Japanese naval decisions in the 1930's

I am aware fo the Japanese culturale background and understand it is one of highly honored motives nomrally, but suicide is not one of the most important ones. Though suicide does occur in Japanese history more than once, it never was done at the start of a conflict, but only in desperation, just to save others of their people. For that reason the idea of Kamilaze at the start of a war makes no sense at all and is in direct conflict of the japanese as a people. Japanese Law would intevene in the millitary and the ones responsible for the creation of a Kamikaze unit would be expelled, or worse, being not honorable and opposed to Japanese interests.

So the IJN is so desperate that it should be considering blowing up its own oil reserves to avoid war, but at the same time is not desperate enough to introduce the tactics necessary to give a short war any chance at all....
 
I am not quite sure how you train a pilot to crash into a ship accurately, and have them survive, or how you land an Okha even if you had one in 41. The trainers are essentially unpowered gliders with very different characteristics than a rocket powered machine.

Oh and for an Okha powered you have a 23 nm range so need a carrier a/c to get to the target (or you are basically within gun range of the USN) Never seen an Okha carried except by a Betty and good luck in getting one of them on a CV and back.

There is no point in having kamikaze on carriers, it just takes up space for a one shot weapon, and one with limited AP capability. Once you have the hard part, the carrier landing and oversea navigation trained adding in bombing is a minor consideration really. And carrier training for the US cost more crews than combat (nearly double). No real advantage over a trained crew either. Once you get past the longer range AA and fighter cover weapon release for a bomb or torp is generally outside 1940-43 AA range (hence the 40mm refits) carrying on to crash actually puts the weapon in more danger of being hit by then current light AA as there is a vulnerable guidance system on a kamikaze.

Tactically such an air group both diminishes the strike power of the IJN carrier air group AND makes that power entirely dependent on achieving a first strike or surviving an enemy first strike. Too much investment in training and kit for that to be viable. It’s a land based weapon of desperation not a magic way to get a PGM in service in the 40’s.

In 200 – 250 hours you can train a pilot to be an effective newly qualified dive bomber of torpedo bomber pilot. After that all you need is another 200 hours on type to be really effective.

All the other air forces did that and that doubles the potential size of the aircrew pool at wars start. and increases throughput during the war. Though I get the impression that training for IJN pilots was even more in squadron service than in other air forces, just an impression.

I would slightly disagree with Warspite on the suicidalness of the IJN. They did open several wars with only nominally survivable attacks, including PH if the aircrew views prior to the attack are considered. As did most other armed forces in fact, but this is not the same as a deliberate peace trained suicide air wings as part of a general policy introduced before hostilities, that requires desperation.
 
So the IJN is so desperate that it should be considering blowing up its own oil reserves to avoid war, but at the same time is not desperate enough to introduce the tactics necessary to give a short war any chance at all....

First of all: suicidal attacks are not a tactic to start with, unless the ones doing so are brainwashed, or psychopatic at least. As far as known, only terrorists have done so on a large scale, at least when starting a conflict.

The basical point is that waisting valuable resources at the start of a conflict is equal to surrendering yourself, as it denies you to fight with those resources another time, due to its waist. If you throw away your weapons, you are defenceless.

Secondly, the operational difficulties might cause the mission to fail in its objective, resulting in yourself being disarmed, as your weapons have been expanded, while a very angry opponent still has strength to fight you. Throwing away your fightingpower is a bad choice to start with, if the intention is to fight succesfully.

Thirdly, the Japanese millitary would strongly object to suicidal attacks, as these were simply seen as not honorable for an offensive purpose. Even in the OTL in 1944, when the first Kamikaze attacks took place, the Imperial command opposed to the tactic as it was a waist of both expensive pilots and aircraft, both in short supply already. The tide turned more positive for the Kamikaze, once the Philippines were about to be lost and Japan itself came under constant attack, threatening the civillian population and especially the life of the Emperor. This sort of desperation was the base for a general accepted Suicidal tactic for the Armed forces. Anything less was not.
 
I am not quite sure how you train a pilot to crash into a ship accurately, and have them survive, or how you land an Okha even if you had one in 41. The trainers are essentially unpowered gliders with very different characteristics than a rocket powered machine.

