying even small forces over "Pacific distances" required an inordinate amount of shipping. Efficiency further dropped because most of those ships returned to the home islands empty. For some reason, the Japanese never exploited the possibilities of a triangular shipping route from Japan to the Mandates to the NEI to Japan. It would have had a positive impact on their logistics.
Is it possible that that had something to do with that one route did more to aid the IJN and the other the IJA?
What are the weekly supply requirements for significant base at Port Moresby and a sustained air campaign against Australia? Let's say they don't trans-ship through Truk or the Palaus to save time. That is a 7,400 mi round trip from Osaka, which translates into a 20-day voyage each way, and with loading, assembly and unloading time it is easily a 60-day round trip, probably more. In reality, one is talking about a minimum of 2 significant convoys at sea continuously and probably a 3rd loading, just to supply Port Moresby.
We'll just forget about anymore campaigns in China, Northern Burma, start stripping the Kwang Tung Army earlier, forget Alaska, forget Australia, and just concentrate on Operation: FS. Since I highly doubt with the feathers they'll lose at New Caledonia they'll be in any shape to do any strategic "offensive-offensives" for the rest of the war.
Absolutely correct! Which limits the plausibility of the carriers being at PH to begin with. If there is a "Post 1900" POD to put the carrier in PH on December 7, it must start with the decision to a) not deliver aircraft to Midway and Wake; and b) have the entire fleet in anchor at PH at one time. Concerning the latter, I do not believe this ever happened (i.e., someone was at sea pretty much all the time).
You'd need to have a more defensive minded admiral at Pearl. Then again, a more defensive admiral got canned for insisting to Roosevelt that the fleet stay in San Diego.
I agree that Fuchida could not have changed the plan in action, most especially early in the attack. However, what I talked about is the actual plan from OTL. All of the torpedo planes came in from the WNW, and Kaga's torpedo wing was in fact assigned to loop around the South of Ford Island to attack either Battleship row or carriers moored on the East side of Ford Island (which is precisely why they were exposed to more AA fire).
Hmm. Makes more sense.
Quite correct. However, you have to see it to hit it. Given the prevailing wind conditions and the fires in battleship row, Enterprise (in her usual position) would have been significantly obscured by smoke after the first wave attack. Not so for Lexington.
IDK. Seems to me that sighting an aircraft carrier while flying at 200 knots as opposed to a modern day 600 knots wouldn't be that hard. The green AA crews wouldn't KNOW they weren't being seen, and could hardly hold their fire while their black shoe brethren were being slaughtered before their very eyes. And once all those CV AA guns open up, the fire will lead the IJN aircrews right back to them no matter how thick the smoke is.
Quite correct. In spite of historical second guessing, KB had limited ability (and significant risk) to launch a third wave.
I suspect Midway may have had something to do with making a goat of Nagumo even in operations in which he was successful. The only positive portrayal I've seen of him done was in the film "Midway".
True, but it does not change the outcome of the war.
A worsening of the war for Australia = More Australian forces withdrawn from the UK and the Med
More Australian forces withdrawn from the UK and the Med = Slowing Monty, slowing 2nd El Alemain
Slowing Monty = Delayed meeting with Anglo-Franco-American forces in Tunesia
Delayed taking of Tunesia = Delayed Sicily
Delayed Sicily = Delayed Italian Surrender, delayed invasion of Italy
Delayed invasion of Italy = more hardened defense of Italy
More hardened defense of Italy = X2 delayed taking of Southern Italy
X2 delayed taking of Southern Italy = Delayed and bloodier Anzio/Monte Cassino
Delayed/bloodier Anzio/Monte Cassino = Delayed Liberation of Rome
Delayed Liberation of Rome = Delayed advance to the edge of Northern Italy
Delayed advance to the edge of Northern Italy = WWII ends before Northern Italy is liberated
WWII ends before Northern Italy is liberated = Mussolini flees to Spain.
Mussolini flees to Spain = Mussolini captured by Mossad, hung in Tel Aviv.
