Japanese-American War in 1897 over Hawaii

[Wendell]

Japan was a power? Considering the time period, most countries would just view it as a white country pulverizing an inferior non-white country. Nothing to see here.

The fear of "yellow peril" would probably decrease after an American victory.

Good points.

 

[UncleDynamite]

You have also disregarded Britain siding with Japan which is more likely in 1897 than Britain siding with US.

Why, exactly? IIRC the US and UK were each other's largest trading partner at this time. Furthermore, the US and Canada share massive open indefensible border. There is no reason that I can think of that would make it in Britain's best interests to side with Japan in a war with the United States. If you know of any, I'd be happy to hear them.

 

[Paul V McNutt]

I would think that the US successfully defends Hawaii and an annexation bill passes. I think the Spanish American War still breaks out, but the US is already mobilized and it goes faster.

 

[sloreck]

while the UK is aligned with Japan, I can't see Britain going to war with the USA over who gets Hawaii. The USA can point out, quite rightly, that Hawaii is much closer to the USA & the USA has had interests there for much longer than Japan. If the USA was trying to grab something on Japan's side of the Pacific it might be a little different, but Hawaii...just crazy for the UK to disrupt relations with the USA over this.

 

[Dirk_Pitt]

I would think that the US successfully defends Hawaii and an annexation bill passes. I think the Spanish American War still breaks out, but the US is already mobilized and it goes faster.

April 25, 1898 – August 12, 1898
(3 months, 2 weeks and 4 days)

Kind of hard to make it go faster...

 

[raharris1973]

I'm not sure about whether the Chinese would be hostile to Japan. The general sentiment the Chinese had immediately after the 1894 War was: "If you can't beat them, join them." There was a genuine admiration for Japan's achievements, a fever of oversea study in Japan which lasted until the next war, and even talks of a confederation in 1898.

Good point. An additional factor is that China can more easily sympathize with Japan's position over Hawaii than America's, because it was perceived as a dispute not only over territorial influence, but also over the right to immigrate. Many Chinese, who felt humiliated by the Chinese Exclusion Act, could see Japan's going toe-to-toe with America over Hawaii and Japanese migration there as a brave and admirable move.

R

EALLY funny thing about the "US vs. Japan in 1897" is that the Japanese flagship in 1897 had an American commanding officer in 1896, and the Japanese flagship in 1896 had an American staff officer who presumably would have been in the USN in 1897, and readily available to advise the USN on the strengths and weaknesses of the IJN...as he was in 1898, as the navy's oldest lieutenant.

And if the "US vs. Japan in 1897" war broke out, the American who had been in command (a year previously) of what would have been the Japanese flagship would have been around to advise the USN on the strengths and weaknesses of said IJN flagship.

That's fascinating, and shows a clear advantage to the Americans in naval intelligence. It is a reminder of the Meiji era's dependence on foreign talent until nearly the turn of the century.

The Far Eastern Squadron, that Dewey led in Manilla IOTL, that I believe was based in Hong Kong would seem to be the obvious initial target for the Japanese fleet as it can both achieve a decisive superiority and eliminate the most significant American naval presence in Asian waters. After that there isn't a whole lot Japan can do except wait and prepare for the American fleet to attack.

The Japanese would start the war with action in Hawaii, or they wouldn't start it all. They would start by disembarking troops to protect their interests, or clash with American ships in Hawaiian waters. Once things got hot there, sure, they would go after US Far East Squadron with their home based ships.

In addition to overall OB we need to look at what ships and marines each side had right around Hawaii in different parts of the 1890, to get a picture of initial clashes or if the Japanese could build up a hope of a successful show of force or attack to gain local superiority.

--What of the human rights aspects in the event of any close combat? Japanese military culture was much different in 1897 compared to 1941.

Would military behavior on both sides be fairly chivalrous as in the Spanish-
American War? Or would it be chivalry on the Japanese side matched by racially motivated rat bastardry against civilians and PoWs on the American side? Or rat bastardry and maltreatment of prisoners and civil populations on both sides?

Here I would make a plug again for Pacific Gibraltar. It's a fun book. Also, political violence in Hawaii in the 1890s appeared to be relatively restrained, even if it was a struggle for power. The American community wanted to be in power, but they sent wounded opponents get-well letters. The Hawaiians were relatively sporting if inept. I'm not sure about how the Japanese resident in Hawaii would behave. Perhaps in the easy-going American and Hawaiian style, or in bitter-ender style.

 

[Namayan]

Why, exactly? IIRC the US and UK were each other's largest trading partner at this time. Furthermore, the US and Canada share massive open indefensible border. There is no reason that I can think of that would make it in Britain's best interests to side with Japan in a war with the United States. If you know of any, I'd be happy to hear them.

Oh please, bring your statistics back with sources in rather than much American bravado.

