Japanese Carrier Victory Coral Sea

CalBear

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Aerial mines were latecomers to the party.:rolleyes: The Sub Force had Japan on the ropes already. From Jan '45, there were no ships of substantial size (over about 500 tons IIRC) sunk by Sub Force, since trade was limited to small coasters (about 500 tons & under), or it was in the Sea of Japan, entrances to which were too heavily mined to be worth the risk sending lots of boats into. (There was a nine-boat operation late on, but only once.) Japan lasting another 12mo is a longshot.

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Actually Operation Starvation, the B-29 mining effort, one of the great successes, by any force from any combatant, during the entire war. For the loss of six aircraft the Operation put better than 12,000 mines in place that resulted in the sinking or crippling of 1.25 million tons of Japanese shipping.

Operation Starvation was meant to collect the coastal steamers and the shipping that operated in waters where the subs were not worth risking. This made it an especially effective addition to the blockade.

As the post stream that preceded this shows, any estimate of the Japanese making past September of 1945 was in response to a poster's estimate that the loss of Midway would have extended the Pacific War by 12-18 months.
 
Agreed. The issue I had in mind was IJN success, which puts Hawaii under far too much threat to be accepted.

Yeah, I think my scenario is a draw (from that perspective) - the strictly naval action might be a success, the rest is at best a flop and at worst a fiasco, depending on how much the Japanese put in before recognizing this is stupid even for them and send their forces to do some other operation, leaving Midway battered (perhaps) but not taken.

True. As said, it's not like Nimitz had a lot of options. Leaving Moresby, or Midway, to be taken without a fight is a non-starter.
Agreed. If there's a realistic chance (or the perception of the same) of either happening, carriers are sallying. I feel like I'm paraphrasing someone for some other fight here, but: If they're lost, the ships won't be worth anything.

Midway OTL was done on just that principle, to some extent, TTL isn't changing why.

Agreed, & I don't anticipate Nimitz looking for a fight when he's at such a decided disatvantage. Being able to avoid one is another matter.
Yeah. This gets into issues like the above - you might be able to feasibly delay a US offense with what's left of the carriers, but you can't really just pull them back to Pearl or California and twiddle thumbs. That kind of pull back would get Nimitz or anyone else fired lickedy-split.

What would you have Nimitz do in these cases, then?:confused::confused: I don't see he had any choice but fight with what he had.
Succeed. :D I'm just pointing out that in this scenario (carrier wipe out), it has been tried and failed.

Nimitiz did the right thing here, and his subordinates played their hand well.

If it means greater threat to SLOCs, or friendly bases, what option is there? (BlondieBC gets it right, & I wrong: Guadalcanal did need CVs for the landing to happen.:() Bear in mind, tho, USN has the initiative, & can strike wherever it wants (continued "tip & run" ops, which is what I meant).
There's that. But how much of a threat is worth risking them?

If I implied just throwing force against a superior enemy, my bad. I didn't mean that at all. It appears we agree.:cool:
Yeah, I think you are implying a more aggressive policy than I'm thinking is feasible, but not by very much - we're disagreeing on details, and not even on those for most of the fleet.

You didn't, & if I implied I thought you did, my bad.:eek:
No worries. We're looking at approximately the same thing - the carriers and such might be pulled back, the rest is another story. How much the former is maintained even at risk of Japanese triumphs...depends on a bunch of stuff, but I can't see OTL's admirals not at least trying if it gets down to Midway for instance being in real danger.

The USN has a long and proud tradition of bravery in the face of danger, I don't think any plausible timeline is butterflying that no matter how bad the carrier situation is.

:mad: My view exactly.
I hope there's a place in hell for that. Its not even well intentioned stupid.
 
Actually Operation Starvation, the B-29 mining effort, one of the great successes, by any force from any combatant, during the entire war. For the loss of six aircraft the Operation put better than 12,000 mines in place that resulted in the sinking or crippling of 1.25 million tons of Japanese shipping.

