I agree to a point, especially on the training cadre, but if you look at what Haig (now
there's a butcher) was planning clear into 1918 or the conditions that finally pushed the French infantry to mutinty (actually it was more like go on strike) in 1917, it is clear that the supposed German general's quote regarding the BEF is frightningly true "A mass of lions led by jackasses."
The troops had figured out the truth of the new war within a couple of months, the spontaneous appearance of the first trenches prove that; unfortunately the General Staffs took years to get it (junior officers don't really count in the matter since they had the lifespan of an open tuna can at a cat convention). The German Staff got a clue first, although if this was the result of spending most of the time on the defensive and learning by watching the failure of one British or French offensive after another or if it actually indicates a smattering of common sense is unclear.
BTW: The red trousers were okay, but the
matching Fez, well they were special!
Various of the British generals were quite handy - Plumer's the typical one: not a cavalryman but an Engineer. But I've also heard about Grierson lately - carelessly died of a heart attack en route to WWI, and his replacement, Smith-Dorien, gets a good appraisal in general. I agree the idea of overwhelming the enemy by taking more damage was damned silly.

Then again, Haig did kick up a ruckuss about the Shell Crisis - the Brits didn't employ the fire concentration of the Germans at the Somme, rather stupidly. Well, I say stupidly. They didn't have the guns.
The German Staff did have a clear advantage over the Brits and the French. Specifically, they'd had a pretty meritocratic Staff since about 1870. The Brits had finally grudgingly got round to something that wasn't as good as it later on, and the French were sort of in-between the two extremes. Following on from this, the British learning curve is quite steep, when y'think about it. The Germans had been planning for a war with millions of men for decades. A few British generals had been thinking about war with under 200,000 men for about 5-10 years. The French had that idiotic "Charge" mentality that got many of their best and brightest killed at the start, poor sods.
I used to think quite poorly of the British, but the massive expansion of the army's made me reconsider that. It's only in '16 that they deploy the New Army en masse, and that as a panicked strategic response to Verdun, which was a considerable screw-up by the Germans.
Actually, Verdun makes me think of summat quite interesting. I was reading about Mons the other day, and the author made the point that the experienced BEF platoon and company commanders fell back eventually as they saw their forces falling back on their flanks. It was an orderly withdrawal, no rout. However, divisional command had nowt to do with this - it was a series of purely tactical decisions. It's interesting to compare that to Verdun (or to Prince Rupert's response to the French attacks in the Alsace-Lorraine region early in the war).
In these two instances the General Staff had ordered a battle to drain the enemy, but failed to ensure its commanders on the ground followed through. The heady scent of victory led Prince Rupert to demand the right to advance - whereupon he got shot up and forced to retreat in turn; and the German battalion commanders in Verdun exceeded their initial advance markers and kept moving up, intent on pushing the French out of Verdun. The grand plan was to bleed the French white, but the enthusiasm of chaps lower down the chain of command buggered it up. Conversely, the way German NCOs and officers were encouraged to take command of whatever was nearby and make the best of whatever was going on was surely a boon to them in any action. Swings and roundabouts, I s'pose . . .