Japanese Chinese Dynasty

[Admiral Matt]

I just mean numbers-wise, could the situation between Japan and China ever be comparable to that between England and France in the Hundred Years' War or in other medieval conflicts? It's still sorta mind-boggling to imagine island nations challenging huge mainland states, whether we're talking about the HYW or Japan's invasion of China in WWII.

I'm afraid the scale is not comparable. England's worst ratio was being outnumbered 5:1 by the French. In practice, even that never actually happened, because England controlled other parts of the British Isles and (more importantly) great whopping hunks of France itself. To speak of the HYW as a fight between England and France is convenient, but it would be just as accurate to describe it as a long French civil war between the central government and powerful vassals - one of those vassals happening to have access to English levies.

Japan's best population ratio, to my knowledge was about 9 Chinese to every 1 native son. Which obviously is ignoring the fairly relevant existence of Koreans.

I've been trying to explore this scenario myself just recently. The question is, fundamentally, could the Japanese have achieved the same success as the Jurchens/Manchu.

First of all, where did the Qing Dynasty come from? An organized caste, military, and state system was gradually assembled which could delineate roles in a potential future empire as well as sieze it. A successful peasant rebellion had overthrown the Ming in the wake of climatic problems and government over-spending in defense projects. A Ming general invited in the foreigners to save himself. Then a very long process of conquest began. Conversion to the same faith as the Mongols made it possible to pacify the one great military threat to a state ruling China (before industrial powers navies arrive).

The Japanese could certainly benefit from most of these factors. A resurgent Liao, or even the Qing themselves, could have allowed for wars in northeast Asia that could have expended much of the strength of both China and Korea. If these were quickly followed by large and successful rebellions in China, and Japan had just united as it did under Hideyoshi, it's conceivable that an opportunity would exist.

Let's say we have this much. The Japanese have advantages the Manchu didn't: their heartland is much more secure from external attack, and they also have a larger and more uniform population and military. But they also have severe disadvantages: they can't get their feet wet as the Manchu did (all they can do is jump right in), they're not in a position to coopt the Mongols, and they can't walk to China. The latter is the most critical - they need to control both the Yellow Sea and Korea. Even lacking one would be serious, but if for a moment they lack both, it's all over.

So China concludes a big war to it's north and northwest, or north and northeast, just as Japan is unified. Korea, worn out from its participation in the conflict, is suddenly invaded from the opposite direction. The Chinese are still on campaign far west of there, but they would intervene. Except they can't. One of the peasant rebellions that started during the war (it's interesting trying to find any point in Chinese history when there wasnt a peasant uprising somewhere) snowballs, overrunning much of the Central Plains. That makes it a matter of immediate life or death, and Korea gets nothing.

The Japanese overrun the peninsula fairly quickly, as they did historically, and prepare for a drive through modern Liaoning, planning to march the circumference of the Yellow Sea. That doesn't go as planned. They quickly find that looting Korea is insufficient; if it's to be used as a springboard it must also be administered. Also it would be nice if there weren't guerillas all over the place. The conquerors are not exactly gentle souls, so they probably go a little heavier on the stick than the carrot. Stick here meaning "gun," and carrot "almost enough rice to feed your family." Still and all, with a proper civil war going on across the water, they'll be able to manage.

Then four to six years after they went into Korea the last emperor is dead in Beijing and a Ming general invites them into China. They march into Beijing and proclaim a new dynasty.

I am skeptical that they will ever unify China. They'll probably try to use Mahayana Buddhism and Confucianism as cultural common ground to justify their rule. The former might work well enough in China, but will mean that this Japanese dynasty will never "solve" the Mongol issue as the Qing did in OTL. As for the latter, it's relatively weak sauce in Japan, but it's very Chinese. As a result I expect the dynasty to use it just as the Qing did - over-the-top adherence to the Chinese system to make up for not being Chinese. What that tells me is that we have a state with a hostile populace that is perforce so focused on the security of Korea and the Yellow Sea that it will struggle to meet it's other security goals.

At a guess I would say expansion loses momentum between the Yellow River and Yangtze. The dynasty will have off and on control of the lower Yangtze and southern coast, but anti-Japanese and even pro-Ming states will outlast them. Something like the Revolt of the Feudatories, but never actually ending. There will be regular revolts against the dynasty, but then there were against every Chinese government until Mao. More seriously, the dynasty probably never subdues Mongolia, Tibet, or even northern Manchuria and Xinjiang. Heck, you might even see a restored kingdom of Dali. It's flank will always be open.

We're probably not discussing once of those dynasties that lasts 300 years, is what I'm saying.

 

[chornedsnorkack]

A successful peasant rebellion had overthrown the Ming in the wake of climatic problems and government over-spending in defense projects. A Ming general invited in the foreigners to save himself.

Noted.

The Japanese could certainly benefit from most of these factors. A resurgent Liao, or even the Qing themselves, could have allowed for wars in northeast Asia that could have expended much of the strength of both China and Korea. If these were quickly followed by large and successful rebellions in China, and Japan had just united as it did under Hideyoshi, it's conceivable that an opportunity would exist.

Let's say we have this much. The Japanese have advantages the Manchu didn't: their heartland is much more secure from external attack, and they also have a larger and more uniform population and military. But they also have severe disadvantages: they can't get their feet wet as the Manchu did (all they can do is jump right in),

Really? Didn´t they have an option to get their feet wet?

they're not in a position to coopt the Mongols, and they can't walk to China. The latter is the most critical - they need to control both the Yellow Sea and Korea. Even lacking one would be serious, but if for a moment they lack both, it's all over.

So China concludes a big war to it's north and northwest, or north and northeast, just as Japan is unified. Korea, worn out from its participation in the conflict, is suddenly invaded from the opposite direction. The Chinese are still on campaign far west of there, but they would intervene. Except they can't. One of the peasant rebellions that started during the war (it's interesting trying to find any point in Chinese history when there wasnt a peasant uprising somewhere) snowballs, overrunning much of the Central Plains. That makes it a matter of immediate life or death, and Korea gets nothing.

The Japanese overrun the peninsula fairly quickly, as they did historically, and prepare for a drive through modern Liaoning, planning to march the circumference of the Yellow Sea. That doesn't go as planned. They quickly find that looting Korea is insufficient; if it's to be used as a springboard it must also be administered. Also it would be nice if there weren't guerillas all over the place. The conquerors are not exactly gentle souls, so they probably go a little heavier on the stick than the carrot. Stick here meaning "gun," and carrot "almost enough rice to feed your family." Still and all, with a proper civil war going on across the water, they'll be able to manage.

