Japan doesn't surrender and US ops to starve and bomb. How long does the war last

August 18th to September 4th is a rather far cry from 2 months.

Active fighting, yes, but I was referring to the need to secure them as logistical bases; I recall reading somewhere that sufficient supplies weren't on hand until October at the earliest to contemplate another attempted landing. They ended up doing so in Korea. This is also with the Japanese surrendering instead of fighting on, due to Tokyo's orders.

I certainly agree a Soviet attack on Hokkaido won't happen in the August-September period of 1945, but how successful it would be is rather dependent on some details. Japanese troop strength on Hokkaido in August of 1945 were disproportionately small compared to the amount of coastline and coastal ports they had to guard and hence were totally inadequate to cover all potential Soviet landing points, so if the Soviets manage to land in a area devoid of Japanese troops (which was their preference for amphibious invasions) and are able to secure a port while doing then it probably would be reasonably successful. Of course, the Japanese might simply reinforce Hokkaido or redeploy their forces to better guard against a Soviet landing in the interim, but the mining of the Tsurugu Straits would hamper reinforcement and it's unclear how much attention the Japanese paid to the possibility of a Soviet Hokkaido landing following the Russian entry into the war.

They have no capability to land tanks and their only means of fire support, the minesweeper Okhotsk with its 130-millimeter gun, was damaged at the Battle of Shumshu Island. Of the 16 LCIs in their amphibious fleet, five were lost at the aforementioned battle as well.
 
Active fighting, yes, but I was referring to the need to secure them as logistical bases; I recall reading somewhere that sufficient supplies weren't on hand until October at the earliest to contemplate another attempted landing. They ended up doing so in Korea. This is also with the Japanese surrendering instead of fighting on, due to Tokyo's orders.

The Korean Landings took place simultaneously with the Kurile landings, not in October. I can't find anything supporting your claim about logistical resupply on the Kuriles taking until October. What's your source?

They have no capability to land tanks and their only means of fire support, the minesweeper Okhotsk with its 130-millimeter gun, was damaged at the Battle of Shumshu Island. Of the 16 LCIs in their amphibious fleet, five were lost at the aforementioned battle as well.

The Soviets certainly have no capability to land tanks in the initial assault, but if they manage to secure a port then armor could be brought in as reinforcements later on via merchant marine. The LCI's certainly made up the core of Soviet amphibious capability, but the Soviets heavily supplemented them with more improvised landing craft like motorized boats going from ship-shore and even direct desant from patrol craft motoring as far in as they could manage and the troops hopping off into the surf (or onto a dock, if they were assaulting a port or harbor). In this manner, Soviet landings resembled more the German amphibious assaults in places like Norway in 1940 then anything the WAllies did and had the same strengths and weaknesses. The loss of the Okhotsk was real enough, but it isn't as if it was the only minesweeper in the Soviet Red Banner Fleet, much less the only surface vessel. Even with it's loss, the Soviets would still have two cruisers, a destroyer lead, ten destroyers, 51 minesweepers, 10 minelayers, and at least 23 frigates (25 without Project Hula being suspended by the Japanese surrender), as well as a host of lighter patrol craft. What's more, Soviet amphibious doctrine emphasized the securing of beachheads via the infiltration of undefended coastline rather then direct assault on defended shores. In such conditions, naval gunfire support is unnecessary. The Kuriles was an anomaly in this respect where the Soviets couldn't hope to practice their standard doctrine, as the force-space ratio made the Japanese defenders too thick on the ground for there to be any undefended coastline.
 
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Starvation isn't going to do the job. It's not like there wasn't any food. Just not enough for everyone without imports (like England, say). The food will be given to the army, the factory workers, and anyone else important enough. The old, the very young, and non-productive poor will be allowed to starve and thus sacrifice themselves for their emperor. Eventually a stable, feedable population will be reached and the war will still go on.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
Starvation isn't going to do the job. It's not like there wasn't any food. Just not enough for everyone without imports (like England, say). The food will be given to the army, the factory workers, and anyone else important enough. The old, the very young, and non-productive poor will be allowed to starve and thus sacrifice themselves for their emperor. Eventually a stable, feedable population will be reached and the war will still go on.

