Japanese sink US carriers at Pearl Harbor, what next?

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I keep coming back to Calbear's post here: I really think this is close to the likely mark, setting aside shipbuilding priorities.

Wake reinforcement is off the table, and so are the Marshalls raids. Ranger stays in the Atlantic, and (this is a close call) Wasp as well, at least for a spell. That leaves Nimitz with only three effective decks, and trying to rush as much land-based air to bases in the Pacific. With three fleet carriers, Nimitz can still stage real operations, but he now has no margin for error...beyond an eventual hope that he gets Wasp by summer.

Does the Doolittle Raid still happen? Roosevelt was an effusive supporter, and King gave it his support, too. But it's one thing to risk 40% of your carrier strength on a high risk raid meant purely for morale purposes, and another to do it with one using 67% of it, leaving you only one single carrier to cover the South Pacific and Hawaii. Maybe King still takes the risk, and generations of historians marvel at the gamble. But it's hard to say. It's a different calculus.

Otherwise, the rest plays out as here: Nimitz still has Rochefort's codebreaking, still knows about MO and, yes, Midway, and he sends all three carriers to try to stop the IJN in the Coral Sea. If it works out, he could still do Midway, hopefully with similar results (though there are many butterflies here: does Halsey come down with his skin rash?). But most likely, Nimitz will by summer be too weak in carrier strength (figure he has to lose at least one deck, maybe even two, in these battles) for King to be willing to take the risk of launching WATCHTOWER, even with Wasp arriving. Which might butterfly the entire Solomons campaign away, leaving Nimitz to play defense until mid-1943, when he has enough firepower to start out his Road to Tokyo in the Gilberts. Which would mean that all the attrition of IJN naval air and surface combatants that happened in the Solomons would now happen some months later in the Gilberts and Marshalls, most likely.

This gets to the point a lot of us have been making - Nimitz's margin for error is a lot lower through 1942. Maybe Wasp stays in the Atlantic for awhile, maybe she doesn't but it still means that Nimitz has at most four decks assuming nobody gets damaged like Sara did in early 42 or simply needs a refit. Practically speaking Nimitz never had more than four decks available to him in 1942 but there was always the possibility of reinforcements (Sara in the yard, Wasp in the Atlantic) or the Japanese had taken a beating themselves.
 
This gets to the point a lot of us have been making - Nimitz's margin for error is a lot lower through 1942. Maybe Wasp stays in the Atlantic for awhile, maybe she doesn't but it still means that Nimitz has at most four decks assuming nobody gets damaged like Sara did in early 42 or simply needs a refit. Practically speaking Nimitz never had more than four decks available to him in 1942 but there was always the possibility of reinforcements (Sara in the yard, Wasp in the Atlantic) or the Japanese had taken a beating themselves.

Which is why the U.S. really was extraordinarily fortunate at Pearl Harbor. Strange though that would have sounded at the time.

Had the attack happened the previous Sunday morning, Lexington would have been at Pearl. Had it happened the following Sunday morning, both of them might have been there.

Or have Kimmel rejigger his plans even slightly - Enterprise was due back on the 7th as it was. If she arrives a day earlier, and Lexington is sent out to Midway a few days later, they're there for the attack. (Think also about likely losses among planes, trained pilots, air operations crew and mechanics that might have happened.)

And those two carriers were really worth more than the entire Battleship Row at that point.

The U.S. wins the war in late 1945 no matter what, of course. But it would have made for a much more nerve wracking first 12 months of the war, and the butterflies could have negatively affected the war effort in the Atlantic, and possibly even TORCH.
 
I keep coming back to Calbear's post here: I really think this is close to the likely mark, setting aside shipbuilding priorities.

Wake reinforcement is off the table, and so are the Marshalls raids. Ranger stays in the Atlantic, and (this is a close call) Wasp as well, at least for a spell. That leaves Nimitz with only three effective decks, and trying to rush as much land-based air to bases in the Pacific. With three fleet carriers, Nimitz can still stage real operations, but he now has no margin for error...beyond an eventual hope that he gets Wasp by summer.

Indeed, Wasp is a close call. But for spite if nothing else once the Admiralty refuses King's request for at least on of their three Indian Ocean carriers to go to Australia immediately pulling Wasp out and transferring her to the Pacific. And to King's POV, its nothing more than "Turnabout is fair play."

Does the Doolittle Raid still happen? Roosevelt was an effusive supporter, and King gave it his support, too. But it's one thing to risk 40% of your carrier strength on a high risk raid meant purely for morale purposes, and another to do it with one using 67% of it, leaving you only one single carrier to cover the South Pacific and Hawaii. Maybe King still takes the risk, and generations of historians marvel at the gamble. But it's hard to say. It's a different calculus.

