Japan would have been embargoed over the China war by 1943 even without going beyond China by 1943

Japan would have been embargoed over the China war by 1943 even without going beyond China by 1943

  • Yes

    Votes: 61 80.3%
  • No

    Votes: 15 19.7%

  • Total voters
    76
Why would the US embargo (and risk a war), especially if it is presumably fighting the Nazis by this point?

Call it a economic war or campaign. The idea was Japan would be forced to negotiate some sort of settlement. What was not understood was the 'stubborn' PoV of the Japanese leaders. Negotiations failed & military attacks followed.
 

raharris1973

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The state of Europe is another factor here. If Germany is defeated by 1941-42 on account of them failing to overrun France in 1940, Japan will have a lot more arrayed against it.

I do not think the Japanese would attack in reaction to an embargo if they were that militarily and navally overmatched.

They were capable of calculation, and they would have less reason to hope they would roll all sixes.

They faced peer pressure to show macho courage, but were not Klingons, Kilrathi or Kzinti.

Others’ mileage may vary. For anyone who does think they would attack the Abcd and f powers if embargoed, how would their scheme of maneuver when attacking differ from OTL? Notably they would not have forward based in French Indochina as a starting point, but would need to seize Indochina as part of the campaign.

Would the Japanese scheme of attempted maneuver be a clockwise wheel south to the Philippines, then southwest to DEI, then north to Singapore and Malaya, then north in a broad movement to take Thailand, Indochina and Burma?
 
I do not think the Japanese would attack in reaction to an embargo if they were that militarily and navally overmatched.

They were capable of calculation, and they would have less reason to hope they would roll all sixes.

They faced peer pressure to show macho courage, but were not Klingons, Kilrathi or Kzinti.

Others’ mileage may vary. For anyone who does think they would attack the Abcd and f powers if embargoed, how would their scheme of maneuver when attacking differ from OTL? Notably they would not have forward based in French Indochina as a starting point, but would need to seize Indochina as part of the campaign.

Would the Japanese scheme of attempted maneuver be a clockwise wheel south to the Philippines, then southwest to DEI, then north to Singapore and Malaya, then north in a broad movement to take Thailand, Indochina and Burma?

Thailand and Formosa. Nutcracker instead of sickle. Means a lot more land based airpower.
 
Back the envelope calculations suggest costs of the China war/occupation would have exceeded revenue & overextended Japan's credit. By late 1942. Japan's economy may have collapsed with out a embargo. Without credit in the world's banks & it's accounts at zero it's the same as a embargo.
 
Back the envelope calculations suggest costs of the China war/occupation would have exceeded revenue & overextended Japan's credit. By late 1942. Japan's economy may have collapsed with out a embargo. Without credit in the world's banks & it's accounts at zero it's the same as a embargo.

It's economy didn't collapse in a total war for the next 3 years, no?
 
It's economy didn't collapse in a total war for the next 3 years, no?

Yes it did. Severe rationing, centralized planning of resource allocation, rigid currency controls, The Zaibatsu capitalist operations were being reduced to socialist planning agencies. Corruption and black marketing. In Mid 1942 Japan was at the top of its military game, yet imports/exports for military operations were insufficient and for industrial purposes had ceased. Factories were running of prewar stockpiled material & where there were no stocks they were shutting down operations. The capture of the Dutch East Indies oil production was hardly noticeable in the home islands, by the end of 1942 planning had began to convert oil power generation plant back to coal as there were still coal shipments available from Manchuria. Conversion was initiated in 1942. French Indo China was a huge rice exporter, but the lack of cargo shipping alone meant rice remained strictly rationed in 1942. John Ellis 'Brute Force' has a long chapter describing the inability to build sufficient cargo ships, war ships, aircraft or train air crew ran straight back to resource shortage at the end of 1942. The details differ between the war & the trajectory of Japans economy without the war, but there are several key general conditions that parallel.

Cargo shipping. in 1940 between 50% & 60% of Japans imports exports were carried on foreign flagged ships. When the embargo Acts froze Japans accounts in the US it foreign flagged carriers could not be paid. The cut off of foreign flagged ships for Japans economy reduced service from over 11 million tons in 1940 to under six million available in the first half of 1942. Without war severe negative cash flow & end of credit in the international banking system creates the same effect. Japans industry and government cant pay for sufficient raw materials, and cant pay for enough transport. It would not matter if the US or Dutch oil companies were allowed to sell petroleum products to Japan. With a increasing negative cash flow and credit collapse Standard Oil or Royal Dutch Shell wont be paid.

