Japan Wins Battle of Midway, Now What?

[eltf177]

Derek Jackson's thread (https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=36806&highlight=midway) discussed the end results of a Japanese victory. Basically Japan still loses the war, at best they only buy themselves a little time.

This thread is a bit different. You are Adm. Yamamoto and Kido Butai wins at Midway, sinking all three US carriers and some of their support ships. IJA troops have taken Midway, but holding it will be difficult at best.

As you predicted, the US has refused to even consider negoisiation. You are aware US production is beginning to really ramp up and in a matter of months the USN will be back to strength and attacking. Submarine attacks have been on the rise and you predict that, with the main fleet temporarily out of action, those attacks will continue to escalate to keep up pressure on Japan. Japan cannot possibly match US production, so no help there.

The question is, what do you do with the few months of time you've bought? Another attack on Pearl? Seize the Solomons? Go after Australia? Go after India? Dig in and make the USN pay?

Be interested in hearing your thoughts on this...

 

[jaybird]

What has the Kido Butai lost? If the USN's been beaten but all four IJN CVs are sunk, that's quite a different situation from beating the USN and the Kido Butai remaining intact.

 

[CalBear]

Short version:

Pray

Smart version:

Defect and Surrender

Probable version:

Get into a war of attrition that you are bound to lose trying to hold Midway.

Midway was a trap for Yamamoto, regardless of what happened. One of Yamamoto's weaknesses was that he didn't plan in depth. Okay, you now have Midway and you have ambushed the Fleet. Now what do you do?

The U.S. is still going to be strong enough to prevent any further movement. Saratoga (back at Pearl on June 9) and Wasp (which actually reached the Pacific on June 10, and entered Pearl on June 19 IOTL) still constitute a noteworthy strike force and the U.S. build-up of aircraft on Pearl is unaffected. Yamamoto can't give up Midway now that it has been captured, so he has to defend it (and projecting Nagumo would have been able to take Midway is a BIG stretch with the forces assigned the task, even with a large carrier force in support) well outside of land based air support and at the end of a very slender supply pipeline while be just within the range of B-17 and B-24 bombers carrying a reduced bombload and additional fuel.

Because of the American carrier threat, most of the Kido Butai is forced to stay in the area on some sort of rotating deployment out of the Mandates. This takes the IJN offensive strike force out of the war the same as if they have been sunk and puts them into a position to be attacked virtually non-stop by American subs (which, as I have noted in the past, can go out expend all their torpedoes and be back to Pearl before the milk goes bad). Even with the dreadful version of the Mark 14 torpedo the subs are currently saddled with, their will be enough that work as designed (somewhere around 20%) that losses will rapidly nibble the fleet to bits. The ongoing carrier threat also means that even a surprise attempt against Pearl is out of the question, not that it would have been particularly wise in any case given the strength of the land based defensive force defending the area by mid-1942 which included well over 100 fighters and climbing, LOTS of additional AAA, close to a WING of heavy bombers (something sure to increase rapidly if Midway falls), and close to two full divisions of troops.

What the IJN gets with a Midway Victory is a different Island to die defending.

 

[Markus]

Winning the naval battle of Midway is possible, taking the island not at all. The Marines had turned the island into a Tawara on steroids: shore batteries, AAA, minesfields, barb wire, concrete bunkers, automatic weapons, even tanks and more Marines than the Japanese had troops.

But it would not have made a difference if they had taken it:
http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm

 

[lothaw]

A good way for the Japanesse to win the naval battle is for the IJN to realize their codes have been compromised. This would not only ensure secrecy again, but they could plant dummy messeges to lure the US fleet into battle at their own choosing.

 

[David S Poepoe]

The Japanese should fall back and form a defensive perimeter of islands outposts. Build additional airfields within and establish a second and third line of defense within. The navy doesn't strike outside of the defensive perimeter and pretty much takes up the position of a 'fleet in being'. Make the Americans bleed for every island they take. Perhaps, just perhaps, one could fight them to a conditional surrender.

