Japanese sink US carriers at Pearl Harbor, what next?

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I have a question would Harlsey permit that the carrier would stay a period of more then three days at pearl harbor? The reason is because he know that japan would attack the USA but did't know where so I won't think that he would have his carriers in pearl for avery long time.
 
IIRC, the Japanese carrier Ryuuhou had neither when she was attacked in port in March 1945, and yet the damage was so severe that the IJN declared her a total loss. Not that it mattered much, seeing as how at that point the IJN had been totally stripped of planes, pilots, and fuel.
Well, yes, as you suggest, when you've got no resources to salvage and repair the carrier, and no fuel to deploy her, then sure the carrier would be deemed a total loss.

Meanwhile, at Pearl Harbour, USS West Virginia was hit by six or seven torpedoes (there was too much damage to be certain) and two heavy high-level bombs before sinking. 2 years, 5 months later West Virginia rejoined the fleet. Had it been necessary, such as with a Yorktown class instead of a slow, yet symbolic dreadnought, the repair would have been done faster.
 
Question: would the carriers have any fighters in the air at the time of the attack? If so, and even with the carriers still being lost, would this have any impact?
 
Question: would the carriers have any fighters in the air at the time of the attack? If so, and even with the carriers still being lost, would this have any impact?
If the carriers are in port the air wings would be ashore at the air station. This means the aircraft are destroyed on the ground. But is there the possibility that now you have a surplus of Naval aviators sitting in Pearl Harbor waiting for replacement aircraft. Perhaps those pilots and any surviving aircraft are sent to reinforce Midway?
 
Utah, even after being disarmed, looked like enough of a BB for her to get two torpedoes.
uss-utah-ag-16-print-9.gif

Anything afloat would get hit by IJA (err IJN) pilots with 'Buck Fever'

Didn't the Japanese pilots confuse the Utah with the Saratoga due to a cover over the ship that made it look like it had a flight deck? Or is this another PH myth?

Hypothetically, the USS Saratoga could not have been damaged by I-6, on January 11th, 1942, but sunk, so lost forever. USS Wasp, ferrying spitfires to Malta could have been lost similarly as HMS Eagle on august 11th 1942 in the same region to a submarine attack as well, so not available. USS Hornet, was still on a shakedown in the Caribbean Sea, possibly being hit on the East Coast as well by marauding U-Boats.

That would leave only the USS Yorktown available, as she had already departed quickly to the Pacific, prior to the U-Boats starting their assault on the US East Coast.

HMS Warspite, there is no one on AH.com who knows more about the technical aspects of warships than you. However, US fleet CVs did have considerable escort. And as you know better than I, one reason that the Sara was such a torpedo magnet was her turn radius being poorer than the Yorktown-class and Essex-class. The Wasp was slightly slower than the Yorktowns, but not by much. Her loss OTL was much due to her being put in the position of constantly patrolling on the same course pattern day after day, allowing intrepid Japanese sub commanders to take advantage. IDK however how her turn radius compared to the Saratoga-class. The Ranger was probably the worst. But again, you would know better.

I don't see all these carriers being torpedoed AND sunk one after the other short of Skippy issuing the the Kriegsmarine AND the IJN Mark 48s (or even Spearfish:rolleyes:) AND the USN getting a case of the criminal stupids by not changing their OTL operations. Your ATL doesn't give a time for the sinking of the USS Hornet, but it would HAVE to be prior to the USS Wasp's mission to Malta, as OTL the Hornet was already long in the Pacific by the time of the delivery of the Wasp-borne fighters to Malta.

IF the Sara is lost AND the Hornet is lost quickly afterwards (lets say so quickly that the USN doesn't have time to react regarding the Hornet's deployment), then by any reasonable standard the Malta mission is a wash. The only way that that could be avoided is if the RN reverses its decision to NOT send any of its three carriers operating off the African coastline to the Coral Sea. (1)

1) The Admiralty's refusal of Admiral King's request to redeploy any of those carriers to Australia making a lifetime enemy of the already anglophobic King was a mistake Churchill only realized later.

So either its Royal Navy carriers in Australia (with a subsequent delayed occupation of Madagascar) or Malta is further starved while the Wasp rushes to the Pacific.

