Japan keeps more after the war ?

[General Tirpitz]

Or simply make Okinawa an independent state, if it wanted to (with a defense treaty with the United States, of course). That was probably feasible, too.

That's possible. Post-occupation US-Okinawan relations though would be quite problematic. Okinawa being a part of Japan means that Tokyo gets at last a share of local grievances while local authorities are powerless to do anything. However, in the case of independent Okinawa you would have an actual national government causing troubles there, even if the US had negotiated/forced Okinawans to sign water-tight treaties on stationing of US forces there.

 

[TDM]

You mean ethnically cleanse them. I’m not saying that it’s likely to happen. I’m saying that settling their colonies would be their best chance to keep them after the war outside of staying neutral.

...When did I say that they’d care. I said that it would be ethnically cleansing by definition. That’s all.

I get what you mean, but I'm not sure it would really be seen as ethnically cleansing when you remove a colonising population that itself had put in place over a subjugated people.

 

[DougM]

In order to change Japan and the US and the War enough to get a situation where Japan can keep more territory you have to change SO much that it is no longer the Same US, Japan and WW2.

This is an issue we see with a LOT of PODs. In order to get the desired outcome/change you often have to change things so much that the participants and event are no longer even close to original. So the problem is how do you change something but not change it...

 

[Athelstane]

I get what you mean, but I'm not sure it would really be seen as ethnically cleansing when you remove a colonising population that itself had put in place over a subjugated people.

I think it would qualify for any reasonable definition of the term, but it would be seen as politically acceptable ethnic cleansing - like the removal of German populations from the Sudetenland after 1945.

Anyway, the numbers we would be talking about in the Marianas would be far smaller than that - only 70,000 or so pre-war.

 

[Lee-Sensei]

I get what you mean, but I'm not sure it would really be seen as ethnically cleansing when you remove a colonising population that itself had put in place over a subjugated people.

Every region in the world was settled by colonists at one point or another. I don’t disagree though. The best way for Japan to keep their colonies, is to stay out of the war. Period. If they’d done that, they wouldn’t have their colonies taken away from them. I’m just saying that heavily settling their colonies would be the best way for them to keep their colonies after the war.

 

[Anarch King of Dipsodes]

Allies do not care about the opinions of the loser. “Boo hoo, I just lost my colonies after losing a war I started”. Any resistance by Japan will result in further punishment by the Allies. Losers have no rights to form opinions.

There was no one in the Marianas who wanted independence from Japan, AFAIK. Unlike Korea or Libya.

There was no other country with a previous claim to the Marianas. Unlike Karafuto, the Kuriles, or Taiwan.

In the scenario I suggested, Allied troops would not have occupied the Marianas. Unlike East Prussia, East Pomerania, or Silesia.

So there would be no pre-existing reason for the Allies to seize the Marianas.

So... after the dust settles, Japan might keep the Marianas. This is the only scenario I can see in which Japan keeps any more territory than OTL.

It's still unlikely, because Japan didn't actually own the Marianas; they were part of a League of Nations mandate. Authority over all such mandates was transferred to the UN; it seems unlikely the UN would renew Japan's mandate.

 

[General Tirpitz]

There was no one in the Marianas who wanted independence from Japan, AFAIK. Unlike Korea or Libya.

There was no other country with a previous claim to the Marianas.Unlike Karafuto, the Kuriles, or Taiwan.

In the scenario I suggested, Allied troops would not have occupied the Marianas. Unlike East Prussia, East Pomerania, or Silesia.

So there would be no pre-existing reason for the Allies to seize the Marianas.

So... after the dust settles, Japan might keep the Marianas. This is the only scenario I can see in which Japan keeps any more territory than OTL.

It's still unlikely, because Japan didn't actually own the Marianas; they were part of a League of Nations mandate. Authority over all such mandates was transferred to the UN; it seems unlikely the UN would renew Japan's mandate.

Japan actually had lost its legal claim to the islands when it withdrew from the League of Nations in 1935, even though it continued to administrate the area de facto. From the perspective of the UN, Japan was illegally occupying the islands before they were taken back by the US. Letting Japan to continue its control over the islands back wouldn't actually mean renewing Japan's mandate but actually giving it back after the country had already lost it ten years prior.

 

[Athelstane]

The best way for Japan to keep their colonies, is to stay out of the war. Period. I

Yup.

