Japan gets bloodied in WW1

Jasen777

Donor
Hmmm, I don't agree with that. The Japanese were really good soldiers, with a tenacity that I don't think even the Americans fighting them ever matched. Look at those Pacific battles and tell me that they didn't have a sound doctrine for extracting the maximum number of enemy causalities. If the Americans hadn't used the atom bomb in Japan and were forced to invade, it would have been bloody beyond comprehension.

Light infantry can be effective in bad terrain. Their limitations really showed when having to engage in more open territory - like against the Soviets.

As for learning lessons, I'd think they had their chance to do that from the Russo-Japanese War but they drew the wrong lessons.
 
Battleship or a division of tanks? The BB was going to win out every time, not just because of the defensive/offensive potential of the warship, but because domestically produced battleships were proof of a nation's status as a major industrial power.
Tanks weren't the automatic trump card in WW2, especially in the Pacific War. Japan could have pursued a better infantry rifle and submachine guns, as well as better artillery, which the British were able to do in addition to the Royal Navy.

Besides that if Japan had been more roughly handled during WW1, the later militarism, if it arises, might have been tempered by that experience.
 

MrP

Banned
The even more serious problem is that the Japanese had, as did every other army prior to the 20th Century, generations of tradition related to battlefield behavior and the importance of bravery and discipline to success. In Japan this was magnified in the interwar years as the Cult of the Samurai, along with many other traditions from the 16th Century, were used by the government to help convince the population of the correctness of the government's path. As I noted earlier, the other industrial powers had the belief in the bayonet mashed out of them by the horrors of the trenches, although it took FOUR YEARS for the British & French to understand the change that had occured (the Germans figured it out in about two years).

In fairness to the British, they did have to train their entire post-BEF force from scratch, often relying on Reserve NCOs and officers. And in fairness to the Germans, some of them seem to have been aware of sensible tactics from the start,* although others were mad.** I can't really comment on the French, but I'm inclined to blame their ludicrous pre-war tactical doctrines for the initial lunacy. And red trousers. I need to study their later actions more, tbh.

* If Rommel's accounts of his Great War experiences are reliable.
** Like the Guards at Mons.
 
One possibility for the Japanese to be more involved in WWI and sustain heavy casualties is if they pursued another war with Russia. Perhaps the Japanese would figure that since the Russians are sending most of their forces to the west to fight Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Ottomans, they could attack from behind and seize a few more Pacific Ports, like Vladivostok for instance.

Then, they'd be sure to suffer heavy casualties that way and perhaps draw the necessary lessons to properly pursue a combined-arms doctrine.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
Tanks weren't the automatic trump card in WW2, especially in the Pacific War. Japan could have pursued a better infantry rifle and submachine guns, as well as better artillery, which the British were able to do in addition to the Royal Navy.

Besides that if Japan had been more roughly handled during WW1, the later militarism, if it arises, might have been tempered by that experience.

No they weren't, but a decent tank would have given the Marines a much more difficult tactical problem on Saipan, Guam, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, and in the border wars with the USSR. So would a decent artillery train. The Japanese tried to emulate the UK, but simply couldn't. Their resource base and manufacturing capacity simply wasn't in the same league as the other big players in WW II.

Better tactics would have helped even more. Look at the actions across the Pacific, from the Tenaru River, to the senseless Banzai charges on Tarawa, Saipan, & the foolhardy counter offensives on Southern Okinawa the Japanese threw away tactical superiority, or painstakingly prepared, well built & hidden defesive position to charge directly into the massed guns of the Marines and off-shore gun support provided by the USN.

It was earlier metioned how skilled the Japanese were in extracting maximum casualties from American forces; nothing could be further from the truth. American losses were far lower than could have happened, had the Japanese simply stayed in the defense that had taken months, even years, to prepare. The Japanese were great at PLANNING to slaughter landing forces, unfortunately for the IJA & IJN they simply sucked at actually putting these plans into action. Instead of selling every meter of ground dearly, normally within 48 hours of initial contact, the Japanese commanders would order their men to fix bayonets, the officers would draw their swords (swords, for God's sake) and off they would charge into the waiting U.S. defensive line where they would be heroically massacred wholesale.

Had the Japanese spent a couple years in the mud of Flanders it is not unreasonable to assume that the relative safety & comfort of a coral and palm log bunker would have been much more attractive than stripping to the waist and charging M2 Brownings with a knife.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
In fairness to the British, they did have to train their entire post-BEF force from scratch, often relying on Reserve NCOs and officers. And in fairness to the Germans, some of them seem to have been aware of sensible tactics from the start,* although others were mad.** I can't really comment on the French, but I'm inclined to blame their ludicrous pre-war tactical doctrines for the initial lunacy. And red trousers. I need to study their later actions more, tbh.

* If Rommel's accounts of his Great War experiences are reliable.
** Like the Guards at Mons.

