Japan peace feelers through others

WI Japan had made its peace suggestions through diplomatice missions of other nations than the USSR in May 1945, Switzerland, Sweden or even Ireland.

It is obvious in retrospect, and frankly looks fairly clear at the time that Stalin was not the most trustworthy character to deal with
 
The idea to send peace feelers through the USSR wasn't as crazy as it seemed, even after the USSR chose to denounce the non aggression pact.
In this non aggression pact both Japan and the USSR agreed that when a party didn't want to prolong or wanted to cancel/denounce the pact, both parties would still refrain from attacking one another for at least a year.

That the Soviets didn't chose to follow that particular interpretation is a whole different kettle of fish.

And as Elfwine already replied, the Japanese peace offers were without a chance to get accepted anyway.
 
Would the Allies even actually consider such attempts through such neutral powers?

They didn't consider them OTL for reasons that really don't seem to have had anything to do with what powers Japan went through.

A focus on unconditional surrender is more responsible than Japan's choices as changed by this what if.
 
They didn't consider them OTL for reasons that really don't seem to have had anything to do with what powers Japan went through.

A focus on unconditional surrender
is more responsible than Japan's choices as changed by this what if.
(bold&underline by me)

Although I agree that the allies demanding unconditional surrender is important, there were also reasons on the part of the Japanese, such as that the people they sent to negotiate didn't have much to negotiate with or authority for that matter.

There was a complete lack of realism in the Japanese government and then not just the war hawks, but even the doves.
 
(bold&underline by me)

Although I agree that the allies demanding unconditional surrender is important, there were also reasons on the part of the Japanese, such as that the people they sent to negotiate didn't have much to negotiate with or authority for that matter.

There was a complete lack of realism in the Japanese government and then not just the war hawks, but even the doves.

This is true. But a situation where the Allies weren't accepting anything kind of makes it a moot point.
 

abc123

Banned
(bold&underline by me)


There was a complete lack of realism in the Japanese government and then not just the war hawks, but even the doves.

I agree.
Trough OTL, Japan DID send a peace feelers trough their diplomats in Switzerland and a contact with US lower diplomaticall personell was established, but USA insisted on unconditional surrender.
 
This is true. But a situation where the Allies weren't accepting anything kind of makes it a moot point.

:p

You might as well say it the other way around;

the lack of realism with the Japanese, the lack of authority of the Japanese negotiators and the lack of anything to bargain with for the Japanese, made the demand for unconditional surrender a moot point.
 
Allen Dulles (head of the OSS in Switzerland) was meeting with the former Japanese Naval Attache in Berlin, who had escaped to Geneva in April, '45, and the man was passing peace feelers from Tokyo to Dulles. He had to be cautious, though: Ultra code-breaking told him that the attache's efforts were not officially sanctioned by the Japanese Government, though Admrial Yonai, the Navy Minister, may have approved of the Attache's work. (basically, if the man succeeds, Yonai takes the credit. If he fails, Yonai disavows him)

Only a formal request for Swiss mediation would get Allied attention. And the Allies (mainly the U.S.) would repeat their demand: Unconditional Surrender or else.
 
:p

You might as well say it the other way around;

the lack of realism with the Japanese, the lack of authority of the Japanese negotiators and the lack of anything to bargain with for the Japanese, made the demand for unconditional surrender a moot point.

I might, but I won't because it becomes less accurate.

The Allies inflexibly demanding unconditional surrender makes it impossible for any efforts on Japan's part to influence the situation. The only option the Allies have allowed Japan is choosing when they want to give up.

Had the Allies been more flexible (which is not to say "flexible is always good"), Japanese negotiations might have a chance of going somewhere.

I'm not saying Japan was being entirely reasonable, but Allied policy being different is the only way to change the situation. Japan can offer anything and send anyone through anyone else, and the Allies will have to be the ones who decide to change their basic policy on the subject.
 
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