Right but your example of this (presumably the strongest one you could find) was not very good, suggests that it may be somewhat harder than you think
I think we get that, but as pointed out many times now the army that is suppose to be key to all this by suddenly turning around and supporting Bose was an all volunteer force. Now don't get me wrong the reason for volunteering were many and varied and certainly not all based around love of the Brits. But that itself suggests that the cause of Indian nationalism is somewhat more complicated than "what Bose's in Burma lets go!"
not so simple
food availability decline (FAD) and failure of exchange entitlements (FEE). (Mukerjee and Sen are in the latter)
1). There was actually food in India at the time but it was not moved around, pretty much because the regional governments (who by this time
had a fair amount of self determining authority in these matters) were not keen on seeing food they felt they might need themselves leave their control. Their citizens were also not keen and there was certainly ground up resistance to it. Given what was going on at the time they can maybe forgiven for being a bit cagey. Pricing controls were dropped, speculation increased (but was reduced when inter province pricing controls were put back in 1943)*
2). The above came out of the fact that the '42 harvest had been relatively poor (but it also wasn't that bad there had been a worse one in '41 however two not great harvests in a row has a multiplicative effect) and more reliance was therefore placed on held reserves, but also intra and international import.
3). A huge amount of rice was usually imported to Bengal from Burma especially in times of shortage, only for obvious reasons Burma wasn't exporting much Rice in 1942/3, what it was exporting of course was plenty of refugees not to mention threat of Japanese invasion.
4). The army did not confiscate food in Bengal, it bought it's own food with it (it actually ended up giving some of it away), it later became the vehicle for more organised distribution.
However direct action (or inaction) by the British did certainly factor in:
1). the removal of boats (due to denying them to a potential enemy invasion) from a lot of the Bay of Bengal removed fishing as an option from many areas, additionally no compensation in the form of alternative food supplies was given (or well not very much anyway).
2), There was at least one shipment of food from Australia earmarked for Greece that could have been diverted (and was requested by the Indian colonial office). Now Churchill was an racist arsehole who most certainly would have prioritised whites over non whites (especially while fighting a war which he saw as a war of survival primarily for Britain and the maintenance of British power, but also culture), and he specifically denied this request. However it's not like the Greeks were just a little bit hungry. There were also other shipments of food around S Asia & SE Asia that could have been redirected but they weren't, Cylon was one IIRC, but again food stress was fairly wide spread at the time for obvious reasons. But I also think the attitude of "what those ungrateful traitorous
indians** who were fomenting unrest (asking for independence), yeah they can stave", was well within his likely responses
3), Colonial driven food supplies were focused on War essential services i.e. when top down colonial office effort was there they prioritized workers making stuff for the war not Bengali farmers. There was a pretty poor assumption that the local markets would provide, without actually ensuring they would!
4). More generally a lack of willingness to step in when concerns were raised (Ok it's 1942 and there are other pressing concerns, but if you going to play at being the white empire that rules the world efficiently and well, you better step up).
So basically a mess, a mess not helped by a global war, disrupted shipping and economic movement and planning, and the enemy literally at the border. But still a mess that could have been at least alleviated by better action sooner by direct action from the British Govt and Colonial Office, and most certainly decisions where made to prioritise other concerns than staving Bengali farmers!
However lest anyone take this as a defence of the British empire in India, you want a really as advertised diabolical famine pretty much directly caused by mismanagement by the British in India and their economic policy? The earlier all India famines (esp Orissa 1863 ) is where to go. But even then there's a link as the lessons learned there by the British at great cost (a cost paid the Indians and not paid by the British of course) meant that they should have acted sooner in 1943!
*this isn't an attempt to blame the Indians, more to point out that there were other actors than just a top down Britain forcing India to do stuff, and of course it's not like the colonial office had completely lost all influence etc!
**not the word he'd have used I'm sure!