Then four to six years after they went into Korea the last emperor is dead in Beijing and a Ming general invites them into China. They march into Beijing and proclaim a new dynasty.

I am skeptical that they will ever unify China. They'll probably try to use Mahayana Buddhism and Confucianism as cultural common ground to justify their rule. The former might work well enough in China, but will mean that this Japanese dynasty will never "solve" the Mongol issue as the Qing did in OTL. As for the latter, it's relatively weak sauce in Japan, but it's very Chinese. As a result I expect the dynasty to use it just as the Qing did - over-the-top adherence to the Chinese system to make up for not being Chinese. What that tells me is that we have a state with a hostile populace that is perforce so focused on the security of Korea and the Yellow Sea that it will struggle to meet it's other security goals.

At a guess I would say expansion loses momentum between the Yellow River and Yangtze.

Why?

The dynasty will have off and on control of the lower Yangtze and southern coast,

Why off?

Remember: Japanese cannot walk to China. They have to use ships.
They possibly might sail to Pusan and then walk all around Yellow Sea. But if they have ships anyway then from Nagasaki, Beijing at the head of Yellow Sea is no closer than Nanjing right across the mouth of Yellow Sea.

AND they have collaborationists already.

The Manchu attacked China overland and had pretty poor navy. They had a coast at the mouth of Liao river at least by 1630s. They did not use the coast to build a navy on Bohai gulf and sail around the end of Great Wall at Qinhuangdao - they conquered China overland.
With conspicuous success by land. The Mongols had needed 74 years from conquest of Beijing in 1215 till they took Guangzhou. The Manchu took less than three years from taking Beijing (June 1644) to taking Guangzhou (January 1647).
And yet conspicuous lack of success by sea. Southern Ming was chased to remote mountains of Yunnan by 1651, and destroyed in Burma in 1662. Koxinga on the southeastern coast was conspicuously successful, and Qing had no better solution to try than forcibly evacuate the coast. Only in 1683 did Qing finally manage to have a navy that could hit at Taiwan.

There was a long tradition of Japanese wokou cooperating with local Chinese who were dissatisfied with Ming restrictions on sea trade. What if a government of metropolitan Japan actively backs it - from the southeast coast of Zhejiang and Fuzhou up Yangtze river, and only then to Beijing? The advances inland can include Chinese defecting armies, like Manchu did.

Also: for Qing heirs to Ming centralized state, Three Feudatories were an anomaly and therefore vulnerable to being eliminated. For a Toyotomi, Tokugawa or Yui China, Three Feudatories would be just daimyo... whom Tokugawa did not destroy in 250 years.

 

[Admiral Matt]

Noted.

Really? Didn´t they have an option to get their feet wet?

Not in China, no. A landing in Okinawa or Taiwan would be good practice, but it would take a lot longer, use up a lot of resources, and invite an immediate conflict with China (jumping in) unless there's no organized state between Shandong and Guangdong.

Actually, they could get their feet wet - in Korea. That's why I had them going there first rather than straight to Tianjin. I'm sure the Liaodong Peninsula could be picked up the same way. But other than that, I doubt it. Its virtually impossible to take over the north of China from the south - the Ming are the only ones to ever do it, and that only worked because the Mongols wouldn't stop fighting each other and the ethnic Chinese uniformly despised them.

At a guess I would say expansion loses momentum between the Yellow River and Yangtze.

Why?

Diminishing returns and logistical distance. Taking over the northeast plain is all or nothing. The more you control of the place, the easier it becomes to hold the parts you already have, so if you can win at all you can win it all. South and west of that resistance is easier. South China is all geographically isolated chunks. You can take the coastal chunks, sure, but you can only hold them at the sufferance of the warlords in adjacent provinces. Only in the northeast is there a single place you can take and hold as one big block which far outweighs its more difficult-to-reach neighbors.

But if you snatch up the northeast plain you also assume its security risks. It can easily be attacked by non-Han people's raiding from Manchuria, Mongolia, Xinjiang, or Tibet. The Qing solved this through existing cultural links and converting to Tibetan Buddhism, allowing them to find Mongolian allies they could pay to conquer the rest of the place for them, then using that same religious group to demilitarize the populace.

The Japanese lack that option and so must do it the hard way - the way every previous dynasty did - by a combination of massively expensive defense projects and large-scale bribery of their neighbors. It's assuming a huge burden, and one which would limit the energy they could devote to other tasks. The peculiarities of their situation also mean that naval supremacy and control of Korea are also necessary to merely hold on to the basics, never mind expanding. Its a basic set of costs they can't be rid of, and a higher cost then any (successful) Chinese dynasty ever had to bear. So it seems unlikely that given such a disadvantaged situation compared with all previous dynasties and the OTL Qing they would be able to unite the place.

Sorry, have to get back to work. I'll reply to the rest later.

 

[democracy101]

I'm not saying you are wrong, but I would put forward the idea that Nurhaci only became bold enough to directly challenge China precisely because of the terrible condition dynasty was in, and he could act with relative impunity from his flanks because of the Imjin War's strain on Korea. If it had not occurred, Nurhaci would probably have remained relatively localized and not directly compete with China. If he did start a conquest, it would not have gone much more than a Jin/Liao-like state at its most successful.

Generally in agreement.

I'm afraid the scale is not comparable.

. . .

I've been trying to explore this scenario myself just recently. The question is, fundamentally, could the Japanese have achieved the same success as the Jurchens/Manchu.

First of all, where did the Qing Dynasty come from? An organized caste, military, and state system was gradually assembled which could delineate roles in a potential future empire as well as sieze it. A successful peasant rebellion had overthrown the Ming in the wake of climatic problems and government over-spending in defense projects. A Ming general invited in the foreigners to save himself. Then a very long process of conquest began. Conversion to the same faith as the Mongols made it possible to pacify the one great military threat to a state ruling China (before industrial powers navies arrive).

The Japanese could certainly benefit from most of these factors. A resurgent Liao, or even the Qing themselves, could have allowed for wars in northeast Asia that could have expended much of the strength of both China and Korea. If these were quickly followed by large and successful rebellions in China, and Japan had just united as it did under Hideyoshi, it's conceivable that an opportunity would exist.