 

[MacCaulay]

Myself, I'd give some more support to the Aleutian Operation, and extend it. If not a push to Dutch Harbour, at least I'd hold the troops at Kiska and not pull them out like in OTL.

This would give the Japanese a freedom of movement in the North Pacific that they didn't have, where the USN's strength in that theatre of operations would be more or less unchanged since they were using mostly ground based air and a small destroyer based surface group.

 

[larpsidekick]

The Japanese should fall back and form a defensive perimeter of islands outposts. Build additional airfields within and establish a second and third line of defense within. The navy doesn't strike outside of the defensive perimeter and pretty much takes up the position of a 'fleet in being'. Make the Americans bleed for every island they take. Perhaps, just perhaps, one could fight them to a conditional surrender.

Thats pretty much OTL, removing the desire for decisive battle from the fleet. Even without this, the lack of fuel (thanks to the lack of interest in ASW) will bring Japan to surrender unconditionally.

 

[CalBear]

Myself, I'd give some more support to the Aleutian Operation, and extend it. If not a push to Dutch Harbour, at least I'd hold the troops at Kiska and not pull them out like in OTL.

This would give the Japanese a freedom of movement in the North Pacific that they didn't have, where the USN's strength in that theatre of operations would be more or less unchanged since they were using mostly ground based air and a small destroyer based surface group.

The Aleutians were a dead end. There was no strategic use for them to the Japanese, any effort there would divert men, ships, and most critically, fuel from the part of the war that was marginally more useful.

Japan was dead, no matter what. But the Aleutians were dead AND cold.

 

[CalBear]

The Japanese should fall back and form a defensive perimeter of islands outposts. Build additional airfields within and establish a second and third line of defense within. The navy doesn't strike outside of the defensive perimeter and pretty much takes up the position of a 'fleet in being'. Make the Americans bleed for every island they take. Perhaps, just perhaps, one could fight them to a conditional surrender.

This is pretty much what the Japanese did IOTL. They bled the U.S. for every island and bled far more in return.

At some point in 1944 the IJN has to fight, even in this scenario, when it does it gets obliterated a la Leyte, which was when the IJN finally did come out to fight IOTL, before then the main Battle Line had mostly been kept out of combat. If the Kido Butai stays out of the fight and acts as a "Fleet in Being" it simply dies a death of a Thousand Cuts as USN subs pick off one unit after another. The "Fleet in Being" concept only works as long as you present a credible threat. Once the USN has four separate carrier divisions as part of the 3rd/5th Fleet that are each larger and far more powerful than the entire Japanese Navy a Fleet in Being becomes a Target in Waiting.

 

[jaybird]

Depends on what the Japanese lose on the way. If they lose all 4 carriers as OTL, we're still looking at V-J Day in the summer of 1945. If they don't lose a single carrier...the USN is going to have some more problems, but nothing it can't deal with once American industry gets into full gear.

The Philippines campaign, should the 4 extra carriers last the Kido Butai to that point, could be messy, but there's still no doubt of American victory.

 

[Dan Reilly The Great]

If I managed to destroy the american carrier force and kept my fleet relatively in tact, I'd loiter my fleet around midway and get the big guns to show up, then shell the crap out of midway, maybe send some airstrikes in and pray they don't get cut to pieces by the AAA. After inflicting enough damage on the islands I'd leave it alone and head back home to do damage elsewhere, maybe try another strike on pearl or something.

Occupying midway was a waste of time, the Japanese only wanted to cost the americans enough blood to come to the negotiating table, the chances of that are slim I know, but this is the best way to do it. If you hit em enough in enough different places you might be able to keep the USN off balance enough to prevent any major offensive operations for the forseeable future. Again this isn't entirely likely, but it's the IJN's best hope.

