Japanese Discovery of Manchurian Oil = No Pacific War?

Let's imagine for moment that the Japanese have a stroke of luck and discover one of the easier-to-reach oil reserves in Manchuria sometime between 1938 and 1941, solving their petroleum problems for the foreseeable future. What reasons do they still have to go to war with the US and other western powers?

Basically, what other resources were the Japanese lacking that drove them to make "Strike South" a reality? Or was the desire for empire; rather than just autarky, a core motivating factor for the war?
 
Oil was obviously a huge region for the move south, and the Daqing Oil field could supply a lot of it. If we handwave the issues of finding it and producing it, it would change a lot of Japan's calculations.

However, we need to remember there are other natural resource issues such as scrap metal, rubber, tin, and aluminum among many other. When the USA, Britain, and Netherlands froze Japanese assets, it represented 75% of Japan's overseas trade as well as 88% of its oil supply. This is going to impact Japan's ability to get hard currency to buy these other resources, assuming it can even do so. And it's going to affect the Japanese standard of living.

Not having studied this enough, my gut instinct still tells me that Japan still goes to war, but that Manchurian oil will change how Japan fights it.
 
I believe that issue was already brought forward in past and that it was said the technology to extract oil from these deposits wasn't available because of the depths involved.
This said, one of the main reasons Japan attacked the US is because the embargo had put their back against the wall. If they have a source of oil important enough to satisfy their needs, and provided that they can refine it (Iran for instance has much oil but not the capacity to refine it all), I don't think they would want to expand the conflict so much dramatically and keep focus on their first objective ever: the conquest/submission of China.
This in turn would delay the US involvement in the war in Europe since Hitler would likely wait a little more before declaring war, if ever he does it. The Allies still get the upper hand, but without direct US involvement, their progression in Western Europe and Italy would be delayed, meaning the Red Army gets even further west than it historically did before meeting the western Allies forces.
 
If they have a source of oil important enough to satisfy their needs, and provided that they can refine it (Iran for instance has much oil but not the capacity to refine it all), I don't think they would want to expand the conflict so much dramatically and keep focus on their first objective ever: the conquest/submission of China.
According to this extract from the British official history of the War Against Japan, they had the capacity to refine 32 million barrels of crude oil a year.
From her own oil wells and from the production of synthetic oil, Japan could provide only some ten per cent of her annual peacetime requirements. As part of the preparations made for her expansionist programme she had, during the 1930’s, imported annually quantities considerably in excess of her actual requirements and in 1938 had introduced petrol rationing for civil users. By the 1st April 1941 she had created a reserve stock of crude and refined oils amounting to about forty-nine million U.S. barrels, had constructed in the home islands storage for some sixty million barrels, had provided a capacity for refining crude oil of some thirty-two million barrels a year and had launched a very ambitious programme to develop her production of synthetic oil.
 
I'm aware of the technological difficulties involved; my main interest is in exploring the reasons for "Strike South." In this thread a poster argues that having oil would not have changed the IJN's overall posture and desire to expand because of the Army/Navy rivalry that characterized Japanese military politics. The other position of course is that once Japan has oil it loses that sense of desperation and decided to focus on pacifying China instead.
 
I believe that issue was already brought forward in past and that it was said the technology to extract oil from these deposits wasn't available because of the depths involved.
This said, one of the main reasons Japan attacked the US is because the embargo had put their back against the wall. If they have a source of oil important enough to satisfy their needs, and provided that they can refine it (Iran for instance has much oil but not the capacity to refine it all), I don't think they would want to expand the conflict so much dramatically and keep focus on their first objective ever: the conquest/submission of China.
This in turn would delay the US involvement in the war in Europe since Hitler would likely wait a little more before declaring war, if ever he does it. The Allies still get the upper hand, but without direct US involvement, their progression in Western Europe and Italy would be delayed, meaning the Red Army gets even further west than it historically did before meeting the western Allies forces.

Unless the delay in LL and moral and troops, etc, causes a crises in Russia leading to a negotiated peace or a collapse etc (not impossible IMHO). Then all bets are off... or inversely, Russia does worse but still "wins", and meets the allies in Poland or thereabouts... :eek: (which might work out better for europe in the long run)
 
'38-41 is probably too late and I suspect many of the wheels were already in motion with regards to the Japanese military leadership and the road to war with America.

