Japan retreats from China in 1939

Hi. I have a different scenario proposal, after reading Mad monarchist's article about the japanese "justifications" for their entry in the war, then I reached this part:

"Japan had actually been prepared, after years of fighting in China, to abandon the conflict and withdraw their forces to focus on the defense of Manchuria and consolidating the hold on northeast Asia that Japan already possessed. Had they done so, the Empire of Japan might still be around today."

So what would have happened if Japan in 1939, maybe by appointing a more isolationist PM, or due their economical situation, or just because of the hand of God, the japanese retreated from mainland China back to Manchukuo and Mengkukuo to consolidade their empire (maybe trying to negociate peace with Kai Shek) and preventing the pacific war

What in your opinion would happen, and why?
 

B-29_Bomber

Banned
Hi. I have a different scenario proposal, after reading Mad monarchist's article about the japanese "justifications" for their entry in the war, then I reached this part:

"Japan had actually been prepared, after years of fighting in China, to abandon the conflict and withdraw their forces to focus on the defense of Manchuria and consolidating the hold on northeast Asia that Japan already possessed. Had they done so, the Empire of Japan might still be around today."

So what would have happened if Japan in 1939, maybe by appointing a more isolationist PM, or due their economical situation, or just because of the hand of God, the japanese retreated from mainland China back to Manchukuo and Mengkukuo to consolidade their empire (maybe trying to negociate peace with Kai Shek) and preventing the pacific war

What in your opinion would happen, and why?

Why should the Chinese accept peace?
 
Thus won't happen unless you get rid of Tojo - then everything becomes easier. And by consolidating, do you mean forcing the Chinese off their lands to make way for Japanese settlers?
 
Thus won't happen unless you get rid of Tojo - then everything becomes easier. And by consolidating, do you mean forcing the Chinese off their lands to make way for Japanese settlers?

Ok, use the hand of God and kills Tojo, or make he lost credibility for some reason

Yes, let's say that they retreat from most of mainland china except from their puppet states of Mengkukuo and Manchukuo, there is no attack on pearl harbor or occupation of Indochina and japan adopts a defensive policy against the chinese.
 

RousseauX

Donor
Hi. I have a different scenario proposal, after reading Mad monarchist's article about the japanese "justifications" for their entry in the war, then I reached this part:

"Japan had actually been prepared, after years of fighting in China, to abandon the conflict and withdraw their forces to focus on the defense of Manchuria and consolidating the hold on northeast Asia that Japan already possessed. Had they done so, the Empire of Japan might still be around today."

So what would have happened if Japan in 1939, maybe by appointing a more isolationist PM, or due their economical situation, or just because of the hand of God, the japanese retreated from mainland China back to Manchukuo and Mengkukuo to consolidade their empire (maybe trying to negociate peace with Kai Shek) and preventing the pacific war

What in your opinion would happen, and why?

Which ever civilian tries to do this will either 1) be ignored by the military or 2) get assassinated by the military.

The Japanese military wanted the war in China to be brought to a victory and a withdraw would signify defeat, the military has already demonstrated it's ability to control domestic Japanese politics through violence and have already assassinated a PM in 1932: any "peace" leader will simply be shot. This isn't something limited to Tojo but extends to the entire Japanese military.

If they actually withdraw north of the great wall though, it will signify a huge victory for Chiang and the KMT, because for all intents and purposes it looks like they forced the japanese to withdraw from China proper. The legitimacy this lends Chiang likely means that he will be able to continue to strengthen his position within China on the short-medium run. On the long run it means China will be gearing for a second matchup against Japan over Manchuria in 10 years or so: on much better terms for the Chinese.
 
For this to occur you would require a dramatically earlier POD to change the senior Army leadership and their mindset. However, by this stage the IJA was unwilling to accept that the entire Chinese adventure was a gigantic sink for both men and material. I would also suggest that the Chinese Nationalists would need to change leaders as well to possibly Wang Jing Wei.
 
Thus won't happen unless you get rid of Tojo - then everything becomes easier. And by consolidating, do you mean forcing the Chinese off their lands to make way for Japanese settlers?

Tojo wasn't PM in 1939. Not like Prince Fumimaro Konoe was much of a moderate, though.
 

RousseauX

Donor
For this to occur you would require a dramatically earlier POD to change the senior Army leadership and their mindset. However, by this stage the IJA was unwilling to accept that the entire Chinese adventure was a gigantic sink for both men and material. I would also suggest that the Chinese Nationalists would need to change leaders as well to possibly Wang Jing Wei.

Why?

Chiang didn't really want to fight the Japanese, he wanted to consolidate power within China before confronting the Japanese and was basically forced to fight when his own subordinates kidnapped him and forced him to make a deal with the Communists.
 
For this to occur you would require a dramatically earlier POD to change the senior Army leadership and their mindset. However, by this stage the IJA was unwilling to accept that the entire Chinese adventure was a gigantic sink for both men and material. I would also suggest that the Chinese Nationalists would need to change leaders as well to possibly Wang Jing Wei.