I do agree with those who say that the USS Ranger stays in the Atlantic. Not for air support for Torch so much, or its value as a training ship for USN aviators, or even to calm panicky Americans on the East Coast:rolleyes:. Rather, because Ernest King was pathological about keeping Ranger out of harm's way. (2) Since she was the first US carrier designed from the ground up, she was built for aircraft capacity above all, allowing for 72 aircraft on a vessel that on any other carrier design for a ship that size would have had perhaps half that complement. The cost being virtually no protection from torpedoes, and a metal flight deck only one inch thick! A one hit wonder, more in common with a light carrier than a true CV.

2) So pathological that he was forced to swallow his enormous pride and accept the deployment of the HMS Victorius/USS Robin to the Pacific to fill in the gap when at a time the only operational US carrier left was the Enterprise. Better King be humiliated than risk the Ranger against the Japanese. IIRC, the Ranger was never brought within enemy air range in WWII (though I have a faint memory that she might have seen action in Norway).

As to the Japanese? ITTL the USN simply doesn't have the wherewithal to do very much. I just don't see the Wasp being deployed to the Med in a world where Enterprise, Lexington, Saratoga, AND Hornet have been lost. Oh yeah, and the Langley too.:eek: Just a seaplane carrier by then, but the political perception is there of "there goes another one". OTL much of the aggressiveness of the USN in the first year of the Pacific War can be based on the following:

a) Starting the war with an intact force of seven Fleet CVs (with one permanently spotted in the Atlantic).

b) The need to send the carriers into combat to actively give the aircrews the baptism of fire they so desperately needed

c) The need to bolster the morale of the military and the Home Front.

d) 1942 was an election year.

e) See "d"

I believe that at the very least some of the pinprick raids will have to be done. They're not really dangerous, and Hawaii defense can be handled by the garrison and shipping or flying in every last combat aircraft to the Hawaiian Islands as the facilities there can handle. Even Lend Lease will take a back seat to protecting Hawaii ITTL. At least in terms of fighters. As to the Doolittle Raid, I believe FDR will force that on the navy anyway ITTL. It would just be a matter of co-ordinating the pinprick raids and preparation for Doolittle. FDR's thinking would be that if he doesn't give the Americans SOMETHING before Election Day the US House is going to go Republican (he only kept the House by 42 seats).

OTOH, it means Port Moresby falls to a virtually unimpeded Japanese assault.:( OTOH again, Yamamoto did not consider that the two fleet carriers employed in the Coral Sea were needed at Midway, so maybe the operation doesn't happen as some kind of ATL overwhelming force. I don't know. I'd appreciate your opinion on that, and what would be the results.

The only things I am certain of are these: Midway and New Caledonia are both too distant and too heavily defended for the Japanese to take. Fiji and Samoa are too small and too difficult to properly supply for the US to hold. But Midway, considering the force Japan was bringing to bear on the island, could take whatever the Japanese threw at it. New Caledonia would represent an exercise on how to slaughter troops on the beaches. Japan's intelligence on that island was criminally inept.

If Ranger and Wasp are pulled out of the Atlantic earlier to replace Lexington and Enterprise that means that fewer Spitfires are flown off to Malta in the case of Wasp and less air cover available for Operation Torch in the case of Ranger.

Its not like air power was all that critical at Torch, considering how fast the Vichy switched sides.

Is it feasible to have Saratoga at Pearl Harbor when the Japanese attack too?

AIUI, the Saratoga had a number of obsolete aircraft it was having transferred off (F3F's? Vindicators?) and therefore really couldn't get to Hawaii that quickly. Like at Midway, she was just too late for the action.

OK, so let's say Lexington and Enterprise are at Pearl Harbor. Does that mean that KB delayed their attack by 24 hours?

No. Too short of fuel. Using the North Pacific route gave the KB strategic surprise, but it also did a number on the fleet's fuel reserves.

Nevertheless, if everybody is home. Lexington is moored on the NW side of Ford Island, behind Utah and Enterprise is moored where Neosho was OTL (between California and Oklahoma), sitting at an angle to the battleships. This was their usual mooring spot when in port.

