Japan strikes soon after Fall of France

elkarlo

Banned
Dang it Blondie! I was looking into some of the things that you posted. You found more than i did. Thank you!
 

BlondieBC

Banned
We should also remember the Zero had a much longer range than the Claude. Even with the same bases, which Japan will not have, it will not be able to escort its long range bomber missions. This operation will look much different, and be harder, even if the USA is not involved.

First Japan will have to take Indochina, then it will likely not be able to invade Malaysia directly due to lack of air cover, and the extra time the Allies have to prepare. The Japanese will have to make many more landings, or will have to risk their carriers by directly supporting the landings.

And, America has a Japan phobia at this time. Even if FDR can't get the USA in the war, he will be able to get a massive additional defense authorization bill for the Army and Navy, with far fewer restrictions on the use of the Army.

The US probably tries to speed up their reinforcement of the PI but I don't think there is much they can do to speed that up. They may have fleet exercises in the western pacific to try to send a message to the Japanese or they may not. They might move some or all of the fleet to Pearl Harbor early as a warning to the Japanese - but this would probably be temporary since I don't think Pearl was really prepared for the whole PacFlt in early 1940.

Tom.

The USA was generally pulling forces out of the Pacific to the Atlantic in 1941, so PI would be stronger, at least in BB and DD.

In early 1940, Adm Richardson was in charge, and he did not keep the ships in Pearl, but in another anchorage in Hawaii. A lot will depend on the exact attack date, since the USA was moving forces around, and also switched Admirals in early 1941.

Due to the ramp/decision making process in OTL, I have trouble seeing Japan attacking before January 1941. All the little details they needed to take care of in OTL, will need to be taken care of in this ATL.
 
We should also remember the Zero had a much longer range than the Claude. Even with the same bases, which Japan will not have, it will not be able to escort its long range bomber missions. This operation will look much different, and be harder, even if the USA is not involved.

First Japan will have to take Indochina, then it will likely not be able to invade Malaysia directly due to lack of air cover, and the extra time the Allies have to prepare. The Japanese will have to make many more landings, or will have to risk their carriers by directly supporting the landings.

And, America has a Japan phobia at this time. Even if FDR can't get the USA in the war, he will be able to get a massive additional defense authorization bill for the Army and Navy, with far fewer restrictions on the use of the Army.



The USA was generally pulling forces out of the Pacific to the Atlantic in 1941, so PI would be stronger, at least in BB and DD.

In early 1940, Adm Richardson was in charge, and he did not keep the ships in Pearl, but in another anchorage in Hawaii. A lot will depend on the exact attack date, since the USA was moving forces around, and also switched Admirals in early 1941.

Due to the ramp/decision making process in OTL, I have trouble seeing Japan attacking before January 1941. All the little details they needed to take care of in OTL, will need to be taken care of in this ATL.

Good points, I had forgotten that Adm Richardson was still in charge and you are exactly right. The fleet if it were moved to Hawaii at all would be at several anchorages maybe some light ships (a DD/CL flotilla) at Pearl but the heavies elsewhere.

The timing depends on if they start with preping to invade FIC and move to occupation after the French surrender or if they delay all planning until after the French surrender. Then the timing of when they start changes the nature of the Allied opposition, if they start too early the French get involved and maybe FIC fights rather than surrenders as Vichy dictates. If they start later then things move closer to OTL and the pressures to attack the US along the way mount.
 
I think that the magnitude of the crisis that would have been caused by Japan taking control of South East Asia in Summer 1940 is being underestimated by some posters. Rubber would have been the greatest problem although tin was also needed. According to an article http://portal.acs.org/portal/acs/cor...8-e07971963c8b published by the American Chemical Society “At this time [in 1942], the United States had a stockpile of about one million tons of natural rubber, a consumption rate of about 600,000 tons per year, and no commercial process to produce a general purpose synthetic rubber. Conserving, reclaiming, and stockpiling activities could not fill the gap in rubber consumption.” The situation in 1940 when the US Rubber Reserve Company (RRC) was formed in June 1940 was potentially much more dangerous.

A table was posted on the Axishistory site http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtop...?f=66&t=144816 by Michael Emrys taken from The Big L: American Logistics in World War II, Alan Gropman ed., ISBN 1-57906-036-6 and attached below. The points to note are that firstly imports of roughly 113 thousands of tons for each of the first three quarters of 1939 when the USA was still recovering from the 1937-8 recession. Secondly that imports rise to 160, 175 and 176 thousand tons up to the end of June 1940 as military orders raise demand. Then thirdly and critically, imports go to 222, 246, 248, 229, 207 and 265 thousand tons up to the end of 1941. This step rise occurs because FDR orders the establishment of a rubber stockpile. Finally we see the first effects of the Japanese attack in the first quarter of 1942 with imports falling to 208 thousand tons and then fall to only 11 thousand tons in the third quarter.

Thus when South East Asia fell OTL, the USA had a stockpile of roughly a million tons and an annual consumption of 600,000 tons according to the ACS article. Although there must have been some stockpile held by companies in 1940, it seems likely that most of the 1942 stockpile was created by artificially high imports after June 1940 at a rate of roughly 75 to 100,000 tons per quarter over seven quarters. OTL the USA was just able to live off its stockpile until the production of synthetic rubber took off in the second half of 1943.

If Japan takes South East Asia in Summer 1940, then either America declares war and has a difficult time raising production while short of rubber and tin or America tries to maintain its peace time economy without controls such as a nation wide speed limit to save rubber and without much civilian use of rubber. In the second case, because industry could calculate that rubber will run out in six months, it will immediately stop buying materials and parts for production of vehicles or for goods requiring rubber clad electric wiring. This will tip America into an immediate recession.