Kind of challenging to move food from the farms to the cities (or the barracks and mines) absent any petroleum imports and a railway network where every bridge and viaduct has become a strategic target vulnerable to aerial bombardment, naval gunfire, raiding party, or all of the above.

See:

https://www.scribd.com/document/175964974/SS-220-Barb-Part2
 
if the 2 atomic bombings didn't work they will have serious doubts the tactic they have been using is effective enough.

Massive chemical warfare against the Japanese population and agriculture had been planned but not executed. If you think the strategic bombings and atomic bombs were bad, remembered those are mostly relatively localized attacked against infrastructures and urban areas. There were still food in rural areas and we did see city people (those who can) obtaining food from rural areas. Much more serious starvation would occur if the Japanese agriculture is destroyed via chemical means.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Downfall#Chemical_weapons

In addition to use against people, the U.S. military considered chemical attacks to kill crops in an attempt to starve the Japanese into submission. The Army began experimenting with compounds to destroy crops in April 1944, and within one year had narrowed over 1,000 agents to nine promising ones containing phenoxyacetic acids. One compound designated LN-8 performed best in tests and went into mass production. Dropping or spraying the herbicide was deemed the most effective employment method; a July 1945 test from an SPD Mark 2 bomb, originally crafted to hold biological weapons like anthrax or ricin, had the shell burst open at a predetermined height to send the chemical agent flying. By the time the war ended, the Army was still trying to determine the optimal dispersal height to cover a wide enough area. Active ingredients in LN-8 and another tested compound would later be used to create Agent Orange, used during the Vietnam War.[80]

@Scott Washburn
 

Lusitania

Donor
Weren’t the Japanese more afraid of Soviet invasion than American? I read somewhere once that Soviet invasion and occupation of Manchuria scared the Japanese officials more than American nuclear bombs.
 
The Korean Landings took place simultaneously with the Kurile landings, not in October. I can't find anything supporting your claim about logistical resupply on the Kuriles taking until October. What's your source?

On the landings in Korea, it wasn't until October that Kim Il-Sung was returned to Korea and this was via landing at Wonsan; my understanding is that several brigades began to arrive at this time via the same method although I'm having trouble re-finding the source in question for it. As a general overview, I defer to Michael Sandusky's America's Parallel, which states that the situation in Mid-August was that there was only two Soviet divisions stalled out around Chongjin-still north of the 41st parallel-against around 9 Japanese divisions throughout Korea. Limited landings did occur at this time around the Eastern Korean coastline but these were extremely limited and damn near disastrous. Pyongyang was actually occupied by air lifted Soviet officers, not the arrival of serious Red Army forces.

As for the logistics thing, I think you've misunderstood what I was trying to say; there was no existing serious ports in the Kuriles to allow for a major landing against Hokkaido.

The Soviets certainly have no capability to land tanks in the initial assault, but if they manage to secure a port then armor could be brought in as reinforcements later on via merchant marine. The LCI's certainly made up the core of Soviet amphibious capability, but the Soviets heavily supplemented them with more improvised landing craft like motorized boats going from ship-shore and even direct desant from patrol craft motoring as far in as they could manage and the troops hopping off into the surf (or onto a dock, if they were assaulting a port or harbor). In this manner, Soviet landings resembled more the German amphibious assaults in places like Norway in 1940 then anything the WAllies did and had the same strengths and weaknesses.

They had enough sea lift capacity to deposit one Rifle division at a time even without losing the LCIs. The Japanese had something like three, including elite formations, on Hokkaido in August of 1945.

The loss of the Okhotsk was real enough, but it isn't as if it was the only minesweeper in the Soviet Red Banner Fleet, much less the only surface vessel. Even with it's loss, the Soviets would still have two cruisers, a destroyer lead, ten destroyers, 51 minesweepers, 10 minelayers, and at least 23 frigates (25 without Project Hula being suspended by the Japanese surrender), as well as a host of lighter patrol craft.

And yet, they didn't deploy these vessels to aid their landings in Korea nor the Kuriles. That's very telling.

What's more, Soviet amphibious doctrine emphasized the securing of beachheads via the infiltration of undefended coastline rather then direct assault on defended shores. In such conditions, naval gunfire support is unnecessary. The Kuriles was an anomaly in this respect where the Soviets couldn't hope to practice their standard doctrine, as the force-space ratio made the Japanese defenders too thick on the ground for there to be any undefended coastline.