If it decides not to go to war - to keep the oil flowing - then it has to withdraw from French Indochina at minimum; and it's doubtful how long they could remain in China, or at least most of it - at least, beyond the 1940's.

But all of its pre-1937 possessions (Formosa, Manchukuo, Korea, South Sakhalin and Kurils, the Marianas and Carolines, etc.) it can likely keep in the relative long-term.

 

[Athelstane]

Japan actually had lost its legal claim to the islands when it withdrew from the League of Nations in 1935, even though it in de facto continued to administrate the area of course. From the perspective of the UN, Japan was illegally occupying the islands before they were taken back by the US. Letting Japan to continue its control over the islands back wouldn't mean renewing Japan's mandate but actually giving it back after the country had already lost it.

Well, keep in mind that the United Nations only comes into being because of WW2. Otherwise, it's still the League of Nations in operation.

I strongly suspect that in a scenario where Japan decides *not* to go to war, but instead makes the minimum concessions needed to keep its oil imports going, it could probably work out a renewal of the mandate from the League when the time comes. Outside of total war, after all, no one is going to be willing to kick Japan out of the mandates.

But you obviously are thinking of a scenario where WW2 *does* happen, the U.S. just for some reason decides to skip the Marianas. And in that case, I agree, the Allies have all the legal basis they need to kick Japan out of the islands, and that would doubtless include repatriating most or all Japanese nationals still remaining there. Which is, again, only about 70,000 or so people. Nothing like the 3.5 million Sudetenlanders who got the heave-ho after 1945.

 

[Lee-Sensei]

Yup.

If it decides not to go to war - to keep the oil flowing - then it has to withdraw from French Indochina at minimum; and it's doubtful how long they could remain in China, or at least most of it - at least, beyond the 1940's.

But all of its pre-1937 possessions (Formosa, Manchukuo, Korea, South Sakhalin and Kurils, the Marianas and Carolines, etc.) it can likely keep in the relative long-term.

There were Japanese soldiers fighting decades after WW2 ended. I can’t see them being forced to give up any colonies by colonial insurrection. Russia’s has similar problems in its history. They’d probably put down any rebellions violently. Some of their colonies are fairly rich in natural resources. I don’t remember what the Americans wanted the Japanese to leave. Was it just the European colonies and their Chinese territories starting from 1937? Or did they include Manchuria?

 

[Athelstane]

There were Japanese soldiers fighting decades after WW2 ended. I can’t see them being forced to give up any colonies by colonial insurrection. Russia’s has similar problems in its history. They’d probably put down any rebellions violently. Some of their colonies are fairly rich in natural resources. I don’t remember what the Americans wanted the Japanese to leave. Was it just the European colonies and their Chinese territories starting from 1937? Or did they include Manchuria?

Actually, I don't disagree with this.

What I was thinking of in terms of negotiations between Japan and the Roosevelt Administration in 1940-41. If you look at the Hull Note (Nov. 6, 1941), the only territorial questions that came up related to French Indochina and (non-Manchuria) China. And from what I have read of interal administration discussions, China could probably have been subject to some level of flexibility, since everyone appreciated that it was unrealistic to expect an immediate, full withdrawal of all Japanese forces from China - especially if Tokyo preempted it with some counter proposal (esp. before July 1941, when the embargo was instituted) that promised negotiations with Chiang, some kind of phased withdrawal. (Which, yes, I know, the Kwangtung Army would have flipped its lid over.)

There's nothing in it about the League Mandate, Korea, Formosa, Manchukuo, etc.

 

[Athelstane]

They were also, as noted in the other quoted bits, willing to drop the demand for an unconditional surrender entirely while several were talking about not doing an occupation like OTL at all; disarming and the retention of bases near Japan, for example, was brought up.

Again, though, Truman himself had a harder line on this whole question; he was the one up for reelection, not the JCS chiefs.

It is not impossible, given what we know, to suggest that Truman *could* be talked in 1) delay, b) major alteration, or even c) cancellation of MAJESTIC if Japan continues the war past mid-August, and if and when more solid intelligence of the buildup on Kyushu reaches him. What I think is much harder to concede is that Truman would agree to any peace that leaves the Japanese regime in place, and not disarmed - because none of the allies could possibly trust it (with good reason, given its horrifically aggressive record over the previous decade). And it is hard to see how you get that without some kind of occupation.

