Obtaining and holding on to Sakhalin up to WW2 is doable enough. Beyond that, you'd need the Americans to get in there first at the end of WW2 to preempt the Soviet annexation, which is a pretty tall order.

To be fair, that could require the Soviets to be too exhausted to continue in WW2, to the point where the Soviets can't declare war on the Japanese later on, when they did.

Although, for the northern half... If the Soviets are less successful initially during the revolution, and the various bits of Russia continue to exist (continuing Far Eastern Republic), the Japanese might be willing to offer the Far Eastern Republic a bid to buy the northern half of the island, along with settling any other boundary issues (along the Korean border) in exchange for both monetary support and recognition. The deal could extend to other areas as well.

Or perhaps some timeline where China manage to maintain Sakhalin and the Japanese still engage in a war against China that results the Japanese winning and, instead of just Formosa, they claim Sakhalin as well? Or even have the original Russo-Japanese treaty about joint settlement sans actual delineation remain the treaty in force, instead of the Japanese trading away their claim to Sakhalin for the Kurils. Assuming everything remains the same, in a later Russo-Japanese war, they can claim that since they already possess half of the island de facto, the only way that any territorial claim could be resolved would be to claim the north. (along with at least half the Kurils).
 
I thought they were Ainu?

Sakhalin also has Oroks and Nivkhs among its indigenous population, beside the Ainu. It should be noted that there did live some Japanese, Manchus and Chinese too, but those were mostly people like fishermen and merchants who didn’t live there permanently. The Qing did also have few officials on the island from time to time, when it still officially belonged to China.

Obtaining and holding on to Sakhalin up to WW2 is doable enough. Beyond that, you'd need the Americans to get in there first at the end of WW2 to preempt the Soviet annexation, which is a pretty tall order.

This response assumes things go fairly similarly to IOTL until 1945:

After the Soviet Union joins the war against Japan, keeping the island Japanese would be highly difficult. From strategic perspective, controlling La Pérouse strait is very important from the naval perspective as it allows easy and safe movement of Soviet ships to Northern Pacific. The Island was also one of those places which fitted the description of places which Japan had taken “by violence and greed”, as specified in the Cairo Declaration, and thus the Soviet Union did have already a good case for their claim that the island belonged to them.

Interestingly though, keeping the Kurile Islands might have been possible (or at least the southernmost part of them, the area Japan calls Northern Territories), if the United States had taken greater interest in them earlier than it did IOTL. Unlike with Sakhalin, Japan had gained them through peaceful negotiations with the Russian Empire in 1855 (Northern Territories) and 1875 (rest of islands). This meant that unlike with other territories, the islands had to be mentioned separately from other territories Japan was to lose to the USSR in the Yalta Agreement, as they didn’t fit the description territories gained by “the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904.” Americans did come to regret this decision relatively quickly though but by then it was difficult to reverse.
 
If a Second Russo-Japanese War breaks out over Khalkin Gol or some such skirmish, Japan will lose Manchuria (and perhaps Korea too, if they are spectacularly unlucky) but has a good chance of gaining and holding all of Sakhalin. A poor exchange, but it does end with Japanese Sakhalin.
 
If a Second Russo-Japanese War breaks out over Khalkin Gol or some such skirmish, Japan will lose Manchuria (and perhaps Korea too, if they are spectacularly unlucky) but has a good chance of gaining and holding all of Sakhalin. A poor exchange, but it does end with Japanese Sakhalin.

Losing Manchuria and Korea would have broken Japan's militarist streak handily, and put an end to their Chinese adventurers. Without both, there's a good chance Japan would stay out of WWII (or join the Allies, for whatever reason) and hold on to Sakhalin.
 
my scenario is Japan tries to hold island empire and Korea but it has been pointed out (or posed) several times even if they were more successful in exploiting those areas they would still pursue China ... their undoing.

(possibly they get a little further along on synthetic oil production and the coal on Sakhalin viewed as more valuable? precluding advancing further than Manchuria)
 
There was a timeline a few years ago where the Soviets won the battle of Warsaw. This set off several butterflies including the British unofficially agreeing that the Germans could rearm to certain limits as a way to stop the Soviet advancement. The Soviets did attack the Free City of Danzig and then invade Germany. The Germans defeated the invasion but then there was the Bavarian uprising.

One aspect of the timeline was Britain was negotiating with the Japanese to help block Soviet aggression. When the timeline died, the Japanese were planning to make sure they were compensated for their efforts. I have always assumed that they would demand control of the Far Eastern Republic, all of Sakhalin, the Kamchatka Peninsula and maybe other territory. I assumed that Britain would also provide them with surplus weapons, supplies, and maybe loans.
 