The Liao had been destroyed by the Jurchen Jin in 1125, although some migrants established a state further to the west soon afterward, and despite the fact that Later Liao was briefly established by a Khitan remnant in 1216 after taking advantage of the chaos caused by the Mongol invasions, it ceased to exist after a joint Mongol-Korean force defeated it in 1219, after which virtually all of the remaining Khitan were absorbed into the Mongols. Another entity claiming "Liao" as its dynastic title would be unlikely after 1400 or so due to the fact that the Yuan and Ming had broken the precedent of naming dynasties after their locations of origin. On the other hand, an ambitious Mongol entity seeking to directly confront China would have to unify the other tribes beforehand, and would most likely reassert itself as the Yuan instead of adopting another title, such as the Liao.

If the Japanese do not invade by 1630 or so, while the Jurchen become assertive under Nurhaci, or an equivalent, before then, the Ming and Joseon would be in a strong position to invade Manchuria outright and directly administer the region. The Song and Goryeo had failed to do this when their respective nomadic entities began to pose as major threats, as the Liao had been established in 907, after which Balhae had been overrun in 926 and the Sixteen Prefectures ceded to the Khitan in 938, while it was not until 979 that the Song reunified China. As a result, even though Goryeo had confronted the Jurchen for decades until 1109, while the Song engaged in a standoff with the Liao, negotiations allowed the Jurchen to subjugate the Khitan before seizing territories north of the Huai River. These developments meant that the Mongols were able to conquer the Jin before destroying the Southern Song. However, after the Yuan was forced into the steppes, the Mongol entities generally remained fragmented, and although they occasionally became nominally unified, they ceased to pose as a major threat after the Tumu Crisis in 1449, while the Jurchen fell under increasing Chinese and Korean influence since the late 14th century.

As a result, the Song and Goryeo were unable to make significant gains against nomadic entities due to their relative consolidations. However, around 1550-1630, the Ming and Joseon would have been more than prepared to confront the Jurchen if they made sudden moves, as nomadic entities in Central and Northeast Asia had remained fragmented.

Let's say we have this much. The Japanese have advantages the Manchu didn't: their heartland is much more secure from external attack, and they also have a larger and more uniform population and military. But they also have severe disadvantages: they can't get their feet wet as the Manchu did (all they can do is jump right in), they're not in a position to coopt the Mongols, and they can't walk to China. The latter is the most critical - they need to control both the Yellow Sea and Korea. Even lacking one would be serious, but if for a moment they lack both, it's all over.

So China concludes a big war to it's north and northwest, or north and northeast, just as Japan is unified. Korea, worn out from its participation in the conflict, is suddenly invaded from the opposite direction. The Chinese are still on campaign far west of there, but they would intervene. Except they can't. One of the peasant rebellions that started during the war (it's interesting trying to find any point in Chinese history when there wasnt a peasant uprising somewhere) snowballs, overrunning much of the Central Plains. That makes it a matter of immediate life or death, and Korea gets nothing.

The Japanese overrun the peninsula fairly quickly, as they did historically, and prepare for a drive through modern Liaoning, planning to march the circumference of the Yellow Sea. That doesn't go as planned. They quickly find that looting Korea is insufficient; if it's to be used as a springboard it must also be administered. Also it would be nice if there weren't guerillas all over the place. The conquerors are not exactly gentle souls, so they probably go a little heavier on the stick than the carrot. Stick here meaning "gun," and carrot "almost enough rice to feed your family." Still and all, with a proper civil war going on across the water, they'll be able to manage.

Then four to six years after they went into Korea the last emperor is dead in Beijing and a Ming general invites them into China. They march into Beijing and proclaim a new dynasty.

. . .

We're probably not discussing once of those dynasties that lasts 300 years, is what I'm saying.

If the Jurchen do not take significant action before 1630 or so, they would almost certainly do so soon after the Little Ice Age comes into effect, causing major uprisings across the countryside. If the domestic rebels fail to cement control over most of China by 1640-50 or so, the Jurchen (potentially Manchus at this point) could drive into North China by then, although the Chinese would almost certainly continue to put up fierce resistance in the south. The Japanese would only have been able to invade after major issues within China had generally been settled, as they would have received the information much later, forcing them to either directly confront a revived China or a determined nomadic entity, neither of which would go well for the invaders. However, even before then, a proxy war would occur in Korea, which would further complicate issues, as the Ming or the Jurchen/Manchu would send troops in order to aid the struggling tributary, despite unresolved tensions between them, or Korea could theoretically ally with Japan in order to attack China (given Hideyoshi's original plans), although the latter would require severe turmoil within China for more than just a few decades, making it extremely unlikely.

In other words, while Japan might face a much more disorganized China if it invades around 1640-50, soon after the archipelago is nominally reunified, reinforcements would still probably arrive in Korea, forcing the Japanese to withdraw after significant losses. However, I agree that China, Japan, and Korea would generally all have been much worse off.

 

[Admiral Matt]

Why off?

Remember: Japanese cannot walk to China. They have to use ships.
They possibly might sail to Pusan and then walk all around Yellow Sea. But if they have ships anyway then from Nagasaki, Beijing at the head of Yellow Sea is no closer than Nanjing right across the mouth of Yellow Sea.

AND they have collaborationists already.

The Manchu attacked China overland and had pretty poor navy. They had a coast at the mouth of Liao river at least by 1630s. They did not use the coast to build a navy on Bohai gulf and sail around the end of Great Wall at Qinhuangdao - they conquered China overland.
With conspicuous success by land. The Mongols had needed 74 years from conquest of Beijing in 1215 till they took Guangzhou. The Manchu took less than three years from taking Beijing (June 1644) to taking Guangzhou (January 1647).
And yet conspicuous lack of success by sea. Southern Ming was chased to remote mountains of Yunnan by 1651, and destroyed in Burma in 1662. Koxinga on the southeastern coast was conspicuously successful, and Qing had no better solution to try than forcibly evacuate the coast. Only in 1683 did Qing finally manage to have a navy that could hit at Taiwan.

We're pretty much on the same page so far. It's just that I think this is something easier to do by land.

There was a long tradition of Japanese wokou cooperating with local Chinese who were dissatisfied with Ming restrictions on sea trade. What if a government of metropolitan Japan actively backs it - from the southeast coast of Zhejiang and Fuzhou up Yangtze river, and only then to Beijing? The advances inland can include Chinese defecting armies, like Manchu did.

That was my first thought as well. But again I think there's something to be said for having experience in naval invasions and annexations before you barrel into the beating heart of Eurasian civilization. The wako were basically just pirates and raiders - familiar with smashing and grabbing, but not holding territory. They were just weren't up to committing Viking-level antics. As for the Japanese themselves, few would have left Japan once before the invasion, how many would have any idea what to do with a conquered foreign town?

