Japanese invasion of Australia in WWII

Cook

Banned
Well I once read a time line about Indonesia occupying North Australia, so if they could do it, why not Japan?
The difference is that the Indonesians couldn’t have but the Japanese could and would have benefited considerably from doing so.
 
The difference is that the Indonesians couldn’t have but the Japanese could and would have benefited considerably from doing so.

Yeah, I know, Im just saying. If the US had lost at Midway, then Japan might have been able to attack Australia. But the plan was considered really stupid by the IJN.
 
If the Japanese had won Midway, probably the most intelligent next move would have been to bomb out the naval infrastructure at Pearl Harbour to keep the US from using it as a forward naval base, rather than chasing off on some damn fool crusade that costs a lot of troops and resources and nets little or nothing in return.
 
Indeed. And I'm sure the Japanese won't hesitate to terror-bomb the hell out of Sydney and Melbourne, to say nothing of any other civilian centers they can reach.

If you look at a map you'll notice that Darwin is closer to Singapore than Sydney. Holding Darwin would be very useful as a naval air base but the town they could bomb from there would be Alice Springs and maybe Mount Isa. Both of which are irrelevant.
 
Hmm....I wonder if they would try to bomb or make a minor 'dip' into New Zealand. Wow, I wonder how much this would strengthen ties with the US and NZ because obviously they will be the biggest supporters of Australia.
 
If the Japanese had won Midway, probably the most intelligent next move would have been to bomb out the naval infrastructure at Pearl Harbour to keep the US from using it as a forward naval base, rather than chasing off on some damn fool crusade that costs a lot of troops and resources and nets little or nothing in return.

There are several problems with this idea,

1) it is almost impossible for Japan to take Midway. See This thread for a long discussion of this.
2) Even if they take Midway the Atoll can only support a max of about 100 Aircraft.
3) Midway is 1300NM from Pearl Harbor, while the Japanese had bombers that could hit Pearl, they didn't have fighters that could escort them. The A6M had about half the range needed. And at this point in the war the US had on the order of 150-200 fighters on Oahu along with radar that will pick up a Japanese raid 100 miles out. Can you say turkey shoot?

So no, even if the Japanese manage to take Midway (which is low probability at best), they really don't want to send their bombers on a one way trip to Oahu to get shot down. It is almost as bad an idea as invading Australia...:D

Tom.
 
There are several problems with this idea,

1) it is almost impossible for Japan to take Midway. See This thread for a long discussion of this.
2) Even if they take Midway the Atoll can only support a max of about 100 Aircraft.
3) Midway is 1300NM from Pearl Harbor, while the Japanese had bombers that could hit Pearl, they didn't have fighters that could escort them. The A6M had about half the range needed. And at this point in the war the US had on the order of 150-200 fighters on Oahu along with radar that will pick up a Japanese raid 100 miles out. Can you say turkey shoot?
When does the airbase at Midway figure into the equation? I was thinking a re-run of Pearl-Harbour, but with heavier Japanese losses (more defence, but more desperate Japanese pilots as well).
 
If you look at a map you'll notice that Darwin is closer to Singapore than Sydney. Holding Darwin would be very useful as a naval air base but the town they could bomb from there would be Alice Springs and maybe Mount Isa. Both of which are irrelevant.
Capturing Darwin does fit with Japanese doctrine though. Create a barrier around Asia, then sit back and watch as the colonial powers fight a slow slog through that defense line and face attrition at both land and sea.

Course, that didnt really work irl.
 
While its probably quite possible for Japan to capture Darwin (at least in 1942), what are they going to do with it??

Its a long way from Darwin to anywhere - it it actually in fighter range to escort any bombing raids of any consequence. If it isnt they are going to lose a lot of bombers.

And of course there is always the issue of those supply convoys in easy range of submarines. And US torpedoes or not, a Japanese base on Oz is goingto result in RN subs (with working torpedos) arriving.

Strikes me as another Midway, a poisoned chalice the IJN would do well to avoid.
 