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Beyond that, you'd need the Americans to get in there first at the end of WW2 to preempt the Soviet annexation, which is a pretty tall order.
Might the Soviets try to set up a communist "North Japan" in Sakhalin/Karafuto plus maybe Hokkaido? As an alternative to direct annexation.
 
Might the Soviets try to set up a communist "North Japan" in Sakhalin/Karafuto plus maybe Hokkaido? As an alternative to direct annexation.

Maybe, but they always wanted to take the island as their own. Maybe they attach an Ainu autonomous region to North Japan?
 
Japan takes northern Sakhalin during the Russian Civil War, remains quasi-democratic, never invades Manchuria (maybe China remains strong or something), stays neutral during WW2 initially and then joins the Allies later on.

Hey presto, Japanese Sakhalin!
 
Losing Manchuria and Korea

They'd definitely lose Manchuria. Given the Soviet Union's relative military ineptitude after the Great Purge (read: Winter War), however, I'm not convinced that the Soviets could have conquered a region the size of western Europe and taken Japan's strongest foothold on the Asian continent (a country far more powerful than Finland).

But I agree, it would massively discredit elements of Japan's militarist faction. The IJA, definitely. You might see a massive boost in influence for the IJN, however, which could lead to more friction with the western powers. Then again, without support in Tokyo for Chinese adventures, there is no need for the embargo on Japan.
 
Losing Manchuria and Korea would have broken Japan's militarist streak handily, and put an end to their Chinese adventurers. Without both, there's a good chance Japan would stay out of WWII (or join the Allies, for whatever reason) and hold on to Sakhalin.

Anything which breaks the Kwantung Army is probably beneficial to Japan in a longer term. The Second Russo-Japanese War wouldn't remove all nationalist and militarist influences in the Japanese society at the time, but it would certainly remove one big troublemaker from the equation and give the government at least some more freedom to maneuver. Without the Chinese adventure, the reason why Indochina was occupied is also removed and that in turn also takes away the justification for the invasion of SE Asia. I would also assume that the United States attitude towards Japan might change as the country wouldn't seem as much a threat anymore. It is of course possible that nationalist circles would come up some new idea and Japan still joined the WW2 as an Axis power, but likeliness of that seems lower here.

They'd definitely lose Manchuria. Given the Soviet Union's relative military ineptitude after the Great Purge (read: Winter War), however, I'm not convinced that the Soviets could have conquered a region the size of western Europe and taken Japan's strongest foothold on the Asian continent (a country far more powerful than Finland).

The Winter War and the hypothetical Second Soviet-Japanese War can’t be directly compared though. There were a certain set of circumstances in the Winter War which would have caused challenges for the Red Army even without purges, a rather significant one being that the Winter War wasn’t supposed to be an actual war but a relatively swift occupation supported by Finnish workers. That wouldn’t be a mistake what the Soviets wouldn't do against Japan.
 
The Winter War and the hypothetical Second Soviet-Japanese War can’t be directly compared though. There were a certain set of circumstances in the Winter War which would have caused challenges for the Red Army even without purges, a rather significant one being that the Winter War wasn’t supposed to be an actual war but a relatively swift occupation supported by Finnish workers. That wouldn’t be a mistake what the Soviets wouldn't do against Japan.

Quite. Nevertheless, I sincerely doubt the USSR's ability to penetrate into Korea, given its mountainous terrain and presumably fanatical resistance from its Japanese defenders. I would also mention that a Second Russo-Japanese War in 1938-9 wouldn't be the sweeping Soviet success seen in the 1945 Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation, and the Kwantung Army would probably fight significant delaying battles around Harbin and other choke-points on the various Manchurian railways and roads.
 
why did Japan leave the northern part of Sakhalin in 1925? domestic problems after their foray in Siberia? (and of course they didn't know some of resources existed there)
It well, investigators found that Karafuto in general was of little use, so why would land further north be any good? Plus they would need to get a government to agree to the annexation, if only for forms sake. I believe that at first they liked to prop up the Far Eastern Republic, as it gave them a large sattelite state, bit it fell out of their grasp.
 