Lt. Nagai's force of 16 torpedo planes were designated for the carrier attack and he is approaching from the WNW (directly into the sun). 2 of 6 torpedoes launched at Utah hit the target (1 of the misses hit Raleigh), which shows the problems caused by attacking into the rising sun. So, let's say Fuchida recognizes the carriers early and notifies Nagai to attack carriers. I assume he would attack Lexington with 8 aircraft and loop the other 8 around to the south to attack Enterprise.<snip>

IIRC, the timing was such that the torpedo planes came in so quickly that such surgical maneuvering over a battle site in 1941 would have been impossible. Fuchida couldn't assume that there weren't American fighters deployed on airfields on other nearby islands winging their way to Battleship Row at that very moment. The idea was to go in and hit hard before the US warships could react.

As it was, the Kaga's torpedo air wing suffered the severest losses in the attack because they approached in line with another strike force, causing any American AA fire missing the aircraft in front of them to hit the torpedo planes behind them. I remember watching one very old IJN Kaga torpedo plane aircrew veteran saying: "Everyone talked after the attack how light our losses were. You didn't say that if you were in the Kaga's torpedo plane squadron.":(

Does Fuchida change the attack plan due to the presence of the carriers? I doubt it, because the attack plan already had that contingency and allocated 16 torpedo planes to the carriers. He does have 36 dive bombers with 250 kg general purpose bombs in the second wave allocated to shipping targets. He would probably allocate some number of those to the carriers for sure. How destructive would they be and what would their hit rate be? Enterprise is certainly going to be shrouded in smoke.

A sitting duck is a sitting duck.:(

Does this necessitate the 3rd strike? It is my understanding that Fuchida and Genda wanted it in the first place, but do they get it? If Nagumo now knew where the carriers were at Pearl Harbor does he relent? And, if so, how much of the smaller 3rd wave is allocated to shipping versus infrastructure? Even if, I do not buy the premise that the Fuel farm is lost for a year. The article referenced talks about replenishment oilers, not the tankers used to supply PH (reasonable mistake for a USAF officer). Operational reach is a different issue than the ability to rebuild and resupply a fuel depot at PH.

Fuel logistics more than anything bar a third strike. If a third strike HAD been launched, then some of Nagumo's ships aren't getting home. He was under strictest orders (from the Navy Ministry IIRC) to get his fleet home completely intact, despite the expected losses of at least one or two of his carriers. As it was, OTL, three of his destroyers had only three hours worth of fuel left in their bunkers by the time they reached port (the weather going home was even more stormy than getting to Hawaii in the first place). Losing your ships in combat is one thing. Losing some of your ships because they ran out of fuel and foundered at sea in a North Pacific storm (to be lost with all hands, that water will kill you in minutes) is the supreme dishonor,:mad: even with all the "glory" Nagumo had gained. If nothing else, it will mean much less respect for Nagumo, and more for his aviators.

Something similar happened to a force of German destroyers in Norway, where 10 DDs were lost when they ran out of fuel, just as a British battleship showed up loaded for bear. Similarly, a British Royal Navy officer was disgraced when he decided to launch a force of Spitfires by air to Malta when the fighters were outside of their effective air range. Every plane was lost.

Even if Moresby falls, does that prevent US troops and supplies from reaching Australia? No!

But it does mean that NE Australia gets the same 200 days of bombing that NW Australia's Darwin did. And there are more people living there if I'm not mistaken.

Does that prevent the US from attacking westward in 1942? First, they didn't have much reach to begin with so the major offensive crossed off the list is Guadalcanal, and should make the Doolittle raid too risky.

I agree with you about Guadalcanal, but we'll agree to disagree about Doolittle.

What about Kwajalein? That actually fits better with Navy plans anyway and scratches the "do something" itch; and it is within range of the West Coast.

I disagree. With such a pummeling of the USN, IMO Dougout Dougie wins the argument years earlier and gets the men, aircraft, and ships he needs to start his own island-hopping campaign. Having Halsey as his naval commander would be a huge plus, as against all expectations OTL the two men became fast friends.

The advantage being the use of Australia as an unsinkable aircraft carrier and allowing the USAAC to be brought to bear against Japan's critical oil sources in the DEI. Though the price may be that the 5th Air Force (and accelerated Lend-Leased aircraft to the RAAF & RNZAF) will dampen the US's efforts at daylight strategic bombing for quite some months.