Steel: Japans steel industry was dependent on high quality scrap steel from the US & elsewhere. In the 1930s the ship breakingindusty was becoming import for Japan as it provided bulk scrap iron & steel.

Machine tools & alloys needed for manufacturing tools: Yet another sector Japan lacked internal capacity for its needs. Expensive imports were needed & A Europe at war drives up that cost.

In the short run implementing a command economy can extend Japans industrial operations. Thats what they resorted to, even before the Pacific war started. Central planning & free market restrictions were being planned and implemented by 1940. By the end of 1942 free market & capitalist economy had effectively ended in Japan. That could help in a economic collapse scenario, but I don't think that anyone will argue that rigid socialism or defacto Communism would be be any sort of solution to get Japan through a stalemated China War & unservicable debt burden.

My estimates here are strictly that. Perhaps occupied China and Manchuriias industrial development could start paying off from 1941-42 absent the Allied embargoes and war. Even 1943 might not be too late if the profitability is clear to the international banking community. But given the trends through 1940 & the inefficiencies in the Zaibatsu system and general exploitation of occupied Asia I'm not optimistic.
 

raharris1973

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Yes it did. Severe rationing, centralized planning of resource allocation, rigid currency controls, The Zaibatsu capitalist operations were being reduced to socialist planning agencies. Corruption and black marketing. In Mid 1942 Japan was at the top of its military game, yet imports/exports for military operations were insufficient and for industrial purposes had ceased. Factories were running of prewar stockpiled material & where there were no stocks they were shutting down operations. The capture of the Dutch East Indies oil production was hardly noticeable in the home islands, by the end of 1942 planning had began to convert oil power generation plant back to coal as there were still coal shipments available from Manchuria. Conversion was initiated in 1942. French Indo China was a huge rice exporter, but the lack of cargo shipping alone meant rice remained strictly rationed in 1942. John Ellis 'Brute Force' has a long chapter describing the inability to build sufficient cargo ships, war ships, aircraft or train air crew ran straight back to resource shortage at the end of 1942. The details differ between the war & the trajectory of Japans economy without the war, but there are several key general conditions that parallel.

Cargo shipping. in 1940 between 50% & 60% of Japans imports exports were carried on foreign flagged ships. When the embargo Acts froze Japans accounts in the US it foreign flagged carriers could not be paid. The cut off of foreign flagged ships for Japans economy reduced service from over 11 million tons in 1940 to under six million available in the first half of 1942. Without war severe negative cash flow & end of credit in the international banking system creates the same effect. Japans industry and government cant pay for sufficient raw materials, and cant pay for enough transport. It would not matter if the US or Dutch oil companies were allowed to sell petroleum products to Japan. With a increasing negative cash flow and credit collapse Standard Oil or Royal Dutch Shell wont be paid.

Steel: Japans steel industry was dependent on high quality scrap steel from the US & elsewhere. In the 1930s the ship breakingindusty was becoming import for Japan as it provided bulk scrap iron & steel.

Machine tools & alloys needed for manufacturing tools: Yet another sector Japan lacked internal capacity for its needs. Expensive imports were needed & A Europe at war drives up that cost.

In the short run implementing a command economy can extend Japans industrial operations. Thats what they resorted to, even before the Pacific war started. Central planning & free market restrictions were being planned and implemented by 1940. By the end of 1942 free market & capitalist economy had effectively ended in Japan. That could help in a economic collapse scenario, but I don't think that anyone will argue that rigid socialism or defacto Communism would be be any sort of solution to get Japan through a stalemated China War & unservicable debt burden.

My estimates here are strictly that. Perhaps occupied China and Manchuriias industrial development could start paying off from 1941-42 absent the Allied embargoes and war. Even 1943 might not be too late if the profitability is clear to the international banking community. But given the trends through 1940 & the inefficiencies in the Zaibatsu system and general exploitation of occupied Asia I'm not optimistic.