Operation Starvation was meant to collect the coastal steamers and the shipping that operated in waters where the subs were not worth risking. This made it an especially effective addition to the blockade.
I don't mean to minimize its effectiveness by any means. I just think the impact wasn't felt til past the point the Sub Force had already turned off the tap. (Admittedly, I have some bias in favor of the subs...;))
As the post stream that preceded this shows, any estimate of the Japanese making past September of 1945 was in response to a poster's estimate that the loss of Midway would have extended the Pacific War by 12-18 months.
Noted, & agreed, it wouldn't.
Yeah, I think my scenario is a draw (from that perspective) - the strictly naval action might be a success, the rest is at best a flop and at worst a fiasco, depending on how much the Japanese put in before recognizing this is stupid even for them and send their forces to do some other operation, leaving Midway battered (perhaps) but not taken.
Nimitz might not have thought so at the time (nor King, nor FDR), but if Yamamoto failed to invade & hold, Nimitz wins, even if he loses all his CVs & has most of the garrison wiped out.
If there's a realistic chance (or the perception of the same) of either happening, carriers are sallying. I feel like I'm paraphrasing someone for some other fight here, but: If they're lost, the ships won't be worth anything.
I get the feeling I'm lifting it from somebody, too. Ships are built to fight, otherwise what are they good for? Nimitz wouldn't like the losses, but he'd know they were necessary. King, I think, would give less a damn, but maybe I'm being nasty; he was an SOB, but AFAIK, not a heartless SOB.;)
Midway OTL was done on just that principle, to some extent, TTL isn't changing why.
No, Nimitz did say "calculated risk": "don't lose your shirt" (TTL, he'd have added "if you can help it").
you can't really just pull them back to Pearl or California and twiddle thumbs. That kind of pull back would get Nimitz or anyone else fired lickedy-split.
Can't, & I don't see that being Nimitz's style anyhow, even if King would tolerate it. :)rolleyes:)
:rolleyes: Everybody's a comedian.:rolleyes::p
There's that. But how much of a threat is worth risking them?
IDK how far Nimitz would push before he'd move. Japan building an airbase at Tulagi/Guadalcanal provoked a counterattack. Would he let them finish it? Could he risk that? IDK. If he didn't have the force to counter, could he accept rerouting convoys away? Would King, Marshall, & FDR live with that? (Would they put up with MacArthur's complaining for long?:rolleyes:)
Yeah, I think you are implying a more aggressive policy than I'm thinking is feasible, but not by very much - we're disagreeing on details, and not even on those for most of the fleet.
I'd say not. I have in mind more of the pre-Midway kind of ops for a longer period over a broader area, because that's all Nimitz can do. If he has the wit to pull Christie's subs back to Pearl, so much the better.;) (Worse for Japan.:eek:)
We're looking at approximately the same thing - the carriers and such might be pulled back, the rest is another story. How much the former is maintained even at risk of Japanese triumphs...depends on a bunch of stuff, but I can't see OTL's admirals not at least trying if it gets down to Midway for instance being in real danger.

The USN has a long and proud tradition of bravery in the face of danger, I don't think any plausible timeline is butterflying that no matter how bad the carrier situation is.
I take the view that Nimitz's response would be about the most measured you'd get. Halsey would do something stupid. Fletcher IMO would be more timid. (I admit a bias; he may not be as bad as I think.) Spruance might even do something more interesting (if he's as smart as I've read; IDK enough about him), maybe even adopt the options Nimitz didn't (but I wish he had:(). I don't see any senior USN officer being as timid as BlondieBC seems to demand for this to work, & honestly, if Nimitz got fired, IMO King would replace him with somebody more likely to be aggressive to the point of stupidity, not less. FDR wanted victories, not delay. (Actually, if King had been a trifle more persuasive, Coral Sea could've been a slaughter of IJN CVs, with Hornet & Enterprise there, too.:rolleyes:)
I hope there's a place in hell for that. Its not even well intentioned stupid.
Amen. Let history roast them, & tell your friends. "Damn anyone who won't sit up all night cursing John Jay." Substitute Fife & Christie, for me, with a dishonorable mention for Spike Blandy. (Who, shockingly, was Lockwood's friend.:eek: Tho Blandy wasn't OIC when the Mark 6 was {not:rolleyes:} tested...)
 
Hi,

with the Coral Sea being a big japanese victory you need
- less japanese pilots lost
- both american carriers sunk
- soho saved - even without PM invaded (i doubt the japanese can take it, but honestly i do not know much abouot the australian strengh at PM in may 1942), so to optimize it, japan take PM.... loosing the soho...

in this situation the americans can try to make a trap at midway, but will they do?
Saratoga is out, wasp isn´t in and with two carriers against 4 (or 5-6!) the chance of sucsess is small.

