Japanese join the Germans

You'd need a completely different set of Axis priorities from the start, as the necessary prerequisite to that scenario is Axis control of the Mediterranian (or at the very least Malta, Cyprus, and Suez). You'd need larger and fitter German and Italian navies, which necessitate either an earlier focus on said navies or a later war. Of course, the latter option favors the Allies, and especially the Soviets, since a Mediterranian strategy virtually guarantees a delayed Barbarossa.
 
Suppose that the German invasion of the Netherlands had been paired with a Japanese intervention into the Dutch East Indies?
 
You would indeed need a different set of Axis priorities, but that's probably a good thing for them. But sending a mere 4 mobile divisions to Africa (the maximum which could be maintained) in September 1940 couldn't affect Barbarossa any worse then sending 2 Pz divs in Feb 1941 (OTL), indeed in those intervening months the Suez Canal could well be captured. Nor would sending forces to Africa in September damage the Blitz and Uboat happy time which limits Britain's ability to do anything about Rommel.

Expanding the sideshows to effect a linkup should provide more benefit to the greater Axis cause than any loss to an individual campaign the members were conducting.
 
Tangentially, this thread makes me want to do a TL where a secret deal with Germany has Japan and the USSR left out of WWII with Japan fighting the Soviets (with secret agreement that the Germans will keep America occupied).

Japan still gets creamed and without fighting two enemies simultaneous the US would probably help compensate partially for the lack of the Eastern Front chewing up Germans.

Still, it'd probably be a much longer and bloodier war in Europe (until insane Hitler bolstered by his success in Europe launches a sneak attack on the Soviets, with the Japanese, out of individual pride rather than forethought against antagonizing the US, refuse an alliance with them even so making it two separate wars on the Soviets instead of one unified one). And though the Soviets would cream the Japanese, that might just lead the US to re-arming them as an anti-communist ally in the post-war era.

Convoluted but more byzantine things have happened in history right?
 
You would indeed need a different set of Axis priorities, but that's probably a good thing for them. But sending a mere 4 mobile divisions to Africa (the maximum which could be maintained) in September 1940 couldn't affect Barbarossa any worse then sending 2 Pz divs in Feb 1941 (OTL), indeed in those intervening months the Suez Canal could well be captured. Nor would sending forces to Africa in September damage the Blitz and Uboat happy time which limits Britain's ability to do anything about Rommel.
"Sending a mere four mobile divisions to Africa" acheives absolutely nothing unless those divisions can be supplied. These supply lines, assuming Gibraltar is not captured (which is borderline ASB anyway given the problems of supplying the paratroops needed to take it; there's no possibility whatsoever of an amphibious operation working against Gibraltar), must run through the Central Mediterranian, near Malta. Assuming the Italians even have enough ships at this point to supply these four divisions, which might or might not be the case, particularly after a couple of months, you still need to protect these convoys against British naval forces in theater and against British air assault from Malta.

From here it becomes a real puzzle. To supply a large army in North Africa you need to push the Royal Navy out of the Mediterranian. To do that you have to capture Malta, Gibraltar, and Suez (capturing Suez means capturing Alexandria as well, otherwise it would be included). But to get armies to Suez you have to supply them.

This puzzle can only be solved by ensuring a larger and fitter Italian navy, by the capture of the French fleet (and the training of reasonably proficient crews) upon the French surrender, and/or a German prewar fleet buildup and the placement of much of this fleet in Italian ports before the war. Now, it is very possible that the Axis-to-be navies can be increased in both material and effectiveness in the prewar period, but going simply off OTL naval force levels in theater during the period considered, a Mediterranian strategy for the Axis is simply not a war winner.

P.S. Are there any good "Fitter Axis Navies" TLs floating about?
 
To get Japan to attack the USSR several PODs will be necessary.

1. The decision should be made three years in advance at least. Five would be better. This isn't all that hard to imagine as Japan didn't like communism.

They did prepare to counter Soviet intervention in China starting from 1936 - the Hokushin plan.
 
We're talking about invading, not countering. That's a very different cup of tea.

What I meant was that, after the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact, Japan searched for ways to stop the stem of Soviet arms and air wings to China - by planning for an attack on Soviet-held Mongolia and Siberia.

Of course, these got stopped in the events following the border incidents of 1938-1939, and the Soviet-German non aggression pact. The Japanese didn't have enough logistics and winter gear anyway (there were plans to requisition winter gear from the Manchurian colonies - to no avail)
 
Those preparations should have incorporated technology exchange with Germany. It isn't beyond the grasp of Japan to start building Panzer IVs and perhaps Panthers once the bugs are worked out. I could see the Japanese being pragmatic enough to largely copy the T-34 unlike the Germans instead of building the Panther. Winter gear should have been bought and Japan should have started mechanizing their army like Germany was doing in '35 or something. And Japan MUST find the Daqing oilfield several years in advance and build sufficient roads and railroads in Manchuria.