So, in other words, nowhere near a port to allow them to deposit armor and nowhere near close enough an air base. The Japanese had 400 aircraft on Hokkaido in August of 1945...

I'm sure @BobTheBarbarian has some citations on the matter.
 
Well, according to Decisive Darkness

Summer of 1946, but without a V-J Day because Japan eventually runs out of people with the authority to sign a formal surrender.
 
Kind of challenging to move food from the farms to the cities (or the barracks and mines) absent any petroleum imports and a railway network where every bridge and viaduct has become a strategic target vulnerable to aerial bombardment, naval gunfire, raiding party, or all of the above.

See:

https://www.scribd.com/document/175964974/SS-220-Barb-Part2
Japan isn't all that large. Food was being grown on all the major islands and could be transported by carts hauled by peasants if necessary. It might well require a lot of relocation of people from the cities to the countryside, but that can be done, too. It might not have been possible to sustain the effort indefinitely, but it could be sustained for far longer than the American people would have been willing to maintain a full wartime stance while waiting. After all, it's not like the US could start demobilizing in any meaningful way if they still might have to launch an invasion. The people would have demanded that something be done to finish the war quickly-and the politicians would have agreed to do it.
 
I was always curious why the execution of Olympic is painted as a horrific endeavor for the western allies (which possessed the greatest air/sea force the world had ever seen), yet the Soviet invasion of Hokkaido is viewed as a “done deal” (who had never done an amphibious invasion)?
If Hokkaido was such a cake walk, why didn’t the western force invade there instead? Wouldn’t it give a them a huge tactical and physiological advantage, as well as blocking Soviet intensions?

Ric350
 
Japan isn't all that large. Food was being grown on all the major islands and could be transported by carts hauled by peasants if necessary. It might well require a lot of relocation of people from the cities to the countryside, but that can be done, too. It might not have been possible to sustain the effort indefinitely, but it could be sustained for far longer than the American people would have been willing to maintain a full wartime stance while waiting. After all, it's not like the US could start demobilizing in any meaningful way if they still might have to launch an invasion. The people would have demanded that something be done to finish the war quickly-and the politicians would have agreed to do it.

I presume you have not read my post on chemical warfare on Japanese Agriculture?
 
I was always curious why the execution of Olympic is painted as a horrific endeavor for the western allies (which possessed the greatest air/sea force the world had ever seen), yet the Soviet invasion of Hokkaido is viewed as a “done deal” (who had never done an amphibious invasion)?
If Hokkaido was such a cake walk, why didn’t the western force invade there instead? Wouldn’t it give a them a huge tactical and physiological advantage, as well as blocking Soviet intensions?

Ric350

Because the fall of Hokkaido is not going to cause Japan to surrender and it would a waste of military effort.
 
So, in other words, nowhere near a port to allow them to deposit armor and nowhere near close enough an air base. The Japanese had 400 aircraft on Hokkaido in August of 1945...

I'm sure @BobTheBarbarian has some citations on the matter.

The Soviets had zero chance of carrying out a successful landing on Hokkaido in 1945. They would have been busy with Manchuria and Sakhalin and had basically no capacity to carry out anything near what the US or even the British (Operation Zipper) were doing in terms of amphibious warfare.

If anyone brings up a landing at Rumoi in late August 1945, know that it was envisioned as an administrative maneuver to disarm surrendered Japanese forces; if the Russians actually attempted it under wartime conditions it would have been suicide.

Moderately related - the Soviet landing in the Kuriles (Shumshu and Paramushiro) was and would have been an unmitigated disaster. Had the war continued General Gnechko's tiny force would have been totally annihilated.
 
Weren’t the Japanese more afraid of Soviet invasion than American? I read somewhere once that Soviet invasion and occupation of Manchuria scared the Japanese officials more than American nuclear bombs.

Scared the Emperor and original cabinet yes, who knows what the coup takers might think. If they aren't going to surrender no matter what, they aren't going to surrender.
 
Scared the Emperor and original cabinet yes, who knows what the coup takers might think. If they aren't going to surrender no matter what, they aren't going to surrender.