While its probably quite possible for Japan to capture Darwin (at least in 1942), what are they going to do with it??

Its a long way from Darwin to anywhere - it it actually in fighter range to escort any bombing raids of any consequence. If it isnt they are going to lose a lot of bombers.

And of course there is always the issue of those supply convoys in easy range of submarines. And US torpedoes or not, a Japanese base on Oz is goingto result in RN subs (with working torpedos) arriving.

Strikes me as another Midway, a poisoned chalice the IJN would do well to avoid.
Like i said above, it fits their doctrine.

No one ever said their doctrine made much sense.
 
When does the airbase at Midway figure into the equation? I was thinking a re-run of Pearl-Harbour, but with heavier Japanese losses (more defence, but more desperate Japanese pilots as well).

My apologies I assumed that you were talking about what they actually thought about doing, taking Midway as a forward base. :rolleyes:

They are even less likely to try another raid on Pearl after Midway even with a win. The Americans had on the order of 150-200 USAAF fighters alone on Oahu, 80-100 USMC, 80-100 USN by the end of the summer of 1942 which is the soonest the Japanese can rebuild their air groups after even a successful Midway. Remember they took 20% damaged and downed planes in the strike on Midway, 45% damaged and downed planes in the strikes on the Yorktown. Two or three more strikes like that and even without loosing the carriers they are going to have to head for the home islands to get new air groups, then take a couple of months to work them up. So August is about the earliest they can leave Japan for another strike on Pearl. By this time the USMC is not flying F3Fs but F4Fs and upgrading to F4Us, the USAAF is not flying P40Bs and P39s any more but P40Ds and P38Fs with a smattering of P40Es and P40Fs - at least at Pearl Harbor.

The IJN does not want its carriers anywhere near the hornets nest that is Oahu after the Pearl Harbor attack. There is a reason they never tried again, they would have been outnumbered 2-3 to 1 and had US strike aircraft chasing their carriers.

Pearl Harbor was a sneak attack against an unprepared opponent trying to do the same thing again against a prepared opponent is just asking to loose carriers. No Japanese Admiral wanted to come within striking distance of Pearl a second time unless it was to take America's surrender.

Tom.
 
They are even less likely to try another raid on Pearl after Midway even with a win. The Americans had on the order of 150-200 USAAF fighters alone on Oahu, 80-100 USMC, 80-100 USN by the end of the summer of 1942 which is the soonest the Japanese can rebuild their air groups after even a successful Midway. Remember they took 20% damaged and downed planes in the strike on Midway, 45% damaged and downed planes in the strikes on the Yorktown.
They wouldn't have lost most of the Yorktown run if they'd been successful at Midway though, surely? Also, it would be a desperation strike, not something they want to delay just for the fear of having to face newer American fighters. Even if it costs most of the remaining aircraft it's still the best chance they have of slowing the Americans up. Also, because it is so desperate I figure it would be the first battle to see planes used Kamikaze style.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
When does the airbase at Midway figure into the equation? I was thinking a re-run of Pearl-Harbour, but with heavier Japanese losses (more defence, but more desperate Japanese pilots as well).

By mid-1942, Pearl Harbor is not a practical target for the Japanese. Not only do they need to defeat 3 carriers with 4 carriers, but there are hundreds of planes Pearl Harbor. The island radars would see the planes coming in, and the would be met by every land base fighter on the island plus possible the carrier planes. For any planes that made it to Pearl Harbor would fight heavy anti-aircraft fire. The Americans had broken the codes, so there would have been no ships of value in the harbor. There is no realistic way an attack on Pearl Harbor goes better for the Japanese than an attack on Midway.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
They wouldn't have lost most of the Yorktown run if they'd been successful at Midway though, surely? Also, it would be a desperation strike, not something they want to delay just for the fear of having to face newer American fighters. Even if it costs most of the remaining aircraft it's still the best chance they have of slowing the Americans up. Also, because it is so desperate I figure it would be the first battle to see planes used Kamikaze style.