But just let say the japanese have more luck - winning midway (sink both carriers, 4-5 cruisers and a few supplyships) with "Only" loosing kaga...

so the japanese have shown that they are superior, could beat americans at will...

i doubt the usa will risk anything... they will produce even more ships, better planes and start with a 4:1-superioity in areas they have best tactical chances... so they will (slowly) tear down the japanese....
without knowing how many ships the japanese loose against the subs it is open, for sure the japanese will visit the indian ocean and try to sink the british commerce fleet here - this could have BIG influence in northern africa, also for russian supply through persia.

the end will be the same, in a certain time the americans will battle the japanese and will win, cause better pilots, ships, radar and strategy means victory... but i bet it will be 9-12 months later compared to otl... the nukes will still end the war around august/september 45, but the allies will have not taken so much from the "japanese empire" and it will be more costly for the allies in the time summer 1942-summer 1944...
 
One other thought I had in the shower this morning (yes I am enough of an Alt-History Geek to think of this stuff in the shower).

Even if as BlondeBC suggests Nimitz gets canned and a more conservative cautious admiral is put in place that admiral may not be able to avoid Guadalcanal. It was a joint US/Australian effort and there will be quite a bit of pressure from the Australians to go through with it to keep the Japanese from getting any closer to the shipping lanes serving Australia's east coast. That after all was why the Japanese wanted Guadalcanal in the first place - an airfield closer to those shipping lanes so they could raid with land based air.

So the timeline that BlondeBC proposed would be amended to look more like
June 15, 1942 - Nimitz relieved of command. Secretary of Navy issues an order than unless a 1.75 to 1 ratio can be achieved in Air Power, no carrier battles are to occur without his personal authorization. Admiral X is appointed new commander.

June 20, 1942 - Nimitz XO issues orders to prepare way for new commander. 1st Marine Division is told to continue preparing for Solomon Island Campaign, but to be prepared for different orders from the new commander. Orders are issues to transfer half the South Pacific surface fleet back to Pearl Harbor to replace the losses.

July 4, 1942 American B-17 flies over Guadalcanal and confirms presence of Japanese building an airstrip. (OTL shouldn't change)

July 5, 1942 Admiral X arrives in Pearl Harbor. He spends most of the month organizing his new command and trying to learn how the previous two commanders failed so badly. He also shuffles his command staff, relieving 5 admirals of their command. Ready the Secretary of the Navy 1.75-to-1 order, he orders the two remaining carriers back to San Diego.

July 10, 1942 Australian Navy having heard nothing from the US Informs the Australian PM who sends a cable to FDR... (OTL the decision was made July 5, the Australians were informed of the schedule by July 8 so they could plan for their part of the operation). FDR talks to Ernie King, about helping out our allies and how we can't ignore the needs of our alliance partners. Ernie King sends a scathing cable to Admiral X asking why he hasn't taken action on operation "Shoestring", after all this is war we can't take a month off to make decisions. Be decisive or be relieved.

Things go on much as OTL. There were good reasons why the US did all of the things that they did. And not just US public and private pressure, they have allies and other services that are putting pressure on the USN as well as Congress and the other senor officers. So I think it would be very hard for the USN to slow down much more than they did in OTL.

This whole thread has triggered some ideas I may try to write a TL where Japan wins at Midway and play with some of the ideas that have come out here. (In another thread of course!).

Tom.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
One other thought I had in the shower this morning (yes I am enough of an Alt-History Geek to think of this stuff in the shower).


July 10, 1942 Australian Navy having heard nothing from the US Informs the Australian PM who sends a cable to FDR... (OTL the decision was made July 5, the Australians were informed of the schedule by July 8 so they could plan for their part of the operation). FDR talks to Ernie King, about helping out our allies and how we can't ignore the needs of our alliance partners. Ernie King sends a scathing cable to Admiral X asking why he hasn't taken action on operation "Shoestring", after all this is war we can't take a month off to make decisions. Be decisive or be relieved.

Things go on much as OTL. There were good reasons why the US did all of the things that they did. And not just US public and private pressure, they have allies and other services that are putting pressure on the USN as well as Congress and the other senor officers. So I think it would be very hard for the USN to slow down much more than they did in OTL.

This whole thread has triggered some ideas I may try to write a TL where Japan wins at Midway and play with some of the ideas that have come out here. (In another thread of course!).