As planned, it wasn't actually all that great a risk for the carriers, considering what was supposed to be the timing of the launch of the B-25s and the ability of the USN to essentially "shoot and scoot" for this operation. It was the 16 B-25s air crews that were all but committing suicide by launching so many hours earlier due to the fleet's being spotted by a patrol boat. That the Hornet was forced to launch hundreds of miles further out to sea made the IJN's attempt to pursue nothing more than a wild goose chase. Plus the strategic effect the raid had on Japanese minds was incalculable. Goodbye attacking Russia, reinvesting in the war on China, any more Indian Ocean raids, and even cutting off Australia's lifeline all took a backseat (or got thrown out of the car:rolleyes:) in the name of eliminating the US Pacific Fleet as a threat to the Japanese Home Islands.

IMVHO FDR and King were acting more wisely than they then knew.

Otherwise, the rest plays out as here: Nimitz still has Rochefort's codebreaking, still knows about MO and, yes, Midway, and he sends all three carriers to try to stop the IJN in the Coral Sea.

Well, as I've stated again and again, IMO its Port Moresby that pays the price for the losing of the Enterprise and Lexington. Something's got to give somewhere, some sacrifice will have to be made that wasn't ITOL.

If it works out, he could still do Midway, hopefully with similar results

The code-breakers by the time of the decision making for sending a fleet to the Coral Sea was already deducing that the Japanese were planning something for operations deep in the Central Pacific. That really only left Johnston, Palmyra, Midway, and Hawaii itself. IMO that scrubs sending what's left of the fleet to the Coral Sea. WE may know today that the Japanese were sending a landing force and bombardment force totally inadequate to take Midway, but Nimitz didn't have that information IIRC. I agree about your remark regarding "similar results" though. Many talk of the Five Minutes of Midway representing a miracle, but in fact with their advantage of surprise and superior search capacity the actual marvel is that they didn't do better. That can be blamed on the greenness of American aircrews. Had they the training and experience of American air crews in 1943, they would have carved up the KB like a roast. Indeed, even with what they had, if the Hornet's SBD squadrons hadn't gotten lost the Hiryu could potentially have gone down the same time as the other CVs.

(though there are many butterflies here: does Halsey come down with his skin rash?).

Hard to say if he doesn't travel to tropical latitudes. But if its shingles, no. He will still get the disease.

But most likely, Nimitz will by summer be too weak in carrier strength (figure he has to lose at least one deck, maybe even two, in these battles) for King to be willing to take the risk of launching WATCHTOWER, even with Wasp arriving.

Agreed absolutely. Like "Operation: Shoestring" wasn't shoestring enough as it was. We had a guy who wrote a WWII ATL so off the wall [and so Japan-wank and Ameri-screw)]that he had the USN getting slaughtered not just at Pearl Harbor and but a much worse and earlier Coral Sea plus a Midway by which time the USN as a whole was nearly bereft of carriers while the IJN was almost intact! And after all this, he STILL had WATCHTOWER go forward! Mainly as a mechanism to further whittle down the remnants of the USN (particularly its newest ships) for the purpose of maintaining Japanese naval supremacy through to the invasion of the Philippines (another trick used was handwaving the Battle of the Philippine Sea). He had no problem (eventually) of admitting his love of Japan, but to the bitter end he never would admit to his rampant Anti-Americanism.

Which might butterfly the entire Solomons campaign away, leaving Nimitz to play defense until mid-1943, when he has enough firepower to start out his Road to Tokyo in the Gilberts. Which would mean that all the attrition of IJN naval air and surface combatants that happened in the Solomons would now happen some months later in the Gilberts and Marshalls, most likely.

IDK. This leaves the possibility of Midway not being the blockbuster defeat for the IJN that it was IOTL. With the USN so much weaker than OTL, and if the Saratoga draws its inevitable torpedo, Nagumo just might be a little more aggressive, possibly yielding a better result for the KB. IF the Japanese manage a Midway win, it actually gets worse for them. Operation: FS has all the hallmarks of being a war of attrition markedly worse than the Solomons. Especially if Fiji and Samoa falls while New Caledonia sits there as the Immovable Object that can not only take everything the Japanese can throw at it but stand as an unsinkable aircraft carrier against the KB. The trick is, if Fiji and Samoa DO fall, when could the Japanese bring themselves to admit that the game was up for FS? Without a Midway defeat, IMO it would take a VERY long time.
 