The Mongols took a long time at it. For the Manchu it was arguably their fourth try - they'd been part of a Chinese state (the Liao) for centuries, taken the north of China and run it as the Jin dynasty, then collaborated with the Mongols (and learned how not to do it). On top of that, they spent decades building the system to rule a racial-caste state before actually getting involved.

From my perspective the greatest likelihood for success would involve getting the Japanese to build some hegemonic structures before they go whole hog.

Also: for Qing heirs to Ming centralized state, Three Feudatories were an anomaly and therefore vulnerable to being eliminated. For a Toyotomi, Tokugawa or Yui China, Three Feudatories would be just daimyo... whom Tokugawa did not destroy in 250 years.

You raise an interesting question. Would the dynasty rule based on a Chinese or Japanese model of governance? If it's run like China, the Japanese will be unfamiliar with it; but if it's run like Japan, regional Chinese warlords retain military power.

And that was the problem with the Three Feudatories, after all - their ethnicity. The Tokugawa actually did eliminate daimyo, they just limited it to cases where they couldn't be brought to heel, and these cases were correspondingly rare. I sincerely doubt that post-Ming Han warlords are going to prove as tractable.

It's a fun question. Certainly you're right about China being run by water.

 

[chornedsnorkack]

Not in China, no. A landing in Okinawa or Taiwan would be good practice, but it would take a lot longer, use up a lot of resources, and invite an immediate conflict with China (jumping in) unless there's no organized state between Shandong and Guangdong.

Um. Japanese DID land in Okinawa. In 1609. Ming did nothing about it for 35 years.
What would have strong strategic effects would be for Japan to conquer, garrison and fortify Choushan archipelago - commanding Yangtze delta.

Koxinga, between 1647 and 1662, operated out of Chinese coastal fringe without a safe homebase and survived. It was only in 1662 that he conquered Taiwan - and it was then a tiny coastal fringe that was settled by Chinese. Which is why Koxinga did, for these 15 years, experience problems taking and holding major cities. He could not mobilize large armies out of Japan to confront the land forces whom Qing could mobilize on land.

So what if Koxinga IS backed by the might of Japan - the daimyo are required to send significant detachments to take, fortify and hold Yangzhou, Nanjing et cetera? How easy would it be for Japan+Koxinga to make Yangtze Delta safe as a recruitment area to send armies marching overland to, say, Shandong next?

 

[Admiral Matt]

Generally in agreement.

The Liao had been destroyed by the Jurchen Jin in 1125, although some migrants established a state further to the west soon afterward, and despite the fact that Later Liao was briefly established by a Khitan remnant in 1216 after taking advantage of the chaos caused by the Mongol invasions, it ceased to exist after a joint Mongol-Korean force defeated it in 1219, after which virtually all of the remaining Khitan were absorbed into the Mongols. Another entity claiming "Liao" as its dynastic title would be unlikely after 1400 or so due to the fact that the Yuan and Ming had broken the precedent of naming dynasties after their locations of origin. On the other hand, an ambitious Mongol entity seeking to directly confront China would have to unify the other tribes beforehand, and would most likely reassert itself as the Yuan instead of adopting another title, such as the Liao.

Yes. I am familiar with the raw bones of Liao history. I was assuming an alternate history scenario in which that were not the case. There's no reason to take a 1592 or 1547 (etc.) POD when discussing what's possible - we can explore all the options.

Likewise I wouldn't expect Liao as a name to recur.

If the Japanese do not invade by 1630 or so, while the Jurchen become assertive under Nurhaci, or an equivalent, before then, the Ming and Joseon would be in a strong position to invade Manchuria outright and directly administer the region. The Song and Goryeo had failed to do this when their respective nomadic entities began to pose as major threats, as the Liao had been established in 907, after which Balhae had been overrun in 926 and the Sixteen Prefectures ceded to the Khitan in 938, while it was not until 979 that the Song reunified China. As a result, even though Goryeo had confronted the Jurchen for decades until 1109, while the Song engaged in a standoff with the Liao, negotiations allowed the Jurchen to subjugate the Khitan before seizing territories north of the Huai River. These developments meant that the Mongols were able to conquer the Jin before destroying the Southern Song. However, after the Yuan was forced into the steppes, the Mongol entities generally remained fragmented, and although they occasionally became nominally unified, they ceased to pose as a major threat after the Tumu Crisis in 1449, while the Jurchen fell under increasing Chinese and Korean influence since the late 14th century.

Now these are details I had not had, and useful ones at that.

As a result, the Song and Goryeo were unable to make significant gains against nomadic entities due to their relative consolidations. However, around 1550-1630, the Ming and Joseon would have been more than prepared to confront the Jurchen if they made sudden moves, as nomadic entities in Central and Northeast Asia had remained fragmented.

If the Jurchen do not take significant action before 1630 or so, they would almost certainly do so soon after the Little Ice Age comes into effect, causing major uprisings across the countryside. If the domestic rebels fail to cement control over most of China by 1640-50 or so, the Jurchen (potentially Manchus at this point) could drive into North China by then, although the Chinese would almost certainly continue to put up fierce resistance in the south. The Japanese would only have been able to invade after major issues within China had generally been settled, as they would have received the information much later, forcing them to either directly confront a revived China or a determined nomadic entity, neither of which would go well for the invaders. However, even before then, a proxy war would occur in Korea, which would further complicate issues, as the Ming or the Jurchen/Manchu would send troops in order to aid the struggling tributary, despite unresolved tensions between them, or Korea could theoretically ally with Japan in order to attack China (given Hideyoshi's original plans), although the latter would require severe turmoil within China for more than just a few decades, making it extremely unlikely.

In other words, while Japan might face a much more disorganized China if it invades around 1640-50, soon after the archipelago is nominally reunified, reinforcements would still probably arrive in Korea, forcing the Japanese to withdraw after significant losses. However, I agree that China, Japan, and Korea would generally all have been much worse off.

I've reread that a couple of times, because clearly you feel this is a definitive argument. But based on what you've written so far, it isn't one.

The one key flaw is the assumption that the Japanese are invading because of China's weakness. That was the case in the general invasion of 1931-1945, so it's not that far out a position to take. But the invasions of 1592-1598 were purely motivated by the internal political circumstances of Japan. If they'd been looking for opportunities, they would not have seen them in 1590s China!