Sure they can opt for not surrender, still there is a limit at what the population (rest of the army included) can take both psycologically and phisically from starvation (at that you need to add all the health problem due to that and the lack of medicine). The american plan to continue the bombing campaign, eliminate any transporting route and block any attempt to supply the home islands, even destroying any fish vessel will mean in the end that really Japanese will be a language spoken only in Hell.
 
On the landings in Korea, it wasn't until October that Kim Il-Sung was returned to Korea and this was via landing at Wonsan; my understanding is that several brigades began to arrive at this time via the same method although I'm having trouble re-finding the source in question for it. As a general overview, I defer to Michael Sandusky's America's Parallel, which states that the situation in Mid-August was that there was only two Soviet divisions stalled out around Chongjin-still north of the 41st parallel-against around 9 Japanese divisions throughout Korea. Limited landings did occur at this time around the Eastern Korean coastline but these were extremely limited and damn near disastrous. Pyongyang was actually occupied by air lifted Soviet officers, not the arrival of serious Red Army forces.

The Soviet landing at Wonsan occurred on August 21, with overland forces linking up by August 25th. The bulk of the 25th Army is dated as arriving along the 38th Parallel at about the same time. American forces did not land in the south until early-September. Undoubtedly all of this was facilitated by the Japanese surrender and without that, the Soviets would have likely taken several more months to finish up dealing with Manchuria and Korea, but then the Americans would never have the opportunity to even set foot in Korea without the Japanese surrender.

As for the logistics thing, I think you've misunderstood what I was trying to say; there was no existing serious ports in the Kuriles to allow for a major landing against Hokkaido.

Well, the most likely launch point for such an invasion would probably be Vladivostok, not the Kuriles, so I don’t really see why that matters?

They had enough sea lift capacity to deposit one Rifle division at a time even without losing the LCIs. The Japanese had something like three, including elite formations, on Hokkaido in August of 1945.

The combined total of Soviet amphibious operations in mid-August amount to a corps of forces being landed simultaneously (one division in Korea, two at Shumshu, and a reinforced brigade on Sakhalin). There may also be a brigade-sized air drop by the VDV. Merchant marine As for the Japanese three divisions, you seem unable to grasp that three divisions is a very small force for the size of coastline Hokkaido presents so their presence on the island in general is less important then precisely where on the island they are when the Soviets land. In late-August, they were mostly deployed facing north and east, with the western coastline bare, but it’s possible the Japanese may simply redeploy them in the interim.

Also, looking into it, the invasions of North Korea did involve landing light armor, about a company of T-26s, so it shows the Soviets did have some minimal capacity to put armor ashore.

And yet, they didn't deploy these vessels to aid their landings in Korea nor the Kuriles. That's very telling.

Quite a number of them were deployed to the Kuriles: there were a total of 64 vessels of all types deployed as was. As for the rest, they were absorbed by the other operations. The Soviets were conducting simultaneous operations in North Korea (56 vessels initially, with further allotments following) and Sakhalin (32 vessels), as well as patrols in the Sea of Japan and preparations for a future Hokkaido operation.

So, in other words, nowhere near a port to allow them to deposit armor and nowhere near close enough an air base. The Japanese had 400 aircraft on Hokkaido in August of 1945...

I refer to you to my earlier point about how the Japanese had inadequate forces to garrison all the ports and hence the Soviets very much might have been able to find a undefended port to land at, possibly even with a nearby airfield. The nearest Japanese forces to the port town of Rumoi, for example, was a single coastal defense point, which maxes out at about battalion strength, 40 kilometers to the south. The operational status of the Japanese aircraft on Hokkaido is questionable, seeing as all available fuel was being allocated for the defense of Kyushu and Honshu, to say nothing of the questions surrounding the quality of the craft and pilots.

The Soviets had zero chance of carrying out a successful landing on Hokkaido in 1945. They would have been busy with Manchuria and Sakhalin and had basically no capacity to carry out anything near what the US or even the British (Operation Zipper) were doing in terms of amphibious warfare.

The obvious flaw in that assumption is that they would need what the US or British were doing in amphibious warfare. This isn't Iwo Jima or Normandy we're talking about here. Hell, as I observed earlier, it isn't even Shumshu.

Moderately related - the Soviet landing in the Kuriles (Shumshu and Paramushiro) was and would have been an unmitigated disaster. Had the war continued General Gnechko's tiny force would have been totally annihilated.

