Japanese fleet in Europe

I agree up to #6. # 6 doesn't go far enough.

# 7. Given the overall situation, was it POSSIBLE to hold Singapore, regardless of cost?

The answer here is No.

There was no way to hold the island for two or three years & any effort to take it back/ relieve it before 1944 would result in heavy losses and major diversion of effort from Europe. Trying it in early 1942 would have been a disaster that would have resulted in the loss of the entire relief force.

Maybe maybe not.

If Singapore is held then the Japanese would be denied the rubber plantations and they could not invade the DEI and therefore their access to the oil there would severely hamper their ability to continue as effectively as they did. By concentrating their efforts on interdicting convoys to Singapore would the Japanese still be able to conduct Coral Sea or even seriously threaten the American Pacific bases?

Not to mention the relief forces would consist of battle hardened troops not the untrained and under equipped ones that were defeated OTL. If these had managed to defeat the Japanese attack then their replacements / reinforcements should be able to defeat any Japanese counterattack. Combined with the loss of the original Japanese force and the subsequent realisation that the Japanese were a formidable enemy not a joke but they could be defeated by a determined stand, the Japanese would face a severe strategic problem.
 

CalBear

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Maybe maybe not.

If Singapore is held then the Japanese would be denied the rubber plantations and they could not invade the DEI and therefore their access to the oil there would severely hamper their ability to continue as effectively as they did. By concentrating their efforts on interdicting convoys to Singapore would the Japanese still be able to conduct Coral Sea or even seriously threaten the American Pacific bases?

Not to mention the relief forces would consist of battle hardened troops not the untrained and under equipped ones that were defeated OTL. If these had managed to defeat the Japanese attack then their replacements / reinforcements should be able to defeat any Japanese counterattack. Combined with the loss of the original Japanese force and the subsequent realisation that the Japanese were a formidable enemy not a joke but they could be defeated by a determined stand, the Japanese would face a severe strategic problem.

By the time Singapore fell, the Japanese already had mostly taken Borneo and Celebes and had troops on Sumatra. Japanese force were pushing into Burma, and had taken the Philippines except for Bataan/Corrigedor. The IJN was basing heavy ships out of Davro in the Philippines and pretty much owned the South China Sea.

If we are talking about stopping the Malay invasion cold on December 8th, then, yes, a relief force would be worth trying, assuming the Japanese haven't met with full success elsewhere. If they have, then any attempt is almost certainly doomed. As noted earlier the IJN had Nagumo's carriers in the region, specifically to support the capture of the DEI (several carriers actually used the port facilities at Davro in late January) as well as several hundred G3M & G4M medium bombers. The JNAF had also staged several squadrons of land based Zeros to Siam & French Indochina, with some of these fighter aircraft also based on Borneo and the southern Philippines. The Allies didn't have anything close to an answer to this sort of force anywhere in the Pacific or Indian Oceans. If the Japanese have taken airbases on Borneo, Cebeles, the Philippines and at Rabaul (as IOTL) then the quality of the relief tropos doesn't matter. they'll never get off the transports, at least not at a quay.

It again comes down to the IJN vs. the RN Eastern Squadron. The Japanese can muster around 700 modern aircraft to attack any force sailing for Singapore. The RN has about 70-80 aircraft, none of which is a match for the Zero, while the RAAF, RAF & USAAF have no fighters with enough range to make a meaningful defense, and maybe 40 bombers, mostly B-17D. That is a serious meat grinder. It is very unlikely that any of the major fleet units sent in would survive under those circumstances.

The Brish squadron would be about three times the combat power of Force Z, it would face at least 10 times the combat power that killed PoW & Repulse in an hour. All an attempted relief does is kill a lot of brave Royal Navy crews and Australian 7th Division troopers.
 
I agree up to #6. # 6 doesn't go far enough.

# 7. Given the overall situation, was it POSSIBLE to hold Singapore, regardless of cost?

The answer here is No.

There was no way to hold the island for two or three years & any effort to take it back/ relieve it before 1944 would result in heavy losses and major diversion of effort from Europe. Trying it in early 1942 would have been a disaster that would have resulted in the loss of the entire relief force.


I agree that #6 didn't go far enough but I was interrupted by the real world and had to break off.

My answer to your #7 is a maybe, but it would depend on the Japanese reaction to General Hommas failure to take Singapore on the first try. If Japan diverted sufficient resources from other efforts I agree that it is unlikely (not impossible) that Britain could hold the island in the long term.

The critical question is, would the diversion of Japanese resources into the effort be worth the cost of the resources the British lost anyway in the surrender?

My answer to that is I believe that the problems that a longer more resource intensive campaign in Malaya would cause Japan on the other fronts would have been worth the additional casualties and damage. This is based on the belief that a more competent general could have held out for an additional 3 or 4 months with what was available to Percival.
 