I think Truman could have been shifted into making an *explicit* offer to retain the emperor, and territorial integrity of Japan at least insofar as the Home Islands are concerned. Anything beyond that is extraordinarily unlikely, even if MAJESTIC goes ahead in December (after the recovery from Louise) and turns super-bloody. Truman could just keep dropping atomic bombs, at a clip of 2 per week and climbing, until someone in Tokyo cries uncle. You don't need any significant levels of combat or casualties to do *that*.

 

[Lee-Sensei]

Actually, I don't disagree with this.

What I was thinking of in terms of negotiations between Japan and the Roosevelt Administration in 1940-41. If you look at the Hull Note (Nov. 6, 1941), the only territorial questions that came up related to French Indochina and (non-Manchuria) China. And from what I have read of interal administration discussions, China could probably have been subject to some level of flexibility, since everyone appreciated that it was unrealistic to expect an immediate, full withdrawal of all Japanese forces from China - especially if Tokyo preempted it with some counter proposal (esp. before July 1941, when the embargo was instituted) that promised negotiations with Chiang, some kind of phased withdrawal. (Which, yes, I know, the Kwangtung Army would have flipped its lid over.)

There's nothing in it about the League Mandate, Korea, Formosa, Manchukuo, etc.

I don’t know. The Japanese had the ambitions of becoming a world power and for that, they knew that they needed more land and resources. Even if the Japanese civilians and military leaders had looked at the disparity in manpower, resources and production between Japan and the United States and accepted that they weren’t ready for a war with a country that large, giving up Manchukuo would have been the end of that dream. It was about 4 times larger than metropolitan Japan.

 

[General Tirpitz]

Actually, I don't disagree with this.

What I was thinking of in terms of negotiations between Japan and the Roosevelt Administration in 1940-41. If you look at the Hull Note (Nov. 6, 1941), the only territorial questions that came up related to French Indochina and (non-Manchuria) China. And from what I have read of interal administration discussions, China could probably have been subject to some level of flexibility, since everyone appreciated that it was unrealistic to expect an immediate, full withdrawal of all Japanese forces from China - especially if Tokyo preempted it with some counter proposal (esp. before July 1941, when the embargo was instituted) that promised negotiations with Chiang, some kind of phased withdrawal. (Which, yes, I know, the Kwangtung Army would have flipped its lid over.)

There's nothing in it about the League Mandate, Korea, Formosa, Manchukuo, etc.

There was an interesting suggestion by Roosevelt just few days before the occupation of Southern Indochina that if Japan withdrew from Indochina, it would be made into a "neutralized country in the same way" than Switzerland. I think that in part tells how far Americans were ready to go to placate Japanese during the summer 1941.

Lots of issues in negotiations actually seem to have stemmed from misunderstandings on both sides and general chaos in Tokyo where nobody knew what they were actually doing. The Tripartite Pact is a good example of this. To Americans, it became on of the main issues in talks with Japanese and some Americans even seem to have believed that Germans were somehow directing Japanese actions in Asia. Japanese actually didn't think the Pact that important in itself as they was it in terms of strengthening Japanese position politically vis-à-vis Americans than as an actual military-political alliance with Germany. This level of discrepancy in views caused a great amount of confusion in talks. There were also quite few points when some members of the Japanese cabinet were going to openly oppose the war during 1941 but something always seems to have came up at the last moment to keep those people quiet when the meeting actually took the place.

 

[mork23]

Maybe start a civil war or coup would help. That and getting the Japanese to let the USA to own the lands for Japan and say give them back a decade later.

 

[Anarch King of Dipsodes]

What nobody has bothered to mention: the OTL surrender pre-empted orders from Imperial HQ to murder all PoWs and civilian internees in Japanese hands, throughout occupied Asia and the Indies. Several hundred thousand people, at Shanghai, Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, and in the Home Islands.

After this atrocity, Japan would be regarded as a mad dog that had to be put down at any cost. Japanese forces overseas would be hunted down and exterminated. US forces would land in China to work with the Chinese army there. Allied tactics would be revised to maximize the "kill ratio"; using firepower instead of manpower. The Soviets would overrun all Korea, and with US assistance invade Hokkaido. The US would invade Kyushu. Both campaigns would be conducted with complete indifference to collateral damage. If US casualties became intolerable, China would probably provide additional ground troops.

That's in addition to sustained nuclear and conventional bombing, and the collapse of Japan's economy and civil order. It's often asserted that Japanese morale was invulnerable; that only the Emperor's order could have brought about surrender. But there is evidence that morale was cracking by 1945. After a year of destruction, epidemics, and starvation, would the entire Japanese population still follow orders blindly? I doubt it.