Yeah, that doesn't fit with what was happening on Shumshu at all. By the time the Japanese garrison laid down their arms, the Japanese shore batteries had already been destroyed and the Soviets had a solid, secure beachhead which was receiving a steady flow of reinforcements, including heavy artillery. The attempted counterattack by the 11th tank regiment the day before had seen it completely wiped out (the wreckage of it's tanks are still there too this day). That the force experienced difficulties in establishing the beachhead is well recorded, but at no point was it at risk in being wiped out.
 
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The Soviet landing at Wonsan occurred on August 21, with overland forces linking up by August 25th. The bulk of the 25th Army is dated as arriving along the 38th Parallel at about the same time. American forces did not land in the south until early-September. Undoubtedly all of this was facilitated by the Japanese surrender and without that, the Soviets would have likely taken several more months to finish up dealing with Manchuria and Korea, but then the Americans would never have the opportunity to even set foot in Korea without the Japanese surrender.

That doesn't mesh with Michael Sandusky's work and that landing at Wonsan is not the one I'm talking about; it was an initial small one (And after the surrender as well), yes, but Kim Il-Sung didn't come in until October. As I'm still unable to find the source I had, I'll concede on that particular of it, but I do very much back what I've cited from Sandusky.

Well, the most likely launch point for such an invasion would probably be Vladivostok, not the Kuriles, so I don’t really see why that matters?

Because that is hundreds of miles away, meaning that you'd be taking a poorly armed Soviet fleet with no training across hundreds of miles of ocean while the Japanese have complete air superiority. Even ignoring all of that, the logistics are telling; as I said, the Soviets could only deposit a single Rifle division at this time, meaning they'd be on their own for days until the fleet could return.

The combined total of Soviet amphibious operations in mid-August amount to a corps of forces being landed simultaneously (one division in Korea, two at Shumshu, and a reinforced brigade on Sakhalin). There may also be a brigade-sized air drop by the VDV. Merchant marine As for the Japanese three divisions, you seem unable to grasp that three divisions is a very small force for the size of coastline Hokkaido presents so their presence on the island in general is less important then precisely where on the island they are when the Soviets land. In late-August, they were mostly deployed facing north and east, with the western coastline bare, but it’s possible the Japanese may simply redeploy them in the interim.

They deployed a single under-strength Rifle division at Shumshu and a few hundred guys off torpedo boats in Northern Korea. If we take the claim of an entire division landed at Korea at face value, that would would represent 50% of total Soviet strength in the region at the time of the OTL surrender, which obviously doesn't pass the common sense test.

Also, looking into it, the invasions of North Korea did involve landing light armor, about a company of T-26s, so it shows the Soviets did have some capacity to put armor ashore.

Not until after the surrender, when they had port facilities and the cooperation of the Japanese.

Quite a number of them were deployed to the Kuriles: there were a total of 64 vessels of all types deployed as was. As for the rest, they were absorbed by the other operations. The Soviets were conducting simultaneous operations in North Korea (56 vessels initially, with further allotments following) and Sakhalin (32 vessels), as well as patrols in the Sea of Japan and preparations for a future Hokkaido operation.

I was talking about the Destroyers and Cruisers.

I refer to you to my earlier point about how the Japanese had inadequate forces to garrison all the ports and hence the Soviets very much might have been able to find a undefended port to land at, possibly even with a nearby airfield. The nearest Japanese forces to the port town of Rumoi, for example, was a single coastal defense point, which maxes out at about battalion strength, 40 kilometers to the south. The operational status of the Japanese aircraft on Hokkaido is questionable, seeing as all available fuel was being allocated for the defense of Kyushu and Honshu, to say nothing of the questions surrounding the quality of the craft and pilots.

This is assuming that, after months of combat very clearly signaling Soviet intentions to the Japanese, the IJA does nothing at all despite us knowing how active the Tokyo was being in this timeframe.
 
Sure they can opt for not surrender, still there is a limit at what the population (rest of the army included) can take both psycologically and phisically from starvation (at that you need to add all the health problem due to that and the lack of medicine). The american plan to continue the bombing campaign, eliminate any transporting route and block any attempt to supply the home islands, even destroying any fish vessel will mean in the end that really Japanese will be a language spoken only in Hell.
As the Americans and British found out in Europe this is a lot easier said than done. Despite endless bombing they never managed to completely shut down the German railways, or wreck all their factory production, or starve or crack the will of the civilian population or smash the economy. German military production kept increasing until Allied and Russian armies actually began to capture the factories. The Japanese would probably prove just as resilient.
 
