Japanese go all in on A-Go, commit surface fleet also.

The Japanese went all in during the October Leyte gulf operation with their Battleship surface fleet committed to a counter attack breaking up the invasion. However by this point in time the Japanese carrier fleet was feeble and the war lost anyway due to submarines and aircraft based in the Marianas could shut down the Japanese economy.

What if instead the Japanese committed their old and new Battleship fleet to the June battle off Saipan. At least the carrier force is intact, and there is theoretically some land based air in the Marianas (at least in the planning state). The Japanese considered it a do or die battle, why not do or die here??

The goals of the Battleship force.

a) to break up the invasion force directly
b) to allow reinforcement/resupply of Saipan by sea.
c) to act as a diversion for the American carrier force.
 
Isn't the battle of Saipan after the Battle of the Phillipine sea where the Japanese lost 3 fleet carriers?
 
It probably means that the Japanese Navy is finished off there instead of at Leyte. Spruance's deployment was designed to deal with exactly that sort of thing. Even with the battleships committed, the great Turkey Shoot would still happen and the IJN carrier aircraft annihilated in the opening stages of the battle. Slaughtering the IJN surface fleet after that would be easy. I just finished reading "The Fleet at Flood Tide" by James Hornfischer. an excellent book which looks at the Marianas battle in great detail.
 
A. The Japanese intended to, but the failure of the carrier force to defeat the US carrier force meant the main battle fleet should not be committed as per their doctrine. While they had some air support in the Marrianas they were unable to create the density of land based air groups on the islands needed to influence the battle.

B. the USN leaders understood the Japanese intent with the battle fleet. Phillipino guerrillas had obtained a copy of the Japanese defense plan & Nimitz, Spruance ect understood what they were up to. They had the US battle fleet present to meet the IJN surface fleet, had it sought battle. Post war Spruance was criticized for not running down and sinking the Japanese carriers. At the time he knew the Jpanese battle fleet would be present, but his reconissance had not located it. He did not want to leave the amphib and support fleets uncovered, nor advance his carrier force to far & into a ambush.
 
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Thanks for the replies.

1) Sounds like the Japanese were still in doctrine mode, not do or die mode (or just die mode) like in October 44 or later.
2) Sounds like even if in do or die mode, the Japanese would almost have to lead with the Battleship force to have any effect on the air battle, which is not doctrine, and would lead to a crushing defeat of both carrier force and Battleship force as the Allies were expecting that. (even though leading with a Battleship force would have made a lot of sense at Coral sea, Midway, Santa Cruz, Eastern Solomons etc., vs a light carrier bait force, or the main carrier force, which would force the Allies to reveal and commit their carrier force, without risking the main carrier force, and the Battleships could take it and might survive unlike a Shoho class carrier.
3) A want to read the "Fleet at Flood Tide", its part of a trilogy I believe that all look good. (I find it interesting that that these moderns writings of the same history read so better than the 70s or before written stuff. )
 
Thanks for the replies.

1) Sounds like the Japanese were still in doctrine mode, not do or die mode (or just die mode) like in October 44 or later.
2) Sounds like even if in do or die mode, the Japanese would almost have to lead with the Battleship force to have any effect on the air battle, which is not doctrine, and would lead to a crushing defeat of both carrier force and Battleship force as the Allies were expecting that.

This may be slightly off concerning doctrine. Prewar the doctrine was for the carriers, along with the submarines, and screening cruisers, to attrit the enemy battle fleet, then the friendly battle fleet would deliver the main blow. This was more or less everyones doctrine, tho some like the Italians or French substituted and based air for the carriers. The Japanese never fully got past this one. Neither for that matter did some US leaders. In the Marrianas operation Spruance was well prepared to fight the 1944 version of Jutland, had the opportunity turned up.

3) A want to read the "Fleet at Flood Tide", its part of a trilogy I believe that all look good. (I find it interesting that that these moderns writings of the same history read so better than the 70s or before written stuff. )

Many do. in part its the style of writing. Much of the earlier material was written by journalists, not academics. It was often written in a lowest common denominator style, and the object of the narrative was different. There are exceptions & some really good accounts can be found pre 1980.
 

CalBear

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As noted, Spruance had 5th Fleet deployed to deal with a surface threat. if fact several of his subordinates were quite unhappy that he didn't allow the carrier force to go haring off after the Japanese carriers. Spruance had an understandable concern about leaving the landing force undefended (he worried about a Savo Island engagement writ large, but with the IJN not repeating Mikawa's conservative decision to withdraw rather than advance against the 'Phibs).

Overall, had they done this, Spruance would have handed them their heads in a canvas sack and not a IJN ship would have gotten within 200 miles of the landing fleet.
 
Thanks for the replies.

1) Sounds like the Japanese were still in doctrine mode, not do or die mode (or just die mode) like in October 44 or later.
2) Sounds like even if in do or die mode, the Japanese would almost have to lead with the Battleship force to have any effect on the air battle, which is not doctrine, and would lead to a crushing defeat of both carrier force and Battleship force as the Allies were expecting that. (even though leading with a Battleship force would have made a lot of sense at Coral sea, Midway, Santa Cruz, Eastern Solomons etc., vs a light carrier bait force, or the main carrier force, which would force the Allies to reveal and commit their carrier force, without risking the main carrier force, and the Battleships could take it and might survive unlike a Shoho class carrier.
3) A want to read the "Fleet at Flood Tide", its part of a trilogy I believe that all look good. (I find it interesting that that these moderns writings of the same history read so better than the 70s or before written stuff. )

Apart from what @Carl Schwamberger said, many new primary sources and archives were disclosed or declassified in the 80s and 90s, as the periods of classification usually ended after 30 or 50 years.

Also, books, even academic ones, invariably become out of date as the latest researches are published in academic journals. One need to keep an eye on journals if one want to know what the cutting edge researches are.
 
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