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Indeed, Wasp is a close call. But for spite if nothing else once the Admiralty refuses King's request for at least on of their three Indian Ocean carriers to go to Australia immediately pulling Wasp out and transferring her to the Pacific. And to King's POV, its nothing more than "Turnabout is fair play."

Good point. Wasp probably ends up in the Pacific sooner here.

As planned, it wasn't actually all that great a risk for the carriers, considering what was supposed to be the timing of the launch of the B-25s and the ability of the USN to essentially "shoot and scoot" for this operation.

That is certainly true, based on what we know now. At the time, of course, there were significant unknowns. What if Japanese carriers were in the area? Rochefort felt fairly certain they weren't, that Kido Butai was still returning from the Indian Ocean (which they were). But with only one carrier able field any fighter defense before the B-25s were launched, it was still seen as a significant risk to scarce carrier resources.

The Doolittle Raid is a close call for me. I think Calbear is right, but I can't say there isn't a chance FDR orders it anyway and that King goes along with it. It's a greater gamble, though.

Well, as I've stated again and again, IMO its Port Moresby that pays the price for the losing of the Enterprise and Lexington. Something's got to give somewhere, some sacrifice will have to be made that wasn't ITOL.

One risk here, though: If we have Nimitz launching the Doolittle Raid instead of trying to parry Operation MO, then Zuikaku and Shokaku almost certainly are relatively unharmed (barring a lucky shot by a sub or land-based air out of Port Moresby or Australia) and available for Midway. Which means Nimitz is now facing six carriers instead of four. And even if he has Wasp available, that still makes odds a little worse for Nimitz. Nagumo gets a bigger CAP. (I think the U.s. still wins for the reasons you give, but it might be a less decisive victory.)

With the USN so much weaker than OTL, and if the Saratoga draws its inevitable torpedo, Nagumo just might be a little more aggressive, possibly yielding a better result for the KB. IF the Japanese manage a Midway win, it actually gets worse for them. Operation: FS has all the hallmarks of being a war of attrition markedly worse than the Solomons. Especially if Fiji and Samoa falls while New Caledonia sits there as the Immovable Object that can not only take everything the Japanese can throw at it but stand as an unsinkable aircraft carrier against the KB. The trick is, if Fiji and Samoa DO fall, when could the Japanese bring themselves to admit that the game was up for FS? Without a Midway defeat, IMO it would take a VERY long time.

Well, let's think about this. The bulk of the Kido Butai has to be intact for Operation FS to even be on the table.

But while we are in full agreement on the un-takeability of New Caledonia, I think Fiji is out of reach, too. At the end of June there were two New Zealand infantry brigades and a battalion on Fiji. That month, the U.S. 37th infantry Division began arriving and commenced training. The 3rd Construction Battalion also arrived that month to complete work on an oil tank farm and seaplane base; the 70th fighter squadron was already there. If Yamamoto tries to take Fiji in the summer of 1942, he'd be facing at least a reinforced US infantry division, and (depending on how late we're talking), and one New Zealand equivalent division as well, with significant air support. (EDIT: Check that. By October, the full New Zealand 3rd Division was there, with substantial anti-aircraft batteries.) The islands didn't have heavy fortifications yet, but they were large enough for defense in depth, and had limited approaches for landing thanks to reefs...I just can't see the IJN taking Fiji, either, even if Nimitz does no reinforcement at all.

I'm less sure about Samoa. I know the 2nd Marine Brigade was there, and some Marine fighters. Samoa might have been tough to take, too.

The Japanese might be able to take Efate, though. Which would extend them badly.

Otherwise, I agree with everything else you say.
 
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One risk here, though: If we have Nimitz launching the Doolittle Raid instead of trying to parry Operation MO, then Zuikaku and Shokaku almost certainly are relatively unharmed (barring a lucky shot by a sub or land-based air out of Port Moresby or Australia) and available for Midway. Which means Nimitz is now facing six carriers instead of four. And even if he has Wasp available, that still makes odds a little worse for Nimitz. Nagumo gets a bigger CAP. (I think the U.s. still wins for the reasons you give, but it might be a less decisive victory.)

Two extra Decks, to me means that Plan MI would have a 2nd diversionary attack besides the Aleutians.

Yamamoto never did a simple battle plan. He never concentrated his forces. Why start now?
 