Zachariah

Banned
It well, investigators found that Karafuto in general was of little use, so why would land further north be any good? Plus they would need to get a government to agree to the annexation, if only for forms sake. I believe that at first they liked to prop up the Far Eastern Republic, as it gave them a large sattelite state, bit it fell out of their grasp.
I think that you lot might find this article, about the historical context of the relationship and resource-sharing agreement, between Japan and the Soviet Union up in Sakhalin prior to WW2, quite intriguing. BTW, for the bit where it says about "Sakhalinneft's oil production kept growing thereafter, as illustrated by the table below", the table's missing. But the overwhelming majority of the oil on the island was in the northern Sakhalinneft oil fields; these had only been developed in the first place thanks to a loan which was granted to the Soviet Union by the Japanese, with the mutual agreement that the loan would be repaid in the form of supplies of Sakhalinneft-produced oil for the Japanese Naval Ministry. But due to mounting tensions between the USSR and Japan, culminating in armed clashes outside Lake Khasan, the Soviets had curtailed oil exports to Japan by 1937. And by 1940, only 3yrs later, 12-13yrs after the exploitation of these oil fields in northern Sakhalin began, Sakhalin's yearly oil production was listed as 4 million barrels a year- for comparison, in 1940, the entire Empire of Japan's oil production was cited as only 2.5 million barrels. In taking northern Karafuto (with the best time to do so having been back in July 1920, when Japanese troops occupied Northern Sakhalin- with the Japanese refusing to withdraw its troops from Northern Sakhalin after being failing to get the concession that the production of Sakhalin oil be granted to it, and annexing the territory instead), the Japanese Empire's oil production would have been almost trebled relative to OTL. How could northern Karafuto have possibly been any more useful?
 
I think that you lot might find this article, about the historical context of the relationship and resource-sharing agreement, between Japan and the Soviet Union up in Sakhalin prior to WW2, quite intriguing. BTW, for the bit where it says about "Sakhalinneft's oil production kept growing thereafter, as illustrated by the table below", the table's missing. But the overwhelming majority of the oil on the island was in the northern Sakhalinneft oil fields; these had only been developed in the first place thanks to a loan which was granted to the Soviet Union by the Japanese, with the mutual agreement that the loan would be repaid in the form of supplies of Sakhalinneft-produced oil for the Japanese Naval Ministry. But due to mounting tensions between the USSR and Japan, culminating in armed clashes outside Lake Khasan, the Soviets had curtailed oil exports to Japan by 1937. And by 1940, only 3yrs later, 12-13yrs after the exploitation of these oil fields in northern Sakhalin began, Sakhalin's yearly oil production was listed as 4 million barrels a year- for comparison, in 1940, the entire Empire of Japan's oil production was cited as only 2.5 million barrels. In taking northern Karafuto (with the best time to do so having been back in July 1920, when Japanese troops occupied Northern Sakhalin- with the Japanese refusing to withdraw its troops from Northern Sakhalin after being failing to get the concession that the production of Sakhalin oil be granted to it, and annexing the territory instead), the Japanese Empire's oil production would have been almost trebled relative to OTL. How could northern Karafuto have possibly been any more useful?

They're still going to need a lot more than that, though. This was from the article itself.

Although Sakhalin oil was important to Japan, its share in the Japanese import was nothing much. Petroleum products output was next to nothing: in April through June 1939, and over the first quarter of the 1939-1940 business year, the Okha refinery processed a mere 200 tons of crude oil into 117.2 tons of fuel oil, 55.2 tons of diesel fuel and 24.3 tons of motor lubes.

Japan imported most of its oil and petroleum products, aviation fuel in particular, from the United States.

Sakhalin oil could migitate the shortages to an extent, but ultimately, the Japanese still need way more.
 

Zachariah

Banned
They're still going to need a lot more than that, though. This was from the article itself.

Sakhalin oil could migitate the shortages to an extent, but ultimately, the Japanese still need way more.

That excerpt from the article itself related to the amount of oil which Japan was getting from its own oilfields in southern Sakhalin though, which were the only ones which it still had access to after 1937. Japan's smaller oilfields on the southern half of the island were a bust, and ran out extremely quickly, with its own oil production from Sakhalin taking a nose dive- the Sakhalinneft's oil fields in northern Sakhalin, on the other hand, were where all of the major oil deposits really turned out to be, with oil production from them ramping up, and by 1940, this production had increased to 4 million barrels a year. Southern Sakhalin/Karafuto was practically worthless without Northern Sakhalin- but combined, the island as a whole, and its oil production would have been far, far more valuable to the Imperial Japanese. Of course, the Japanese would still need more regardless- but the difference between supply and demand wouldn't have been nearly as bad as it was for them IOTL.
 
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