Of course isolationists will argue that America can buy rubber from Japan delivered to the Philippines. However, maintaining trade with Japan will cause Britain to make peace with both Germany and Japan. Thus the arguments in the 1940 election will come down to immediate war or isolationism with no middle ground of keeping out of the war while employing American workers to produce munitions.

That's profound. I just don't see a preemptive US war in 1940 being in the cards. Never underestimate the influence of an election year.

Far too many people wanted to avoid a repeat of WWI in which (as they saw it) the US needlessly rushed into war for no good reason and no vital national interest. A posture that is perceived to be overly aggressive-let alone an economic dip could easily cost FDR the election. Almost as bad would be winning narrowly alongside a more isolationist congress (the public has an intuitive sense of checks and balances). It would be unnatural and arguably unwise for him to take those risks.

Based on this information, even a boycott seems very problematic. Like boycotting OPEC in the 1970's problematic. Can you imagine being blamed for even more massive unemployment (we still hadn't fully recovered from the great depression) or arguing to declare a "war for rubber" when your opponent points out we could simply have bought the stuff for an affordable price like everyone else in the world? It would make declaring war to help Nationalist China look like a popular idea.

At his most ambitious and devious, I think FDR would think in terms of running like Wilson on being the man who "kept us out of war" while planning to make his move in 1941 at the earliest.
 
Last edited:

Using a ship for its intended purpose which requires entering a war zone is different to what the other poster suggested, in that it was intentionally sent out to be sunk with the intention of bringing the US into the war. THAT is a conspiracy theory.

Depth charging the wreck doesnt prove anything, it could have been by accident, or some cold hearted git could have decided to test depth charges on it. Dropping depth charges on it does next to nothing to hide any crime unless they blow the whole damm thing up.
 
I have read all the G-2 intelligence reports from 1941. The Army clearly believes it is in an undeclared global war. We don't have to speculate on FDR motives, he left a written record to show us what he believed. FDR wanted Hitler and Japan defeated, and I have seen no evidence that anyone important seriously thought the Nazi's could be removed except through military victory.


With the benefit of hindsight we dont have to wonder, at the time however it was a slightly different story. Hitler didnt have access to all the same information we do
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Using a ship for its intended purpose which requires entering a war zone is different to what the other poster suggested, in that it was intentionally sent out to be sunk with the intention of bringing the US into the war. THAT is a conspiracy theory.

Depth charging the wreck doesnt prove anything, it could have been by accident, or some cold hearted git could have decided to test depth charges on it. Dropping depth charges on it does next to nothing to hide any crime unless they blow the whole damm thing up.

I am reposting the quotes for clarity.

i think that the US would have baited the Japanese into attacking some USN ships, and then declared war. They would have done their best to manufacturer a Lusitania or a Gulf of Tokin event.

His quote talks about bait, not the certain knowledge that it would be sunk. I think you are reading too much into the original quote. But only the author can clarify for certain.

Destroying what a person claims to be exculpatory evidence is considered evidence of guilt, at least in the USA, but there are many people serving very long prison sentence in the USA based on doing the type of action the British did to the Lusitania.

This is the last I will speak of the Lusitania in this thread.

With the benefit of hindsight we dont have to wonder, at the time however it was a slightly different story. Hitler didnt have access to all the same information we do

You are totally missing the point. These documents are not hindsight, the are the written record of flag level officers executing FDR orders. They are from the same time period. And your original quote was discussing what FDR intended to do, not Hitler. These records show that FDR wanted Hitler beaten, not to make peace with Hitler. He was not trying to send a message to Hitler to rethink his position, FDR was trying to defeat Hitler by military means while working within the constraints of the USA political system.
 
Besides, would Japanese be able to ignore the sanctions, which US will certainly impose. They did it in 1941. for much less important China.
 
You are totally missing the point. These documents are not hindsight, the are the written record of flag level officers executing FDR orders. They are from the same time period. And your original quote was discussing what FDR intended to do, not Hitler. These records show that FDR wanted Hitler beaten, not to make peace with Hitler. He was not trying to send a message to Hitler to rethink his position, FDR was trying to defeat Hitler by military means while working within the constraints of the USA political system.

I think you are misunderstanding my original post. I was not trying to claim that the reason FDR sent the ships out there was simply a warning, because we all know that was not the case. However Hitler and the others did not know that, and so his orders and the ships could easily be seen as a warning to them to back off and behave.
Suddenly seeing "neutral" warships from a powerful nation escorting your enemies is clearly a warning.

My comment about hindsight is on that element, namely that Hitler did not have access to the same information that we do and so would be forced to draw his own conclusions about why the ships were there.
 
There is little doubt, that Japan can sweep through South East Asia in 1940, if the US are not attacked and do not immediately react to the Japanese aggression.

But even if the US decide to react, they would have to send the fleet in. This basically gives the Japanese admirals, what they wanted all the time: the decisive battle.
Is that good?
 
There is little doubt, that Japan can sweep through South East Asia in 1940, if the US are not attacked and do not immediately react to the Japanese aggression.

But even if the US decide to react, they would have to send the fleet in. This basically gives the Japanese admirals, what they wanted all the time: the decisive battle.
Is that good?

The decisive battle concept was obsolete, tough it took both sides some time to digest. Americans basically stopped pursuing decisive battle strategy immediately, while Japanese persisted till 1942. If US sent their fleet units it would probably be like in Atlantic, where British convoys were escorted by American ships for some legs in their journey. Japanese would then either be forced to ignore those convoys or risk war with US.

With PI and Guam still US, this will be a very short war.
 
Top