Rubicon
Banned
This thread is something the wiking might post, but instead of about Germany it's about the Japanese capital ship building, to be more precise the organization of it or more accurately the lack of organization. In particular the panic that gripped the Japanese command after Midway which meant a fair bit of ordering, canceling and halting ships already in production not to mention that there were a fair bit of bottlenecks on the slipways with ships taking up a lot slipways for much longer then they should have.
Overall there doesn't seem to be to much problems with resources such as steel, or engines for capital ships, in the last two years Japan built and finished at least nine capital ships with several more building at the time of surrender. So to me it seems more like a problem with slipway space instead of resources.
This is not about not building the Yamato-class and instead building carriers for the resources, that's a non-starter to me, you have to move back into the Russo-Japanese war at least to find a PoD to change that or an act of god (i.e. The Emperor intervenes, which isn't happening).
So in essence Japan had six slipways that had the capacity to build capital ships, with one additional enlarged mid-war.
In Yokosuka you had the Naval Ship Yard, with slipway #1 and slipway #2 enlarged in early -43.
Kure Naval Ship yard had the #1 and #2 large enough.
Nagasaki had the Mitsubishi #1 and #2 slipways.
And at Kobe Kawasaki had slipway #1.
I'm attaching a very helpful picture someone with a fair bit of knowledge of this compiled.
To me there seems to be four large roadblocks that if removed or changed would help immensely.
Roadblock no.1 is the Shinano at Yokusuka slipway #1, it spent four years and four months on the slipway, not to mention that materials for two Unryū-classcarriers (#5002 and #5005) were used to finish the Shinano as a pretty crappy carrier. The Yamato spent two years and nine months on the slipway and Musashi two years and one month. So launching and finishing the Shinano as a battleship would free the slipway at around July/August -42 for new construction. An Unryū-class carrier could then be laid down and launched a bit over a year later. So for the time, materials and slipway space to build the Shinano as a crappy carrier you'd instead get a powerful battleship and a decent carrier, seems like a bargain to me.
Roadblock no.2 is hull #111 at the Kure slipway #1, the fourth unnamed and unfinished Yamato-class battleship. Either never lay down it, or finish the hull, laid down in November -40 means it would, using the same timetable as the Musashi, could be launched in January or February -43. This would delay the Katsuragi by two or three months, more or less unacceptable as that would mean December -44 or January -45 before it's commissioned. So the best idea is to not lay down hull #111. A Taihō-class could be laid down instead in November -40 and launched, even following the very slow timetable of the Taihō, early -42 which then frees up the slipway for another Unryū-class carrier that can be launched a year later and finished summer -44.
Roadblock #3 and #4 is the Jun'yō and Hiyō at Mitsubishi #2 and Kawasaki #1 respectively. These begun as ocean liners and was converted into what best could be described as mediocre carriers, they were slow, vulnerable even by Japanese standards and with small air complements, better to not convert them and build two repeat Shokaku-class or two Taihō-class instead. The Jun'yō was begun converting in March -39 a repeat Shokaku would have launched in September -40 if laid down instead. Followed by a Taihō launched then in early -42.
If instead of the Hiyō the repeat Shokaku would launch in May -41 which could also be followed by another Taihō.
So to summarize by not building #111 and convert the Jun'yō and Hiyō it would give the Japanese the following:
Shokaku-class #3 built at Nagasaki Mitsubishi slipway #3, launched September -40, commissioned December -41/January -42.
Shokaku-class #4 built at Kobe Kawasaki slipway #1, launched in May -41 and commissioned September/October -42.
Taihō-class #1 built at Nagasaki Mitsubishi slipway #3, launched March/April/May -42, comissioned winter -43/-44.
Taihō-class #2 built Kure Naval Ship Yard slipway #1, launched January/February -42, commissioned summer -43.
Taihō-class #3 built at Kobe Kawasaki slipway #1, launched summer -42, commissioned winter -43/-44.
This leaves slipway capacity during the second half of 1942 for three Unryū-class carriers following a disaster at Midway. If the Shinano is finished as a battleship it adds a 4th Unryū-class carrier all that would be commissioned during 1944. Together with the other three Unryū-class carriers built on the other three slipways not meddled with above this gives a large number of fleet-carriers both during -43 as well as in -44.
Now linking to Jon Parshall's Combined Fleet homepage and the industrial disparity between Japan and USA is not really productive to this, USA will outproduce Japan.
The question is, what happens if Japan even after losing four carries to two during Coral Sea and Midway still has carrier superiority during the second half of 1942 with four Shokaku-class carriers with an additional three Taihō-class carriers during 1943.