One more question that I have never seen asked or answered: If the US nukes Tokyo, wiping out the Imperial family and the military high commands: what happens politically with the remains of Japanese forces and government? I.e. do the Japanese establish some sort of emergency government? If so, where and who?

 

[General Tirpitz]

What nobody has bothered to mention: the OTL surrender pre-empted orders from Imperial HQ to murder all PoWs and civilian internees in Japanese hands, throughout occupied Asia and the Indies. Several hundred thousand people, at Shanghai, Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, and in the Home Islands.

My understanding is that this is speculation and there is no actual evidence that this is true. Japanese destroyed lots of documents related to war crimes in the final days of the war so there might have been something like that among those but that isn't based on concrete evidence. There were orders to murder prisoners in the event their liberation would be imminent or there was a danger of uprising though but that wasn't anything new. If you know a source for that though, I am interested to see it.

That's in addition to sustained nuclear and conventional bombing, and the collapse of Japan's economy and civil order. It's often asserted that Japanese morale was invulnerable; that only the Emperor's order could have brought about surrender. But there is evidence that morale was cracking by 1945. After a year of destruction, epidemics, and starvation, would the entire Japanese population still follow orders blindly? I doubt it.

I belong myself to the school of thought that Japanese people wouldn't be blindly following orders to the extent many people believe. The fear of internal rebellion among Japanese leadership was probably just as an important reason for the Japanese surrender as the bomb and the Soviet declaration of war.

One more question that I have never seen asked or answered: If the US nukes Tokyo, wiping out the Imperial family and the military high commands: what happens politically with the remains of Japanese forces and government? I.e. do the Japanese establish some sort of emergency government? If so, where and who?

Well, it's unlikely that they would bomb Tokyo, there are plenty of other targets they could choose. The US did think bombing Yokohama so that the explosion would be visible to Tokyo though, as a form of psychological warfare.

 

[Athelstane]

I don’t know. The Japanese had the ambitions of becoming a world power and for that, they knew that they needed more land and resources. Even if the Japanese civilians and military leaders had looked at the disparity in manpower, resources and production between Japan and the United States and accepted that they weren’t ready for a war with a country that large, giving up Manchukuo would have been the end of that dream. It was about 4 times larger than metropolitan Japan.

No, I meant to say that Manchukuo was excluded from the discussion about "China." The Hull Note doesn't specify Manchuria in any form, and from what I can make out from Hull and FDR's discussions, they're were not meaning to insist on Manchuria, too (whatever the territorial claims of Chiang were). In short, to try to get back to a 1937 status quo ante bellum, if possible. Because yes, I agree, any regime in Tokyo would see Manchuria as essential to its strategic ambitions.

 

[Athelstane]

There was an interesting suggestion by Roosevelt just few days before the occupation of Southern Indochina that if Japan withdrew from Indochina, it would be made into a "neutralized country in the same way" than Switzerland. I think that in part tells how far Americans were ready to go to placate Japanese during the summer 1941.

Cordell Hull was the hardliner here, and he had allies within the administration. FDR does seem to have been....more flexible.

FDR's focus was more on Germany and what was happening in Europe, which he saw as the greater threat. Keeping Japan out of the war was obviously going to be helpful to even a United States with the warmaking power it had.

Had Tojo government (and Hirohito) appreciated this - and had they been able to manage the Army hotheads, obviously - then I think it is conceivable that a phased withdrawal and neutralization of French Indochina, perhaps combined with some vague promise of negotiations with Chiang, if done by spring of 1941 could have been enough to keep the oil flowing.

But that did not happen, and the longer things went on, the more Hull was allowed to have his head. The result was the Hull Note in November, which the Japanese not unreasonably saw as an ultimatum.

 

[Athelstane]

One more question that I have never seen asked or answered: If the US nukes Tokyo, wiping out the Imperial family and the military high commands: what happens politically with the remains of Japanese forces and government? I.e. do the Japanese establish some sort of emergency government? If so, where and who?

Well, that's the reason why Truman had Tokyo kept off the a-bomb target list. They all appreciated the need to keep the emperor alive so as to have someone who could actually enforce a surrender.

I think that even if the war goes to spring and the United States ends up nuking 30, 40, 50 Japanese cities and bases, Tokyo would still be out of bounds. At least, what was left of it.