No effect on the war in Western Europe or the USSR.
You are probably correct, but the Doolittle raid is a significantly greater risk following the loss of 2 or more CVs in December 1941.
Its worth it though. It really is. A rare case of a politician knowing better than his military commanders (though AIUI Admiral King was ready to go for it). Doolittle really was a sucker punch to the stomach of the Japanese nation.
Well, we'll agree to disagree about DD and the "unsinkable aircraft carrier", due to the fact that Japan's grandiose Southern expansion does not make Australia any closer to the US West coast.
DD =/= 100% wrong about all things. Sometimes even a broken clock is right. He was right about going for the Philippines, and ITTL he'd be right about using what the Russians call a "strategic direction" that could fully employ America's land-based air forces against the IJN and IJA air forces, rather than leaving it just to the USN's poor outnumbered flight decks.
The "pummeling" and potential loss of Fiji and Samoa only makes the supply route longer. I have no doubt that DD gets his two divisions in 1942, but any "island-hopping" campaign that far out is only further delayed. It is still essentially 8,000 mi from San Diego to Botany Bay (and the Port at Brisbane is exposed to Japanese air attacks).
Brisbane would be within Port Moresby air range for Betty bombers AND Zeroes?
I seriously doubt that Australia gets more in this 1942 than OTL, in spite of the impact of Port Moresby. Neither Britain nor the US took a Japanese attack on Australia seriously and I seriously doubt they take any move to re-allocate supplies destined for the UK to Australia. I can not see how SWPA gets more, faster than OTL; delaying the strategic bombing campaign is not going to happen IMHO.
OTL Australia's outer defenses were described by Aus. PM John Curtin as "rapidly vanishing". ITTL They. Would. Be. Gone. I liked one comment by DD (when asked by Curtin if the Japanese had the capacity to invade Australia): "I believe that Japan's supply lines are becoming over-extended.
Strategically I believe it would be a blunder. But then, I thought the Germans would rule out an invasion of Russia on strategic grounds too."
As I explained above, IMO the Aussies get more goodies or they recall more forces home. And that'll be in the form of an ultimatum, with DD, the Republicans, and especially the Chicago Tribune (the Fox News of its day) beating the tom-toms.
Would they opt to attack Kwajalein? You are probably correct that they would not. My primary point (not fully explained) was based on the fact that given the "pummeling" it is the only reasonable place the USA could launch a counteroffensive in 1942. It is half the distance from California to Australia and the US could probably put the logistics together to attack there. If you want to contend that given these new circumstances 1st Marine Division goes elsewhere, I will not argue. A very reasonable argument could be made that it is sent to Australia or is used to reinforce New Caledonia or elsewhere.
One of the lesser reasons why I said New Caledonia was invincible was because the island was garrisoned by the best trained best led division in the United States Army, the Americal Division. By July 1942, the earliest that the Japanese could ever have expected to have landed on the island, Major General Alexander Patch (future 7th US Army commander) had his men whipped into not only the best trained division period, but the ONLY US Army division specifically trained in jungle warfare. I could go on and on about the difficulties of trying to invade that island, but the truth is that New Caledonia didn't even need the 1st US Marine with Patch's boys on the job.
IMHO for Dougie to get more, earlier a swarm of butterflies need to swoop in and eliminate Nimitz, King and Stark (and their replacements). For him to get more aircraft than OTL, Hap Arnold and his air planning staff need to all suffer at least a minor stroke. Marshall and his planning staff need to ignore the logistical realities and lose their commitment to Germany first. To say nothing of any influence Churchill has on FDR, or FDR's commitment to Europe. Frankly, what are the chances the loss of Port Moresby will have a greater influence on Allied planning than the Battle of the Atlantic?
It could easily turn out that Dougie is even more limited than OTL.