No, the Japanese would be better off fighting the US Navy near a Japanese held island where Japanese land base airplanes add to Japanese strength. Based on the forces available, the Mariana Islands were a logical place to make a last stand. There may be a better location, but the Mariana are a good location. After December 1941, a Naval battle near Pearl Harbor does not work for the Japanese.
 
No, the Japanese would be better off fighting the US Navy near a Japanese held island where Japanese land base airplanes add to Japanese strength. Based on the forces available, the Mariana Islands were a logical place to make a last stand. There may be a better location, but the Mariana are a good location. After December 1941, a Naval battle near Pearl Harbor does not work for the Japanese.

Yup what he said, the Japanese wanted to get the USN the come out and fight away from the US land based air. Optimally from the Japanese perspective they wanted to get the USN to fight inside of Japanese land based air. And the sooner in the war the better. If they could have figured out a way to have the Battle of Midway happen near Saipan or better yet Truk they would have been thrilled. But fighting a naval battle where the US has hundreds of land based aircraft? not going to happen.

Tom.
 
By mid-1942, Pearl Harbor is not a practical target for the Japanese. Not only do they need to defeat 3 carriers with 4 carriers, but there are hundreds of planes Pearl Harbor. The island radars would see the planes coming in, and the would be met by every land base fighter on the island plus possible the carrier planes. For any planes that made it to Pearl Harbor would fight heavy anti-aircraft fire. The Americans had broken the codes, so there would have been no ships of value in the harbor. There is no realistic way an attack on Pearl Harbor goes better for the Japanese than an attack on Midway.
No, the Japanese would be better off fighting the US Navy near a Japanese held island where Japanese land base airplanes add to Japanese strength. Based on the forces available, the Mariana Islands were a logical place to make a last stand. There may be a better location, but the Mariana are a good location. After December 1941, a Naval battle near Pearl Harbor does not work for the Japanese.
People, Pearl Harbour is chock full of vital naval infrastructure, fuel tanks, dry docks, torpedo stores, machine shops, etc. Take those out and the US is going to be set well back in the Pacific. Not crippled, but severely limited in its offensive power (in Admiral Nimitz's own words of Pearl Harbour "Had the Japanese destroyed the oil, it would have prolonged the war another two years").
 
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Cook

Banned
Darwin was seen by both sides as an extension to the Dutch East Indies; it was included in the ABDACOM area and was the southern point on the Malay Barrier: the necessary line of defence of Australia and was recognised as such by the British, Australian and America High Commands prior to the war.

For the Japanese it was critical for the defence of their new possessions in South-East Asia. With Darwin and its surrounds in allied hands the D.E. Indies, Malaya and Borneo were all vulnerable to air and sea attack. The Japanese IOTL chose to neutralise this threat by ‘using a hammer to crack an egg’; employing the strike carriers that three months earlier attacked Pearl Harbour to launch an even larger air attack on Darwin and following it up with heavy bombers based in Ambon. They followed this up with repeated air raids for the next two years.

Just prior to the fall of Singapore in February 1942, General Yamashita submitted a proposal to invade and occupy Darwin and its surrounds, recognising that air attacks alone no matter how successful, could not eliminate permanently the threat. This would have employed troops then on their way to Bali and Timor and the land and carrier based aircraft that were presently in the area, against which the allies had no more than a dozen P-40 Kittyhawks, a couple of B-17s and three anti-aircraft guns. Landings in late February 1942 would have built on the disorder and confusion of the collapsing Allied command in Java. Yamashita’s plan called for a force to be landed on the coast near Daly River Station and push inland towards Adelaide River and from there north into Darwin. The coastal conditions were well known to the Japanese; in fact they had better maps of the north of Australia than the Australians had.