Tom.

I will now be admiral X, the timid admiral. I will go with FDR still wants aggression after a few days. I believe it will cause chaos. These are samples, so i may miss personality style of Admirals. I think the changes still cause chaos and issues.

July 10, 1942 Aussie PM send cable to FDR.

July 12, 1942 FDR chews out King.

July 13, 1942 King sends memo as above.

July 14, 1942. Admiral X does not enjoy coffee. Not wanting to be 4th in row, quickly review of what it takes to please FDR. Clear lessons - Always do exactly what FDR wants or lose job. Second - If lose big, lose job. Order staff to stop work on my new battle plan to be sent to Washington at end of month. By July 20th, have new South Pacific focus plan. I instruct XO to issue warning orders to all commanders, but not to change orders. And to report to me a 5 am tomorrow on complications he sees. Send cable to King asking if Sec Navy 1.75 order still stands.

BTW, i like FDR skipping chain of command, he did that a lot with Navy.

July 15, King meets with Sec Navy. Sec Navy not happy about FDR skipping him, but does grant waiver for South Pacific carrier due to FDR focus. Order 5 man review board to be appointed to review carrier battles, have report ready for presidential briefing on July 1. MacArthur sense a way to get more troops sends cable to Army if South Pacific area is transferred to SW, all this mess would not have happened. Also points out his superior ability would not have lost carriers.

July 16, I get reply from King. Carriers are near West Coast. Half of South Pacific surface fleet in Pearl. South Pacific in Pearl immediately send back. I also send most of Pearl CA, CL and BB with them. Tell Carriers they have up to 10 days for any need repairs at the Naval base. They will be moving out with TF that includes all available CA, CLAA, and BB that happen to be on West Coast. Also cable 1st Marine division on status. Reply back is that he can be ready before ships arrive from Pearl or West Coast. I am glad that i did not move the logistical ships or land craft. Meet with Air commander and intel rest of day. Decide that i can defend Pearl with the extra air units (4 fighter/6 bomber squadrons order) and 5 divisions at Pearl. Intel guy says 2 Jap carriers near truk, 2 in dry dock for repairs upkeep, 2 ready, and 2 new carriers in workup, but could be ready on short notice.

July 26 Carriers leave San Diego. 1st Marine Reports ready to go.

August 15 - Carriers arrive in landing staging area. I am tempted to find some reason to delay the operation, but any delay over a few weeks gets me fired, and the additional carriers are still months away. If i have a second division and landing craft in the area, i will be tempted to use it to. Going big on land may make up for weaknesses in Naval.

August 25 - Date set for landing. Tides, local considerations, etc. This is actually faster than i expected, mainly because FDR reversed course before i finished my 25 day review which would have started to move logistics, transport, and land units. A month later, and i have started to moving amp stuff to Pearl for the Central focus campaign. The other benefit is that the 1st Marine left San Diego before i assumed command, otherwise the pause command would have them prepping in San Diego, but there is a lot of randomness in war.

BTW, based on FDR pattern of firing and the you must go order, only a direct order by FDR will stop the attack.

Analysis compared to OTL.

1) Japan has 6 not 4 carriers available within a few weeks. They will have 8 by the end of the year. The USA has 2 not 4.

2) Japan has had another 20 days to prep airfield and prepare other defenses.

3) All these order changes have generated a huge amount of radio traffic. Japan does not have the codes, but they may see higher radio traffic indicates an operation. On the bright side, moving the ships around maybe have confused them, and the Japanese may still be unprepared.

4) The loss of the carriers will weaken land air in the South Pacific. I did not remove air power, but the South will not be getting many new air units over the next few months.

To me, the most likely outcome is the First Marine division is lost after months of hard combat. Even if the USA sinks more carriers than Japanese by a 2 to 1 margin, Japan controls the sea at the end of the battle. To me, this indicates that inaction (active defense) is the best action at the end of 1942.

At best, the slower, more costly battle makes MacArthur look even better. I see President MacArthur. A loss makes him look even better by comparison. If i get fired, MacArthur is going to be Supreme Commander, All Pacific forces.
 
Yup, I see ugly precedents being set of politicians overruling military decisions for non-military reasons. Could cause problems militarily later in the century.

Tom.
 
Nimitz might not have thought so at the time (nor King, nor FDR), but if Yamamoto failed to invade & hold, Nimitz wins, even if he loses all his CVs & has most of the garrison wiped out.