Towed targets at an altitude sufficient to make a simulated attack seems an obvious answer. Just have to be careful to have a training model that mimics sea-level performance at training level, and that would take a year or more's development. (The historical program was a crash program, so was implemented inefficiently. It would have been even more formidable if the IJN had 10 years tinkering to perfect its doctrine).

Oh and for an Okha powered you have a 23 nm range so need a carrier a/c to get to the target (or you are basically within gun range of the USN) Never seen an Okha carried except by a Betty and good luck in getting one of them on a CV and back.

Okha was a land based system deployed by twin engine bomber and by surface or ship-borne catapult. It had nothing to do with carriers. Okha in the fleet would presumably be something along the lines of a ship-borne Okha battery in place of a main turret or two.

There is no point in having kamikaze on carriers, it just takes up space for a one shot weapon, and one with limited AP capability.

Doctrinally, you take out the US CV's with kamikazes with the first strike, preferably while staying outside the strike range of the US fleet. (Don't forget, with kamikazes, you can strike from outside 300nm). Then move in and wipe up with the conventional forces. Instead of your conventional forces being chopped up by USN fighter defences, they have a free ride.

So, the implications to Kido Butai in terms of operational doctrine is two-fold. First, a small deck park (8 to 12 aircraft) would be routine. Second, long range scouting to 400nm would be necessary to properly employ the kamikaze element.

Tactically such an air group both diminishes the strike power of the IJN carrier air group AND makes that power entirely dependent on achieving a first strike or surviving an enemy first strike.

A kamikaze element would pretty much about double or triple the hitting power of Kido Butai. First, the planes themselves by hitting harder plane for plane than a regular strike. Second, by eliminating USN fighter defences prior to the main engagement, by allowing the conventional IJN carrier forces to attack surviving forces facing only AA.

Too much investment in training and kit for that to be viable. It’s a land based weapon of desperation not a magic way to get a PGM in service in the 40’s.

A land based Betty/Okha system would have been absolutely formidable in 1941. Bloody terrifying, frankly. Carrier based kamikazes would be less stark in their operational advantages over that combination. But with proper doctrine the IJN could contemplate the elimination of US carrier forces in open battle without taking simliar damage in return.
 
Some really good points have been made already...

Let's face it; unless it's a _very_ short war Japan will lose. And no guarantee for winning a short war either. The best things I can come up with are:

1) Japan needs a bigger merchant fleet, period.
2) More pilots, the bar is going to have to come down.
3) More DD's; again, the Fubuki's are nice but a "Matsu" type needs to be built earlier for the numbers needed.
4) No "Yamato's", more carriers (and the pilots and planes they need).
5) I like the idea of converting the old CL's to CLAA's and Torpedo Cruisers, do this.
6) A bigger and better sub force that goes after merchants as well as warships would certainly help.
7) A better ASW program.
8) I also like the idea of a Convoy Management group to avoid empty ships and wasted trips.

Of course the best thing would be to either keep the IJA out of China or (failing that) try and get them out fast to avoid US embargos. Yeah, good luck on that...
 
Some really good points have been made already...

Let's face it; unless it's a _very_ short war Japan will lose. And no guarantee for winning a short war either. The best things I can come up with are:

1) Japan needs a bigger merchant fleet, period.
2) More pilots, the bar is going to have to come down.
3) More DD's; again, the Fubuki's are nice but a "Matsu" type needs to be built earlier for the numbers needed.
4) No "Yamato's", more carriers (and the pilots and planes they need).
5) I like the idea of converting the old CL's to CLAA's and Torpedo Cruisers, do this.
6) A bigger and better sub force that goes after merchants as well as warships would certainly help.
7) A better ASW program.
8) I also like the idea of a Convoy Management group to avoid empty ships and wasted trips.

Of course the best thing would be to either keep the IJA out of China or (failing that) try and get them out fast to avoid US embargos. Yeah, good luck on that...

This is all pretty much reorganisations to fight a long term conflict in what must be a short war. The object is to come out of the gate with such force that the US panics and makes peace out of fear of the consequences to not doing so. Hawaii has to fall quickly and FDR has to sweat that California could be next. It literally has to be an offensive with that much power.
 
To win, the Japanese must walk a tightrope: They must accomplish thier objectives without pissing off OR frightening the U.S.