IIRC, the Japanese carrier Ryuho had neither when she was attacked in port in March 1945, and yet the damage was so severe that the IJN declared her a total loss. Not that it mattered much, seeing as how at that point the IJN had been totally stripped of planes, pilots, and fuel.

Wasn't she damaged during the Doolittle Raid but was able to be repaired and eventually returned to action? IIRC she was just about the only flight deck the IJN had that wasn't available for Midway because of this reason.

No one has mentioned the escort carriers. If two fleet carriers are lost on the first day of the war could there be a push to get the CVEs in action earlier? Perhaps they could patrol around Hawaii? If there is still a Guadalcanal landing the CVEs could help cover the beachhead. The bad thing is you get an earlier version of Taffy 3's fight at Samar.

Combustible. Vulnerable. Expendable. Oh yeah, and Slow. They run into fleet ships, whether surface or carriers, and there's nothing to do but pray. They simply lack the speed to escape. Short of having overwhelming numbers. CVE's are for ASW, tactical air support, CAP, pilot training, and best of all early in the war, aircraft ferrying. The USS Long Island, the USN's first escort carrier (and around long before her sisters started to arrive) did yeoman service in the Guadalcanal Campaign through her keeping up a constant flow of planes to the "Cactus Air Force".

Something else to remember is this: By the end of 1942 the US Navy only had Enterprise left in the Pacific OTL. The US still hung on.

ITTL maybe the British do more to right their Madagascar error by sending more CVs than HMS Victorius/USS Robin, and for a longer time?
 
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Wasn't she damaged during the Doolittle Raid but was able to be repaired and eventually returned to action? IIRC she was just about the only flight deck the IJN had that wasn't available for Midway because of this reason.

The damage Ryuuhou received during the Doolittle Raid was very minor compared to the drubbing she took at Kure.

Armenian Genocide said

Ryūhō was attacked by Task Force 58 aircraft on 19 March near Kure, suffering hits by three 500 lb bombs and two 5.5-inch rockets. The damage was severe: the flight deck bulged upward between the two elevators, the No. 1 boiler was punctured by a bomb fragment, the stern settled two meters into the water, and a raging fire broke out. Twenty crewmen were killed and 30 were wounded. Upon returning to Kure on 1 April, Ryūhō was considered to be a total loss.
 
Good points made Usertron, I was only p[ointing out on a hypothetical chain of misfortunes. How unlikely they were to happen, or how likely they were is another thing.

Only one remark: USN ASW was pathetically baad in late 1941 and throughout 1942, lacking both the ships able to perform in this role and the knowledge how to fight effective in ASW. Escorts were typically fast destroyers still, which had below average ASW in the period, until more properly designed ships of the Frigate and ASW escort types came around, replacing the more multirole DDs in this role. (Frigate is the more correct term for what the USN in the period called a DE.) USS Saratoga had only 2 DDs escroting her whern torpedoed by I-6 and USS Hornet, during her Trials runs normally had just one, or two PC boats esorting her. Both of these were lacking ASW capabilities, as the DDs were not yet equipped with more capable ASW gear, such as Hedghog and Squid, found later in WW2. Damage on USS Saratoga form a single torpedo was seriously heavy, showing a defect in the general underwaterprotective system.
(See: http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/WarDamageReports/WarDamageReportCV3/WarDamageReportCV3.html)

So in theory the USN could have lost USS Saratoga easily, had it not been saved by very good damage control on behalve of her crew.

For USS Hornet and USS Wasp, things are more theoretical, as both were not actually attacked in the period mentioned, though enemy naval presence was in their neighbourhood at the time. Both ships were realitvely simmilar, with USS Hornet being the more protected one, though by a small margin only and certainly not as good as a later war Essex and weak by British standards, with armored hangars and decks on their carriers, except HMS Ark Royal. It had a large capacity though for aircraft, which compensated this a bit, but still a hit or either bomb, or torpedo would likely do serious damage still.