I'm not arguing that the Japanese do everything right and take over. I'm arguing that they could unify under a leader with Hideyoshi's inclinations at a time when Korea, Manchuria, and especially China were much more susceptible to invasion than they were in OTL 1592.

Think along the lines of the Muslim expansion. Mohammed happened to begin the military part of his adventures concurrently with a massive war between the Byzantines and Persia. When he died, the combatants were finally approaching the point of exhaustion. Then within four years there was a major climatic disaster. Absent this rather bizarre luck, the long triumphant campaigns of the Arabs would have been much reduced, if not stillborn.

I would question the assertion that there would be inevitable interference in Japan's invasion of Korea.

On the matter of China, I think we can agree that a dynasty in the moment of a struggle for survival would not divert loyal troops to defend a vassal. Likewise, we both seem to doubt that such a period of weakness could last more than a decade at best. I feel that means that if luck was with the Japanese, they could strike at a moment when China would not have any energy to spare for Korea.

You also suggest that if China didn't, the nomadic or Manchurian-based state bordering Korea would instead. You seem to be using my premise of a war between the three as a model. You further suggest that in such a conflict the Chinese and Koreans would be very likely to win decisively. Assuming all that to be the case, I can't imagine why anyone in Manchuria would have the slightest interest in interfering with the Japanese invasion. If anything, I'd expect them to try to cooperate with it.

 

[Admiral Matt]

Um. Japanese DID land in Okinawa. In 1609. Ming did nothing about it for 35 years.

I had no idea. That would have been during their foray into shipbuilding, when they were sailing all over. Fascinating.

What would have strong strategic effects would be for Japan to conquer, garrison and fortify Choushan archipelago - commanding Yangtze delta.

Koxinga, between 1647 and 1662, operated out of Chinese coastal fringe without a safe homebase and survived. It was only in 1662 that he conquered Taiwan - and it was then a tiny coastal fringe that was settled by Chinese. Which is why Koxinga did, for these 15 years, experience problems taking and holding major cities. He could not mobilize large armies out of Japan to confront the land forces whom Qing could mobilize on land.

So what if Koxinga IS backed by the might of Japan - the daimyo are required to send significant detachments to take, fortify and hold Yangzhou, Nanjing et cetera? How easy would it be for Japan+Koxinga to make Yangtze Delta safe as a recruitment area to send armies marching overland to, say, Shandong next?

I wonder if Koxinga would have been open to such a questionable alliance. Anyway if not we can just posit "someone like Koxinga." Although just after the Qing have unified China would not be the ideal moment to get involved, militarily speaking....

Huh.

What if Japan had pulled its act in a 1672-like situation? Now a second Japanese invasion would require a lot of explanation, and how the alternate-Qing could even exist if this is the first Japanese invasion is a real question. But hypothetically speaking, it would be a brutal situation for the Qing.

The Japanese'd go in, overrun Korea, be pushed back by the Qing as the Koreans brutalize their supply lines. Then a or two year later Guizhou, Yunnan, Guangxi, Fujian, and Sichuan would be aligned against Beijing, along with a warlord in the Gansu-Shaanxi borderlands. The rebels would quickly occupy Hunan, then before the Japanese can launch their next try (or the Qing can do more than halt the existing rebels' momentum), Guangdong and Taiwan join the party. A year later, the Japanese are in Korea again. In that situation, a simultaneous descent by sea on the mouth of the Yangtze would seem rather reasonable on the part of the Japanese.

For that matter, if the Japanese could take Nanjing while that much of the south was up in arms, the Qing would already be done for. They'd have lost the Grand Canal, and with it the lines of communication between the "loyal" south and the plains. At that point its just a matter of details - how do the Japanese and the Feudatories (with Wu Sankui preeminent) deal with each other? If they fall out early, China remains in multiple pieces and the Feudatories and Qing both survive in some form. If they fall out late, you get a Japanese north and east and a Han south and west, which then come into conflict.

 

[democracy101]

Yes. I am familiar with the raw bones of Liao history. I was assuming an alternate history scenario in which that were not the case. There's no reason to take a 1592 or 1547 (etc.) POD when discussing what's possible - we can explore all the options.

Likewise I wouldn't expect Liao as a name to recur.

Well, if the Liao had not collapsed against the Jurchen in 1125, it would have been virtually impossible for the state to continuously last until the 16-17th century, as a dynastic change would have occurred, or a rival state (nomadic or Chinese) would have taken over the state, as the Liao wasn't exactly in a stable position after failing to take Kaifeng.

It's also worth noting that the Khitan failed to make further gains against the Song due to three failed campaigns in Goryeo, as they bypassed most of the main fortifications.

Now these are details I had not had, and useful ones at that.

It was meant as a lead-in to the following analysis, and glad you found it useful.

I've reread that a couple of times, because clearly you feel this is a definitive argument. But based on what you've written so far, it isn't one.

The one key flaw is the assumption that the Japanese are invading because of China's weakness. That was the case in the general invasion of 1931-1945, so it's not that far out a position to take. But the invasions of 1592-1598 were purely motivated by the internal political circumstances of Japan. If they'd been looking for opportunities, they would not have seen them in 1590s China!

I'm not arguing that the Japanese do everything right and take over. I'm arguing that they could unify under a leader with Hideyoshi's inclinations at a time when Korea, Manchuria, and especially China were much more susceptible to invasion than they were in OTL 1592.

Think along the lines of the Muslim expansion. Mohammed happened to begin the military part of his adventures concurrently with a massive war between the Byzantines and Persia. When he died, the combatants were finally approaching the point of exhaustion. Then within four years there was a major climatic disaster. Absent this rather bizarre luck, the long triumphant campaigns of the Arabs would have been much reduced, if not stillborn.

My point was that the Jurchen would never have been in a position to significantly threaten the Ming and Joseon simultaneously in order for Japan to take advantage of the situation, and somehow manage to overrun both Korea and North China without forcing to withdraw altogether due to stiff resistance. I only focused on the Japanese invading after the Jurchen making their move because it would have been the worst situation for both China and Korea as a whole. Even if Japan had invaded around 1600 while the Jurchen simultaneously attempted to expand their influence, the Ming and Joseon would have had more than enough resources to spare to confront the invaders, as they had generally deployed less than 50,000 troops against the Jurchen, which would continue as long as both states continued to pit the tribes against each other, as had occurred IOTL.