Once Darwin was in Japanese hands there would have been no possibility of conducting the air raids on South-East Asia that continually hindered Japanese efforts to get the Indonesian oil industry operational, or exports of other strategic resources from E.S. Asian ports that were obstructed by mines dropped by Australian and American B-17s. Nor would the commando raids that tied down so many Japanese troops in the region, 20,000 in Timor alone, have been possible. Japanese bombers based in Darwin and Batchelor could have hit any target in Queensland down as far as Brisbane, including the docks in Brisbane and Townsville where vitally important war supplies were being unloaded. In the west they could hit any target down to Exmouth, threatening to sever the air link to India. Such bombers could have operated unescorted and unhindered with no Australian modern fighter aircraft closer than Egypt, no more than twenty American P-40s transiting Australia on their way to Java, and only 17 anti-aircraft guns in the entire country.

Once taken Darwin would have been secure: it could not be attacked from the south and an amphibious invasion would have to come from either the east or west. East would have to brave the narrows of the Torres Straits, where they’d have been sitting ducks to air attack from Darwin and Ambon and would have been well beyond the island hopping operations the allies conducted along the New Guinea coastline. An attack from the west would have been equally beyond the range of Allied air support without first building up further bases along the west coast and equally vulnerable to prolonged air attack before approaching Darwin. Far from being at the end of a long supply line vulnerable to air and sea attack, it would have been the point that could secure the sea lanes of South East Asia from allied air attacks. It would have substantially changed the Pacific campaign in 1942 and ’43 if not longer.
 
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Wolfpaw

Banned
Darwin was seen by both sides as an extension to the Dutch East Indies; it was included in the ABDACOM area and was the southern point on the Malay Barrier: the necessary line of defence of Australia and was recognised as such by the British, Australian and America High Commands prior to the war.

For the Japanese it was critical for the defence of their new possessions in South-East Asia. With Darwin and its surrounds in allied hands the D.E. Indies, Malaya and Borneo were all vulnerable to air and sea attack. The Japanese IOTL chose to neutralise this threat by ‘using a hammer to crack an egg’; employing the strike carriers that three months earlier attacked Pearl Harbour to launch an even larger air attack on Darwin and following it up with heavy bombers based in Ambon. They followed this up with repeated air raids for the next two years.

Just prior to the fall of Singapore in February 1942, General Yamashita submitted a proposal to invade and occupy Darwin and its surrounds, recognising that air attacks alone no matter how successful, could not eliminate permanently the threat. This would have employed troops then on their way to Bali and Timor and the land and carrier based aircraft that were presently in the area, against which the allies had no more than a dozen P-40 Kittyhawks, a couple of B-17s and three anti-aircraft guns. Landings in late February 1942 would have built on the disorder and confusion of the collapsing Allied command in Java.

Once Darwin was in Japanese hands there would have been no possibility of conducting the air raids on South-East Asia that continually hindered Japanese efforts to get the Indonesian oil industry operational, or exports of other strategic resources from E.S. Asian ports that were obstructed by mines dropped by Australian and American B-17s. Nor would the commando raids that tied down so many Japanese troops in the region, 20,000 in Timor alone, have been possible. Japanese bombers based in Darwin and Batchelor could have hit any target in Queensland down as far as Brisbane, including the docks in Brisbane and Townsville where vitally important war supplies were being unloaded. In the west they could hit any target down to Exmouth, threatening to sever the air link to India. Such bombers could have operated unescorted and unhindered with no Australian modern fighter aircraft closer than Egypt, no more than twenty American P-40s transiting Australia on their way to Java, and only 17 anti-aircraft guns in the entire country.

Once taken Darwin would have been secure: it could not be attacked from the south and an amphibious invasion would have to come from either the east or west. East would have to brave the narrows of the Torres Straits, where they’d have been sitting ducks to air attack from Darwin and Ambon and would have been well beyond the island hopping operations the allies conducted along the New Guinea coastline. An attack from the west would have been equally beyond the range of Allied air support without first building up further bases along the west coast and equally vulnerable to prolonged air attack before approaching Darwin. Far from being at the end of a long supply line vulnerable to air and sea attack, it would have been the point that could secure the sea lanes of South East Asia from allied air attacks. It would have substantially changed the Pacific campaign in 1942 and ’43 if not longer.
You see, this is what Turtledove should've been writing instead of that hackneyed "Days of Infamy" rubbish.
 
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