Some facts on USS Wasp running spitfires to Malta: While having Spitfires on board, she could not operate her own aircraft, as the non folding win Spitfires were both on the flightdeck and upper hangar, forcing her own aircraft to the lower hangar, with no space left on the flightdeck itself to start and land on. The British Force H had to cover USS Wasp on her runs, which this unit did very well, with no incidents of enemy attacks comming near her. In theory, the escorting Force H could have been overpowered by landbased airpower on both North African AXIS airbases and South Italy/Sicily, as the AXIS powers had some 300 aircraft stationed in the region. (HMS Indomitable carried only around 40 at the time, with the inclusion of a number of torpedoplanes.) Had the AXIS powers attacked in strength, they would have overpowerd the defenders by some 10 to 1 in aircraft likely. With USS Wasp unable to use her own aircraft and a lot of spitfires fueled and ready to lauch on deck, she was a floating bomb at the time. Just one hit would have been enough to destroy her then.
 
Didn't the Japanese pilots confuse the Utah with the Saratoga due to a cover over the ship that made it look like it had a flight deck? Or is this another PH myth?

That pic is how she looked before the attack, except rigged with sun screens, like this pic of Dreadnought
dreadnought_001.jpg



and Utah after

uss-utah-sinking1.jpg


I really don't see how anyone gets' Flight Deck' from all that
 
There was a thread earlier this year about having a British carrier at Midway. It was brought up that both Illustrious and Formidable were in American shipyards for repairs. In this situation with two US carriers sunk in Hawaii could one or both of the British carriers be loaned to service with the US fleet? Would Churchill be so generous and Roosevelt and Admiral King be receptive to the offer?

My next question is if that least one British carrier stays in the states how long would it take to get her ready to handle American aircraft and/or retrofit Wildcats fresh from the factory for FAA use?
 
Some facts on USS Wasp running spitfires to Malta: While having Spitfires on board, she could not operate her own aircraft, as the non folding win Spitfires were both on the flightdeck and upper hangar, forcing her own aircraft to the lower hangar, with no space left on the flightdeck itself to start and land on. The British Force H had to cover USS Wasp on her runs, which this unit did very well, with no incidents of enemy attacks comming near her. In theory, the escorting Force H could have been overpowered by landbased airpower on both North African AXIS airbases and South Italy/Sicily, as the AXIS powers had some 300 aircraft stationed in the region. (HMS Indomitable carried only around 40 at the time, with the inclusion of a number of torpedoplanes.) Had the AXIS powers attacked in strength, they would have overpowerd the defenders by some 10 to 1 in aircraft likely. With USS Wasp unable to use her own aircraft and a lot of spitfires fueled and ready to lauch on deck, she was a floating bomb at the time. Just one hit would have been enough to destroy her then.


You can make that case for any of the club run carriers. During PEDESTAL, HMS Eagle was sunk while HMS Furious was in the process of launching her Spitfires. If U-73 is in a different place that morning, it is Furious that gets a spread of torpedoes instead of Eagle. Frankly, it is kind of miraculous that none of the club run carriers ever ate a spread of torpedoes given how many club runs were made.
 
There was a thread earlier this year about having a British carrier at Midway. It was brought up that both Illustrious and Formidable were in American shipyards for repairs. In this situation with two US carriers sunk in Hawaii could one or both of the British carriers be loaned to service with the US fleet? Would Churchill be so generous and Roosevelt and Admiral King be receptive to the offer?

My next question is if that least one British carrier stays in the states how long would it take to get her ready to handle American aircraft and/or retrofit Wildcats fresh from the factory for FAA use?

I've always like the idea of the RN and USN forming a large carrier force at Pearl Harbor to take the war to the enemy. Theoretically it could have done although there would have been a number of hurdles to doing, none of them are insurmountable.
 
Some facts on USS Wasp running spitfires to Malta: While having Spitfires on board, she could not operate her own aircraft, as the non folding win Spitfires were both on the flightdeck and upper hangar, forcing her own aircraft to the lower hangar, with no space left on the flightdeck itself to start and land on. .
Wasp still had two Hangar Deck catapults, so could launch that way.

cv-12_hanger_deck_launch.jpg
ffc668163045dbb9bf8e7cb7f5796cd0.jpg


Landing is the problem
 
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BTW, I'm not sure how vulnerable the club runs were to air attack. They launched about 630 miles from Malta, about 330 miles from the air bases on Sardinia. That's well beyond the range of any fighter escort as well as the single engine dive bombers. The threat in that part of the Mediterranean was submarines - see HMS Ark Royal and HMS Eagle.
 