It's also worth noting that during the Imjin War, because the Jurchen were still a Korean tributary, Nurhaci specifically offered to send his troops to Korea to directly confront Japan, although this was rebuffed by the Joseon court, as it had continued to view the Jurchen as "barbarians," making it not worth the effort. This situation would generally remain the same as long as Japan did not invade before 1630, as a Manchurian entity would only have been able to escape vassalage status after decisively defeating Korea.

I would question the assertion that there would be inevitable interference in Japan's invasion of Korea.

On the matter of China, I think we can agree that a dynasty in the moment of a struggle for survival would not divert loyal troops to defend a vassal. Likewise, we both seem to doubt that such a period of weakness could last more than a decade at best. I feel that means that if luck was with the Japanese, they could strike at a moment when China would not have any energy to spare for Korea.

You also suggest that if China didn't, the nomadic or Manchurian-based state bordering Korea would instead. You seem to be using my premise of a war between the three as a model. You further suggest that in such a conflict the Chinese and Koreans would be very likely to win decisively. Assuming all that to be the case, I can't imagine why anyone in Manchuria would have the slightest interest in interfering with the Japanese invasion. If anything, I'd expect them to try to cooperate with it.

After looking it over, it would probably have been much more likely for the Ming to retain its hold over China, or the Shun (or a similar equivalent) to reunify China. The Manchus managed to attack China precisely because it had subjugated Korea twice beforehand (1627 & 1636-7) with the main goal of preventing Ming and Joseon from forming a concrete alliance, ultimately forcing Korea to nominally switch allegiance to the Qing. However, if the Japanese had not invaded before the Jurchen decided to head further south, Korea would have been in a much stronger position, as its resources would not have been severely depleted, not to mention that a major revolt would not have occurred in 1624. In addition, Gwanghaegun (r. 1608-23) had been conducting thorough negotiations with both the Ming and Jurchen in order to strengthen the Korean military. Given that his position would have been more stable without the Imjin War, due to consolidating his status as the crown prince, he would have been able to make enough preparations to confront the Jurchen over the long term, mostly in conjunction with Ming troops, and possibly redirect most of the troops to fight Japan in the event of a major invasion from the southeast.

In addition, the Japanese specifically invaded Korea in order to invade China, as attacking the peninsula had never been intended in the first place, and was only used as a last measure. If the state originating from Manchuria took over most of North China after taking advantage of chaos due to the Little Ice Age, it would have been well aware of this, and would have sent troops to Korea in order to avoid being caught between an expansionist Japan and a South China continuing to hold out. As a result, aiding Japan would have essentially been suicidal for the alternate "Qing," as doing so would only have made it easier for the Japanese to launch a major incursion into North China. On the other hand, the weakened "Ming/Shun" would have been unable to aid the Japanese in order to restrain its counterpart in North China, due to major commitments along its northern border.

 

[Tyr]

Hideyoshi would have been directly involved in China if Korea had somehow been "conquered," as his main objective had been to conquer China, India, and Southeast Asia, and initially demanded Joseon to "make way" for an invasion of China, although this was refused by the Korean court. In other words, the Chinese would have been involved, regardless of the situation, and the numerous Korean guerrilla efforts (with the navy's support) would have been more than enough to tie the Japanese down in the peninsula.

True that the original intention was to invade China. But given how tough Korea proved I don't think its certain he would have followed through into China if they hadn't gotten involved themselves- which is a bit unlikely given Korea was a Chinese vassal. All getting into impossible theoreticals here though.

He managed Korea as well as the US managed Afghanistan and Iraq; winning overwhelming military victories before discovering that holding the land was a bit more difficult than conquering it. As much as Chinese intervention was helpful, ultimately, the Korean contribution, first in disruption of Japanese supply lines, and later in the naval theater cannot be understated.
.

It can. It is typically way too overstated what with it being something Korean nationalists are fond of and 'iron clads' being cool. Supply lines really weren't that big a deal to armies of the time and guerilla warfare was rather easy to deal with since you could just kill everyone without concern for PR.

 

[democracy101]

True that the original intention was to invade China. But given how tough Korea proved I don't think its certain he would have followed through into China if they hadn't gotten involved themselves- which is a bit unlikely given Korea was a Chinese vassal. All getting into impossible theoreticals here though.

Japan would only have been able to "conquer" Korea if it had managed to sweep through the entire peninsula within six months or so, similar to what had occurred during the first invasion before Chinese intervention. In this case, Hideyoshi would have been confident enough to carry out his plan of invading China, which would have elicited a strong response from the Ming, ultimately forcing the invaders to retreat back to the archipelago after sustaining significant losses. On the other hand, if it had taken Japan much longer to advance through Korea, China would have eventually intervened in order to protect its tributary, as it had no major military engagements at the time, due to the internal fragmentation of nomadic entities for decades. It's also worth mentioning that the Ming's decision to send a relatively token force IOTL ended up turning the tide in the long run.

It can. It is typically way too overstated what with it being something Korean nationalists are fond of and 'iron clads' being cool. Supply lines really weren't that big a deal to armies of the time and guerilla warfare was rather easy to deal with since you could just kill everyone without concern for PR.

It's worth noting that Yi Sun-shin's abilities were admired by Chinese and Japanese contemporaries alike, as Chen Lin praised the admiral when reporting to both the Ming and Joseon rulers, while Wakisaka Yasuharu admitted in private correspondence that he both feared and respected his Korean counterpart, which wouldn't have made sense if Yi's tactics had not significantly affected Japanese planning during the war. In addition, the Japanese had systematically carried out massacres of entire villages that had continued to put up stiff resistance, which didn't exactly prevent the guerrillas operating from mountains, nor various fortresses continuing to hold out despite being severely outnumbered.

In any case, the Chinese would have ultimately intervened, due to reasons stated above, forcing the Japanese to retreat altogether.

 

[chornedsnorkack]

I had no idea. That would have been during their foray into shipbuilding, when they were sailing all over. Fascinating.



I wonder if Koxinga would have been open to such a questionable alliance. Anyway if not we can just posit "someone like Koxinga." Although just after the Qing have unified China would not be the ideal moment to get involved, militarily speaking....

Huh.

What if Japan had pulled its act in a 1672-like situation? Now a second Japanese invasion would require a lot of explanation, and how the alternate-Qing could even exist if this is the first Japanese invasion is a real question. But hypothetically speaking, it would be a brutal situation for the Qing.

The Japanese'd go in, overrun Korea, be pushed back by the Qing as the Koreans brutalize their supply lines.

Uh, why?
In 1592, Japanese were attacking because they were overestimating their newfound strength. Neither Korea nor China was particularly troubled in 1592 - so Hideyoshi first asked Korea to defect without fighting for China and when Korea refused, attacked Korea first.