I think that the US Navy would have to attempt to stop the Port Moresby operation. Allowing the Japanese to just walk in and take Port Moresby would make the Australians feeling very naked. That would mean nothing stands between the Australian mainland and the Japanese. Now while the Japanese are not likely to carry out such an operaton the newspapers in Australia would be screaming bloody murder at being abandoned by the American Navy. Not that but the Japanese army was going to land and considering what had happened in China to the Chinese what would they do to the Australians. Just Imagin the news stories and the hysteria that it would whip up. So the American Navy would have to at least try and do something to stop the Japanese
 
Two extra Decks, to me means that Plan MI would have a 2nd diversionary attack besides the Aleutians.

Yamamoto never did a simple battle plan. He never concentrated his forces. Why start now?

Don't blame just Yamamoto. The constant use of razzle-dazzle tactics seemed to be an obsession with the IJN. Yamamoto had been dead 18 months when the Japanese operational plans for Leyte Gulf were used in just as must a dispersal of effort as Midway.

I think that the US Navy would have to attempt to stop the Port Moresby operation. Allowing the Japanese to just walk in and take Port Moresby would make the Australians feel very naked. That would mean nothing stands between the Australian mainland and the Japanese. Now while the Japanese are not likely to carry out such an operation the newspapers in Australia would be screaming bloody murder at being abandoned by the American Navy. Not that but the Japanese army was going to land and considering what had happened in China to the Chinese what would they do to the Australians. Just imagine the news stories and the hysteria that it would whip up. So the American Navy would have to at least try and do something to stop the Japanese

Timing doesn't allow for American troops OR for the 5th Air Force to be deployed, and if the Australian 7th Division is sent (assuming it gets to Australia itself ITTL) it may find itself suffering the same fate as Singapore IF the Japanese chose to make enough of an investment of land-based air power from north of the Owen Stanley Range.

While I freely admit that the effects of losing Port Moresby could be catastrophic to Australian morale, it may come down to a completely imponderable choice ITTL:

a) Do the Americans make the commitment when the potential loss of fleet CVs could mean that the Central Pacific is left all but naked of carrier hulls?

OR INSTEAD

b) Do the Australians and New Zealanders withdraw more forces (air and ground) from the Middle East, thereby delaying the 2nd Battle of El Alemain?

The thing is, Australian politics at the time was such that the Labor Party was governing with a majority of only 1 MP. HOWEVER, this was after an election that had devastated the ruling majority of the coalition government of the Country Party and the (soon to be electorally destroyed) Conservative Party. It only took one defection to put the Curtin Government in power. The political undercurrents in Australia however were running massively against the Country/Conservatives.

Since they'd basically been in power forever (since the early 30s), and it was they who'd made Australian defense policy based on sending everything to support the British Empire and expect Britain to reciprocate when Oz's own time of need came, it was men like Menzies and Fadden and their governments that had to pay the price post-PH and the Fall of Singapore. So a continuing tide of defeats actually politically HELPS the ruling Labor Party as their position was seen by Australian voters as the party of "Australia First". That's why the Labor Party enjoyed such a historic landslide victory in their mid-WWII elections.

Oh, and an invasion of Australia is logistically even less sound than an attempt on New Caledonia. 70% desert, no major ports in the north, a rail system that would have to be completely rebuilt (and the Japanese don't have the resources to do so), and not one single merchant ship to spare for the operation. And for all the criticism of Dougout Dougie, in private he speculated correctly that Japan's supply lines were at their breaking point. That is, that they had gone as far south as they reasonably could, and anything further would be an exercise in how to slaughter troops on the beaches (Unspeakable Seamammal), or force them to die of thirst (CSA Sibley's defeat in New Mexico in 1862). Apparently he told this directly to Curtin himself, who seemed to have given DD his trust.

So the question is I guess just how much influence can DD have (if any) on American decision-making in Washington? I don't think that this will be left to Nimitz alone.

My thoughts on this are known: You can't ITTL do both Coral Sea and Doolittle. And IMVHO Roosevelt will see to it that Doolittle will have priority. After all, the Doolittle Raid was in the works before even the Japanese plans for MO were drawn up AIUI.

There is a political matter to on the subject of Australians "screaming bloody murder". Australia is a Dominion in the British Empire, not a state or collection of states in the United States of America. So if there's anyone to be screamed AT, its the Royal Navy, not the US Navy.

The problem there is that with all of his travels all over the English-speaking world, the one place Winston Churchill never visited were the Lands Down Under, and his war strategies seem to reflect that. Both British and American Pacific war plans early on were drawn up as if Australia didn't exist (Frank Forde's opinion). The problem for Australia in getting British aid unfortunately was two-fold.

ONE, every time a convoy was sent to Australia, it inevitably got rerouted somewhere else. Churchill even diverted the 6th and 7th Australian Divisions to Rangoon despite the fact that they had expressly been taken out of Egypt for service in Australian defense and the convoy was not combat loaded. Canberra blew such a gasket that for once even Winston had to give in, sending the convoy to Ceylon for refueling, and then to their original destination Down Under.