Wasp still had two Hangar Deck catapults, so could launch that way.

cv-12_hanger_deck_launch.jpg
ffc668163045dbb9bf8e7cb7f5796cd0.jpg


Landing is the problem

I know that, though the hangar catapults were on the upper hangar deck, crowded with Spitfires as well, while the lower hangar had no such device and could not launch aircraft from there as a result. USS Wasp therefore was a teethless tiger, as long as her passangers were on board, eending on other ships to shield her with aircraft, or whatever.
 
BTW, I'm not sure how vulnerable the club runs were to air attack. They launched about 630 miles from Malta, about 330 miles from the air bases on Sardinia. That's well beyond the range of any fighter escort as well as the single engine dive bombers. The threat in that part of the Mediterranean was submarines - see HMS Ark Royal and HMS Eagle.

We are not speaking of fighters, but bombers mainly, as the sheer numbers of AXIS power bombers in the West Mediterranean Sea were vastl outnumbering the Allied fighters on Force H and Malta. long range Bombers are not so easy pickings in this time, as the difference in speed between a Ju-88 and Spitfire Mk-V, or so of the period was not that great, while the F4F was even slower than a Ju-88, as was the Fulmar. Since the slower He-111 and Ju87 were not so much a threat, being hampered by lesser range, were not likely to be deployed against the force, teh fighters still would have a hard time catching the fast bombers, besides them having troubles of their own in their low numbers.
 
snip

OTOH, it means Port Moresby falls to a virtually unimpeded Japanese assault.:( OTOH again, Yamamoto did not consider that the two fleet carriers employed in the Coral Sea were needed at Midway, so maybe the operation doesn't happen as some kind of ATL overwhelming force. I don't know. I'd appreciate your opinion on that, and what would be the results.

The only things I am certain of are these: Midway and New Caledonia are both too distant and too heavily defended for the Japanese to take. Fiji and Samoa are too small and too difficult to properly supply for the US to hold. But Midway, considering the force Japan was bringing to bear on the island, could take whatever the Japanese threw at it. New Caledonia would represent an exercise on how to slaughter troops on the beaches. Japan's intelligence on that island was criminally inept.

Agree in part. While Fiji and Samoa are difficult to defend, leaving them to the Japanese puts a major hole in the Air Ferry route to Australia. While the shipping route is fairly easy to move to the East, the air route is a different story. There is no good way to cross the gap between French Polynesia and Auckland (2,500 mi) if you lose Fiji and Samoa. So, I don't see much choice but to attempt a defense if the Japanese attack. In January 1942, there is a US Marine Brigade on American Samoa, a NZ Brigade on Fiji (replaced by a US Division in June), and a US infantry Brigade on Tonga. So, even without reinforcement, neither Fiji nor Samoa are easy targets for Japan in June 1942.

The Japanese plans to take Port Moresby, Fiji, New Caledonia and Samoa were grandiose. They never had the shipping to adequately supply forces in these locations. Let's not forget their operations in the Solomon Islands.

A significant air base at Port Moresby would certainly expose more of Australia to air attack, but think of the supply difficulty for the Japanese; they would have been unable maintain adequate supplies of "beans, bullets and gas". They couldn't adequately supply their operations on the NE coast of New Guinea.

So, I guess the Japanese just put more trucks in place to move supplies from their new container port at Buna over the Kokoda autobahn; or perhaps they just whip-up a rail road across the Owen Stanley mountains.:p So that means an earlier attack on Milne Bay (impossible to believe they could wait until August under these circumstances). More troops, more supplies, more air and shipping assets required.

Facetious comments aside, I have long been amazed that the Japanese planners were so detached from their logistical realities. Now holding Milne Bay, it is a mere 1,600 mi trip from Truk Lagoon to Port Moresby. Japanese merchants are relatively small in DWT and are definitely slow. It was a chore for them to maintain even 8 knots true distance gained. The fact is that shipping distance had as large an effect on Japanese shipping requirements as it did on Allied requirements. Ton-miles are ton-miles, and supplying even small forces over "Pacific distances" required an inordinate amount of shipping. Efficiency further dropped because most of those ships returned to the home islands empty. For some reason, the Japanese never exploited the possibilities of a triangular shipping route from Japan to the Mandates to the NEI to Japan. It would have had a positive impact on their logistics.