That doesn't mesh with Michael Sandusky's work and that landing at Wonsan is not the one I'm talking about; it was an initial small one (And after the surrender as well), yes, but Kim Il-Sung didn't come in until October. As I'm still unable to find the source I had, I'll concede on that particular of it, but I do very much back what I've cited from Sandusky.

From what I can tell, Sandusky doesn't seem to have been working with the latest military data. His book is from 1982, which would be well before the opening of Soviet archives allowed better perspective on Soviet military operations in that time period. Poking around, there seems to be some disagreement about precisely when Kim Il-Sung arrived in North Korea: some authors do agree with Sandusky and say October, while others say he was brought in around mid-September. Regardless, his arrival personally in the wake of the Red Army's advance isn't really that important as he was only brought in after the Soviets were well established.

Because that is hundreds of miles away, meaning that you'd be taking a poorly armed Soviet fleet with no training across hundreds of miles of ocean while the Japanese have complete air superiority.

A large chunk of the Soviet fleet which invaded Shumshu did so from Vladivostok and in doing so had to travel much further then to any hypothetical landing point on the western coast of Hokkaido. That coast is also within the operational range of Soviet aircraft flying out of airbases around Vladivostok, so it isn't guaranteed that the Japanese would have air superiority.

They deployed a single under-strength Rifle division at Shumshu and a few hundred guys off torpedo boats in Northern Korea. If we take the claim of an entire division landed at Korea at face value, that would would represent 50% of total Soviet strength in the region at the time of the OTL surrender, which obviously doesn't pass the common sense test.

Troop strength that were landed by sea in North Korea in the period of August 13-17 alone amounts to 6,500 men, with the main bulk of 5,000 landing on August 15th. Overall, the personnel were mostly drawn from the 355th Rifle Division, with the rest coming from some non-divisional specialist units (naval infantry battalions and the like). Rather a far cry from "a few hundred guys". I'm still trying to pin down the numbers for the landings that took place on the 18th-20th, but it seems to have been another several thousand.

Not until after the surrender, when they had port facilities and the cooperation of the Japanese.

The landing of the tanks took place in two waves on August 15 and 17th. The first wave unloaded while the port was only partially in Soviet hands. Only in the second wave were the port facilities were in Soviet hands by that time, and even then only because they had been seized by force by the Soviets and they received no cooperation from the Japanese. Word of the Japanese surrender was only just starting to reach the Japanese forces in the region and most didn't accept it as genuine for several more days.

I was talking about the Destroyers and Cruisers. They were neither used at the Kuriles or in Korea,

The Korean landings involved two of the destroyers. I'm still trying to find out what the cruisers were doing.

This is assuming that, after months of combat very clearly signaling Soviet intentions to the Japanese, the IJA does nothing at all despite us knowing how active the Tokyo was being in this timeframe.

Yes, obviously. That's why I'm positing a successful Soviet operation as merely a possibility, not an inevitability. We don't know have any evidence involving how active Tokyo was being in regards to a Soviet threat to Hokkaido specifically nor how well Soviet intentions would be picked up on by the Japanese: they already had badly misread Soviet intentions and capabilities in the run-up to the invasion of Manchuria, after all, despite receiving plenty of indications otherwise. Hell, the landing on Shumshu managed to take them by surprise despite the Soviet invasion force having to sail right by the relatively strong Japanese garrison at Wakkanai. That's part of my point in terms of the uncertainty here. My position is not that a Soviet invasion would succeed, only that it might and whether it does depends on what happens in the intervening time.
 
As the Americans and British found out in Europe this is a lot easier said than done. Despite endless bombing they never managed to completely shut down the German railways, or wreck all their factory production, or starve or crack the will of the civilian population or smash the economy. German military production kept increasing until Allied and Russian armies actually began to capture the factories. The Japanese would probably prove just as resilient.

Japan is much more dependent on external sources for both fuel and food, plus unlike Germany they don't have that extended railway and industrial network (bomb proff subterraneal factories included) to attack.
 
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