Does Guadalcanal still happens and if it does what happens when Japan has carrier superiority?
Will Japan make a second attempt at Port Moresby as was planned?
What happens if the US navy still looses the Wasp and Hornet?
Overall there doesn't seem to be to much problems with resources such as steel, or engines for capital ships, in the last two years Japan built and finished at least nine capital ships with several more building at the time of surrender. So to me it seems more like a problem with slipway space instead of resources.
This is not about not building the Yamato-class and instead building carriers for the resources, that's a non-starter to me, you have to move back into the Russo-Japanese war at least to find a PoD to change that or an act of god (i.e. The Emperor intervenes, which isn't happening).
So in essence Japan had six slipways that had the capacity to build capital ships, with one additional enlarged mid-war.
In Yokosuka you had the Naval Ship Yard, with slipway #1 and slipway #2 enlarged in early -43.
Kure Naval Ship yard had the #1 and #2 large enough.
Nagasaki had the Mitsubishi #1 and #2 slipways.
And at Kobe Kawasaki had slipway #1.
I'm attaching a very helpful picture someone with a fair bit of knowledge of this compiled.
To me there seems to be four large roadblocks that if removed or changed would help immensely.
Roadblock no.1 is the Shinano at Yokusuka slipway #1, it spent four years and four months on the slipway, not to mention that materials for two Unryū-classcarriers (#5002 and #5005) were used to finish the Shinano as a pretty crappy carrier. The Yamato spent two years and nine months on the slipway and Musashi two years and one month. So launching and finishing the Shinano as a battleship would free the slipway at around July/August -42 for new construction. An Unryū-class carrier could then be laid down and launched a bit over a year later. So for the time, materials and slipway space to build the Shinano as a crappy carrier you'd instead get a powerful battleship and a decent carrier, seems like a bargain to me.
Roadblock no.2 is hull #111 at the Kure slipway #1, the fourth unnamed and unfinished Yamato-class battleship. Either never lay down it, or finish the hull, laid down in November -40 means it would, using the same timetable as the Musashi, could be launched in January or February -43. This would delay the Katsuragi by two or three months, more or less unacceptable as that would mean December -44 or January -45 before it's commissioned. So the best idea is to not lay down hull #111. A Taihō-class could be laid down instead in November -40 and launched, even following the very slow timetable of the Taihō, early -42 which then frees up the slipway for another Unryū-class carrier that can be launched a year later and finished summer -44.
Roadblock #3 and #4 is the Jun'yō and Hiyō at Mitsubishi #2 and Kawasaki #1 respectively. These begun as ocean liners and was converted into what best could be described as mediocre carriers, they were slow, vulnerable even by Japanese standards and with small air complements, better to not convert them and build two repeat Shokaku-class or two Taihō-class instead. The Jun'yō was begun converting in March -39 a repeat Shokaku would have launched in September -40 if laid down instead. Followed by a Taihō launched then in early -42.
If instead of the Hiyō the repeat Shokaku would launch in May -41 which could also be followed by another Taihō.
So to summarize by not building #111 and convert the Jun'yō and Hiyō it would give the Japanese the following:
Shokaku-class #3 built at Nagasaki Mitsubishi slipway #3, launched September -40, commissioned December -41/January -42.
Shokaku-class #4 built at Kobe Kawasaki slipway #1, launched in May -41 and commissioned September/October -42.
Taihō-class #1 built at Nagasaki Mitsubishi slipway #3, launched March/April/May -42, comissioned winter -43/-44.
Taihō-class #2 built Kure Naval Ship Yard slipway #1, launched January/February -42, commissioned summer -43.
Taihō-class #3 built at Kobe Kawasaki slipway #1, launched summer -42, commissioned winter -43/-44.
This leaves slipway capacity during the second half of 1942 for three Unryū-class carriers following a disaster at Midway. If the Shinano is finished as a battleship it adds a 4th Unryū-class carrier all that would be commissioned during 1944. Together with the other three Unryū-class carriers built on the other three slipways not meddled with above this gives a large number of fleet-carriers both during -43 as well as in -44.
Now linking to Jon Parshall's Combined Fleet homepage and the industrial disparity between Japan and USA is not really productive to this, USA will outproduce Japan.
The question is, what happens if Japan even after losing four carries to two during Coral Sea and Midway still has carrier superiority during the second half of 1942 with four Shokaku-class carriers with an additional three Taihō-class carriers during 1943.
Does Guadalcanal still happens and if it does what happens when Japan has carrier superiority?
Will Japan make a second attempt at Port Moresby as was planned?
What happens if the US navy still looses the Wasp and Hornet?