TWO, The Bureaucratic Dodge (as old as bureaucracies themselves):
a) There's no need to do anything
b) We shouldn't do anything now
c) We should do something, but now is not the right time to do it
d) We should do something, but we can't do it now
d) Maybe we should have done something, maybe we could have done something, but its too late now!

OTL Churchill's definition of danger for Australia during the war ran the gamut from (9/1/39) "no danger whatsoever" to "if the Japanese ever invade Australia on a massive scale (*) we will of course drop everything in the Middle East and come to their aid." Except that Parliament would never allow him to do that. And he knew it. That fact is, he saw that whether or not Japan had Australia and New Zealand would make damned little difference to the outcome of the war.

*) Probably defined eventually as meaning that Canberra has come under Japanese long-range artillery fire.:eek::rolleyes:
 
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I keep coming back to Calbear's post here: I really think this is close to the likely mark, setting aside shipbuilding priorities.

Wake reinforcement is off the table, and so are the Marshalls raids. Ranger stays in the Atlantic, and (this is a close call) Wasp as well, at least for a spell. That leaves Nimitz with only three effective decks, and trying to rush as much land-based air to bases in the Pacific. With three fleet carriers, Nimitz can still stage real operations, but he now has no margin for error...beyond an eventual hope that he gets Wasp by summer.

Does the Doolittle Raid still happen? Roosevelt was an effusive supporter, and King gave it his support, too. But it's one thing to risk 40% of your carrier strength on a high risk raid meant purely for morale purposes, and another to do it with one using 67% of it, leaving you only one single carrier to cover the South Pacific and Hawaii. Maybe King still takes the risk, and generations of historians marvel at the gamble. But it's hard to say. It's a different calculus.

Otherwise, the rest plays out as here: Nimitz still has Rochefort's codebreaking, still knows about MO and, yes, Midway, and he sends all three carriers to try to stop the IJN in the Coral Sea. If it works out, he could still do Midway, hopefully with similar results (though there are many butterflies here: does Halsey come down with his skin rash?). But most likely, Nimitz will by summer be too weak in carrier strength (figure he has to lose at least one deck, maybe even two, in these battles) for King to be willing to take the risk of launching WATCHTOWER, even with Wasp arriving. Which might butterfly the entire Solomons campaign away, leaving Nimitz to play defense until mid-1943, when he has enough firepower to start out his Road to Tokyo in the Gilberts. Which would mean that all the attrition of IJN naval air and surface combatants that happened in the Solomons would now happen some months later in the Gilberts and Marshalls, most likely.



One should note USS Ranger was not equipped to arm aircraft with torpedoes, as her bombstores could not accomodate such devises and in reality USS Ranger operated just a fighter + bomber mix, with no torpedoplanes. Lacking the hardest Hitters would make her a liability in any carrier vs carrier conflict, as even with the questionable quality of USN torpedoes, having bad torpedoes is less a problem than no torpedoes at all. This all would have to do with the impact on an enemy, forcing her to react on a low level torpedoattack by aircraft, such as at Midway, forcing the CAP fighters down, leaving less at higher altitude to cope with bombers.

USS Ranger therefore was not likely to be send to the Pacific as a combat carrier, but at its best as a replenishing vessel of some kind, due to her poor equpment and totally inadequate deffenses, as the ship was known to completely lack any protection internally and below average weapons to defend herself. (Even USS Wasp was better designed with at least some internal protection around her vitals compared to nothing on USS Ranger.)
 
One should note USS Ranger was not equipped to arm aircraft with torpedoes, as her bombstores could not accomodate such devises and in reality USS Ranger operated just a fighter + bomber mix, with no torpedoplanes. Lacking the hardest Hitters would make her a liability in any carrier vs carrier conflict, as even with the questionable quality of USN torpedoes, having bad torpedoes is less a problem than no torpedoes at all. This all would have to do with the impact on an enemy, forcing her to react on a low level torpedoattack by aircraft, such as at Midway, forcing the CAP fighters down, leaving less at higher altitude to cope with bombers.

USS Ranger therefore was not likely to be send to the Pacific as a combat carrier, but at its best as a replenishing vessel of some kind, due to her poor equpment and totally inadequate deffenses, as the ship was known to completely lack any protection internally and below average weapons to defend herself. (Even USS Wasp was better designed with at least some internal protection around her vitals compared to nothing on USS Ranger.)