Wang Jingwei was already "supporting" the japanese, the nationalists would not accept him as their president in 1939
 
Hi. I have a different scenario proposal, after reading Mad monarchist's article about the japanese "justifications" for their entry in the war, then I reached this part:

"Japan had actually been prepared, after years of fighting in China, to abandon the conflict and withdraw their forces to focus on the defense of Manchuria and consolidating the hold on northeast Asia that Japan already possessed. Had they done so, the Empire of Japan might still be around today."

Apparently Japan did put out peace feelers to Chiang around this time, but they were completely unsatisfactory to the Chinese, "demanding a semipermanent occupation of North China." https://books.google.com/books?id=MuyizRQAjt4C&pg=PA18 Chiang could not have accepted such terms even if he had wanted to do so. Chiang had sent out peace feelers of his own, but they required complete restoration of China's "territorial integrity and sovereignty" which of course was unsatisfactory to the Japanese. https://books.google.com/books?id=DUg2KGMQWHQC&pg=PA164

I just don't see any way of bridging the gap between the two sides by this time.
 
Wang Jingwei was already "supporting" the japanese, the nationalists would not accept him as their president in 1939

The Japanese in 1939 would probably be willing to give up on Wang (whose government they had not yet officially recognized) if Chiang had reacted favorably to their peace feelers, but as I noted in another post, these were totally unsatisfactory, involving Chiang's acquiescence in a semipermanent Japanese occupation of North China.
 
What if better performance by KMT troops from Marco Polo to 1939? The Japanese dont overrun the coasts as easily, suffer heavier casualties for alot less land occupied. KMT resistance severely stiffening with the WAllies giving alot more supplies to prop em up. Thus making the militarists look alot worst as they got Japan stuck in a quagmire with no end in sight.... not that that's stopped em.

How the KMT performs better enough to really bloody the Japanese's nose, heh well, that's a good question.
 

RousseauX

Donor
What if better performance by KMT troops from Marco Polo to 1939? The Japanese dont overrun the coasts as easily, suffer heavier casualties for alot less land occupied. KMT resistance severely stiffening with the WAllies giving alot more supplies to prop em up. Thus making the militarists look alot worst as they got Japan stuck in a quagmire with no end in sight.... not that that's stopped em.

How the KMT performs better enough to really bloody the Japanese's nose, heh well, that's a good question.

But this isn't that different from OTL, unless a defeat like Nominhan level bad occurs fairly early on the military will simply throw more resources into the problem so they don't have to admit defeat.

In a way it actually make sense too, a Japanese withdraw in the late 30s is probably a "win condition" for the KMT as far as the struggle for the asian mainland goes. Japan cannot hope to hold onto Manchuria indefinitely once the KMT consolidates power within China proper. Therefore the only solution is to destroy the threat of a united China before it's realized.
 
Why?

Chiang didn't really want to fight the Japanese, he wanted to consolidate power within China before confronting the Japanese and was basically forced to fight when his own subordinates kidnapped him and forced him to make a deal with the Communists.

To quote an old soc.history.what-if post of mine:

" Jay Taylor has argued in his recent sympathetic biography,
*The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China*
(Harvard UP 2009) that even before the kidnapping the KMT on the one hand
and the CCP on the other, had already reached a preliminary agreement for
a united front, with the KMT dropping its prior demand that Mao and Zhu De
leave the country.
http://books.google.com/books?id=03catqbPCmgC&pg=PA125 Thus Taylor
concludes that the kidnapping itself did not change history: ..."if the
kidnapping had not occurred, Mao, pushed by Stalin, would probably have
agreed to a united front on the terms worked out by Chen Lifu, Zhang Qun,
Zhou Enlai, and Pan Hannian--and if Stalin had then committed the Soviet
Union in effect to a secret military alliance with China, Chiang would
probably have called off the 'last five-minute' offensive, and the united
front would still have begun. Thus the kidnapping itself did not change
history; it was Chiang's decisions that shaped events."
http://books.google.com/books?id=03catqbPCmgC&pg=PA136 (Taylor also
argues that Chiang could easily have resumed the military offensive
against the Communists after his release, but that's a matter for another
post...) "
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/soc.history.what-if/GXVC6drA8pw/mhT9A7DeH-oJ
 
Not "retreat". They "win" and come home. If they can get the Army under control. I imagine the Chinese stay in chaos from all the competing leaders and those wanting independence. And I think they would want to keep Innner Mongolia, Manchuko, the Reformed Republic of China, and the Provisional Tepublic of China around. They also got Hainan in February, which should be annexed.
 
Not "retreat". They "win" and come home. If they can get the Army under control. I imagine the Chinese stay in chaos from all the competing leaders and those wanting independence. And I think they would want to keep Innner Mongolia, Manchuko, the Reformed Republic of China, and the Provisional Tepublic of China around. They also got Hainan in February, which should be annexed.

The problem is that there is no reason for China to agree to this peace.
 
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