Well, it depends on what you call a win. I'm looking at this as "If victory is what you said (Midway is lost, and the navy's butt is kicked), a draw is the second, and a defeat is OTL, where the Japanese accomplish nothing worth their sacrifices".

That make sense?

I get the feeling I'm lifting it from somebody, too. Ships are built to fight, otherwise what are they good for? Nimitz wouldn't like the losses, but he'd know they were necessary. King, I think, would give less a damn, but maybe I'm being nasty; he was an SOB, but AFAIK, not a heartless SOB.;)

Yeah.

No, Nimitz did say "calculated risk": "don't lose your shirt" (TTL, he'd have added "if you can help it").

Calculated risk, yes, but the operation happening was based on the idea that the ships not being used was an entirely unacceptable idea, if Midway was at stake.


You did ask for it. That's the only thing about his behavior in a timeline where things go wrong I'd ask for a change on - Nimitiz wasn't flawless, but he was a victor (OTL). My point was just that he's tried, it hasn't worked (TTL), and the answer is that the US isn't as ready as we thought. Maybe this timeline has more men of the Fife and Christie and so on stripe, and a little more sloppiness pre-war on things like training.

Not enough for butterflies, enough to break down when tested in the heat of action.

IDK how far Nimitz would push before he'd move. Japan building an airbase at Tulagi/Guadalcanal provoked a counterattack. Would he let them finish it? Could he risk that? IDK. If he didn't have the force to counter, could he accept rerouting convoys away? Would King, Marshall, & FDR live with that? (Would they put up with MacArthur's complaining for long?:rolleyes:)

I'd say not. I have in mind more of the pre-Midway kind of ops for a longer period over a broader area, because that's all Nimitz can do. If he has the wit to pull Christie's subs back to Pearl, so much the better.;) (Worse for Japan.:eek:)

I take the view that Nimitz's response would be about the most measured you'd get. Halsey would do something stupid. Fletcher IMO would be more timid. (I admit a bias; he may not be as bad as I think.) Spruance might even do something more interesting (if he's as smart as I've read; IDK enough about him), maybe even adopt the options Nimitz didn't (but I wish he had:(). I don't see any senior USN officer being as timid as BlondieBC seems to demand for this to work, & honestly, if Nimitz got fired, IMO King would replace him with somebody more likely to be aggressive to the point of stupidity, not less. FDR wanted victories, not delay. (Actually, if King had been a trifle more persuasive, Coral Sea could've been a slaughter of IJN CVs, with Hornet & Enterprise there, too.:rolleyes:)

Agreed on all of this. Waiting until the US has parity or better? Sure. But itching to get there, even if temporally stunned by the defeat, not afraid of anything Japanese.
 
darn, darn, darn I did the math for feet and said yards. I know better than that. :eek::eek::eek:

Thanks for catching!
No worries, I figued you probably did know.;) Oops.:D
admiral may not be able to avoid Guadalcanal
Agreed. Just one of many flaws in this TL.
he orders the two remaining carriers back to San Diego.
That's another, & I should have thought of this before.:eek: Never mind inactivity, with his CVs on the West Coast, it makes reacting to Japanese moves much harder: they're now about a week further away from where the action is liable to be. Worse still from CincPac's POV, if he's not using them, you can bet somebody else will want them,:rolleyes: & he'll lose them entirely.:eek: Which makes it likely, if BlondieBC is right, he will get fired, too, when the Japanese attack Fiji & Samoa & the Aussies have a stroke.:eek:
Ernie King sends a scathing cable ...Be decisive or be relieved.
Which is exactly why Nimitz would keep his job to begin with. He may have lost, but he stood up. King knows you get beat sometimes. He knows teams have bad starts, even whole losing seasons. He also demands you stay in the fight (if I know him at all:rolleyes:).
This whole thread has triggered some ideas I may try to write a TL where Japan wins at Midway and play with some of the ideas that have come out here. (In another thread of course!).
I will be very interested in seeing that.:cool::cool:
Well, it depends on what you call a win. I'm looking at this as "If victory is what you said (Midway is lost, and the navy's butt is kicked), a draw is the second, and a defeat is OTL, where the Japanese accomplish nothing worth their sacrifices".