Don't know if they dropped torpedoes or not but for OPERATION LEADER, USS Ranger had an air group of 27 F4Fs, 27 SBDs, and 18 TBFs.
 
What did Churchill have against the Aussies? Why did he ignore the country but had no problem using it's army? Is there anything in his writings?
 
Don't know if they dropped torpedoes or not but for OPERATION LEADER, USS Ranger had an air group of 27 F4Fs, 27 SBDs, and 18 TBFs.

Hi there,

Some correction on the previous post, USS Ranger as build lacked torpedostorage, though a modification corrected it in the 1941. See quote:
In January, 1939, Ranger transited the Panama Canal and in the Caribbean its air wing had the honour of ‘sinking’ the new carrier, USS Enterprise CV-6, during Fleet Problem XX, the last ever staged by the USN. She attended the New York World’s Fair in May and then took part from Sept.5, 1939 in ‘Neutrality Patrols’ as a new war in Europe began. Along with the newly-commissioned USS Wasp CV-7, she spent 1940 and 1941 involved in training and on patrols and was in the yards at Norfolk, Virginia, on Dec.7, 1941. One change made, out of many, was to give her provision for storing torpedoes, thus at the end of 1941 she had a squadron of TBD-1’s aboard. See: http://www.carrierbuilders.net/element/element.php?id=997
 
Hi there,

Some correction on the previous post, USS Ranger as build lacked torpedostorage, though a modification corrected it in the 1941. See quote:
In January, 1939, Ranger transited the Panama Canal and in the Caribbean its air wing had the honour of ‘sinking’ the new carrier, USS Enterprise CV-6, during Fleet Problem XX, the last ever staged by the USN. She attended the New York World’s Fair in May and then took part from Sept.5, 1939 in ‘Neutrality Patrols’ as a new war in Europe began. Along with the newly-commissioned USS Wasp CV-7, she spent 1940 and 1941 involved in training and on patrols and was in the yards at Norfolk, Virginia, on Dec.7, 1941. One change made, out of many, was to give her provision for storing torpedoes, thus at the end of 1941 she had a squadron of TBD-1’s aboard. See: http://www.carrierbuilders.net/element/element.php?id=997

Thanks for posting that, I've wondered about that issue.
 
Thanks for posting that, I've wondered about that issue.

Hi there again.

About USS Ranger's performance against German Shipping off Norway, used bombs only, a far as I can recall it. Low level strikes were hampered due to the local terrain of the steep fjordsides and lack of room to navigate a low flying aircraft near Bodö, Norway.

This record below suggest only bombs were used as well.:
The Northern Attack Group, which comprised 20 Dauntless dive bombers escorted by 8 Wildcat fighters, began to take off at 6:18 am. These aircraft flew at low altitude towards Bodø until their crews sighted Myken Lighthouse, and then turned to the north and climbed as they neared the target area.[13] Weather conditions were clear, with the air crews having good visibility.[17] Four Dauntlesses and a pair of Wildcats were detached from the force shortly after it passed Myken Lighthouse to search for German shipping nearÅmnøya island. They soon sighted the 8,000 GRT German freighter La Plata, and two of the dive bombers attacked the ship. The Americans believed that La Plata was badly damaged, and the six aircraft rejoined the main body of the Northern Attack Group.[13][18][15]

In the meantime the other American aircraft continued north, sighting but not attacking many small cargo ships and fishing boats. At 7:30 am they located a German convoy comprising the steamer Kerkplein and the tanker Schleswig under the escort of the minesweeper M 365. Eight of the Dauntlesses attacked Schleswig and another pair targetedKerkplein, inflicting significant damage on both ships. One of the escorting Wildcats was damaged by gunfire during the attack and returned to Ranger.[13][20] Schleswig wasbeached to avoid sinking, and later salvaged and brought to Bodø for repairs.[15] Following this engagement, the eight Dauntlesses which had yet to drop their bombs continued on to Bodø where they attacked four small German cargo ships. All of these vessels were hit: the 2,719 GRT ore carrier Rabat was sunk, Cap Guir badly damaged, a bomb which nearly struck Malaga inflicted minor damage and the small steamer Ibis was machine gunned.[21][19] Two of the dive bombers were shot down by anti-aircraft guns located on the shore and ships. The crew of one of the aircraft survived and were taken prisoner after ditching into the sea, but both men on the other Dauntless were killed.[13][22]

