Japanese Siberia

Any reminats of NTS or the white movement helping out? Denkin was trying to finance an army of liberation as late as 35.

Manchuria had a huge Russian emigre community, most of them Whites by orientation. The gangster methods of Japanese administration in Manchukuo alienated most of the Russians, but many still collaborated in the hope of overthrowing the USSR and returning to their homes. Chief among them a former Cossack Warlord, Ataman Semyonov, who apparently gathered 15,000 or so men ready to invade Siberia alongside the Japanese.

I guess Semyonov and the emigres would form an important part of Japan's hegemony in Siberia - which, I imagine, would look a bit like Manchukuo, but with a slightly bigger and more convincing native participation ("native" here meaning both White Russians and Buryats etc). But who knows. Interesting PoD, in any case.
 
With a Siberian puppet state, Japan's metal worries are over; and with northern Sakhalin, they'll get a bit of oil (and more, long-term, with the off-shore fields).
 
Manchuria had a huge Russian emigre community, most of them Whites by orientation. The gangster methods of Japanese administration in Manchukuo alienated most of the Russians, but many still collaborated in the hope of overthrowing the USSR and returning to their homes. Chief among them a former Cossack Warlord, Ataman Semyonov, who apparently gathered 15,000 or so men ready to invade Siberia alongside the Japanese.

I guess Semyonov and the emigres would form an important part of Japan's hegemony in Siberia - which, I imagine, would look a bit like Manchukuo, but with a slightly bigger and more convincing native participation ("native" here meaning both White Russians and Buryats etc). But who knows. Interesting PoD, in any case.
I agree. I see a simmlarity with Korea
 
Curious to see how the deep doctrinal changes needed for the IJA to carry this out happen, especially with no war in China.

Ask and ye shall receive...

[lightly edited from a couple of online source - not THAT much is changed ITTL]

For the IJA the Infantry Branch was the heart and soul of the force. Only the best officers were commissioned into the infantry. The bulk of the force structure remained predominantly infantry even as the army modernized in the 1920s and 1930s. In 1917, 68 percent of the force was infantry. Twenty years later, a square Japanese infantry division still counted about 48 percent infantry rifle strength (5600 out of 11,858), and its wartime rifle strength stood at 37 percent despite extensive augmentation of what we today term combat service and combat service support troops.

Anticipating a war against either China or the USSR, which was bound to take place over vast distances and stretch logistics to breaking point, the army created triangular divisions. These units were 43 percent infantry (3780 of 8871). Moreover, in the post–World War I military reductions between 1922 and 1925, the Japanese army opted for a large-scale reduction of artillery firepower, eliminating 115 artillery batteries in 1922 and twenty-four more in 1915. As one former Imperial Army staff officer and historian remarked, "Those thinking that the way to strengthen the division's fighting strength was by eliminating the field artillery brigade and independent mountain artillery regiment probably were influenced by the 1908 Infantry Manual." The doctrine espoused in that particular manual, weighted heavily on the intangible factors of infantry in battle, marked the beginning of a consistent theme in Japanese military thought that infantry, properly led and motivated, can overcome the material advantages of the foe. The Japanese army then was diverging from machine and firepower solutions to tactical problems. Men, not machines and firepower, win wars.

The introduction of the triangular division increased the overall number of infantry divisions available and allowed for a more aggressive us of available forces. Japanese planners envisioned the triangular division as having one sub-unit for a holding attack, one sub-unit for a flanking envelopment attack, and the last sub-unit as an exploitation force. Whereas the square division had focused on firepower the new triangular division fit the strategy of maneuvering quickly and destroying the enemy.


...

Primarily, the Imperial Army doctrine foresaw a war against the USSR on the plains of Manchuria. The previously mentioned 1938 manual emphasized morale factors and tenacity of the will and stressed training designed to develop the command ability to recognize opportunities for attack and make quick decisions. The wide-open plains of Manchuria offered Japanese officers opportunity to envelop open Soviet flanks, encircle formations, and destroy numerically and technologically superior forces. Japanese infantry always probed for an open flank to exploit. Since 1908 the traditional Imperial Army emphasis on highly motivated infantry conducting night attacks pressed home with the bayonet had never varied and had served as the basic tactical doctrine of the Japanese Army to counter the superior firepower of the Red Army. Training then emphasized the unique role of the infantryman. He was expected to be tough and resolute and to fight without elaborate combined arms support.

...

Tactics and tactical instruction—battle drills and so forth—are products of training designed to implement instinctive reaction. Command of large units cannot be accomplished by reflex. It requires years of education and experience to produce commanders capable of innovative thought and creativity on the battlefield. Yet in the IJA "the heart of the War College curriculum was tactics," although its mission was to prepare officers for high-level command. A typical class for the two-year course between 1915 and 1938, whose graduates became the World War II leaders, had about fifty officers. They were normally captains and majors who were eligible for selection after eight years' service, including at least two with a unit. Subject matter, for the most part, relied on rote memorization of facts, which similar to training, can produce narrow, if effective, specialists. Infantry branch officers accounted for at least half the enrolment and in the Twentieth Class for three-quarters of the student officers. Instructional materials in the 1930s included the superb tactical histories of the Russo-Japanese War, as the course concentrated on tactics. Students spent fewer hours on military history, studies and lectures on logistics, intelligence, airpower, and communications. After their two years of study they participated in a staff ride to the battlefields of the Russo-Japanese War in Manchuria and Korea, because these were the hypothetical battlegrounds of the next war.