Well then this only proves that Japan can fight with a zombie economy for a few years. If it could do that while facing American attacks over that time and still make advances against China, as it did as late as early ‘45, then why couldn’t Japan persist at least as long against China alone?
 
Well then this only proves that Japan can fight with a zombie economy for a few years. If it could do that while facing American attacks over that time and still make advances against China, as it did as late as early ‘45, then why couldn’t Japan persist at least as long against China alone?

If they do it still wrecks their economy, a incentive to make policy changes much earlier.

In the case of the US Japan had its back against the wall with US demands it withdraw from Manchuria as well as China & Indo China. Without that outside pressure the Zaibatsu are not going to see the point in pursuing a bankrupting war with China. Before the economy gets that bad the odds are a new government would be negotiating something with China. Imperialists and maverick Army officers that don't understand the new policy would find themselves posted to distant islands, or assination targets.

Japans policy since the Great War or earlier had been to reach complete economic independence. US demands in the 1941 negotiations were certain, in the Japanese view, to return them to client state status, or worse. They were right in hindsight. Agreement with the core US demands in 1941 gave away everything successive governments had struggled for in two decades, and left Japan in deep debt to US banks. Dealing just with China Japan can seek at least a temporary peace & hope for a decade or two of recovery and consolidation of its 1936 empire before China seeks to recovery its rightful Manchurian, Formosan, & Korean territories or client states from Japan.

So, in simple terms the choice would have been to prosecute a losing war to bankruptcy, or cut the losses in the hope of economically and militarily outrunning China in the next few decades. Who knows, it the US were distracted with a European war, or neutral in Asian affairs it might even act as a genuine peace broker as it had in 1905. After all the US government may not want to see the banks take a flyer on its loans to Japan.
 
Last edited:

raharris1973

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If they do it still wrecks their economy, a incentive to make policy changes much earlier.

In the case of the US Japan had its back against the wall with US demands it withdraw from Manchuria as well as China & Indo China. Without that outside pressure the Zaibatsu are not going to see the point in pursuing a bankrupting war with China. Before the economy gets that bad the odds are a new government would be negotiating something with China. Imperialists and maverick Army officers that don't understand the new policy would find themselves posted to distant islands, or assination targets.

Japans policy since the Great War or earlier had been to reach complete economic independence. US demands in the 1941 negotiations were certain, in the Japanese view, to return them to client state status, or worse. They were right in hindsight. Agreement with the core US demands in 1941 gave away everything successive governments had struggled for in two decades, and left Japan in deep debt to US banks. Dealing just with China Japan can seek at least a temporary peace & hope for a decade or two of recovery and consolidation of its 1936 empire before China seeks to recovery its rightful Manchurian, Formosan, & Korean territories or client states from Japan.

So, in simple terms the choice would have been to prosecute a losing war to bankruptcy, or cut the losses in the hope of economically and militarily outrunning China in the next few decades. Who knows, it the US were distracted with a European war, or neutral in Asian affairs it might even act as a genuine peace broker as it had in 1905. After all the US government may not want to see the banks take a flyer on its loans to Japan.


I get this. Pretty good explanation. What terms would China agree to, and when? Accepting loss of anything beyond Manchuria and agreeing to any formal ceasefire is going to be politically toxic in China. Maybe even a deal that fails to recover Manchuria is enough to unseat Chiang. Even if he makes such a deal and survives, getting Manchuria back is going to be a public medium term objective. Recovering Taiwan China can be more patient about even if it remains an aspiration. I think OTL shows they can wait until 2019 at least.
 
Occupied China was incredibly rich and thoroughly looted. ...

That sustained the Japanese Army in China. They were living fairly well, while even in early 1944 food rationing in Japan was reaching hardship levels. Manchuria was a fairly comfortable place for a Japanese then, much more so than on Kyushu or Honsho where fuel shortages were causing a serious increase in resperitory illnesses & reduction in labor productivity.
 
What if Japan attack the Allies but not the USA?

They can get their oil from the colonies without getting the USA involved. A very pro-Allies neutral sure, but not involved. Will the American public accept a war over European colonies?

