I keep coming back to Calbear's post here: I really think this is close to the likely mark, setting aside shipbuilding priorities.
Wake reinforcement is off the table, and so are the Marshalls raids. Ranger stays in the Atlantic, and (this is a close call) Wasp as well, at least for a spell. That leaves Nimitz with only three effective decks, and trying to rush as much land-based air to bases in the Pacific. With three fleet carriers, Nimitz can still stage real operations, but he now has no margin for error...beyond an eventual hope that he gets Wasp by summer.
Does the Doolittle Raid still happen? Roosevelt was an effusive supporter, and King gave it his support, too. But it's one thing to risk 40% of your carrier strength on a high risk raid meant purely for morale purposes, and another to do it with one using 67% of it, leaving you only one single carrier to cover the South Pacific and Hawaii. Maybe King still takes the risk, and generations of historians marvel at the gamble. But it's hard to say. It's a different calculus.
Otherwise, the rest plays out as here: Nimitz still has Rochefort's codebreaking, still knows about MO and, yes, Midway, and he sends all three carriers to try to stop the IJN in the Coral Sea. If it works out, he could still do Midway, hopefully with similar results (though there are many butterflies here: does Halsey come down with his skin rash?). But most likely, Nimitz will by summer be too weak in carrier strength (figure he has to lose at least one deck, maybe even two, in these battles) for King to be willing to take the risk of launching WATCHTOWER, even with Wasp arriving. Which might butterfly the entire Solomons campaign away, leaving Nimitz to play defense until mid-1943, when he has enough firepower to start out his Road to Tokyo in the Gilberts. Which would mean that all the attrition of IJN naval air and surface combatants that happened in the Solomons would now happen some months later in the Gilberts and Marshalls, most likely.
This gets to the point a lot of us have been making - Nimitz's margin for error is a lot lower through 1942. Maybe Wasp stays in the Atlantic for awhile, maybe she doesn't but it still means that Nimitz has at most four decks assuming nobody gets damaged like Sara did in early 42 or simply needs a refit. Practically speaking Nimitz never had more than four decks available to him in 1942 but there was always the possibility of reinforcements (Sara in the yard, Wasp in the Atlantic) or the Japanese had taken a beating themselves.