That make sense?
I'm taking victory in two senses. One is OTL, the other is a strategic win where Japan fails. U.S. defeat is where Yamamoto's plan succeeds the way he hoped, which takes a miracle.:rolleyes:
Calculated risk, yes, but the operation happening was based on the idea that the ships not being used was an entirely unacceptable idea, if Midway was at stake.
Oh, yeah, he was telling Fletcher, "Don't do anything stupid, we can't afford the losses." Which he would continue to say til after the Essexes arrived, as any sensible SO would. And when Halsey was stupid at Leyte, Nimitz didn't relieve him (tho IMO he should have), because it went reasonably well despite Halsey screwing up, & Nimitz could afford the losses.
That's the only thing about his behavior in a timeline where things go wrong I'd ask for a change on - Nimitiz wasn't flawless, but he was a victor (OTL). My point was just that he's tried, it hasn't worked (TTL), and the answer is that the US isn't as ready as we thought. Maybe this timeline has more men of the Fife and Christie and so on stripe, and a little more sloppiness pre-war on things like training.

Not enough for butterflies, enough to break down when tested in the heat of action.
Maybe. Even a little less good luck for USN, or bad for IJN. IDK how much of that was preparation (or lack of) or surprise (benefitting Japan), but it really looks like Japan couldn't catch a break after Coral Sea. My sense is, that was mainly really bad IJN doctrine & senior officers...:rolleyes:

At Midway, really, all you need to change OTL to a disaster is for Halsey not to get sick. (Chicken pox, I think.) If he's in charge, he gets his ass handed to him in pursuit.:eek:
Agreed on all of this. Waiting until the US has parity or better? Sure. But itching to get there, even if temporally stunned by the defeat, not afraid of anything Japanese.
Agree entirely.

As tchizek rightly says, the Aussies would be screaming about Guadalcanal, too, so... Changing things isn't always as easy as it looks.:rolleyes:
You did ask for it.
Perhaps.;) I did have the better link, tho.:p
 
I'm taking victory in two senses. One is OTL, the other is a strategic win where Japan fails. U.S. defeat is where Yamamoto's plan succeeds the way he hoped, which takes a miracle.:rolleyes:

Yeah. Correct me if I'm wrong, but these scenarios are all possible (if not all equally likely), in rough order of worst to best for Japan. Looking solely at the sea here.

1) OTL
2) Heavier losses for the US, same for Japan.
3) OTL US losses, lighter Japanese losses.
4) US carriers destroyed, Japan pays heavily.
5) US carriers destroyed, similar to OTL Japanese losses.

Oh, yeah, he was telling Fletcher, "Don't do anything stupid, we can't afford the losses." Which he would continue to say til after the Essexes arrived, as any sensible SO would. And when Halsey was stupid at Leyte, Nimitz didn't relieve him (tho IMO he should have), because it went reasonably well despite Halsey screwing up, & Nimitz could afford the losses.
Good man.

Maybe. Even a little less good luck for USN, or bad for IJN. IDK how much of that was preparation (or lack of) or surprise (benefitting Japan), but it really looks like Japan couldn't catch a break after Coral Sea. My sense is, that was mainly really bad IJN doctrine & senior officers...:rolleyes:

At Midway, really, all you need to change OTL to a disaster is for Halsey not to get sick. (Chicken pox, I think.) If he's in charge, he gets his ass handed to him in pursuit.:eek:
That's a mental image I don't need. :eek: Midway's gains being sacrificed by reckless pursuit is almost as good for Japan as beating the American carriers to begin with.

Agree entirely.

As tchizek rightly says, the Aussies would be screaming about Guadalcanal, too, so... Changing things isn't always as easy as it looks.:rolleyes:
Yeah. You might get a situation where they don't get what they want to the extent they want, but I'm not sure if the "okay, but heavy losses are possible for the USN, and that would inspire some caution" scenario is enough. Certainly not enough to get Guadalcanal just plain canceled - something will be shuffled around until there's a force to try with.

Perhaps.;) I did have the better link, tho.:p
You did, yes.
 
The odds of Halsey pursuing what he knows to be a battleline including most of Japan's battleships with nothing more than a few heavy cruisers are not good at all...of course, the Japanese were so obsessed with the concept of the 'all-out' battle that the senior officers almost had collective seizures when they realized that the USN was NOT pursuing them after Midway.
 
Yeah. Correct me if I'm wrong, but these scenarios are all possible (if not all equally likely), in rough order of worst to best for Japan. Looking solely at the sea here.