I agree to a point, especially on the training cadre, but if you look at what Haig (now there's a butcher) was planning clear into 1918 or the conditions that finally pushed the French infantry to mutinty (actually it was more like go on strike) in 1917, it is clear that the supposed German general's quote regarding the BEF is frightningly true "A mass of lions led by jackasses."

The troops had figured out the truth of the new war within a couple of months, the spontaneous appearance of the first trenches prove that; unfortunately the General Staffs took years to get it (junior officers don't really count in the matter since they had the lifespan of an open tuna can at a cat convention). The German Staff got a clue first, although if this was the result of spending most of the time on the defensive and learning by watching the failure of one British or French offensive after another or if it actually indicates a smattering of common sense is unclear.

BTW: The red trousers were okay, but the matching Fez, well they were special!:p
 
JMO, but if Japan had sent an Expeditionary force to Europe, they would have been painfully more proficient in thier later conflicts. Do you really need tanks, or do you need guns that can kill tanks?

On the other side, it might have clearly shown Japan that esprit de corps/samurai tactics aren't the end all to winning a cause.

JMO
 
JMO, but if Japan had sent an Expeditionary force to Europe, they would have been painfully more proficient in thier later conflicts. Do you really need tanks, or do you need guns that can kill tanks?
Why as far as Europe? How about Japanese troops in East Africa and/or the Middle East each of which the British initially got a bloody nose.
 
Why as far as Europe? How about Japanese troops in East Africa and/or the Middle East each of which the British initially got a bloody nose.
I don't think the Japanese would have been willing to fight in the Middle East - they were too friendly with the Ottomans.
 

sanusoi

Banned
I think that for Japan to change, she would have needed to lose a major war. The 1905 war would have had to have been a Russian Victory. With such a major defeat on their hands, the Japanese would have had to rethink their strategy on battlefield tactics.

Only then would they have had to re-learn a lot of lost tactics from the Prussians and British. If the Japanese army could learn these new tactics throughout WW1 and couple it with the discipline that there ancestors had taught them. You would have a decent army with the capability to fight and win any battle against first rate soldiers.

My only concern with this is that Japan might turn into something that resembles a dangerous army. This Japan in WW2 would be able to fight far more effectively in China and East-Asia then it’s OTL counterpart.
 

MrP

Banned
I agree to a point, especially on the training cadre, but if you look at what Haig (now there's a butcher) was planning clear into 1918 or the conditions that finally pushed the French infantry to mutinty (actually it was more like go on strike) in 1917, it is clear that the supposed German general's quote regarding the BEF is frightningly true "A mass of lions led by jackasses."

The troops had figured out the truth of the new war within a couple of months, the spontaneous appearance of the first trenches prove that; unfortunately the General Staffs took years to get it (junior officers don't really count in the matter since they had the lifespan of an open tuna can at a cat convention). The German Staff got a clue first, although if this was the result of spending most of the time on the defensive and learning by watching the failure of one British or French offensive after another or if it actually indicates a smattering of common sense is unclear.

BTW: The red trousers were okay, but the matching Fez, well they were special!:p

Various of the British generals were quite handy - Plumer's the typical one: not a cavalryman but an Engineer. But I've also heard about Grierson lately - carelessly died of a heart attack en route to WWI, and his replacement, Smith-Dorien, gets a good appraisal in general. I agree the idea of overwhelming the enemy by taking more damage was damned silly. :( Then again, Haig did kick up a ruckuss about the Shell Crisis - the Brits didn't employ the fire concentration of the Germans at the Somme, rather stupidly. Well, I say stupidly. They didn't have the guns.

The German Staff did have a clear advantage over the Brits and the French. Specifically, they'd had a pretty meritocratic Staff since about 1870. The Brits had finally grudgingly got round to something that wasn't as good as it later on, and the French were sort of in-between the two extremes. Following on from this, the British learning curve is quite steep, when y'think about it. The Germans had been planning for a war with millions of men for decades. A few British generals had been thinking about war with under 200,000 men for about 5-10 years. The French had that idiotic "Charge" mentality that got many of their best and brightest killed at the start, poor sods.

I used to think quite poorly of the British, but the massive expansion of the army's made me reconsider that. It's only in '16 that they deploy the New Army en masse, and that as a panicked strategic response to Verdun, which was a considerable screw-up by the Germans.

Actually, Verdun makes me think of summat quite interesting. I was reading about Mons the other day, and the author made the point that the experienced BEF platoon and company commanders fell back eventually as they saw their forces falling back on their flanks. It was an orderly withdrawal, no rout. However, divisional command had nowt to do with this - it was a series of purely tactical decisions. It's interesting to compare that to Verdun (or to Prince Rupert's response to the French attacks in the Alsace-Lorraine region early in the war).