I would suggest a tactical/strategic plan that
a. Do not declare war on the U.S., only Britain and Holland.
b. Ignore any American units that do not interfere with Japanese efforts to secure Malaysia, Singapore, and the DEI.
c. Destroy any units that do interfere, and the bases they sortie from.
d. Don't invade PI, Guam, Wake, do not attack them first, and absolutely do not attack Hawaii. Also, don't attack Australia.
e. After accomplishing thier objectives, call for peace. Be generous: Offer to give Singapore back to Britain.

Japan can't win a war with the U.S. if the American people decide they want to fight. Attacking Pearl Harbor gave the Japanese a tactical victory and a strategic disaster. Let the Americans strike the first blow, play the victim, play the propaganda game making the Americans look like bullies, much like the North Vietnamese did a generation later.
 
To win, the Japanese must walk a tightrope: They must accomplish thier objectives without pissing off OR frightening the U.S.

I would suggest a tactical/strategic plan that
a. Do not declare war on the U.S., only Britain and Holland.
Some people say that might drag the US in, others say it was not. What is certain is that such a sudden and drastic turn of events would be shocking enough to weaken isolationist sentiment.
b. Ignore any American units that do not interfere with Japanese efforts to secure Malaysia, Singapore, and the DEI.
c. Destroy any units that do interfere, and the bases they sortie from.
d. Don't invade PI, Guam, Wake, do not attack them first, and absolutely do not attack Hawaii. Also, don't attack Australia.
You know, the Philippines and Guam may have fallen quickly but don't you think extreme aggression, terrible treatment and of British and Australian prisoners, interference with US commerce in the area and a huge military presence would lead to strengthening of US defenses? If the Japanese cannot take the Philippines from the US, what then?
e. After accomplishing their objectives, call for peace. Be generous: Offer to give Singapore back to Britain.
I suppose if Britain were sufficiently desperate and Japan wanted to leave the area altogether but I cannot easily imagine the British agreeing to such a humiliating offer.
Japan can't win a war with the U.S. if the American people decide they want to fight. Attacking Pearl Harbor gave the Japanese a tactical victory and a strategic disaster. Let the Americans strike the first blow, play the victim, play the propaganda game making the Americans look like bullies, much like the North Vietnamese did a generation later.
On the one hand I agree with you that the propaganda potential diminishes without such a direct attack on the US but I do think there are other possiblities to consider which (by this point) make it possible for the US to avoid playing the bully. If Japan undertook a highly aggressive attack on European colonies (combined with uncommon brutality toward prisoners) in addition to the war with China, it could then be possible to sufficiently vilify them on the basis that they had insidious plans not only to enslave Asia but to eventually attack the US itself. Nevertheless, I am inclined to agree that no pearl harbor would probably have made things easier for the Japanese.
 
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Towed targets at an altitude do not include low level wind and ground effect. They are also not moving at 30 kt and maneuvering evasively, they are technically called kites and blow round in the wind. This is not training its flying kites.
Actual training was "incredibly strenuous training, coupled with cruel and torturous corporal punishment as a daily routine." Irokawa Daikichi, who trained at Tsuchiura Naval Air Base, recalled that he "was struck on the face so hard and frequently that [his] face was no longer recognizable." He also wrote: "I was hit so hard that I could no longer see and fell on the floor. The minute I got up, I was hit again by a club so that I would confess." This brutal "training" was justified by the idea that it would instill a "soldier's fighting spirit." However, daily beatings and corporal punishment would eliminate patriotism among many pilots.’’
No sub launched Okha are recorded as built much less used its vapourware not a kewl SSM.
Swapping out a main battery or two for a one shot weapon does not on the face of it seem to be a good idea in 1936-41. It’s a pretty dodgy idea up to the late 70's.

But I suppose the crew would be motivated by the sight of ‘Everybody was looking down and tottering. Some were unable to stand up and were carried and pushed into the plane by maintenance soldiers’ maybe not – quote is from the Yomiuri Shimbun, not known for be apologetic about wartime Japan.