 

[adam888]

I think it would be interesting to discuss what if the Japanese had managed to get their strike off of their carriers (the famous 10 minutes or so they needed). Let's say the Japanese managed to get their strike off their carriers before the dive dombers arrived.

Presumably the Kaga and Soryu would still have been sunk for they were heavily hit by DB's. The 102 plane strike that was scheduled included 54 torpedo bombers and 36 DB's but only 12 fighters. With inadequate fighter protection, CAP would have taken a heavy toll on the bombers but it would be certain Yorktown would have been destroyed and presumably some hits would have been scored on either Enterprise or Hornet.

The single bomb hit scored on Akagi would not have prevented the ship from staying in the battle. Japanese bomber assets would have been the 9 TB on the Hiryu and approximately 18 DB left on the Akagi along with the returning planes. Presumably the sinking of the Yorktown would have left the command of the carriers to Sprunace who probably would not risked the safety of his remaining carrier assets and withdrawn from the scene, especially if one of Enterprise or Hornet had been lost. Should the USN opt to continue the battle after Saratoga arrives on the scene, its likely they could hold their own against the Akagi and Hiryu unless those carriers were reinforced by the other Japanese carrier but its likely the battle would not continued.

The Japanese would have had a hornets nest to contend with in taking Midway. Whether the island is taken does not impact the war and the earlier loss of the pilots that survived Midway in OTL would have impacted the fight for Guadacanal assuming that campaign is launched.

I've always thought the Royal Navy would have sent carriers such as Victorius to the Pacfic if there was any threat to Australia and the availability of two such carriers in the South Pacific might have deterred the Japanese, forestalling any further expansion in the Pacific.

I would think an earlier "decisive" battle would have been fought in 1943 around the Gilbert Islands between the remaining 8 carriers of the IJN commanded by Yamaguchi (survived Midway) and the newly formed 11 Task Force 50. Both sides would have taken losses but US naval construction would have made good their carrier losses and the new time line would approximate the old time line in the end.

 

[Tellus]

Winning the naval battle of Midway is possible, taking the island not at all. The Marines had turned the island into a Tawara on steroids: shore batteries, AAA, minesfields, barb wire, concrete bunkers, automatic weapons, even tanks and more Marines than the Japanese had troops.

But it would not have made a difference if they had taken it:
http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm

I really disagree about the island itself. The naval battle was all that really mattered; Midway itself would have fallen like Guam and Wake had under a determined assault. The idea you can make an island impregnable is lunacy; it can be made tough to crack, win your navy time, but if youre the only one with boats and planes around it, its just a matter of time till it falls. The Japanese fortified islands just as well, and ultimately, logistics and psychologic warfare were the key elements of the war, not island fortifications. Pouring lots of resources into an island's defense will certainly have an impact, but their ultimate loss eventually offset the damage they cause.

If all three US carriers are sunk and all Japanese carriers are intact - not that unlikely an event all things considered - Midway will fall and the USN will need several months to recoup. But recoup itll. Instead of fighting over Guadalcanal in early 43, therell be more skirmishes in the area and eventually the Japanese will lose to attrition.

As for what Tokyo would do with the time it gained; complete control over the Solomon islands and Port Moresby in the south are the most likely targets to create a strong defensive perimeter. If the USN is shaken up badly they may not be able to resist a strong move in that direction.

 

[Bill Cameron]

Wow... two Done To Death[size=-2](tm)[/size] topics at the top of the Post-1900 board at the same time...

It would be so sad if it weren't also so predictable.

Anyway, here's the usual link usually used to inject a little reality into this all-to-usual question: The Same Old Same Old


Bill

 

[CalBear]

One thing that is being overlooked in some of the more specific bits of the strategy of the IJN air attack on the U.S. Fleet is that Nagumo had absolutely no clue that he was facing three American carriers. His entire strike package would have gone after Yorktown and her consorts, not after the entire American force.