What are the weekly supply requirements for significant base at Port Moresby and a sustained air campaign against Australia? Let's say they don't trans-ship through Truk or the Palaus to save time. That is a 7,400 mi round trip from Osaka, which translates into a 20-day voyage each way, and with loading, assembly and unloading time it is easily a 60-day round trip, probably more. In reality, one is talking about a minimum of 2 significant convoys at sea continuously and probably a 3rd loading, just to supply Port Moresby.

No. Too short of fuel. Using the North Pacific route gave the KB strategic surprise, but it also did a number on the fleet's fuel reserves.

Absolutely correct! Which limits the plausibility of the carriers being at PH to begin with. If there is a "Post 1900" POD to put the carrier in PH on December 7, it must start with the decision to a) not deliver aircraft to Midway and Wake; and b) have the entire fleet in anchor at PH at one time. Concerning the latter, I do not believe this ever happened (i.e., someone was at sea pretty much all the time).

IIRC, the timing was such that the torpedo planes came in so quickly that such surgical maneuvering over a battle site in 1941 would have been impossible. Fuchida couldn't assume that there weren't American fighters deployed on airfields on other nearby islands winging their way to Battleship Row at that very moment. The idea was to go in and hit hard before the US warships could react.

As it was, the Kaga's torpedo air wing suffered the severest losses in the attack because they approached in line with another strike force, causing any American AA fire missing the aircraft in front of them to hit the torpedo planes behind them. I remember watching one very old IJN Kaga torpedo plane aircrew veteran saying: "Everyone talked after the attack how light our losses were. You didn't say that if you were in the Kaga's torpedo plane squadron.":(

I agree that Fuchida could not have changed the plan in action, most especially early in the attack. However, what I talked about is the actual plan from OTL. All of the torpedo planes came in from the WNW, and Kaga's torpedo wing was in fact assigned to loop around the South of Ford Island to attack either Battleship row or carriers moored on the East side of Ford Island (which is precisely why they were exposed to more AA fire).


A sitting duck is a sitting duck.:(

Quite correct. However, you have to see it to hit it. Given the prevailing wind conditions and the fires in battleship row, Enterprise (in her usual position) would have been significantly obscured by smoke after the first wave attack. Not so for Lexington.

Fuel logistics more than anything bar a third strike. If a third strike HAD been launched, then some of Nagumo's ships aren't getting home. He was under strictest orders (from the Navy Ministry IIRC) to get his fleet home completely intact, despite the expected losses of at least one or two of his carriers. As it was, OTL, three of his destroyers had only three hours worth of fuel left in their bunkers by the time they reached port (the weather going home was even more stormy than getting to Hawaii in the first place). Losing your ships in combat is one thing. Losing some of your ships because they ran out of fuel and foundered at sea in a North Pacific storm (to be lost with all hands, that water will kill you in minutes) is the supreme dishonor,:mad: even with all the "glory" Nagumo had gained. If nothing else, it will mean much less respect for Nagumo, and more for his aviators.

Quite correct. In spite of historical second guessing, KB had limited ability (and significant risk) to launch a third wave.

But it does mean that NE Australia gets the same 200 days of bombing that NW Australia's Darwin did. And there are more people living there if I'm not mistaken.

True, but it does not change the outcome of the war.

I agree with you about Guadalcanal, but we'll agree to disagree about Doolittle.

You are probably correct, but the Doolittle raid is a significantly greater risk following the loss of 2 or more CVs in December 1941.

I disagree. With such a pummeling of the USN, IMO Dougout Dougie wins the argument years earlier and gets the men, aircraft, and ships he needs to start his own island-hopping campaign. Having Halsey as his naval commander would be a huge plus, as against all expectations OTL the two men became fast friends.

The advantage being the use of Australia as an unsinkable aircraft carrier and allowing the USAAC to be brought to bear against Japan's critical oil sources in the DEI. Though the price may be that the 5th Air Force (and accelerated Lend-Leased aircraft to the RAAF & RNZAF) will dampen the US's efforts at daylight strategic bombing for quite some months.

