No Bomb doesn't automatically equal Olympic.
What is very likely is that Olympic is delayed due to the October 1945 Typhoon that smacked Okinawa, including the assembly area for about 1/4 of the total invasion force, the airbases that were going to provide a decent amount of the counter-air and CAS, and the warehouses (some 80% of the structures put up by the U.S. military specifically to support the operation were destroyed).
That delays things by 4-6 weeks, taking it to mid December. At that time the flying hours are very low (about 5 hours of sunlight, on average, once normal weather in the area is factored in) so you may see a delay at that time as well, into the Spring.
IOTL, by the second week of August about the only big supporter of the operation was, unsurprising, MacArthur. Everyone else was increasingly spooked by the Intel that showed ever more IJA troops and more & more kamikaze aircraft entering the invasion zone. It is very likely that the U.S. just doubles down on the blockade, including a strong presence off Hokkaido and heavy mining there by B-29s (to prevent any IJA elements from escaping to the Home Islands of course) and, once the 8th AF is stood up with its reequipped squadrons of B-29s operating out of both Okinawa and Tinian kicks the firebombing campaign into a seven days a week operation while mediums and fighter bombers (both land based and off carriers) attack the transport network and targets of opportunity (meaning anything with wheels down to an ox-cart). Strong chance that the Japanese surrender as soon as starvation starts really killing folks in numbers, probably before March 1.
Down side of this is that ALL the PoW in Japan will be dead by that time, 6-700,000 civilians in the IJA occupied regions of China and elsewhere will be dead as well (it was running, by most estimates, at around 90-100,000 dead civilians a month at summer of 1945), and probably 350-450,000 Japanese civilians from the combination of bombing and starvation (which will kill more, the fires or the famine is an open question). So, the delay adds around 1-1.1 million civilian deaths, plus the follow on damage to the Japanese population due to the mass starvation, especially of younger children, elderly, and women (who the IJA more or less had decided didn't deserve to eat by July, based on ration levels).
IF Olympic does come off as scheduled, with the full force size the next step is Coronet, the landings near Tokyo. Unbeknownst to the Americans the Japanese were prepared to shoot their bolt on Kyushu, virtually all their aircraft, ships, and fuel were going to be used to bleed the Allies into negotiating a "just end to the war" (i.e. No war crimes trials, no occupation, no change in government, not just the Emperor, but the rest of the systems as well, etc.). If that didn't happen the IJA/IJN would have almost no serious firepower for Honshu. No kamikazes, no suicide boats, very little fuel for their armor, not even much in the way of transport. Landing would have been near the Tokyo/Yokohama with 15 divisions, including two FULL armored divisions, with six more divisions scheduled to reinforce on D+35, with an airborne division and a floating reserve of 3 more divisions available on D+40. It was expected that the capture of the Kanto Plain would force the Japanese to surrender unconditionally. If that failed to occur there would be further reinforcement, both by U.S. units and units from the WAllies, including Australian, British, Canadian and French divisions.
Interestingly, unlike on Kyushu, where the IJA determined exactly which locations were the likely U.S. landing points and planned their defenses almost as if they had a crystal ball, they totally missed on Honshu. Their battle plan called for stopping the invaders at the water's edge and forcing a virtual hand to hand engagement to negate the American advantage if air and naval firepower. The greatest effort was to be at Kujukuri-hama on the Boso Peninsula, it was to be the prime defensive effort, with priority for all reinforcements, and was where the IJA was going to deply both of its remaining armored divisions. The Americans planned to land there with 1st Army, but with only about 40% of the landing force. The main effort, by the U.S. 8th Army was to land at Sagami Bay (which the Japanese had identified as a probably landing site, but had given a much lower priority). If the engagement had happened as the IJA planned around 2/3 of its Kanto Plain foces would have been trapped on the Boso Peninsula, cut off from the rest of the IJA effort by Tokyo Bay and with a 100+ mile march, across some pretty rough country while under more or less constant air and naval gunfire attack. If the Americans had planned it the Japanese deployments could not have been more in 8th Army's favor.
By the time it was done (assuming the Japanese don't decide to fight to the last cartridge, which is a fairly major assumption), U.S. losses would probably be in the 150-200,000 KIA, x3 wounded area or around 600-800,000 total KIA/WIA/MIA. IJA losses, 90%+ KIA, would be around 1.25-1.75 million (depending on when they finally gave up on the Boso Peninsula, and stopped feeding men into the grinder as soon as then arrived, which, BTW, WAS the actual battle plan). Figure and easy 2.5 million "militia" total casualties, probably 60% KIA, and another 500K-1M civilians who simply get caught in the way. All told, 200K U.S. and 3-4.5 MILLION Japanese, dead, just on Honshu. Between the two operations, 350-400,000 U.S. KIA and upward of 7 million Japanese, along the 700,000 plus civilians who die on the Asian mainland (not counting casualties from the Red Army's advance across all of Manchuria and the Korean Peninsula).