'31-35 would be just on the edge of plausibility for discovery, and then if we add the 5-10 years for infrastructure and proper exploration you might be able to avert Japanese entry in the war. Once they realize what they've got on their hands, everything changes. The USSR will be THE threat to Japanese economic independence and they'll react accordingly.
 
I'm aware of the technological difficulties involved; my main interest is in exploring the reasons for "Strike South." In this thread a poster argues that having oil would not have changed the IJN's overall posture and desire to expand because of the Army/Navy rivalry that characterized Japanese military politics. The other position of course is that once Japan has oil it loses that sense of desperation and decided to focus on pacifying China instead.

The sense of desperation came from having everything cut off.

...
However, we need to remember there are other natural resource issues such as scrap metal, rubber, tin, and aluminum among many other. When the USA, Britain, and Netherlands froze Japanese assets, it represented 75% of Japan's overseas trade as well as 88% of its oil supply. This is going to impact Japan's ability to get hard currency to buy these other resources, assuming it can even do so. And it's going to affect the Japanese standard of living.
....

Between 40% & 50% of Japans imports/exports were carried of foreign flagged ships. The embargos cut the flow of material in and out of Japans ports by nearly half. That alone was the economic equivalent of fire bombing the cities.

For example, Japan had large coal deposits at hand on the Asian mainland, but the number of ships for moving it to the industrial site on the home islands was wholly inadaquate. French Indochina was a major rice exporter, but Japan was rationing rice in late 1941 because there were not enough ships. Tin ore and raw rubber were in large supply in Annam as well, but again...

Japan had no reserve capitol & depended heavily on loans from US & London banks to pay for imports, industrial investment, and pay for imports. It was not necessary to enforce the embargos with diplomacy or threats and pressure. Japans cash flow was wrecked & it could effectively pay for nothing of significance. Even if the Peruvians, Dutch, Soviets or any other had wanted to trade something to Japan they would be taking a bad check in return, or trying to barter stuff for which the primary market would be the US or Commonwealth.

No more industrial tools or chemicals, steel, aluminum, ect.. from the rest of the world. Bottom line here is the US & Britain could have left oil off the embargo list & Japan would have been in the same depth of trouble. Its tanker fleet had 40 odd blue water transports & and another 20 coasters, fleet oilers, and harbor hulks for local movement. 40 tankers were completely inadaquate for moving the petroleum from the US, Venzualia, or the DEI.
 

Delta Force

Banned
Oil was obviously a huge region for the move south, and the Daqing Oil field could supply a lot of it. If we handwave the issues of finding it and producing it, it would change a lot of Japan's calculations.

However, we need to remember there are other natural resource issues such as scrap metal, rubber, tin, and aluminum among many other. When the USA, Britain, and Netherlands froze Japanese assets, it represented 75% of Japan's overseas trade as well as 88% of its oil supply. This is going to impact Japan's ability to get hard currency to buy these other resources, assuming it can even do so. And it's going to affect the Japanese standard of living.

Not having studied this enough, my gut instinct still tells me that Japan still goes to war, but that Manchurian oil will change how Japan fights it.

They can get a lot of their mineral requirements from Korea and Manchuria, including hydropower for the economic production of aluminum.
 
The sense of desperation came from having everything cut off.



Between 40% & 50% of Japans imports/exports were carried of foreign flagged ships. The embargos cut the flow of material in and out of Japans ports by nearly half. That alone was the economic equivalent of fire bombing the cities.

For example, Japan had large coal deposits at hand on the Asian mainland, but the number of ships for moving it to the industrial site on the home islands was wholly inadaquate. French Indochina was a major rice exporter, but Japan was rationing rice in late 1941 because there were not enough ships. Tin ore and raw rubber were in large supply in Annam as well, but again...

Japan had no reserve capitol & depended heavily on loans from US & London banks to pay for imports, industrial investment, and pay for imports. It was not necessary to enforce the embargos with diplomacy or threats and pressure. Japans cash flow was wrecked & it could effectively pay for nothing of significance. Even if the Peruvians, Dutch, Soviets or any other had wanted to trade something to Japan they would be taking a bad check in return, or trying to barter stuff for which the primary market would be the US or Commonwealth.

No more industrial tools or chemicals, steel, aluminum, ect.. from the rest of the world. Bottom line here is the US & Britain could have left oil off the embargo list & Japan would have been in the same depth of trouble. Its tanker fleet had 40 odd blue water transports & and another 20 coasters, fleet oilers, and harbor hulks for local movement. 40 tankers were completely inadaquate for moving the petroleum from the US, Venzualia, or the DEI.