From 1644, Korea is not particularly troubled, but China IS. So, if Japan decides to try second invasion, an obvious option would be to leave Korea alone and sail directly for China. South China first.

How would Korea react?

 

[RousseauX]

The big difference between the Japanese and the Manchus is that the Manchus only really needed to hold down northern and southern China.

A Japanese dynasty would try to hold:

1) Japan
2) Korea
3) N.China
4) S.China
5) Sealanes between Japan and China

The Manchus only really need to fight the southern Chinese and maybe the Tibetans after they took out the Shang but the Japanese needed to fight

1) Ming loyalists
2) Mongols/Manchus
3) Tibetans/Uighurs/whatever Turkish tribes to the west

The key differences is that the Japanese have no real solution to the northern nomadic threat that every Chinese dynasty before the Qing struggled with. And they need to keep control of the seas, which no Chinese government of this era did well in, and directly occupying Korea. So they basically have to hold on to more areas faced with more threats with a less stable domestic settlement.

The Japanese would also, at least initially, try to partition feudally the country between the various daimyos loyal to Hideyoshi (or whoever comes over).

While the Manchus rapidly sinized, the Japanese probably cannot/will not do so. Because they have an independent, alternative center of power in Japan itself. This makes governing the country very difficult.

The Manchus won out in China due to a power vacuum and rapidly adopting the Chinese model of governance with a foreign racial elite at the very, very top instead of a Han elite. The Japanese would be fighting in China against powerful opponents in the form of the Manchus and Mongols for control. At the same time, I don't think they will adopt the Chinese model and incorporate the local gentry, at least right away.

But I think the most important factor is domestic Japanese politics. Assuming we are talking about the 1590s, Hideyoshi is going to die pretty soon, and the western Daiymos who formed his family's power base and which followed him to Korea are going to be even weaker militarily vice-verse Tokugawa's eastern lords (who never committed). Once Hideyoshi dies, his Daiymos in China have to make the decision of how much to send back to Japan to fight in the up coming civil war.

TTL's Sekigahara is still going to go Tokugawa's way. Tokugawa is going to have very little interest in foreign adventures. So basically now you got a bunch of Hideyoshi's Daiymos in charge of large swath of China, militarily weakened, but still holding onto significant land/resources, and facing perhaps insurmountable military challenge in the form of Manchus, pirates, resurgent Han rebels. Do they incorporate themselves into a new order in China or fight to the death?

 

[Admiral Matt]

*snip*

So if we assume states able to perform at the level of the OTL Ming and Joseon present when Japan invaded, the results would likely be limited.

Therefor the crisis in at least China would need to be much worse, and would need to be unusually long. Perhaps not even a crisis, then, but another division of China following a crisis.

 

[Admiral Matt]

From 1644, Korea is not particularly troubled, but China IS. So, if Japan decides to try second invasion, an obvious option would be to leave Korea alone and sail directly for China. South China first.

How would Korea react?

I can't help but think they'd intervene. They're sitting right on Japan's supply lines. The Japanese manifestly can't make a longterm effort in China without Korea - either as an ally or a subject. I don't see any way around it.

 

[Admiral Matt]

The big difference between the Japanese and the Manchus is that the Manchus only really needed to hold down northern and southern China.

A Japanese dynasty would try to hold:

1) Japan
2) Korea
3) N.China
4) S.China
5) Sealanes between Japan and China

The Manchus only really need to fight the southern Chinese and maybe the Tibetans after they took out the Shang but the Japanese needed to fight

1) Ming loyalists
2) Mongols/Manchus
3) Tibetans/Uighurs/whatever Turkish tribes to the west

The key differences is that the Japanese have no real solution to the northern nomadic threat that every Chinese dynasty before the Qing struggled with. And they need to keep control of the seas, which no Chinese government of this era did well in, and directly occupying Korea. So they basically have to hold on to more areas faced with more threats with a less stable domestic settlement.

The Japanese would also, at least initially, try to partition feudally the country between the various daimyos loyal to Hideyoshi (or whoever comes over).

While the Manchus rapidly sinized, the Japanese probably cannot/will not do so. Because they have an independent, alternative center of power in Japan itself. This makes governing the country very difficult.

The Manchus won out in China due to a power vacuum and rapidly adopting the Chinese model of governance with a foreign racial elite at the very, very top instead of a Han elite. The Japanese would be fighting in China against powerful opponents in the form of the Manchus and Mongols for control. At the same time, I don't think they will adopt the Chinese model and incorporate the local gentry, at least right away.

But I think the most important factor is domestic Japanese politics. Assuming we are talking about the 1590s, Hideyoshi is going to die pretty soon, and the western Daiymos who formed his family's power base and which followed him to Korea are going to be even weaker militarily vice-verse Tokugawa's eastern lords (who never committed). Once Hideyoshi dies, his Daiymos in China have to make the decision of how much to send back to Japan to fight in the up coming civil war.

TTL's Sekigahara is still going to go Tokugawa's way. Tokugawa is going to have very little interest in foreign adventures. So basically now you got a bunch of Hideyoshi's Daiymos in charge of large swath of China, militarily weakened, but still holding onto significant land/resources, and facing perhaps insurmountable military challenge in the form of Manchus, pirates, resurgent Han rebels. Do they incorporate themselves into a new order in China or fight to the death?

Overall very well put. I do have a few questions, though.

Who do you mean by Shang?

What makes you say the Qing assimilated? They ruled an efficient apartheid-style state, enforcing orthodox Confucianism to placate the dominated majority ethnicity.

With a Hideyoshi figure holding much of China, couldn't he just buy off most of the Daimyo with titles on the continent? Anyone who stayed to rely on their estates in Japan would be hopelessly poor compared to those who opted to snag a Chinese province for themselves.

 

[chornedsnorkack]

I can't help but think they'd intervene. They're sitting right on Japan's supply lines. The Japanese manifestly can't make a longterm effort in China without Korea - either as an ally or a subject. I don't see any way around it.

Koxinga did OTL make a longterm effort without either Japan or Korea as an ally.

Korea had been subjugated by Qing invasion in 1636, which trapped the king in a mountain fortress, starved him out in lack of relief and forced him to surrender princes as hostages. Korea was a tributary of China till 1895, but Korean Confucian writers continued to express contempt for Qing barbarians, and claim that Korea alone preserved the real Confucianism.