Edit:

"“Roosevelt could only propose war; Congress had to declare it. From a purely diplomatic point of view, Pearl Harbor was therefore a godsend.” It would have been difficult to persuade Congress that an attack upon the Dutch East Indies alone demanded a military response; it might well have proved impossible."
 
If they do it still wrecks their economy, a incentive to make policy changes much earlier.

In the case of the US Japan had its back against the wall with US demands it withdraw from Manchuria as well as China & Indo China. Without that outside pressure the Zaibatsu are not going to see the point in pursuing a bankrupting war with China. Before the economy gets that bad the odds are a new government would be negotiating something with China. Imperialists and maverick Army officers that don't understand the new policy would find themselves posted to distant islands, or assination targets.

Except Japan's change in policy historically was to attack Southeast Asia. Why would it withdraw from China in this scenario? Why not just muddle on, like it did historically?

I mean, Japan kept fighting in China even after it attacked the Allies. here it can focus on the region.
 
Except Japan's change in policy historically was to attack Southeast Asia. Why would it withdraw from China in this scenario? Why not just muddle on, like it did historically?

I mean, Japan kept fighting in China even after it attacked the Allies. here it can focus on the region.

The conditions for occupying FIC were created by the collapse of France AND the Germans ordering Petain to ignore the conditions of the Armistice that required the defense of the French colonies.

In any case the OP here specifically excludes the Indo China gambit.
 
That sustained the Japanese Army in China. They were living fairly well, while even in early 1944 food rationing in Japan was reaching hardship levels. Manchuria was a fairly comfortable place for a Japanese then, much more so than on Kyushu or Honsho where fuel shortages were causing a serious increase in resperitory illnesses & reduction in labor productivity.

What am I, chopped liver? Anyway, China provides the steel, wolfram, slave labor, foodstuffs, and a lot of the aluminum that makes the Japanese war in the Pacific possible. It is not until late 1944 that the US gets its teeth into the Sea of Japan. The Japanese can keep the home islands humming as long as US bombers and submarines do not effectively interdict that Sea of Japan trade.
 
Provides part of it. Still fell short of needs. The short fall in cargo ships held back a lot. The crash program to double the Japanese flagged fleet that got rolling in 1942 diverted steel from other priorities.

... It is not until late 1944 that the US gets its teeth into the Sea of Japan. The Japanese can keep the home islands humming as long as US bombers and submarines do not effectively interdict that Sea of Japan trade.

Actually the cargo ships lost to US air and surface ships in 1943, mostly in the South Pacific was offsetting the cargo ship building program. I'd have to recollect the data again to pin it down, but Japanese cargo shipping peaked out at between 60 & 70 % of its 1940 use & was probably below 60% of its needs from mid 1943. This is aggravated in that the 5,800,000 tons cargo shipping is not all available for imports in 1942. over half was used by the military in he opening months. Mid year 1942 the continued use of significant extra cargo ships in the South Pacific, and Indian Ocean kept the cargo ship capacity for raw materials import somewhere south of the 50% mark of requirements. Aside from Ellis, 'Japans Decision to Surrender' touches on this, and Costellos 'The Pacific War' delves into it. The prewar stockpiles drew down at varying rates, but during 1942-43 they ran out one by one. The managers drew them out, but many of these were only 6-9 months worth & 24 months of use under optimal circumstances for a few. The calculation had been for six months of war and three to six months of restoration of imports and cash flow as the peace was settled.

Food short falls, petroleum shortages, were two items that could in theory been alleviated by imports. But the FIC rice surplus was wasted, the DEI petroleum largely unavailable to industry, long before the US submarine fleet became effective.
 
Provides part of it. Still fell short of needs. The short fall in cargo ships held back a lot. The crash program to double the Japanese flagged fleet that got rolling in 1942 diverted steel from other priorities.

The Japanese had another option, one fortunately which they misused early and often... 40,000 of these.

chinese-junk.jpg


That migration of thousands of Junks into Indonesia was how a lot of Japanese garrison supply continued almost to the end of the war. You would be surprised how much USN and USAAF effort went into shooting these vessels up in the DEI.