I've seen it stated (by whom I can't remember) that Japan had massive currency reserves leading up to the war but the oil embargo and asset freezes pretty well wiped the system out and started the road to war with the west.
 
It wasn't that desperate as it looks by November 5th the Japanese had enough oil for 2 more years, and could have possibly reach a settlement if they were willing to move troops out of at least Southern Indochina, and renounce the Tripartite pact.
 

Delta Force

Banned
The Japanese were extensively developing the hydroelectric potential of the Yalu River in the 1930s, but it was for producing nitrogen fertilizers, not aluminum. Toshiba's website has some information on this. If Japan was able to acquire a secure supply of petroleum the hydroelectric facilities could be used to generate electricity for aluminum instead of fertilizer.
 
Let's see if I understand this thread .... Even if the Japanese Army figured out how to extract and refine Manchurian oil ... they would refuse to share with the IJ Navy. ..... forcing the IJN to strike south in search of oil.

In another scenario, the IJA and IJN develop rival alternate energy programs with the IJN developing ship-sized nuclear reactors while the IJA perfects synthetic oil.
We will just pretend that the IJN never builds any nuclear bombs, only slow smouldering nuclear reactors to drive electric generators and ships.

Bonus points if the IJA develops a third alternate energy source to power army bases and factories on the home islands: wind, tidal, geo-thermal?
 
Let's see if I understand this thread .... Even if the Japanese Army figured out how to extract and refine Manchurian oil ... they would refuse to share with the IJ Navy. ..... forcing the IJN to strike south in search of oil.

In another scenario, the IJA and IJN develop rival alternate energy programs with the IJN developing ship-sized nuclear reactors while the IJA perfects synthetic oil.
We will just pretend that the IJN never builds any nuclear bombs, only slow smouldering nuclear reactors to drive electric generators and ships.

Bonus points if the IJA develops a third alternate energy source to power army bases and factories on the home islands: wind, tidal, geo-thermal?

The oilfield would be so large that they'd have enough for the army, navy, civilian use and maybe a bit left for export.

I think the army would turf out the navy in this scenario just because it would completely reorient the Japanese economy and highlight the importance of Manchuria and Korea.
 
Realignment economically...

...The IJA would need more tankers and escorts for them, wiping out the capacity for capital ships in the shipyards. You can say goodbye to the Yamato, thank goodness, and most of the wartime carrier programme as well. The Kayaba Ka-1 autogyro and its IJA ASW carriers may be of critical importance. We're looking at an IJA Navy and a stunted IJN...:D
 
Let's imagine for moment that the Japanese have a stroke of luck and discover one of the easier-to-reach oil reserves in Manchuria sometime between 1938 and 1941, solving their petroleum problems for the foreseeable future. What reasons do they still have to go to war with the US and other western powers?

Basically, what other resources were the Japanese lacking that drove them to make "Strike South" a reality? Or was the desire for empire; rather than just autarky, a core motivating factor for the war?

Its not resources its Fear, gut wrenching Fear.

As noted it’s not oil alone on the resource list and the oil is much more of an IJN issue than a Japanese issue.

There are a few background issues. The IJNs strength is artificially high. It’s held at 5:5:3 by treaty which treaty goes out of the window when Britain goes to war and for the US at the latest with the Two Ocean Navy Act. The resting state strength of either the RN or USN without Limitation treaties is much higher than the IJN can ever manage.

The exact sequence relates to the Fall of France. This allows the Japanese both close off a supply route to China and to approach DEI and Malaya and forward base forces. But it also causes the US to do two things.

Set up the embargo (which the UK and NL join) and critically the US links the embargo not just to Japanese withdrawal from Indochina but to withdrawal from China.

This is a game changer. The embargo will have a slow burn effect on the Japanese economy theoretically eventually, and much more quickly on the IJN but combined with the USN build up it puts Japan in a race against time. The US has in the Atlantic already shown it will take very aggressive naval actions while remaining ‘neutral’.

Give Japan all the resources it wants in 38 as soon as the US links in withdrawal from China and releases its naval potential Japan is faced with the prospect of overwhelming US force, demands for withdrawal from China and increasing US sanctions to achieve this with only a narrow window of comparative equality to try and do anything about it.
 
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