One other thought I had in the shower this morning (yes I am enough of an Alt-History Geek to think of this stuff in the shower).
July 10, 1942 Australian Navy having heard nothing from the US Informs the Australian PM who sends a cable to FDR... (OTL the decision was made July 5, the Australians were informed of the schedule by July 8 so they could plan for their part of the operation). FDR talks to Ernie King, about helping out our allies and how we can't ignore the needs of our alliance partners. Ernie King sends a scathing cable to Admiral X asking why he hasn't taken action on operation "Shoestring", after all this is war we can't take a month off to make decisions. Be decisive or be relieved.
Things go on much as OTL. There were good reasons why the US did all of the things that they did. And not just US public and private pressure, they have allies and other services that are putting pressure on the USN as well as Congress and the other senor officers. So I think it would be very hard for the USN to slow down much more than they did in OTL.
This whole thread has triggered some ideas I may try to write a TL where Japan wins at Midway and play with some of the ideas that have come out here. (In another thread of course!).
Tom.
I will now be admiral X, the timid admiral. I will go with FDR still wants aggression after a few days. I believe it will cause chaos. These are samples, so i may miss personality style of Admirals. I think the changes still cause chaos and issues.
July 10, 1942 Aussie PM send cable to FDR.
July 12, 1942 FDR chews out King.
July 13, 1942 King sends memo as above.
July 14, 1942. Admiral X does not enjoy coffee. Not wanting to be 4th in row, quickly review of what it takes to please FDR. Clear lessons - Always do exactly what FDR wants or lose job. Second - If lose big, lose job. Order staff to stop work on my new battle plan to be sent to Washington at end of month. By July 20th, have new South Pacific focus plan. I instruct XO to issue warning orders to all commanders, but not to change orders. And to report to me a 5 am tomorrow on complications he sees. Send cable to King asking if Sec Navy 1.75 order still stands.
BTW, i like FDR skipping chain of command, he did that a lot with Navy.
July 15, King meets with Sec Navy. Sec Navy not happy about FDR skipping him, but does grant waiver for South Pacific carrier due to FDR focus. Order 5 man review board to be appointed to review carrier battles, have report ready for presidential briefing on July 1. MacArthur sense a way to get more troops sends cable to Army if South Pacific area is transferred to SW, all this mess would not have happened. Also points out his superior ability would not have lost carriers.
July 16, I get reply from King. Carriers are near West Coast. Half of South Pacific surface fleet in Pearl. South Pacific in Pearl immediately send back. I also send most of Pearl CA, CL and BB with them. Tell Carriers they have up to 10 days for any need repairs at the Naval base. They will be moving out with TF that includes all available CA, CLAA, and BB that happen to be on West Coast. Also cable 1st Marine division on status. Reply back is that he can be ready before ships arrive from Pearl or West Coast. I am glad that i did not move the logistical ships or land craft. Meet with Air commander and intel rest of day. Decide that i can defend Pearl with the extra air units (4 fighter/6 bomber squadrons order) and 5 divisions at Pearl. Intel guy says 2 Jap carriers near truk, 2 in dry dock for repairs upkeep, 2 ready, and 2 new carriers in workup, but could be ready on short notice.
July 26 Carriers leave San Diego. 1st Marine Reports ready to go.
August 15 - Carriers arrive in landing staging area. I am tempted to find some reason to delay the operation, but any delay over a few weeks gets me fired, and the additional carriers are still months away. If i have a second division and landing craft in the area, i will be tempted to use it to. Going big on land may make up for weaknesses in Naval.
August 25 - Date set for landing. Tides, local considerations, etc. This is actually faster than i expected, mainly because FDR reversed course before i finished my 25 day review which would have started to move logistics, transport, and land units. A month later, and i have started to moving amp stuff to Pearl for the Central focus campaign. The other benefit is that the 1st Marine left San Diego before i assumed command, otherwise the pause command would have them prepping in San Diego, but there is a lot of randomness in war.
BTW, based on FDR pattern of firing and the you must go order, only a direct order by FDR will stop the attack.
Analysis compared to OTL.
1) Japan has 6 not 4 carriers available within a few weeks. They will have 8 by the end of the year. The USA has 2 not 4.
2) Japan has had another 20 days to prep airfield and prepare other defenses.
3) All these order changes have generated a huge amount of radio traffic. Japan does not have the codes, but they may see higher radio traffic indicates an operation. On the bright side, moving the ships around maybe have confused them, and the Japanese may still be unprepared.
4) The loss of the carriers will weaken land air in the South Pacific. I did not remove air power, but the South will not be getting many new air units over the next few months.
To me, the most likely outcome is the First Marine division is lost after months of hard combat. Even if the USA sinks more carriers than Japanese by a 2 to 1 margin, Japan controls the sea at the end of the battle. To me, this indicates that inaction (active defense) is the best action at the end of 1942.
At best, the slower, more costly battle makes MacArthur look even better. I see President MacArthur. A loss makes him look even better by comparison. If i get fired, MacArthur is going to be Supreme Commander, All Pacific forces.