Actually the cargo ships lost to US air and surface ships in 1943, mostly in the South Pacific was offsetting the cargo ship building program. I'd have to recollect the data again to pin it down, but Japanese cargo shipping peaked out at between 60 & 70 % of its 1940 use & was probably below 60% of its needs from mid 1943. This is aggravated in that the 5,800,000 tons cargo shipping is not all available for imports in 1942. over half was used by the military in he opening months. Mid year 1942 the continued use of significant extra cargo ships in the South Pacific, and Indian Ocean kept the cargo ship capacity for raw materials import somewhere south of the 50% mark of requirements. Aside from Ellis, 'Japans Decision to Surrender' touches on this, and Costellos 'The Pacific War' delves into it. The prewar stockpiles drew down at varying rates, but during 1942-43 they ran out one by one. The managers drew them out, but many of these were only 6-9 months worth & 24 months of use under optimal circumstances for a few. The calculation had been for six months of war and three to six months of restoration of imports and cash flow as the peace was settled.

The Japanese merchant marine had about 140 tankers at its peak (mid 1943) I devote whole reams of wherewithal in the "Those Marvelous Tin Fish" ATL to get them sunk early and often from the start, which does not happen fruitfully RTL until the 1944 murder year when almost 60 are killed in short order in the second quarter of that year. As for break bulk and dry cargo freighters, the RTL record is that only 18% of the existing 1941 hulls are sunk by mid 1943. Last half of 1943 it is about 27%, but to get that critical additional 2 million tonnes is, again, 1944. The Wallies were just making parity replacement from 1942 to mid 1943.

Food short falls, petroleum shortages, were two items that could in theory been alleviated by imports. But the FIC rice surplus was wasted, the DEI petroleum largely unavailable to industry, long before the US submarine fleet became effective.

The Japanese had no idea how to silo rice, nor did they know how to tank farm seeped oil. The big early success for the United States is when an ULTRA directed sub killed a shipload of Japanese oil experts.

The campaign against Japan’s oil supply was aided by loss of the 14,503 ton Army transport TAIYO MARU (ex-German liner CAP FINISTERRE) to an American submarine. At 1200, 7 May 1942, TAIYO MARU departed Mutsure, Japan for Singapore carrying a large number of oil field technicians to revive the refining facilities at Miri and Balikpapan and other technicians bound for Palembang, Sumatra. She also carried 34 soldiers and 1,010 civilians including military governors, doctors, staff, educators and technicians needed to administer conquered Southeast Asian regions, but at 1945, 8 May, LtCdr William A. Lent’s (USNA ‘25) USS GRENDADIER (SS-210) torpedoed TAIYO MARU 80 nms from Me-Shima Lighthouse. At 2040, TAIYO MARU sank. 656 of 1,044 passengers, four of 53 armed guards/gunners and 156 crew were KIA (total 817). The loss of the oil technichians undoubtedly delayed the Japanese in restoring oil production capacity.

That one victory alone set the Japanese back a whole year.
 

raharris1973

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Thailand and Formosa. Nutcracker instead of sickle. Means a lot more land based airpower.

Very interesting operational concept. The Japanese would have held Formosa/Taiwan and Hainan as air and naval bases to project power into the South China by 1939, so they would be unaffected by the lack of an Indochina occupation.

Getting in to Thailand would have to be its own unique operation. Once Japan is there, Japan can base alot of airpower to menace all surrounding areas of Southeast Asia, but Japan needs to get there first. Did you figure the Japanese could do it just by offering an alliance with Thailand while delivering a veiled threat of destruction if Thailand resists? Possibly backed up by the threat of some carrier operations? Would the Thai just fold, or would they instead refuse if the Japanese have not proven their local power projection by getting into French Indochina?
 
Very interesting operational concept. The Japanese would have held Formosa/Taiwan and Hainan as air and naval bases to project power into the South China by 1939, so they would be unaffected by the lack of an Indochina occupation.

Getting in to Thailand would have to be its own unique operation. Once Japan is there, Japan can base alot of airpower to menace all surrounding areas of Southeast Asia, but Japan needs to get there first. Did you figure the Japanese could do it just by offering an alliance with Thailand while delivering a veiled threat of destruction if Thailand resists? Possibly backed up by the threat of some carrier operations? Would the Thai just fold, or would they instead refuse if the Japanese have not proven their local power projection by getting into French Indochina?

Yup. All of the above. (^^^) I think it was their Plan B.
 
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