Well, we'll agree to disagree about DD and the "unsinkable aircraft carrier", due to the fact that Japan's grandiose Southern expansion does not make Australia any closer to the US West coast. The "pummeling" and potential loss of Fiji and Samoa only makes the supply route longer. I have no doubt that DD gets his two divisions in 1942, but any "island-hopping" campaign that far out is only further delayed. It is still essentially 8,000 mi from San Diego to Botany Bay (and the Port at Brisbane is exposed to Japanese air attacks). I seriously doubt that Australia gets more in this 1942 than OTL, in spite of the impact of Port Moresby. Neither Britain nor the US took a Japanese attack on Australia seriously and I seriously doubt they take any move to re-allocate supplies destined for the UK to Australia. I can not see how SWPA gets more, faster than OTL; delaying the strategic bombing campaign is not going to happen IMHO.

Would they opt to attack Kwajalein? You are probably correct that they would not. My primary point (not fully explained) was based on the fact that given the "pummeling" it is the only reasonable place the USA could launch a counteroffensive in 1942. It is half the distance from California to Australia and the US could probably put the logistics together to attack there. If you want to contend that given these new circumstances 1st Marine Division goes elsewhere, I will not argue. A very reasonable argument could be made that it is sent to Australia or is used to reinforce New Caledonia or elsewhere.

IMHO for Dougie to get more, earlier a swarm of butterflies need to swoop in and eliminate Nimitz, King and Stark (and their replacements). For him to get more aircraft than OTL, Hap Arnold and his air planning staff need to all suffer at least a minor stroke. Marshall and his planning staff need to ignore the logistical realities and lose their commitment to Germany first. To say nothing of any influence Churchill has on FDR, or FDR's commitment to Europe. Frankly, what are the chances the loss of Port Moresby will have a greater influence on Allied planning than the Battle of the Atlantic?

It could easily turn out that Dougie is even more limited than OTL.
 
If the carriers are sunk the United States will simply sign an armistice with Japan in return for withdrawal from its territories and promise of non-intervention in China.
 
The Japanese thought so too. The operational orders for the Kido Butai specifically mention four USN CV in one section and 4-5 CV in a later section.

In another thread I recently remarked on how the IJN operational plan was a reflection on the haphazard state of Japanese intelligence gathering. What REALLY makes it odd is that they had agents right there. One Japanese agent took the tourist boat and airplane tour of Oahu/Pearl Harbor. Still they expected maybe 4 BB and 4-5 CV.

The BB were also noted as the primary target. If there HAD been two CV in the harbor, along with the full battle line, I sometimes wonder just how much attention the carriers would have received.

I was always under the impression the Japanese wanted to carriers to be there. They themselves had focussed on carriers as early as anyone so they know the importance of them. They recognize the American carriers are a bigger threat than their battleships, logically since their own carriers were their prime vessels and enemy sea planes their greatest enemy. Of course they would target the carriers if they were there.

Like others said, them being in port would mean less too since they are weaker and the damage would be much more significant, probably irrepairable. They weren't Essex class. So, they were a sweet target, even only 1 or 2.
 

CalBear

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I was always under the impression the Japanese wanted to carriers to be there. They themselves had focussed on carriers as early as anyone so they know the importance of them. They recognize the American carriers are a bigger threat than their battleships, logically since their own carriers were their prime vessels and enemy sea planes their greatest enemy. Of course they would target the carriers if they were there.

Like others said, them being in port would mean less too since they are weaker and the damage would be much more significant, probably irrepairable. They weren't Essex class. So, they were a sweet target, even only 1 or 2.
Actually, they didn't see the carriers are the biggest threat.That is the classic myth. Nagumo was VERY worried about the absence of the carriers at Pearl, not because he had lost his primary targets but because he was worried about getting bushwacked, or, possibly worse, having his service fleet getting bushwacked. For all his reputation as a air power supporter Yamamoto, along with the rest of the IJN senior command staff, was a battleship proponent. He had a better vision for the use of carriers in preparation for the Decisive Battle than many of his peers, but he still believed that the last great engagement would involve the big gun ships.

Operation order No. 3 is specific in that it list battleships first and foremost, followed by carriers if conditions allowed. Cruisers and any remaining carriers, along with the air fileds were to be targets from that point forward, even if the was a third wave the assignments never moved to shore installations.

Popular semi-historical programs and films (especially Tora, Tora, Tora) have left a less than accurate perspective of the Raid.
 
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