Immediately after a post-1644 Japan undertakes invasion of Japan, it would not be obviously beneficial for Korea to ally with Japan because Korea would still be vulnerable to Qing overland attack, and now the hostages are vulnerable, too. But does Japan actually need active alliance of Korea?
The supply line from Nagasaki to Zhoushan passes a long distance south of the mainland coast of Korea, over open East China Sea. True, Chejudo is a bit closer. But if necessary, the Japanese ships can follow the Ryukyu island chain, which they controlled and which China nor Korea never attempted to attack.

What Korea might conceivably do would have been build a navy and actually sail to raid Japan and force Japan to defend themselves at home. But this would be a huge effort for Korea. Korea never did, in OTL, bring war home to Japan.

Considering the resentment of Korea against Qing attack of 1636... could Korea adopt friendly neutrality, and agree with Japan via their contacts through Pusan and Tsushima that Korea will not molest Japanese warships which stray to Korean coast, and Japanese warships are forbidden to raid and molest Korean coasts?

If Qing complains, then the Korean government could plead poverty and weak naval forces, to conceal the unwillingness to actually fight to help the Qing.

Korea had actively supported the Ming war against Manchu in Manchuria 1619...1636. After, in 1636, Korea recognized herself as a vassal of Qing and therefore Qing as the legal government of whole China, how much did OTL Korea contribute to Qing war effort against Ming between 1636 and 1644?

 

[LeX]

What makes you say the Qing assimilated? They ruled an efficient apartheid-style state, enforcing orthodox Confucianism to placate the dominated majority ethnicity.

Maybe not politically assimilated (until the 1900s), but certainly assimilated in an ethnic and cultural sense. Keep in mind that there were Han bannermen.

As for Japan establishing a dynasty in China, it seems that it would have to first create a solid presence in Korea by conquering it and totally extinguishing any native peninsular kingdom. This would happen sometimes towards the end of the Yuan dynasty in the 1300s. A couple hundred years later, Korea is solidly Japanese and the "Ming" is suffering from revolts, Mongols, and Manchus. The Ming collapses as IOTL, and the Japanese move in to snatch Manchuria and turn it into a vassal. With peace on the Yalu, some Manchu leader goes and tries to conquer China. He succeeds in taking North China and making peace with the Mongols, but is stopped around the Yangtze, with a "southern Ming" remaining. All this is happening in the late 1500s or early 1600s.

In the 1600s, Japan, which by this point is a true multinational empire (the Korean language by now a dialect of Japanese similar to Cantonese vs Mandarin), betrays the Manchus and, with help from Mongols, blitzkriegs their holdings. The result is that Manchuria and much of North China fall to the Japanese. The Mongols and Southern Ming benefit as well. Entering into alliance with the Mongols, the Japanese, who move their capital and imperial court to Beijing and rule under a Chinese/Manchu bureaucracy, then proceed to pacify the "rebels" in southern China. The deed is done by the late 1600s.

This empire would probably be short-lived. Like Admiral Matt I doubt the Japanese would be able to fundamentally deal with the Mongols using the Manchurian model, and as others have said, assimilation into Chinese culture would be difficult for the Japanese, who have their own densely-populated islands to rule over, as would having to affect control over many more geographically strategic points. This is why I think it is essential for them to have a foothold on Korea for a long time first, so that they can get their most major lifeline under control as well as get experience in dealing with and assimilating foreign populations.

The results of such an empire, even if it only has control over a significant part of China for a few decades, could be long-lasting. Culturally, it would force China to recognize the potential of this Japan that has a permanent presence in mainland Asia in the form of Korea. It would also bring about increased sinicization in Korea and Japan if the Japanese rulers fancy themselves as rightful candidates for ruling "all under Heaven". Finally, whatever Chinese dynasty (or collection of states) replaces the Japanese empire in China will not have the luxury that the Qing did of remaining complacent in the 1700s and 1800s. Faced with constant threats from not only the Mongols but Japan as well, our hypothetical Chinese dynasty would be quite military-oriented and be quick to pick up on technological and industrial advances when they become available.

 

[RousseauX]

Overall very well put. I do have a few questions, though.

Thanks!

Who do you mean by Shang?

I meant the Shun dynasty founded by Li Zicheng. It was a typo

What makes you say the Qing assimilated? They ruled an efficient apartheid-style state, enforcing orthodox Confucianism to placate the dominated majority ethnicity.

Their numbers were so small that they were only capable of dominating the very top layer of the government (they were like...2-3% of the Chinese population IIRC), which means the Han largely ran the country anyway.

But the Manchus also lacked their own (as far as I know) cultural and governance tradition to outweigh that of China's, therefore, presenting themselves as the son of Heaven and adopting the Chinese system of governance acceptable to the Chinese gentry seems easy. The japanese OTOH might very well impose their feudal system and it was around this time that they started spewing about how -they- were better heirs to the Han confucian tradition than the Chinese themselves were. In other words, I see them as much less likely of adopting the Chinese system than the Manchus.

With a Hideyoshi figure holding much of China, couldn't he just buy off most of the Daimyo with titles on the continent? Anyone who stayed to rely on their estates in Japan would be hopelessly poor compared to those who opted to snag a Chinese province for themselves.

Assuming OTL, the ones who went to Korea/China with Hideyoshi were the western Daimyos who stood for his son at Sekigahara anyway (well, sort of anyway since quite a few defected). I don't think it's politically viable for Hideyoshi to hand out lands to the lords who went for Tokugawa's faction OTL. If the western lords did all the fighting in China only for Hideyoshi to start handing out lands to the eastern lords they won't be happy, to say the very least.

I guess it's possible that greater success might draw more of the Japanese lords into the war. But then again bribing people with land works while Hideyoshi is alive. As soon as he dies all the pieces gets thrown up in the air and there is no telling how the power struggle works out.

 

[chornedsnorkack]

But the Manchus also lacked their own (as far as I know) cultural and governance tradition to outweigh that of China's,

But they did adopt a lot of the cultural and governance tradition.

therefore, presenting themselves as the son of Heaven and adopting the Chinese system of governance acceptable to the Chinese gentry seems easy. The japanese OTOH might very well impose their feudal system

But the Japanese feudal system was a fairly new development in 17th century. The Japanese could have adapted it, to adopt the Chinese system of government.

and it was around this time that they started spewing about how -they- were better heirs to the Han confucian tradition than the Chinese themselves were. In other words, I see them as much less likely of adopting the Chinese system than the Manchus.

But they already were much closer to Chinese than Manchus.