The Southern Attack Group began launching from Ranger at 7:08 am. It was made up of ten Avenger torpedo bombers and six Wildcats.[13] Two of the Avengers attacked the 4,991 GRT Norwegian cargo ship Topeka off the island of Løkta south of Sandnessjøen, resulting in the ship being set on fire and beached to avoid sinking. Three of the Norwegian crew members on Topeka were killed in the attack, along with several German soldiers manning anti-aircraft guns on board the ship. One of the attacking aircraft was shot down by anti-aircraft fire from the shore with only its pilot surviving.[19][22] Topeka was carrying a cargo of cement and timber, and had until the previous evening been sailing in an escorted German convoy. Local fishermen made their way to the burning vessel to help rescue those on board.[23]

Following the attack on Topeka the American aircraft continued north, and bombed and sank the 687 GRT Norwegian cargo liner Vaagan off Fagervika without loss of life.[19][24]The crew of Vaagan had observed the bombing of Topeka and brought their unarmed ship close to shore and lowered the lifeboats in preparation for a possible attack. Vaaganwas carrying a cargo mostly of food for civilian consumption, and the sinking led to a margarine shortage in parts of northern Norway.[25][Note 2] The force subsequently bombedLa Plata, causing her to be beached on the island Rødøya where the ammunition on board exploded and she burned for several days.[28] The aircraft also bombed the 4,300 GRT Kriegsmarine troop ship Skramstad (a Norwegian cargo ship requisitioned with her crew by the German occupying authorities), which had some 850 German soldiers embarked and was protected by two escorts. Skramstad was severely damaged and beached, burning for days. According to some sources 200 of the troops were killed, while Norwegian sources state that only one Norwegian sailor and a small number of German soldiers were killed. According to further Norwegian sources, the Norwegian resistance movement claimed in a report after the attack that around 360 Germans had been killed in the bombing of Skramstad while the Germans admitted in their reports to the deaths of 37 soldiers.[29][28] The American aircraft also strafed the German cargo ship Wolsum and attacked the ammunition barge F231, which was hit by a bomb and beached.[30] After all the aircraft had completed their attacks, the force returned to Ranger shortly before 9:00 am.[22][31] In addition to the four aircraft lost, six had suffered damage from anti-aircraft artillery.[32]
 
What did Churchill have against the Aussies? Why did he ignore the country but had no problem using it's army? Is there anything in his writings?

Remember that Churchill was a supreme Imperialist. He was born in a time when the sun that never set over the British Empire was seen to be at its blazing noon. He'd spent much of his life traveling about the world either in the British Army or as a war correspondent. He'd been exposed to not only every corner of the Empire (1) but the United States as well, where he had developed strong friendships with famous Americans like the financier Bernard Baruch (who basically kept Britain's #1 Anti-Nazi financially afloat in the Great Depression).

1) But there were three very strong exceptions to this: Ireland, and Australia and New Zealand.

Ireland in that he was as much anti-Irish as any other 19th century Englishmen. He did much to make peace in the creation of The Irish Free State, but he got no thanks for that from anyone.

Australia and New Zealand because he saw them as colonies of convicts as well as Irishmen. AND HE HAD NEVER ONCE IN HIS LIFE BEEN TO THE LANDS DOWN UNDER!

Churchill blamed the Anzac Corps for the failure of Gallipoli. His sense of British (read: "English") Nationalism wouldn't allow himself to blame non-ANZAC troops, nor would he blame British commanders, land or sea. And most of all, his enormous sense of professional pride did not (and would never) allow him to admit how horrendously wrong-headed the entire Gallipoli Campaign was.

Even his closest political ally during his Wilderness Years, Brendan Bracken, sometimes drew Churchill's ire; in part due to his Irish background. Not for that specifically, but that Bracken's Irish-ness seemed to throw petrol on an already existing flame.

IMO, a 21st century amphibious invasion force would have a job trying to force those straits in 1915, and that's assuming that the Turks ran away at the first sight of incoming Super Harriers and helicopter gunships!

So, by 1940, in his 65th year, Churchill's mind was already made up regarding the Australians. Having the Australians electing a Socialist political party that was anathema to Churchill (The Labor Party) just a few months before PH made things a lot worse. That Australia's Labor Party leader had been jailed in WWI for opposing conscription at a time when Churchill was soldiering in the trenches (going there after his Gallipoli humiliation) brought Churchill's opinions of Australians into the abyss.