Sorry just having a problem knowing how the IJN finds the target at 300nm and maintains guidance on a moving target or no, the kamikaze scout plane will get to extreme range call in the attack, keep contact for a couple hours without being seen and provide mid course correction to the Kingfish, whoops Kamikaze and then heroicially shout Banzai (or Hissaku or oh fuck)and sink another cowardly American.

The IJN actually had no real issue in sinking US carriers early in the war. Of course that was with living aircrew who could repeat strikes.

If you Deck park on an IJN carrier you can’t launch the kind of strike you need which worked very well btw. Basically the Kates cant take off and the Vals have a problem unless you flush the Kamikaze. Of course if you happen to get attacked first then you have either a set of corroding planes on deck delaying any CAP launch or a fully fuelled and bombed up set of corroding planes on deck.

The planes don’t hit harder. They will hit above the waterline (unlike torps) or without the acceleration of a free fall bomb. The only way you will exceed the velocity of a dive bomb is with a rocket assisted terminal dive. None of which exist til 1944, anywhere.

And when built they had a range of of 23 miles. A standard Kamikaze (i.e. a plane with a bomb load) would nowhere approach that velocity and have very limited penetration power, and be much more likely to be shot down.

Actual performance is 3,900 a/c expended (4,500 produced in 41) for:
three escort carriers, 14 destroyers three high-speed transport ships,five Landing Ship, Tank,four Landing Ship Medium, three Landing Ship Medium (Rocket, one auxiliary tanker, three Canadian Victory ships, three Liberty ships, two high-speed minesweepers, one Auk class minesweeper, one submarine chaser, two PT boats, two Landing Craft Support

As opposed to actual 1942 US losses of 4 CV, I will stop there but the rest is (5 CA, 2CL,25DD, 6 ML, 4 Gunboats, A seaplane tender, 7 PT ,5 tugs, 3 tankers, 10 troop transports, 16 district patrol craft, rather a lot of other patrol craft, 10 misc auxiliaries and a couple of BB.)

The IJN actually managed to destroy most of the US carrier force anyway. It really does not matter how. Except the Japanese.

Oh and as to the Japanese view of Kamikaze.

I cannot predict the outcome of the air battles, but you will be making a mistake if you should regard Special Attack operations as normal methods. The right way is to attack the enemy with skill and return to the base with good results. A plane should be utilized over and over again. That’s the way to fight a war. The current thinking is skewed. Otherwise, you cannot expect to improve air power. There will be no progress if flyers continue to die.
—Lieutenant Commander Iwatani, Taiyo (Ocean) magazine, March 1945

Or in the words of the first special attack formation commander, ‘please do not appoint me to this post.’

Or
A kamikaze is a surprise attack, according to our ancient war tactics. Surprise attacks will be successful the first time, maybe two or three times. But what fool would continue the same attacks for ten months? Emperor Hirohito must have realized it. He should have said 'Stop.'
"Even now, many faces of my students come up when I close my eyes. So many students are gone. Why did headquarters continue such silly attacks for ten months! Fools! Genda, who went to America — all those men lied that all men volunteered for kamikaze units. They lied."
Saburo Sakai
 
Shadow Hawk said:
Do not declare war on the U.S., only Britain and Holland.
That requires two things to be true in Japan, neither likely. Either
  1. IJN has to be convinced the U.S. & Britain are not inseparable, & therefore it's essential to attack; or,
  2. IJN has to be convinced IJA will not get a growing share of the Japanese military budget, at IJN expense.
Achieve those two things, short of ASBs, you can try the "no U.S. strategy".

You then face FDR trying to provoke an incident which will allow him to impose a blockade on Japan, in aid of China, while at the same time trying to send Lend-Lease to Britain under escort while not looking like a belligerent to Japan.:rolleyes: And Germany, too--tho that's good for FDR.;)