1) OTL
2) Heavier losses for the US, same for Japan.
3) OTL US losses, lighter Japanese losses.
4) US carriers destroyed, Japan pays heavily.
5) US carriers destroyed, similar to OTL Japanese losses.
I'd say that's right. I'd add "6) U.S. carriers destroyed, lighter IJN losses" as a prospect (long shot, given the PBYs spotting Nagumo first).

My biggest problem with the U.S. CVs being sunk is just that: Fletcher had the benefit of much better recce than Nagumo could dream of, because Yamamoto's starting dispositions were awful. (His cruisers, with all their scouts, were covering the heavies, not with Nagumo...:rolleyes:) To avoid the disaster, Nagumo really does have to hit Fletcher before Fletcher launches....
That's a mental image I don't need. :eek: Midway's gains being sacrificed by reckless pursuit is almost as good for Japan as beating the American carriers to begin with.
Oh, yeah. That's why I don't give Murphy (in Tambor) a hard time. His (mistaken) contact report led to the best possible outcome in the circumstances. (That he didn't take advantage after Mogami collided he deserves to get ripped for, but not relieved...)
Yeah. You might get a situation where they don't get what they want to the extent they want, but I'm not sure if the "okay, but heavy losses are possible for the USN, and that would inspire some caution" scenario is enough. Certainly not enough to get Guadalcanal just plain canceled - something will be shuffled around until there's a force to try with.
Agreed. Absent "no CVs to be had", I can't see cancellation. With a trifle more caution by Nimitz, I can see a heavier hit, actually. Wait til the airstrip is finished (just) & throw everything you've got at the island to take it. Might mean delaying other operations in SWP to find the manpower. Likely also means some squadrons don't get their aircraft on OTL schedule so this op gets their P-38s & B-24s. (Accelerate MC accpetance of the F4U, too?)

IDK about cancelling Torch; unless there are serious CV losses, I don't see it matters. The biggest headache I'm seeing is shipping. Could be this ties up too much (& PTO was terrible about slow unloading...:rolleyes:), which makes Torch impossible. Or forces changes to movements to Britain & cutbacks in consumption there. Bengal famine earlier? Or again (since there's liable to be a later fuel crisis)?
 
I'd say that's right. I'd add "6) U.S. carriers destroyed, lighter IJN losses" as a prospect (long shot, given the PBYs spotting Nagumo first).

My biggest problem with the U.S. CVs being sunk is just that: Fletcher had the benefit of much better recce than Nagumo could dream of, because Yamamoto's starting dispositions were awful. (His cruisers, with all their scouts, were covering the heavies, not with Nagumo...:rolleyes:) To avoid the disaster, Nagumo really does have to hit Fletcher before Fletcher launches....

Yeah. But a scenario can be constructed for one of those five (the sixth sounds quite difficult, all things considered), so...

And what is it with the Japanese and recon and logistics and all the boring stuff? They seem to have had a serious blind spot - not universally, but consistently.

No, I'm not seriously asking, its just...they would have done far better with more of that and less battleships and other such things.

Agreed. Absent "no CVs to be had", I can't see cancellation. With a trifle more caution by Nimitz, I can see a heavier hit, actually. Wait til the airstrip is finished (just) & throw everything you've got at the island to take it. Might mean delaying other operations in SWP to find the manpower. Likely also means some squadrons don't get their aircraft on OTL schedule so this op gets their P-38s & B-24s. (Accelerate MC accpetance of the F4U, too?)
That could be interesting.

IDK about cancelling Torch; unless there are serious CV losses, I don't see it matters. The biggest headache I'm seeing is shipping. Could be this ties up too much (& PTO was terrible about slow unloading...:rolleyes:), which makes Torch impossible. Or forces changes to movements to Britain & cutbacks in consumption there. Bengal famine earlier? Or again (since there's liable to be a later fuel crisis)?
Agreed on this without anything to add.
 
Yeah. But a scenario can be constructed for one of those five (the sixth sounds quite difficult, all things considered), so...
Yeah, the others seem within the realm of possible. Butterflies from them could be interesting... Except, as said before (elsewhere), the OTL Pacific War really is a U.S.-wank, & getting any better results for Japan needs a POD around 1868.:rolleyes:
And what is it with the Japanese and recon and logistics and all the boring stuff? They seem to have had a serious blind spot - not universally, but consistently.
I'd love to know the answer. It's not just Navy, but Army, too. The senior offiers of both services are genuinely awful. No understanding of genuine strategy, & a terrible grasp of the difference between fighting Russia or China in home waters & fighting a maritime power like the U.S. in the Pacific.:rolleyes: Among other things...
 