Missing, however, was the dimension of a common education because of the conscious decision to limit special courses dealing with the operational level of war to a select ten officers annually. For them, Colonel Tani Hisao convened a special seminar using sensitive classified documents unavailable to other army officers let alone other War College students. Only a few War College faculty and students, for example, even knew that the compilation on the Russo-Japanese War titled Wartime Statistics existed for planning purposes. While the officially published version of the Russo-Japanese War stressed tactical fine points in illuminating detail, the crucial operational and administrative military history remained secret and hidden from most future staff officers. Thus most War College students argued tactics, and the ability to persevere in one's argument regardless of facts was highly valued. As one former instructor remembered, the ability, as the Japanese put it, to turn black into white was taken as a mark of confidence, because it displayed an officer's initiative and determination. Decibel levels became more important than knowledge in the classroom. Decisiveness and resolution were prized, perhaps because so much decision making in Japan requires a consensus that battlefield pressures did not permit.
 
That's.....a skewed doctrine to put it lightly.

True, mechanized and/or mobile infantry armed with bazookas, recoilless anti-tank rifles and machine guns can maul any opposing force. But that is only possible at close range!!! Without artillery and/or combined arms support all the elite infantry in the world will be killed before coming to engage the enemy!!!
 
Germany meanwhile, in keeping with its newfound Soviet friendship, strongly criticized the invasion, and Tokyo soon found it had had several freighters missing in waters where the German auxiliary cruiser Orion was operating. German military aid to Chiang-Kai Shek, having never really been halted, was massively stepped up, its cost factored into the existing Soviet-German trade agreement.

For the Chinese leader, now felt like the perfect time to bring the remaining warlords to heel, and, once that was accomplished, with the help of German and Soviet weapons and advisors, finally liberate Manchuria from the Japanese yoke.

Sino-German Cooperation would continue from 1938-1939 until the war in Europe breaks out. At that point, China would completed its three year industrial plans with Germany and completed its 60 division plan of German trained divisions. However, after September 1939, there is a complete halt to German trade and assistance to China because of the Allied blockade against Germany. There is no continued cooperation or trade.

The war in Europe probably disappoints Chiang in that further cooperation is prevented, but he wouldn't be interested in aligning his country completely with German interests. Instead, he now has to judge events according to what he sees are China's interests.

I can see Germany initially criticizing the invasion, but I don't see why Germany would not still attack the Soviets in 1941 like IOTL. It is an even better opportunity than OTL. If events arrive like IOTL, the Germans will be well pleased to invade the Soviets in 1941, and the Allies change their minds about Japan's adventure in Siberia completely.

So what about China?

Most likely Chiang takes the opportunity in 1940 to achieve his major goals with the Soviets in exchange for not entering the war against them. That means 1) kicking the Soviets out of Xinjiang, 2) abandoning the CCP to its fate, and 3) coming to some deal in regards to Outer Mongolia favorable to China. Chiang wouldn't risk going to actual war with the Soviets, but Stalin would likely be amenable to concessions to China as they don't threaten vital Soviet interests. Whatever Chiang can't get in 1940, he can probably get in 1941 once Germany attacks the Soviets.

In 1941, Chiang can probably get some good deals with the British and French in regards to their colonies and concessions in China. Most likely they agree to everything they did IOTL near the end of the war, and Chiang eliminates extra-territoriality and gets everything on the mainland. He may even get a good deal on Hong Kong.

I think only then will he consider going to war with Japan over Manchuria. But this would be a Japan allied with Germany, not against it. I don't think Chiang would risk an outright breach with Germany by going to war with their ally Japan at a time when Germany might win the war. Instead, Chiang might approach Germany to intervene on their behalf to work out a better deal for China with Japan in regards to Manchuria while Japan is engaged with the Soviets and really don't want a war with China.

Only when it appears the tide has turned against the Axis (or at least Japan) when a Chinese victory would be assured would Chiang risk going to war. Perhaps in a scenario where the US enters the war against the Axis, and China is able to approach the Anglo-Americans for a combined effort against Japan.

Result of the war is IOTL with complete defeat of the Axis. However, 1) the Soviets are much more weakened, 2) much of Central Europe not occupied by the Soviets because of that weakness, and 3) the Republic of China is extremely well positioned postwar.

I can tell this is not how Magnum will develop this timeline, but the above is a more realistic scenario IMHO. Good luck with your writing.
 
There are 2 problems here.

First off, you explain what happened, but basically handwaved how it happened.

Secondly, your changes basically improved logistics slightly without really addressing the issues that caused the losses to the Soviets in the border conflicts, and in some cases (the reduction of artillery being a prime example), actually making things worse.

I was looking for how exactly Japan decided to change their doctrine to a suitable combined arms doctrine that would allow this, including more arty and decent tanks. This wasn't it.
 
There are 2 problems here.

First off, you explain what happened, but basically handwaved how it happened.

Secondly, your changes basically improved logistics slightly without really addressing the issues that caused the losses to the Soviets in the border conflicts, and in some cases (the reduction of artillery being a prime example), actually making things worse.

I was looking for how exactly Japan decided to change their doctrine to a suitable combined arms doctrine that would allow this, including more arty and decent tanks. This wasn't it.
You wanna know the funny part? That paragraph is more or less OTL. The changes I made are basically cosmetic in nature. I placed it there more to provide context for what is to come (if I get off my lazy ass), which I haven't exactly decided upon yet.
 
You wanna know the funny part? That paragraph is more or less OTL. The changes I made are basically cosmetic in nature. I placed it there more to provide context for what is to come (if I get off my lazy ass), which I haven't exactly decided upon yet.

Well then, still looking forwards to how you manage to explain the hows and whys. :)
 
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