My money's on Tojo losing patience first.:rolleyes: Then we're back to OTL, only a bit later... That delay is very unlikely to be good for Japan.:eek:
 

katchen

Banned
One thing that the Japanese did not take into account was the possibility of an Arctic strategy. By 1931, the Japanese knew because of the Russians that the Northern Sea Route was feasible. If they had been thinking "outside the box" they should have been quietly, if not secretly, been building a few icebreakers and reinforcing their main battle fleet to withstand sea ice. They could train secretly in the Antarctic, perhaps building an Antarctica scientific outpost, as many nations were doing at the time, as cover for this.
Secondly, the Japanese should have worked on special forces units and tactics. They had ninjitsu as a base from which to build from.
Thirdly, they should not be afraid to use poison gas strictly as a naval weapon.
If the Japanese engaged in these three innovations, they would have been in a position in the summer of 1940 to move two carrier groups through the Northern Sea Route, which would only take 2 weeks. The Japanese would want to stay far enough north to stay out of sight of land or Soviet shipping. All of this would depend on the weather and whether or not the weather kept the ice thin enough by September 1940 for Japan to pull this off, which it could reconnoiter via submarine and possibly zeppelin, if Japan also bought part or all of the zeppelin fleet Germany grounded. By doing this, Japan would be in position in September 1940 to launch a surprise attack on the main Royal Navy base at Scapa Flow and sink or perhaps even commandeer British battleships and especially carriers. At the same time, the Japanese could be hammering RAF bases in a way that the Luftwaffe could not because of the limited range of German fighters and bombers. By doing this, the Japanese could make Operation Sea Lion feasible and help the Nazis knock the British out of the war. The Japanese could then safely take over French, Dutch and now Nazi occupied British colonies in Asia. And this, during an election campaign in the US. If the Japanese held the formerly British, Dutch and French colonies by November 1940, it is doubtful that either Roosevelt or Wilkie, if Wilkie won, would be able to sell a war to move Japan to the American People. Or for that matter, sell the American People on a war against Nazi Germany.
 

sharlin

Banned

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This is all pretty much reorganisations to fight a long term conflict in what must be a short war. The object is to come out of the gate with such force that the US panics and makes peace out of fear of the consequences to not doing so. Hawaii has to fall quickly and FDR has to sweat that California could be next. It literally has to be an offensive with that much power.

Yes and no. Yes, these are all useful long-term items. But remember, Japan is trying to gobble up a _lot_ of territory fast. That needs a large strike force to hit all these areas. And enough merchant capacity to keep them supplied.
 
Yes and no. Yes, these are all useful long-term items. But remember, Japan is trying to gobble up a _lot_ of territory fast. That needs a large strike force to hit all these areas. And enough merchant capacity to keep them supplied.

No, by saying these are useful ‘long term’ items, we’re completely missing the point to what the kamikazes are intended to do, strategically. Japan, by doing what you say, will automatically lose the war because any ‘long term’ war objective is part of a war the US must win.

What you are saying of my alterations is certainly true in the war Japan historically wanted to fight and then went ahead and fought, but it is not applicable in the scenario we're looking for and the one my force structure is designed to fight This thread is the strategic equivalent of a chicken running around with its head cut off; a bunch of disjointed suggestions with no coherent purpose beyond Japan taking a longer time to lose the war. Improved ASW is a classic example of this type of broken thinking. Since ASW is only a factor in a long war, and a long war is one Japan must lose, I fail to see what possible point there was for Japan in it.

What we want is a war strategy against the United States where the Japanese either has at least a small chance of winning, or avoiding a defeat. By applying the historical Japanese war objectives as an apriori condition to eliminate potential ahistorical war strategies (which is what you are doing), either consciously or unconsciously the poster is seeking to structure the conclusion towards the historical strategy being the optimal one. But it was not. The optimal US war strategy was so different from, and so incoherent with the historical strategy, that there simply was no chance the Japanese would have adapted it. This discussion is purely theoretical; not in any way whatever practical.

The Japanese went to war to secure the oil resources of the NEI. Here’s the incoherent part; the resources of the NEI were meaningless in the question of a successful Japanese war against the United States. This is because the NEI plays as a factor only in a long war, and in a long war, Japan MUST be utterly defeated. By committing themselves to take the NEI immediately, the Japanese doomed themselves by throwing away any chance of a short war. This is apparent to us now, but was not apparent to them then.

The moment the Japanese were at war with the United States the NEI no longer mattered to the outcome; either Japan achieves peace within a year or a year and a half, or Japan will lose the war. That is the ice-cold logic of the situation, the obverse conclusion to the oft-mentioned declaration on the internet that the US industrial advantage made the outcome of a long war inevitable. Well, yes it did, and because it did, the oil resources and for that matter the whole of Indonesia were irrelevant to the question of victory and defeat in a Japanese-American war.