By the time Singapore fell, the Japanese already had mostly taken Borneo and Celebes and had troops on Sumatra. Japanese force were pushing into Burma, and had taken the Philippines except for Bataan/Corrigedor. The IJN was basing heavy ships out of Davro in the Philippines and pretty much owned the South China Sea.

If we are talking about stopping the Malay invasion cold on December 8th, then, yes, a relief force would be worth trying, assuming the Japanese haven't met with full success elsewhere. If they have, then any attempt is almost certainly doomed. As noted earlier the IJN had Nagumo's carriers in the region, specifically to support the capture of the DEI (several carriers actually used the port facilities at Davro in late January) as well as several hundred G3M & G4M medium bombers. The JNAF had also staged several squadrons of land based Zeros to Siam & French Indochina, with some of these fighter aircraft also based on Borneo and the southern Philippines. The Allies didn't have anything close to an answer to this sort of force anywhere in the Pacific or Indian Oceans. If the Japanese have taken airbases on Borneo, Cebeles, the Philippines and at Rabaul (as IOTL) then the quality of the relief tropos doesn't matter. they'll never get off the transports, at least not at a quay.

It again comes down to the IJN vs. the RN Eastern Squadron. The Japanese can muster around 700 modern aircraft to attack any force sailing for Singapore. The RN has about 70-80 aircraft, none of which is a match for the Zero, while the RAAF, RAF & USAAF have no fighters with enough range to make a meaningful defense, and maybe 40 bombers, mostly B-17D. That is a serious meat grinder. It is very unlikely that any of the major fleet units sent in would survive under those circumstances.

The Brish squadron would be about three times the combat power of Force Z, it would face at least 10 times the combat power that killed PoW & Repulse in an hour. All an attempted relief does is kill a lot of brave Royal Navy crews and Australian 7th Division troopers.

That's what I mean. If the Japanese were stopped at Malaya (it would be too late to stop them when they were at Singapore since the Commonwealth forces were in too bad a state to launch any counter attack) then the whole strategic situation of the Japanese becomes untenable.

The Japanese could not afford to let Singapore remain in allied hands. They therefore could not press their attacks elsewhere and this with the loss of the invasion force as well. This would mean the Americans can rebuild and recover without having to fight desperate battles at Midway and elsewhere and the Coral Sea would probably not even happen. The IJN would need to place large forces to patrol and prevent allied reinforcements and supplies reaching Singapore. It would be like having a fleet in being as well as a base for allied ships and any planes that could be got there.

If the allies play it like they did in OTL then it will be them who can call the tune on where and when to strike. The Japanese may want to use a new invasion fleet to try to lure the allies into the decisive battle they always wanted. If they try this the allies will know in advance and will know where the ships came from and the relative strength of the remaining forces. Say they withdraw significant troops and ships and planes from Borneo and Rabaul then allied counter attacks against these targets would be devestating.

In other words without Mayala and Singapore the Japanese cannot successfully hold any of their other conquests nor launch any other campaigns. The initiaive would pass to the allies sooner than it did and it will remain there. This would be a disaster for the Japanese.
 

CalBear

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Sorry, I misunderstood your previous post.

If the British can hold Malaya (just like if the U.S. can hold Luzon) the whole Japanese gamble comes up snake eyes.
That's what I mean. If the Japanese were stopped at Malaya (it would be too late to stop them when they were at Singapore since the Commonwealth forces were in too bad a state to launch any counter attack) then the whole strategic situation of the Japanese becomes untenable.

The Japanese could not afford to let Singapore remain in allied hands. They therefore could not press their attacks elsewhere and this with the loss of the invasion force as well. This would mean the Americans can rebuild and recover without having to fight desperate battles at Midway and elsewhere and the Coral Sea would probably not even happen. The IJN would need to place large forces to patrol and prevent allied reinforcements and supplies reaching Singapore. It would be like having a fleet in being as well as a base for allied ships and any planes that could be got there.

If the allies play it like they did in OTL then it will be them who can call the tune on where and when to strike. The Japanese may want to use a new invasion fleet to try to lure the allies into the decisive battle they always wanted. If they try this the allies will know in advance and will know where the ships came from and the relative strength of the remaining forces. Say they withdraw significant troops and ships and planes from Borneo and Rabaul then allied counter attacks against these targets would be devestating.

In other words without Mayala and Singapore the Japanese cannot successfully hold any of their other conquests nor launch any other campaigns. The initiaive would pass to the allies sooner than it did and it will remain there. This would be a disaster for the Japanese.
 
Sorry, I misunderstood your previous post.

If the British can hold Malaya (just like if the U.S. can hold Luzon) the whole Japanese gamble comes up snake eyes.

That's ok I should have been clearer.

As for the original post, if the Japanese send ships to Europe of course then the fall of Singapore may not even happen.
 
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