According to this, Marc-William Palen, "Protection, Federation and Union: The Global Impact of the McKinley Tariff upon the British Empire, 1890-94," Journal of Imperial & Commonwealth History (2010) 38#3 pp 395-41

US was a British competitor in the world market. Business is a reason to start a war with the US along with the ongoing negotiated alliance with Japan. Anlgo-Japan alliance did not happen until a fews years but it was under negotiation not unlike a far fetch sudden Russian-China-USA alliance that unreasonable people post here out of the blue.

The American community wanted to be in power, but they sent wounded opponents get-well letters. The Hawaiians were relatively sporting if inept. I'm not sure about how the Japanese resident in Hawaii would behave. Perhaps in the easy-going American and Hawaiian style, or in bitter-ender style.

The easiest way that US will lose Hawaii is if Grover Cleveland wins as president in 1889 instead of Harrison or under 1897 instead of McKinley.

A heavy support on restoration of Kingdom of Hawaii plus a successful counter revolt by Wilcox can tilt the balance against US interference or USA herself.

 

[TFSmith121]

The respective cruiser match-ups are better for the IJN - 2-1 in favor of the USN

In long one on one war, Japan is no match. US already the industrial top dog of the world helps a lot.

Your statistics only mentioned capital ships which we all know aint the focus of Japanese doctrine.

Also statistics is for all US ships regardless if its Pacific or Atlantic. Japan is a one ocean navy while US is a two ocean navy.

You have also disregarded Britain siding with Japan which is more likely in 1897 than Britain siding with US.

Your total focus in capital ships shows the Mahan focus doctrine of the west in the US which was already proven to be a weak doctrine when the Japanese employed Ecole doctrine in OTL.

Here are each navy's modern cruisers in 1897, modern defined as commissioned since 1880 and more than 2,000 tons displacement - which, for a conflict over Hawaii, is pretty much necessary:

USN - 19
AC – 2
Brooklyn (1896)
New York (1893)
PC – 17
1 Olympia (1895)
2 Columbia (1894) Minneapolis (1894)
2 Cincinnati (1894) Raleigh (1894)
3 Detroit (1893) Marblehead (1894) Montgomery (1894)
1 Newark (1891)
1 San Francisco (1890)
2 Baltimore (1890) Philadelphia (1890)
1 Charleston (1889)
1 Chicago (1889)
2 Atlanta (1886) Boston (1887)

IJN - 10 (all protected cruisers)
1 Akitsushima (1894-J means built in Japan)
1 Yoshino (1893)
3 Ikitsushima (1891) Matsushima (1892) Hashidate (1894-J);
1 Chiyoda (1890)
2 Naniwa (1885) Takachiho (1885)
1 Sai-en (1885/1895 commissioned by China/Japan)
1 Izumi (1884/1894 commissioned by Chile/Japan)

In a Pacific War in 1897, the USN would deploy all necessary force to the decisive theater - Oregon's transfer to the Atlantic in 1898 being the obvious corrollary.

As others have pointed out, the Anglo-Japanese alliance did not come into effect until 1902, and was aimed at the Russians; there is no evidence the UK would have intervened in a conflict between the US and Japan over Hawaii in 1897. The UK had no interests at stake, whatsoever.

Concentration is the only rational strategy in a one-ocean conflict; especially east of the Dateline.

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

No, just the correlation of forces, economic, naval,

American bias much

No, just the correlation of forces, economic, naval, merchant marine, and military.

Here are the two scouting force flagships, for example:

USS Brooklyn

IJS Akitsushima

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

Understood, but the enemy of my enemy, true?

I'm not sure about whether the Chinese would be hostile to Japan. The general sentiment the Chinese had immediately after the 1894 War was: "If you can't beat them, join them." There was a genuine admiration for Japan's achievements, a fever of oversea study in Japan which lasted until the next war, and even talks of a confederation in 1898.

As for Russia... They might try an opportunistic land grab, but how large was their presence in the Far East before Siberian Railway was finished? By the time Russian Baltic fleet arrives in The Pacifics, the Americo-Japanese War would be long over.

Basic statecraft 101, and there are some ties between the US and China and the US and Russia in this period - slender, but undeniable.

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

They took the results of 1898 without much of a fuss

One wonders how Berlin would take to American victory in a naval war against a power, albeit a second tier one.

Other than Diederichs minor adventurism in the Phillippines, and we know how that turned out...

The Germans have other things to worry about in the 1890s.

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

Which is one of my thoughts regarding how

Good points.

Which is one of my thoughts regarding how the Twentieth Century plays out - this might actually be a positive for Japan, honestly.

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

Except the UK was not allied with Japan until 1902

while the UK is aligned with Japan, I can't see Britain going to war with the USA over who gets Hawaii. The USA can point out, quite rightly, that Hawaii is much closer to the USA & the USA has had interests there for much longer than Japan. If the USA was trying to grab something on Japan's side of the Pacific it might be a little different, but Hawaii...just crazy for the UK to disrupt relations with the USA over this.

