The US probably tries to speed up their reinforcement of the PI but I don't think there is much they can do to speed that up. They may have fleet exercises in the western pacific to try to send a message to the Japanese or they may not. They might move some or all of the fleet to Pearl Harbor early as a warning to the Japanese - but this would probably be temporary since I don't think Pearl was really prepared for the whole PacFlt in early 1940.
Tom.
We should also remember the Zero had a much longer range than the Claude. Even with the same bases, which Japan will not have, it will not be able to escort its long range bomber missions. This operation will look much different, and be harder, even if the USA is not involved.
First Japan will have to take Indochina, then it will likely not be able to invade Malaysia directly due to lack of air cover, and the extra time the Allies have to prepare. The Japanese will have to make many more landings, or will have to risk their carriers by directly supporting the landings.
And, America has a Japan phobia at this time. Even if FDR can't get the USA in the war, he will be able to get a massive additional defense authorization bill for the Army and Navy, with far fewer restrictions on the use of the Army.
The USA was generally pulling forces out of the Pacific to the Atlantic in 1941, so PI would be stronger, at least in BB and DD.
In early 1940, Adm Richardson was in charge, and he did not keep the ships in Pearl, but in another anchorage in Hawaii. A lot will depend on the exact attack date, since the USA was moving forces around, and also switched Admirals in early 1941.
Due to the ramp/decision making process in OTL, I have trouble seeing Japan attacking before January 1941. All the little details they needed to take care of in OTL, will need to be taken care of in this ATL.
I think that the magnitude of the crisis that would have been caused by Japan taking control of South East Asia in Summer 1940 is being underestimated by some posters. Rubber would have been the greatest problem although tin was also needed. According to an article http://portal.acs.org/portal/acs/cor...8-e07971963c8b published by the American Chemical Society “At this time [in 1942], the United States had a stockpile of about one million tons of natural rubber, a consumption rate of about 600,000 tons per year, and no commercial process to produce a general purpose synthetic rubber. Conserving, reclaiming, and stockpiling activities could not fill the gap in rubber consumption.” The situation in 1940 when the US Rubber Reserve Company (RRC) was formed in June 1940 was potentially much more dangerous.
A table was posted on the Axishistory site http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtop...?f=66&t=144816 by Michael Emrys taken from The Big L: American Logistics in World War II, Alan Gropman ed., ISBN 1-57906-036-6 and attached below. The points to note are that firstly imports of roughly 113 thousands of tons for each of the first three quarters of 1939 when the USA was still recovering from the 1937-8 recession. Secondly that imports rise to 160, 175 and 176 thousand tons up to the end of June 1940 as military orders raise demand. Then thirdly and critically, imports go to 222, 246, 248, 229, 207 and 265 thousand tons up to the end of 1941. This step rise occurs because FDR orders the establishment of a rubber stockpile. Finally we see the first effects of the Japanese attack in the first quarter of 1942 with imports falling to 208 thousand tons and then fall to only 11 thousand tons in the third quarter.
Thus when South East Asia fell OTL, the USA had a stockpile of roughly a million tons and an annual consumption of 600,000 tons according to the ACS article. Although there must have been some stockpile held by companies in 1940, it seems likely that most of the 1942 stockpile was created by artificially high imports after June 1940 at a rate of roughly 75 to 100,000 tons per quarter over seven quarters. OTL the USA was just able to live off its stockpile until the production of synthetic rubber took off in the second half of 1943.
If Japan takes South East Asia in Summer 1940, then either America declares war and has a difficult time raising production while short of rubber and tin or America tries to maintain its peace time economy without controls such as a nation wide speed limit to save rubber and without much civilian use of rubber. In the second case, because industry could calculate that rubber will run out in six months, it will immediately stop buying materials and parts for production of vehicles or for goods requiring rubber clad electric wiring. This will tip America into an immediate recession.
Of course isolationists will argue that America can buy rubber from Japan delivered to the Philippines. However, maintaining trade with Japan will cause Britain to make peace with both Germany and Japan. Thus the arguments in the 1940 election will come down to immediate war or isolationism with no middle ground of keeping out of the war while employing American workers to produce munitions.
Snip
I have read all the G-2 intelligence reports from 1941. The Army clearly believes it is in an undeclared global war. We don't have to speculate on FDR motives, he left a written record to show us what he believed. FDR wanted Hitler and Japan defeated, and I have seen no evidence that anyone important seriously thought the Nazi's could be removed except through military victory.
Using a ship for its intended purpose which requires entering a war zone is different to what the other poster suggested, in that it was intentionally sent out to be sunk with the intention of bringing the US into the war. THAT is a conspiracy theory.
Depth charging the wreck doesnt prove anything, it could have been by accident, or some cold hearted git could have decided to test depth charges on it. Dropping depth charges on it does next to nothing to hide any crime unless they blow the whole damm thing up.
i think that the US would have baited the Japanese into attacking some USN ships, and then declared war. They would have done their best to manufacturer a Lusitania or a Gulf of Tokin event.
With the benefit of hindsight we dont have to wonder, at the time however it was a slightly different story. Hitler didnt have access to all the same information we do
You are totally missing the point. These documents are not hindsight, the are the written record of flag level officers executing FDR orders. They are from the same time period. And your original quote was discussing what FDR intended to do, not Hitler. These records show that FDR wanted Hitler beaten, not to make peace with Hitler. He was not trying to send a message to Hitler to rethink his position, FDR was trying to defeat Hitler by military means while working within the constraints of the USA political system.
There is little doubt, that Japan can sweep through South East Asia in 1940, if the US are not attacked and do not immediately react to the Japanese aggression.
But even if the US decide to react, they would have to send the fleet in. This basically gives the Japanese admirals, what they wanted all the time: the decisive battle.
Is that good?