Yeah, the others seem within the realm of possible. Butterflies from them could be interesting... Except, as said before (elsewhere), the OTL Pacific War really is a U.S.-wank, & getting any better results for Japan needs a POD around 1868.:rolleyes:

Maybe a delay of six months to a year, if everything goes slower, and I do mean everything. Not sure what kind of thing with a POD after Japan started beating up colonial empires would slow down subs and such. OTL was bad enough on the torpedo front, for instance.

I'd love to know the answer. It's not just Navy, but Army, too. The senior offiers of both services are genuinely awful. No understanding of genuine strategy, & a terrible grasp of the difference between fighting Russia or China in home waters & fighting a maritime power like the U.S. in the Pacific.:rolleyes: Among other things...
Can't be just Victory Disease either, at least not from WWII. Just...terrible judgment.
 
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Ok. So Capturing Midway is A bad Idea, Not only is it not A required asset for the Japanese at this time but the chance of A successfull capture is extremely low. So A policy of Strategic Denial is what the Japanese would need&want. I think some circles use the saying "Raze with fire & salt the earth" Japan had A specialised facility&project regarding Bio Weaponry that I can never remember the title/codename of, How likely would it be for the IJN&their Carrier based planes to use its products on Midway?
 
Ok. So Capturing Midway is A bad Idea, Not only is it not A required asset for the Japanese at this time but the chance of A successfull capture is extremely low. So A policy of Strategic Denial is what the Japanese would need&want. I think some circles use the saying "Raze with fire & salt the earth" Japan had A specialised facility&project regarding Bio Weaponry that I can never remember the title/codename of, How likely would it be for the IJN&their Carrier based planes to use its products on Midway?
Unit 731

The do that and the USA respond with gas or fire bombs, Japan was willing to do this on the Chinese who could not respond in kind but the USA can, or the UK as they will help

If this happens Japan is getting a lot more than two nukes on its head
 
Ah...Unit 731. Thanx RamscoopRaider :D I thought Midway was A purely Military occupied Island? If I am wrong about that, Let me know. But there is A big difference in the use of Taboo weapons on A Military Target vs A Civilian Target. Also didnt the US use firebombs on Japan in OTL anyway?
 
Maybe a delay of six months to a year, if everything goes slower, and I do mean everything.
Everything going Japan's way might do that. If Nimitz doesn't adjust & simply cream them even sooner...:rolleyes:
Not sure what kind of thing with a POD after Japan started beating up colonial empires would slow down subs and such. OTL was bad enough on the torpedo front, for instance.
If it's between WW1 & WW2, there's at least a chance of avoiding the lunatic IJA doctrine favoring bayonets over armor.:rolleyes: And avoiding the brutal treatment of POWs. And the "death before good sense" approach to warfare... Maybe the lunatic reaction to the 60% ratio of the Washington Treaty, too. (Yes, putting in 1868 was a bit much. If you go back that far, tho, you have a hope of avoiding the Dreibund aftermath to the Sino-Japanese War & the inferiority complex that came out of it.)
Can't be just Victory Disease either, at least not from WWII. Just...terrible judgment.
It's beyond even terrible judgement. It's incompetence, stupidity, & venality like nothing I've ever heard of anywhere else, with the possible exception of the Red Army. (I'm way less familiar with that, & no expert on Japan.)
Japan had A specialised facility&project regarding Bio Weaponry that
Unit 731

The do that and the USA respond with gas or fire bombs, Japan was willing to do this on the Chinese who could not respond in kind but the USA can, or the UK as they will help

If this happens Japan is getting a lot more than two nukes on its head
This is AN EXTREMELY BAD IDEA. From a country whose leadership is known for bad ideas, this is a topper. You think the Americans were pissed about Pearl Harbor.:eek: The U.S. was already developing chemical weaps to clear caves & to kill rice crops. You may be assured there would be no reluctance to use them after a bioattack at Midway. I would suggest (perhaps unlikely) even a strike against the Home Islands with them, Doolittle revisited.
 
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