Not for nothing did he never concern himself to any degree with Australian defense. In that part of the world, his heart would always be in India. That he allowed one Japanese midget submarine on a diversionary mission to Madagascar to send the British Fleet (those three carriers again) harrowing off to the opposite side of the Indian Ocean (to deal with THAT "Japanese threat") despite that the nearest held Japanese territory was in the Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal... I don't think the Japanese would ever have been within range of Madagascar even if you spotted them a couple hundred B-29s.:rolleyes::eek:

If forces could be spared from the defense of the UK, they went to fight the U-Boats. If they could be spared from fighting the U-Boats, they would be used for Bomber Command. If they could be spared from Bomber Command, they be used for succoring Malta. If they could be spared from Malta, they'd go to Egypt and the Western Desert. If they could be spared from Egypt and the Western Desert, they would go to India. If they could be spared from India, they could go to Burma/Singapore/Malaya (while they lasted). If they could be spared from there (or they were lost), they could be sent to Australia. That is, as soon as the Duchy of Grand Fenwick was secured.:rolleyes: See a pattern?:mad:
 
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So far the consensus seems to be that it would buy the Japanese 3 months of time. What could they profitably have done with it?

The consensus seems to have been that a shortage of troops and merchant shipping prevents the Japanese going further than Midway, Guadalcanal and Port Moresby.

Therefore an invasion of Australia is impossible and an invasion of India is also impossible because even if Japan had the merchant shipping to transport the invasion force the Japanese Army did not have the troops.

So that seems to leave the Indian Ocean. What could they profitably do there with the forces available to them?

I think the best they could do is find and destroy the British Eastern Fleet and cut the British Empire Forces in the Middle East and India off from their supplies of munitions for a few months in 1942. Though what the consequences of that would be (if any) I will leave to the others.
 
So far the consensus seems to be that it would buy the Japanese 3 months of time. What could they profitably have done with it?

The consensus seems to have been that a shortage of troops and merchant shipping prevents the Japanese going further than Midway, Guadalcanal and Port Moresby.

Therefore an invasion of Australia is impossible and an invasion of India is also impossible because even if Japan had the merchant shipping to transport the invasion force the Japanese Army did not have the troops.

So that seems to leave the Indian Ocean. What could they profitably do there with the forces available to them?

I think the best they could do is find and destroy the British Eastern Fleet and cut the British Empire Forces in the Middle East and India off from their supplies of munitions for a few months in 1942. Though what the consequences of that would be (if any) I will leave to the others.

Assuming Japanese victory in all things as you list (Port Moresby/Coral Sea, the completion of the Solomons base, and winning the naval side of Midway), the IJN very specifically had Operation: FS as next on the agenda. Period.

Attacking Russia was a flat no.

China represented a black hole of men and resources, and couldn't be taken seriously as an objective unless the Allied Powers (except China) sued for peace.

India and Australia are as you say a no, particularly India (I'm vexed to think of any serious voice in Japan that was in favor of that, though from their POV an Indian Anti-British uprising would have been nice:frown:).

The Imperial Japanese Naval General Staff HAD proposed an invasion of Australia following a successful Operation: FS, but Tojo and the entire IJA General Staff almost had a collective coronary at the very suggestion. They stated that the troops for such an operation simply did not exist (fairytale ATLs not withstanding), and the IJA for once even recognized the logistical impossibility as well.

However, while the army had rejected all other proposals made, the Doolittle Raid had some IJA generals talking like IJN staff officers after their humiliating failure to protect the sacred airspace over the Imperial Palace.

As part of the deal in terms of having to settle who did what first, it was decided that MO (Port Moresby) would be done first, immediately followed up by MI. But for Yamamoto to get what HE wanted, he was forced to promise the General Staffs of both armed services that his very next target would be FS. The idea being that with America's carrier fleets by this time being destroyed they would be able to sustain a longer campaign for FS than one would normally expect.

The problems for FS were that it faced enormous problems of distance, and that they would be trying to sustain an amphibious operation well beyond the limits of their own land-based air range (1), supported solely by the air power aboard carrier flight decks, with limited lag time before being forced to return to base. Not to mention not seeming to have any idea of what they would be up against once they got there. It seems as though once the Japanese found themselves operating in environments where they did not enjoy air superiority and the enemy were well-prepared, they got into serious trouble. More than they should have. But based on their plans for the landing operation for Midway (and the never realized but planned invasion of Hawaii) the Japanese showed that if nothing else they certainly had no shortage of confidence. Their first reaction on the ground to the American invasion of Guadalcanal is proof enough of that (though I'm certain that if the IJA regimental commander on the scene knew he was up against an entire USMC division even HE would have never have launched any attacks.

1) HMS Warspite can correct me if I'm wrong about Japanese land-based air range problems for an Operation: FS Campaign.

With the political imperative of doing FS ITTL and the impossibility of successfully completing it, any further Japanese expansion anywhere beyond their later deeper incursions into China cannot be done. Post-Doolittle, the IJN will never risk sending the KB into the Indian Ocean again.
 
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