No Japanese aircraft attacked either Enterprise or Hornet on that June day. The only way that Nagumo ever even reasoned out that the U.S. had more than a single deck was by the sheer number of carrier aircraft that hit his force.

The U.S. knew where Nagumo was, he had no idea of where TF 16 was. No one in Japan had any idea of TF 16's actual location on June 4th, 1942 until after the war.

This fact, along with any number of others are frequently ignored in favor of the many myths that have grown up around the battle (like the famous Decks crawling with aircraft being refueled, both Japanese ship logs and reports by senior American squadron commanders, remark on the absence of aircraft on the Japanese decks), in all of the WI revolving around Midway. The IJN was always, even if the strike had been launched, at a massive, likely fatal, disadvantage.

 

[Bill Cameron]

I really disagree about the island itself. The naval battle was all that really mattered...

Tellus,

Agreed. Midway was the bait the IJN used to lure the USN to a hoped for destruction.

... Midway itself would have fallen like Guam and Wake had under a determined assault.

Of course, as CalBear correctly points out, a determined assault requires several material resources that the IJN and it's landing forces didn't actually have on hand. Among those deficits were seemingly unimportant things like landing craft on which logistics depend so heavily. They could just ram destroyers up on the beach as was planned for Wake after all...

And, after such a wasteful and concerted effort, when Midway is taken it immediately turns into a tarbaby for the Japanese that the US will gleefully exploit. That means the war of attrition which Japan cannot win occurs at the end of the Hawaiian island chain instead of off Guadacanal.


Bill

 

[CalBear]

I really disagree about the island itself. The naval battle was all that really mattered; Midway itself would have fallen like Guam and Wake had under a determined assault. The idea you can make an island impregnable is lunacy; it can be made tough to crack, win your navy time, but if youre the only one with boats and planes around it, its just a matter of time till it falls. The Japanese fortified islands just as well, and ultimately, logistics and psychologic warfare were the key elements of the war, not island fortifications. Pouring lots of resources into an island's defense will certainly have an impact, but their ultimate loss eventually offset the damage they cause.

If all three US carriers are sunk and all Japanese carriers are intact - not that unlikely an event all things considered - Midway will fall and the USN will need several months to recoup. But recoup itll. Instead of fighting over Guadalcanal in early 43, therell be more skirmishes in the area and eventually the Japanese will lose to attrition.

As for what Tokyo would do with the time it gained; complete control over the Solomon islands and Port Moresby in the south are the most likely targets to create a strong defensive perimeter. If the USN is shaken up badly they may not be able to resist a strong move in that direction.

Somewhere on the board I have a really lengthy account of the forces dedicated to the invasion of the Island as well as the OOB of the Marine defenders.

(aha! found it!)

There is also the significant matter that the IJN landing force was a far from sure bet to take the Island. In some ways, Midway resembles Tarawa (although somewhat smaller), encircling reef a couple hundred yards out from the Islands (Sand & Eastern) themselves that doesn't have, even at high tide, sufficient water to float boats over. The IJN landing force was only 2,500 men and would have to wade in from as much as 400 yards out. It was opposed by somewhere in the area of 3,500 Marines, fighting from reinforced bunkers (the first raid on the Islands, which cost the Japanese around half the attacking force when you include "write off" aircraft) did virtually no damage to the defenses and caused only six KIA among the ground forces. Marine defenses included four 7" anti ship guns, five 5" DP guns, four 3" anti-boat guns, thirty 0.50 cal and thirty-six 0.30 cal machine guns + the 20MM guns of the anti aircraft units. In addition the defenses featured electrically command detonated mines, 1,500 IEDs and several PT boats (which the attacking planes totally missed even seeing). There was also a unit of light tanks hiding in the trees on Eastern Island, giving the defenders a mobile armored reserve.

https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=88120&highlight=Midway

So you would have an attacking force that was OUTNUMBERED by the defenders, attacking an Island in circumstances far worse than the Marines had at Tarawa (The various Japanese units hadn't even practiced the landing as a group, even though they were from different SERVICE BRANCHES).

