Germany had radar by 1938 and installed air intercept and gunfire surface radars on their ships by 1940. Lets have Japan get German sets for all its aircraft carriers by the end of 1940.
Sure.
The research environment in Japanese labs was ”stifling" since 1928, resulting in significant brain drain and diminished research efficiency. Also, Japanese research efforts were at "bleeding edge" of their industrial capability (or lack thereof), resulting in additional delays due necessary procurement of foreign tools. Also, Japan had problems with raw materials. In particular, nickel shortage (used for vacuum tube cathodes) shortage was severe in 1939-1944, and even nickel-containing coins were confiscated and remelted. Same problem was with barium for tube getters.I want any reasonable means of fleet wide use of air intercept radar and fighter direction in time for Coral Sea.
The research environment in Japanese labs was ”stifling" since 1928, resulting in significant brain drain and diminished research efficiency. Also, Japanese research efforts were at "bleeding edge" of their industrial capability (or lack thereof), resulting in additional delays due necessary procurement of foreign tools. Also, Japan had problems with raw materials. In particular, nickel shortage (used for vacuum tube cathodes) shortage was severe in 1939-1944, and even nickel-containing coins were confiscated and remelted. Same problem was with barium for tube getters.
Overall, most plausible would be for Japanese to import radar sets from Germany.
Regarding military effect of early warning radars in battle of the Coral Sea, it would be likely close to zero given Japanese doctrine of epoch. Japanese put emphasis to stealth for their carrier operation, which mean radars will be prohibited to operate until enemy bombers are already in the visual range.
Obviously the doctrine would need to change.Japanese put emphasis to stealth for their carrier operation (i.e. eggs armed with sledgehammer doctrine), which mean radars will be prohibited to operate until enemy bombers are already in the visual range.
Yes. Trigger for doctrine change would be much more important than any hardware. IOTL, Japanese placed first radar sets on battleships (Hyuga in particular), not on carriers, because it was believed battleship, operating closer to enemy, would have less chances for remaining undetected anyway, therefore constant radio emissions from radar will be less disadvantageous.Obviously the doctrine would need to change.
Yes. Trigger for doctrine change would be much more important than any hardware. IOTL, Japanese placed first radar sets on battleships (Hyuga in particular), not on carriers, because it was believed battleship, operating closer to enemy, would have less chances for remaining undetected anyway, therefore constant radio emissions from radar will be less disadvantageous. ...
Most startling example is history of Yagi antenna. Invented in Japan in 1926, it was shelved until Yagi antenna equipped radars were captured from British in 1942.Could you elaborate further on why the research for Japanese labs was 'stifling' and what could be done to reduce brain drain and improve research efficiency? Are there any potential research bottlenecks that could have been addressed by 1940 to improve their research into Radar?
Air warning radar will have the most impact.
The most obvious example would be allowing to divert some of the fighters to intercept the dive bombers before they start their attack in Midway, potentially saving the carriers.
Yes, all that. We seem to be stuck in this thread where the IJN has air intercept radar on their carriers and other ships but have no idea how to use it, or have for some reason refused to adjust their doctrine and equip their aircraft on how to use it. Come on folks..... I've given the IJN effective shipborne air intercept radar in 1940, the IJN has a year or more to figure out how to use it. Japan has just watched Britain defeat the Luftwaffe through use of radar-vectored, radio-equipped interceptors - if they can learn from Taranto for PH, they can learn from the BoB.That would also require them to have decent radios and disciplined pilots, and probably an entirely new doctrine for CAP in the first place.
Imperial Navy doctrine was that Torpedo Bombers were far more dangerous than dive bombers. So the majority of the CAP, even with good radar, fighter direction teams and radios, will still be vectored onto the torpedo bombersAir warning radar will have the most impact.
The most obvious example would be allowing to divert some of the fighters to intercept the dive bombers before they start their attack in Midway, potentially saving the carriers.
Imperial Navy doctrine was that Torpedo Bombers were far more dangerous than dive bombers. So the majority of the CAP, even with good radar, fighter direction teams and radios, will still be vectored onto the torpedo bombers
Yes and no. In a way, they were right. A dive bomber can only blow holes open that let air in. A torpedo will blow open a hole that let's the ocean in. Their doctrine would have been proven correct except for two factors: the US caught the Japanese carriers in the middle of refueling and rearming their aircraft, the decks strewn with live ordinance and fuel lines. And second, the absolutely abysmal Japanese damage control."Oops."
Yes and no. In a way, they were right. A dive bomber can only blow holes open that let air in. A torpedo will blow open a hole that let's the ocean in. Their doctrine would have been proven correct except for two factors: the US caught the Japanese carriers in the middle of refueling and rearming their aircraft, the decks strewn with live ordinance and fuel lines. And second, the absolutely abysmal Japanese damage control.
So in a purely theoretical sense, the Japanese were right in their assessment of the Torpedo Bomber being the biggest threat to the fleet.
Yes, all that. We seem to be stuck in this thread where the IJN has air intercept radar on their carriers and other ships but have no idea how to use it, or have for some reason refused to adjust their doctrine and equip their aircraft on how to use it. Come on folks..... I've given the IJN effective shipborne air intercept radar in 1940, the IJN has a year or more to figure out how to use it. Japan has just watched Britain defeat the Luftwaffe through use of radar-vectored, radio-equipped interceptors - if they can learn from Taranto for PH, they can learn from the BoB.
So, by Dec 1941 we can assume the Combined Fleet has radar, radio-equipped aircraft, doctrine on how to use both to track incoming raids and to direct interception. What the IJN likely won't change is their re-arming of aircraft in the hangars, the doctrine not to launch strikes while receiving a strike, etc.