The moment the United States entered the war the Japanese the Japanese must ignore the NEI and attack the United States. Incoherent yes, but that was the logic to the strategic calculus. (That strategy and objective were mutually exclusive is the hint that the decision for war in 1941 by Japan was fundamentally irrational).
We’re looking for Japan’s theoretical shot. My opinion is that the Japanese had to neutralize the US industrial advantage by rapidly imposing a strategic situation outside the United States’ ability control, such that Washington itself viewed an immediate settlement as more acceptable to the interests of the United States than risking the continuation of the war with Japan . That is to say, to cause Washington to view the short term situation as so potentially dire that their long term advantage in industrial production would be dismissed as irrelevant by Washington itself , because the advantage to settling with Japan immediately avoided potential consequences that could arise from a long war. The only conceivable way to do that would be to put Japan in the sole position of deciding whether Germany wins or loses the war in Europe, then achieve peace with the US by Japan’s deciding against Germany.

ASB or not, impossible or not, stupid or not, incredulous or not, those were the criteria Japan had to create in order to have any chance at all of a short war with the US. Working from them – and completely ignoring historical Japanese strategy or rational decisions based on the objective of securing the now irrelevant NEI, a bizarre list of requirements makes itself evident:

1. Japan must pose a direct military threat to the continental United States, preferably to both coasts simultaneously.
2. There must be the IMMEDIATE prospect of a German victory in Europe. This point is absolutely crucial, for only the prospect of a German victory in Europe gives the US the incentive to make peace with Japan in the Pacific. (Note that, bizarrely, this means Japan must withdraw a large number of divisions from China in order to attack the Soviet Union as well as the United States).
3. The Japanese must either eliminate or be in a position to eliminate, the strategic oil reserve in California, (which I believe was about 44 million tons and the loss of which would have been a total and unrecoverable disaster to the USN’s plans to fight Japan in WW2).
4. If 2 and 3 fail to achieve a settlement, the potential to disrupt the 1944 USN fleet construction program.
5. Japan must go to war with Germany as a part of the peace settlement.
6. Japan needs to be at peace with Great Britain throughout the war with the US, in order for the British to ‘broker’ 5 above.

This list is paradoxical to Japanese war aims. All that is irrelevant. I suggested the following –

1. An all-volunteer Thunder Gods Corps created in peacetime, deployed as Okha, Kaiten, and Kamikaze units on carriers, surface ships, land based air forces and submarines. Given Japan’s technical capacity in the 1930’s, this should have been possible.
2. A larger merchant fleet, with coal fired ships and older vessels bought from around the world in the 1930’s. Call it 2 million tons of coal fired, 6 million tons of oil fired.
3. An elite and well equipped amphibious warfare force of 4-6 divisions.
4. Battleships; (4) Hiei Class converted to carriers prior to the war (72 aircraft, like Akagi) and battleships (6) converted to specialist amphibious warfare assault ships.

All of this would be intended for Japan to immediately come across the Pacific at the start of the war and eliminate the US fleet’s ability to operate anywhere in the Pacific Ocean basin. The 2 million tons of coal fired merchant ships is crucial to allows the 6 million tons of oil fired merchant ships to be devoted exclusively to military purposes– Japan will need all of it for the logistics of a trans-Pacific campaign. The coal fired fleet allows the six million tons strategic oil reserve to be used in the first year and a half purely on military campaigns; everything staked one roll of the dice. The amphibious warfare force is necessary to quickly take Hawaii, and Hawaii is necessary to eliminate the oil reserve in California, and/or land in Panama and destroy the Panama canal. The extra carriers are there to allow large numbers of kamikazes to be carried, and to form an attritional reserve for the carrier force. Integrating kamikazes with conventional forces would be absolutely vital to achieving the tactical domination necessary to drive the US fleet from the Pacific Ocean basin. It would have been impossible otherwise.

If this didn't work - and chances are it wouldn't - the Japanese oil reserve would become exhausted, the Soviet Union would defeat Japan in Manchuria, and the Japanese war effort would collapse. ie, the conditions necessary to allow the Emperor to demand Japan accept unconditional surrender in 1943.
 
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