Only then do I see a Japanese invasion working.
 
Those preparations should have incorporated technology exchange with Germany. It isn't beyond the grasp of Japan to start building Panzer IVs and perhaps Panthers once the bugs are worked out. I could see the Japanese being pragmatic enough to largely copy the T-34 unlike the Germans instead of building the Panther. Winter gear should have been bought and Japan should have started mechanizing their army like Germany was doing in '35 or something. And Japan MUST find the Daqing oilfield several years in advance and build sufficient roads and railroads in Manchuria.

Only then do I see a Japanese invasion working.

Well, IIRC there was to some degree a Japanese-German military cooperation, with the Germans delivering their unwanted He-112s (which the Japanese rejected on the base of high wing loading).

The main problem is the Japanese industry, which wasn't geared up for producing armor and their viewpoint that the future battles would be infantry ones - artillery and small arms production was the highest priority. China somewhat helped to support this viewpoint.

The main view of mechanizing in the IJA was adding the amount of horses.
Horses and beasts of burden were better transports because they didn't need fuel and could be used as emergency rations. This was of course in the case of an invasion to the USSR disadvantageous because horses were more perishable (especially in the icy Russian steppes) and lacked the speed for mechanized warfare. How to change this viewpoint, I wonder?
 
Japan's purpose in the attack wouldn't be to sieze land, but to tie down a large portion of the Soviet Army. Every division fighting Japan isn't one defending Moscow.

If they can divert enough of the Red Army away, Barbarossa may very well be successful and Japan will get their slice of the cake in the post-war settlement.
 
Japan's purpose in the attack wouldn't be to sieze land, but to tie down a large portion of the Soviet Army. Every division fighting Japan isn't one defending Moscow.

If they can divert enough of the Red Army away, Barbarossa may very well be successful and Japan will get their slice of the cake in the post-war settlement.
And then you run up against the problem that, deficient as the Soviet political and military leadership may or may not have been, they know that, if they have to, they can sacrifice all of Siberia west of Omsk if it means having more troops available to defend Kiev, Leningrad, Karkhov, Moskow, and the other eastern cities. The Japanese can only "divert enough of the Red Army away" from the western (from the Soviet point of view) front if they can pose a conceivable threat to Omsk or Central Asia in a reasonable amount of time, and the fact is that they can't, especially if the Soviets destroy the infrastructure leading towards the important bits of the country.

Of course, Japan is not simply going to accept a situation where their only role is to "divert the Red Army". Such a situation contains virtually no benefit for them, it places them in a subordinate strategic and political position vis a vis the Germans, and pride if nothing else argues against that. The only benefit of their doing so would accrue to the Germans, and Japan wants a tense balance of power in Europe that distracts the Europeans from East Asia, not an all-dominating European superstate looking to conquer Chinese markets.

It helps, when analyzing whether a country would make a decision or not, to analyze its own reasons for doing so, rather than another country's reason for wanting it to do so.
 
slsl

The biggest advantage of Japan attaching the USSR is that they wont be able to attach US, BG and scale down their operations in China.
That means US stays out of the war, no lend-leas for USSR, and less help for GB.
Without the US help and with one more enemies to fight the USSR will be in a very tough position.
The same can be applied for GB (they will receive some help depending on the level of hostilities in the north Atlantic).
There is the argument that the USSR were better equipped and trained than the Japs, true but my point is that the Japs will provide just an diversion (the same diversion that the Brits provided for the Germans in North Africa), whether they win or loose it won’t matter because the fate of the war will be decided in the European theater.
Now the USSR will be in the same position that the Germans were, no help and no supplies from the rest of the world, facing a semi-blockade and a war on two fronts.
As far as the oil supply problem facing Japan if they reach some sort of settlement in China and take over the Duch East Indies (like they did with French Indochina) their problem is solved.
The key for both Germans and Japs is to try and improve their image in the eyes of the American public.
If the Americans don’t see them as a threat they will stay out of the war.
 
Zimmerwald, a lot more than 4 mobile divisions were eventually supplied in Africa, however that is the number recommended by von Thoma as both the minimum required for success and the maximum sustainable in the field, months before Rommel went to Libya. In late 1940 there were only about 36,000 troops in Egypt, basically the 4th Indian and 7th Armoured divisions, I doubt these could handle 4 Pz divisions.

Also, on several occasions Malta was effectively neutralised as an obstacle to Axis supply of Nth Africa. Particularly when the Axis held both Crete and the Benghazi bulge Malta was squeezed out as a problem, the RN having to leave and the RAF reduced to impotence. Malta isn't the obstacle it's made out to be.

Striking while the iron is hot, from September 1940, is well within the capabilities of the Axis.
 
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