Except the UK was not allied with Japan until 1902; in 1897, the Japanese were barely amongst the world's economies.

The British had far more significant concerns, in Europe, the Med, and Central/South Asia to worry about...

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

The USN should have definitely commissioned two destroyers:

R

That's fascinating, and shows a clear advantage to the Americans in naval intelligence. It is a reminder of the Meiji era's dependence on foreign talent until nearly the turn of the century.

The USN should have definitely commissioned two destroyers as the:

USS Philo Norton McGiffen
USS Henry Walton Grinnell

Best,

 

[Dilvish]

I don't know if either side could do much to seriously harm the other. The closest US harbor to Japan is in Hawaii, and the closest Japanese harbor to Hawaii is either Okinawa or somewhere in mainland Japan.

I also don't think the war would last long enough for US industry to make a big impact. Both sides will be fighting mainly with what they already have or what becomes available soon after the war starts.

 

[TFSmith121]

"de facto" alliances often come into being when

Oh please, bring your statistics back with sources in rather than much American bravado.

According to this, Marc-William Palen, "Protection, Federation and Union: The Global Impact of the McKinley Tariff upon the British Empire, 1890-94," Journal of Imperial & Commonwealth History (2010) 38#3 pp 395-41

US was a British competitor in the world market. Business is a reason to start a war with the US along with the ongoing negotiated alliance with Japan. Anlgo-Japan alliance did not happen until a fews years but it was under negotiation not unlike a far fetch sudden Russian-China-USA alliance that unreasonable people post here out of the blue.

"de facto" alliances often come into being when one side in a conflict starts to lose...see Italy in both world wars.

"Business" is a reason to avoid war; the US and UK were major trade partners in the late Nineteenth Century, far more so than competitors, and there was much more money to be made by British interests in US investments than in the sales US companies made in other markets.

Here are some more stats (Bairoch via Kennedy), if needed:

Shares of world manufacturing output - 1900 (UK in 1900 as 100)
US - 127.8
UK - 100
GE - 71.2
RU - 47.5
FR - 36.8
AH - 25.6
IT - 13.6
JA - 13

Italy had a more significant industrial economy than Japan in 1900...

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

Well, the OP's POD is conflict over Hawaii, so it is

I don't know if either side could do much to seriously harm the other. The closest US harbor to Japan is in Hawaii, and the closest Japanese harbor to Hawaii is either Okinawa or somewhere in mainland Japan.

I also don't think the war would last long enough for US industry to make a big impact. Both sides will be fighting mainly with what they already have or what becomes available soon after the war starts.

Well, the OP's POD is conflict over Hawaii, so it is even worse for the Japanese.

Distance from San Francisco to Honolulu, for example, is 2408 miles (steamship, not air); the distance from Honolulu to Yokohama is 3908 miles.

US forces are 1500 miles closer to Oahu than the Japanese are on Day One.

Here's the NHC site on the Spanish-American War; gives plenty of detail:

http://www.history.navy.mil/Special Highlights/SpanAmWar/SpanAm-index.htm

Best,

 

[Wendell]

Which is one of my thoughts regarding how the Twentieth Century plays out - this might actually be a positive for Japan, honestly.

Best,

In what way?

 

[TFSmith121]

An early defeat by the West has one of two potential paths forward:

In what way?

An early defeat by the West leaves Japan with one of two potential paths forward:

1) The Japanese realize that they can not compete with the US specifically and the West generally in the Pacific, and so either:
1a - "Join" the west (moving the ~1950 rapprochement "forward" by a half century); or
1b - remain a nationalist power seeking autarky, but limit said ambitions to the Asian mainland, specifically NE Asia; or

2) Go all in to attempt to compete (i.e., militarization in 1900, rather than 1930).

Now, either 1a or 1b is going to be better than the path the Japanese elite chose historically; 2 is likely to lead to a 1945-level defeat in 1915 or whenever, which would be terribly costly, but still basically avoids the economic and political losses (especially in terms of opportunity costs) of the "real" Twentieth Century for Japan.

Best,

 

[Wendell]

An early defeat by the West leaves Japan with one of two potential paths forward:

1) The Japanese realize that they can not compete with the US specifically and the West generally in the Pacific, and so either:
1a - "Join" the west (moving the ~1950 rapprochement "forward" by a half century; or
1b - remain a nationalist power seeking autarky, but limit said ambitions to the Asian mainland, specifically NE Asia; or

2) Go all in to attempt to compete (i.e., militarization in 1900, rather than 1930).

Now, either 1a or 1b is going to be better than the path the Japanese elite chose historically; 2 is likely to lead to a 1945-level defeat in 1915 or whener, which would be terribly costly, still basically avoids the economic and political losses (especially in terms of opportunity costs) of the "real" Twentieth Century for Japan.

Best,

That makes sense.