Politics. FDR was looking at the 1942 off-year elections. WE today may want to blame DD for the fall of the Philippines in every manner, but that wasn't the prevailing feeling in the US in 1942. Republicans believed that not only did Roosevelt deliberately abandon the Philippines to its fate but that he abandoned DD to HIS fate to insure that DD wouldn't be free or even alive

to run against FDR in 1944. If not, that is, the pressure brought to bear on FDR by our True American Patriots on the editorial staff at the Chicago Tribune.
If the carriers are sunk the United States will simply sign an armistice with Japan in return for withdrawal from its territories and promise of non-intervention in China.
???
You really don't get the mindset of 1940s America, do you?
Or for that matter the 1940s British Empire and the 1940s USSR. The Japanese Empire launched a sneak attack on the United States
while simultaneously engaging in high level peace talks! Ambassador Nomura's communications alone could be considered normal diplomatic discussions, but sending Special Envoy Kurusu, the man who signed the Tri-Partite Pact, was supposed to signal that these were serious negotiations meant to produce a positive outcome. America's last communication to Tokyo was a proposal to have FDR and Hirohito to personally negotiate with one another as heads-of-state. By that time, the KB was closing in on Hawaii.
After Pearl Harbor, any US President who proposed an armistice with Japan would be impeached, tried, convicted, and removed. No matter HOW many seats in Congress were Democratic. Japan had done the national and diplomatic equivalent of facing America, both sides carrying white flags of truce, and then Japan shooting America. Only to drop the truce flag AFTER America was shot.

Popular semi-historical programs and films (especially Tora, Tora, Tora) have left a less than accurate perspective of the Raid.
Don't forget
Pearl Harbor, Pearl, Winds of War, War & Remembrance, and Victory At Sea's Pearl Harbor Special. And that's just comes to me off the top of my head.
EDIT: Forgot about a little flick called
"From Here To Eternity". Oops. Sorry Burt. Sorry Frankie.
You might enjoy the 2011 Japanese film Admiral Yamamoto, just recently translated and subtitled into English and available free on the internet for streaming. It goes from just before WWII in Europe starts to his death and then jumps to August 14th, 1945. The fact that the delivery of Japan's "Declaration of War" (which it wasn't) being too late was far more highly played up than IRL [they played FDR's DoW speech on the radio-with
Japanese subtitles(!)-while Yamamoto and his staff listened, appalled as Roosevelt mentioned that the Japanese Ambassador arrived a full hour after the PH attack had started], but then I suppose you would expect that. The Battle of Midway is surprisingly well done, if very chopped up and abbreviated by American standards.
The film pulls absolutely no punches in the way that Imperialism,
bushido, and militarism crippled Japan's ability to think in the long term. Like Napoleon, for the Imperial Japanese it was always one more battle to be fought.
But the most decisive action in WWII as far as the Japanese were concerned (other than Pearl Harbor), was the Doolittle Raid. The film makers did their own film version of the attack on Tokyo (very accurate renditions of what I believe were B-25Bs). Basically, for the first time since the arrival of the Mongol/Korean Armada in 1281, war had become real for the Japanese People.
I have been thinking about this as well. My theory would be what if Lexington and Enterprise delivered Marine Fighters to Wake and Midway Islands earlier so that they are back in Pearl Harbor on December 7? If VMF 211 arrived on Wake earlier than December 4 would protective berms be finished for the Wildcat fighters? If this is the case then it is possible that more of VMF 211 aircraft survive the first day of the war. I know it won't stop the Japanese but hopefully the Marines are able to down more Japanese aircraft during the siege.
The problem for Wake was a lack of radar. Without that, the Japanese bombers will get tactical surprise every time. Indeed, the only real contribution the Wildcats were able to make was during the very last sortie of the last F4F left on Wake. It shot down a level-bomber coming in at low altitude. That was something that seriously spooked the Japanese aircrews when they returned to their carrier (Hiryu?). The aircrew killed were the very same men credited with dropping the bomb that destroyed the Arizona. Karma. One IJN veteran said: "It was as if the spirits of the Arizona dead had reached up from the sea and pulled them down..."
One more possible butterfly: If Enterprise is in port could Admiral Halsey be killed in the raid?
Wishful thinking?
