One thing that you learn to appreciate from studying the first six months of the Pacific War was just how much of a shoe string the Japanese operated on when they did what they actually did. A big part of the reason ATLs focusing on the early Pacific War are so popular (TLs by me, fester, Galveston Bay, Cal Bear, johnboy to name a few) is that there are so many places where even a slightly more competent performance on the part of the Allies can really throw sand in the gears of the Japanese operation.
Taking a massive convoy of transports loaded with at a minimum three divisions of troops and all of their supplies along with all of the escorts to include enough sea based air power to support them and a fleet train to sustain an extended campaign is several bridges too far.
Order of Battle USN; Pearl Harbor; 7 December 1941
Order of Battle US Army: Pearl Harbor; 7 December 1941
Good grief. The attack on Midway included over 60% of the entire IJN first line strength, burned up 2 months peacetime operations supply of fuel oil and killed the Kido Butai; completely dislocating and ruining the IJN's primary strike arm for a whole two years. (Japanese carrier operations in the Solomon Islands campaign while formidable were a series of organizational ad hockeries, not as formalized as First Air Fleet.) Now someone wants to invade Hawaii on day 1 of the Pacific War?
147,000 armed US Navy, regular army, and marine personnel
15,000 national guardsmen in reserve
Admittedly obsolete, but still present coast artillery defenses... intact coast artillery defenses.
Let's assume
Moritake Tanabe has gone stark raving mad, and the rest of Imperial General Headquarters likewise, what are they going to need?
The entire IJN as deployed for Midway, including the Aleutians side show, because they will need close to 400 aircraft and all 10 carriers to achieve aerial mastery over the entire Hawaiian Island chain.
Enough sea-lift to land FIVE divisions with follow on for four more.
How much is that?
At a minimum, one is looking at about:
150 troop transports
20 fleet tankers
at a guess about 400 landing barges
25 ammunition ships
and enough other auxiliaries to double that IJA force.
The Japanese would have to pick an island, (Not Oahu, their doctrine was to land adjacent to an enemy stronghold, seize or build airbases, gain air superiority and then conduct an amphibious "nibble them to death" series of operations to scatter, dislocate and disintegrate the local defense by a "death of a thousand small battles" campaign. It would take them time to achieve their desired situation (about 60 days?) ).
Where?
Kauai. Along the north shore. Head for Princeville and Lihu. Size? 2 division assault. Operations corresponding to this?
Lingayan Gulf Big Island has to be simultaneous with operations aimed at Hilo along the NE shore. Another two divisions at least. Again as large as Lingayen Gulf. There are not enough ships in the Japanese mercantile fleet to do it, along with just the Philippines and Malaya campaigns. Never mind the Indonesia operations. Where is that 3/4 of a million tonnes of shipping to mount and sustain this operation to come? Where are the 200,000 troops to be found? Where is the 12 months peacetime military supply of fuel oil burned up in 60 days to come?
Logistics.