In these two instances the General Staff had ordered a battle to drain the enemy, but failed to ensure its commanders on the ground followed through. The heady scent of victory led Prince Rupert to demand the right to advance - whereupon he got shot up and forced to retreat in turn; and the German battalion commanders in Verdun exceeded their initial advance markers and kept moving up, intent on pushing the French out of Verdun. The grand plan was to bleed the French white, but the enthusiasm of chaps lower down the chain of command buggered it up. Conversely, the way German NCOs and officers were encouraged to take command of whatever was nearby and make the best of whatever was going on was surely a boon to them in any action. Swings and roundabouts, I s'pose . . .
 

Susano

Banned
Having Japan bloodied? Let it join the CP. Way I understand it thats what teh Army (as opposd to the Navy) wanted anyways.
 

MrP

Banned
Having Japan bloodied? Let it join the CP. Way I understand it thats what teh Army (as opposd to the Navy) wanted anyways.

The Army was trained by them, so it's no surprise. The IJN, however, was trained by the RN - so again no surprise. IIRC, one'd have to change the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to get around this, though.

EDIT: Mentored probably has a better sense than trained, though I suspect both apply in varying degrees.
 
The Army was trained by them, so it's no surprise. The IJN, however, was trained by the RN - so again no surprise. IIRC, one'd have to change the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to get around this, though.
Or make the British Empire neutral/on the CP side, but in that case, the War in Asia still wouldn't be that bloody for the Japanese, or for anyone, so...
 

MrP

Banned
Or make the British Empire neutral/on the CP side, but in that case, the War in Asia still wouldn't be that bloody for the Japanese, or for anyone, so...

Late entry for Britain, maybe? Problem with the Alliance, though, is that one has to go back quite a way to dump its underlying causes, which butterflies a lot of the results. F'r example, the RN used it to strip down their Eastern garrisons so that they could concentrate the lion's share of the fleet at home to face the Germans. One could get rid of the HSF to solve that problem. But the HSF exists because there was German public pressure for a fleet - dreadnoughts mean prestige. So one has to fiddle with the underlying causes of why there's public pressure. Which means either devaluing the big ship (torpedo boats better earlier will help), or get some sort of reason for Germany to worry only about the Army. Tough work, really.
 
No they weren't, but a decent tank would have given the Marines a much more difficult tactical problem on Saipan, Guam, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, and in the border wars with the USSR. So would a decent artillery train. The Japanese tried to emulate the UK, but simply couldn't. Their resource base and manufacturing capacity simply wasn't in the same league as the other big players in WW II.

Ya because tanks on small tropical islands make so much sense . . . I can see it now, the tanks on Kwajalien, Iwo Jima and Saipan really turn the tide of the battle, rumbling across the open . . . oh wait, the Americans carpet bombed the islands before hand and kept a healthy artillery barrage going, so the tanks would get destroyed. I know that tanks are really cool in Europe, but strategies that protect Pacific islands are not the same as the ones used on the Russian steppes, I'm sorry.

Better tactics would have helped even more. Look at the actions across the Pacific, from the Tenaru River, to the senseless Banzai charges on Tarawa, Saipan, & the foolhardy counter offensives on Southern Okinawa the Japanese threw away tactical superiority, or painstakingly prepared, well built & hidden defesive position to charge directly into the massed guns of the Marines and off-shore gun support provided by the USN.

It was earlier metioned how skilled the Japanese were in extracting maximum casualties from American forces; nothing could be further from the truth. American losses were far lower than could have happened, had the Japanese simply stayed in the defense that had taken months, even years, to prepare. The Japanese were great at PLANNING to slaughter landing forces, unfortunately for the IJA & IJN they simply sucked at actually putting these plans into action. Instead of selling every meter of ground dearly, normally within 48 hours of initial contact, the Japanese commanders would order their men to fix bayonets, the officers would draw their swords (swords, for God's sake) and off they would charge into the waiting U.S. defensive line where they would be heroically massacred wholesale.

48 hours huh? So thats why all those Pacific island hopping invasions only lasted two days and were such a cake walk for the Marine Corps, cause after the initial landing the Japanese were nice enough to kill themselves. Except of course, that most of the invasions took far longer than that, and the cost for the Americans was orders of magnitude higher for the Americans.

Had the Japanese spent a couple years in the mud of Flanders it is not unreasonable to assume that the relative safety & comfort of a coral and palm log bunker would have been much more attractive than stripping to the waist and charging M2 Brownings with a knife.

Yes. But getting them to Flanders is going to be quite an undertaking isn't it? I just don't see who they could fight in WWI that would get them that kind of Western Front experience. Even if the Japanese ended up fighting the Russians during WWI, it wouldn't create that kind of close combat, trench war fare that your talking about.

Perhaps a Chinese rebellion on par with the Taiping Rebellion breaks out as WWI starts, and the Japanese are left as the only not otherwise engaged Great Power who can deal with it? I'm thinking the Qing Dynasty falls in 1915 or late 1914, and the use this to justify invading China, bogging them down in China?
 
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