Unlike Guam, which was effectively a walkover with a company of Marines being overwhelmed by a hand picked 5,500 man Brigade, or even Wake (where the Japanese demonstrated incredible incompentence in their amphibious assault planning and execution) where the invaders had significant numerical advantages over the understrength Marine Defense Battalion and still repulsed the first wave, and might have done the same to the second had commumication lines not been severed (leading the Naval and Marine commanders to believe that half the Island was already lost) at Midway you have an extensively prepared, heavily fortified and supplied defense force that greatly outnumbered the potential invasion force facing an enemy attacker that was not even able to request close air support (most Japanese pilots removed the radios from their aircraft to save weight and the IJA didn't have any commonality with the IJN in tactical methodolgy) or direct gunfire support from warships off-shore.

If the Marine defenders destroyed the first wave, which is remarkably likely (the Japanese Invasion Plan called for a THREE HOUR bombardment by a cruiser division, and the battleships in the Main Body, including the Yamato, had almost no bombardment shells in their magazines, even IF Nagumo had asked for additional support, which was extremely unlikely since it was not part of "The Plan") the Japanese had no reserve of any kind available closer than the Mandates.

The Marines might not have held the Island, but The numbers were vastly in their favor

 

[Atreus]

The Aleutians were a dead end. There was no strategic use for them to the Japanese, any effort there would divert men, ships, and most critically, fuel from the part of the war that was marginally more useful.

Japan was dead, no matter what. But the Aleutians were dead AND cold.

On the other hand, Aleutians offer an alternative strategic axis which the Americans could use to approach the Home Islands. Taking Dutch harbour could at least delay a potential American thrust in that region.

Now, this is, as already discussed, a fairly hopeless scenario for Japan. That said, I would do something like this.

- Having taken Midway (not an easy proposition, but the OP says that it has fallen), do what can be done to trash the Island, and pull out. Possibly leave a token garrison so the Americans will be obliged to fight to retake the island.

- Reorganize shipping production, with an emphasis on transports, aircraft carriers, and escorts. Institute a convoy system, and try to actually fight the American submarines. Possibly convert battleships Yamato and Musashi into aircraft carriers a la Shinano.

- Attempt to modernize fighter production, with the aim of having new aircraft capable of holding their own against the more advanced american fighters being produced. Reorganize pilot training. Prewar standards probably cannot be replicated under duress, but it should be reasonable to train pilots capable of actually flying competently.

-Strategically, follow something similar to the OTL plan of withdrawing behind a fortified line in the Pacific. However, on an operational level, be aggressive. Attempt to inflict as many victories as possible on american carrier groups through local superiority before the US can build up a preponderance in numbers in the Pacific (hopefully delaying that time by a few months).

- Announce very publicly that I am willing to come to the negotiating table, with favorable terms. Offer some combination of the return of the Philippines (demilitarized, of course), return of POWs, reparations, help supplying the USSR, a scaling back in China, etc... Not ideal, and not palatable to the conservatives, but they might just be good enough and face saving enough for the Americans to accept (or, at least, to stir up dissent).

- Pray.

 

[Bill Cameron]

I've always thought the Royal Navy would have sent carriers such as Victorius to the Pacfic...

Adam888,

Sorry, but no.

In this post I explained the circumstance behind HMS Victorious' odd deployment in the southwest Pacific. It had nothing to do with the USN's lack of carriers and everything to do with Ernie King's personal war against MacArthur.

Furthermore, the RN's carrier-borne aircraft, Swordfish etc., were worse than useless in the Pacific during this time period and both the RN and USN knew that. Despite having come fresh from a lengthy yard period, the USN had to spend over 100 days refitting Victorious at Pearl for service in the Pacific. Handling equipment for more modern aircraft and additional AA weaponry were part of that work, all of which was removed before she returned to Scapa in October of '43.


Bill