Japan Doesn't Invade China, Longest Possible Pacific War?

raharris1973

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No Japanese war with China = no Pacific War at all.

Why would there even BE a war?

The Japanese have no need for oil, they have no significant friction with the U.S., UK, France, or The Netherlands.

The only way a war starts is if someone high in the command structure goes utterly nuts and orders an unprovoked and unsupported attack.

I would agree that without Japan being involved in a war with China the likelihood of a War iin the Pacific is just about ZERO.

Well, this skips over alot of intermediate questions to simply say, no 1937 China war = no Pacific War, for certain.

The two most important intermediate questions are:

a) assuming it is not butterflied away, how does Japan react to the fall of western Europe to Hitler and the obvious opportunity to easily occupy French Indochina (which they did before the oil embargo, not after), if not other European colonies

b) given (a) above, do the western powers embargo Japan?

On the one hand, they have not had years of getting morally outraged over a hot war in China from 1937 to 1940. So they may not react as harshly to Japanese moves to occupy French Indochina.

On the other hand, Japanese occupation of French Indochina in 1940 or 1941 (or threats to the USSR for that matter) could prompt a western oil embargo/asset freeze, for strategic reasons. In occupying French Indochina, Japan would be signalling a possible intention to scavenge other western colonies and generally profit from the distress of Germany's enemies. With the US determined to hold onto its empire, and the US and UK both wanting successful British and Soviet victory over the Nazis, they may well decide to try to restrain Japan with economic weapons.

An embargo on Japan, if it is not negotiated away, puts you right back to the situation for Tokyo of submitting to western demands or plunging to capture the resources of the DEI, and therefore needing to take Singapore and Manila etc.

---there's plenty of other intermediate questions to consider between 1937 and 1940 in terms of possible knock-ons from there being no China war getting started:

1) With less need to support Chinese resistance from 37-39, do the Soviets up the ante in Spain?

2) What is Japan doing in the meantime- what forces is it investing in? Do they patch up relations with the anti-Hitler coalition or do they continue a policy of greater friendliness with Germany and Italy (dating to the anti-comintern pact? HMaybe they would even send some volunteers to Spain alongside the Italians and Germans (I doubt it, but you never know, especially if there's any trade opportunity involved.) How do they balance Army and Navy modernization?

3) Is the Japanese Kwangtung army still having summer battles with the Soviets from 1937-1939? Maybe they do because the Japanese want to enforce a certain claim on the Manchukuo-Mongolia border. But maybe they don't, their probing actions may have been related to testing Soviet reactions and strength in the context of the China war (ie, how much of a threat do we face up north, and therefore how many Kwangtung divisions can we afford to move south of the Great Wall.

4) What is China doing? I personally doubt it would start a war with Japan in 1937 to 1940, but Chiang had been forced to call off his offensive against the communists as early as 1936 to form a United Front.
 

raharris1973

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“It would be odd to see a pro-Allied Japan getting a free hand in China because pro-Axis China did something stupid and made a pass at Hong Kong.”

It would be odd, and unlikely, although not impossible.

Even before 1936 Japanese policy and strategy was taking on a revisionist, anti-western orientation while greater domestic conformity was being enforced.

Obviously, Manchuria and nearby provinces had been occupied.

The Germany and Japan both left the League of Nations the same year.

Despite the brisk arms sales and advisory relationship between Germany and China in the early to mid 1930s, China did not similarly leave the League of Nations.

Germany, Italy and Japan signaled at least a degree of strategic cooperation in revising the post-WWI order with their Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936.

On the German side, again despite their dealings with the ChiNats, Japan can still have greater affect against potential German enemies than China can.

The default path of Japan by 1936, even if there is no China war, is towards a more favorable orientation to the European Fascist powers and a less favorable one to the US, UK and USSR.


The thing is, there really aren't alternative targets. The Soviets are capable of beating even Japan's best equipped troops with just the forces in the Far East, attacking Western Europe's colonies is too dangerous unless they are occupied elsewhere, and hitting the US for no reason is national suicide.”


Thailand?

You would need to invent a context for such a move out of whole cloth, but it's the only real estate in Asia besides China that is not governed by a great power or ally of a great power.


I agree with this:

“Anyway even if they didn't they would use their resources and free armies to invade Burma and next India to defeat the British before they considder to invade Australia.”

I also agree with this:


“So if a war with the US still occurs (why, no Chinese campaign sucking up resources or embargo), the war probably lasts about the same.”

A Japan could do “better” possibly if the measure is killing more Americans, British or Soviets, or if the measure is temporarily occupying some territories they did not in OTL (maybe Assam or Ceylon or Vladivostock), but Japan could not win or stop the build-up and advance of US forces in the Pacific.

If avoiding war with China from 1937-1941, the Japanese could have somewhat more industrial production compared to OTL, somewhat greater raw materials stockpiles, and somewhat more optimized armor, air or naval forces in the ATL 1940-41 compared to OTL, but in no case would it be optimized enough to beat any of the Allies.



Let me start by saying I haven't done a ton of research into the who, why, and how of the Japan-China war other than "Imperial Japan wanted conquest,resources" but let's say they never invade China(things are smoothed over following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident) how many resources and men does this open up for Japan to fight a longer Pacific War with the US?

see above on the possibilities and their limits

I'm assuming China/Manchuria was a net drain on Japan with needs of waging war outweighing whatever resources were extracted to fuel the Japanese war effort/occupation.

Pretty safely so. On the other hand, there is an argument that support for China, especially after Pearl Harbor, was a net drain on the most efficient possible Allied use of Allied resources. A nonbelligerent China at least prevents that drain of supplies and advisors over the Burma Road and the Hump. Even before WWII, it might enable more Soviet investment in the Spanish Republic's survival.

Weren't the best Japanese armies/troops/equipment stationed in China? Like the Kwantung Army.

The Kwangtung Army was in Manchuria, standing guard against the Soviets. As a unit, the Kwangtung Army was not a participant in either the Pacific front or the active China fronts after 1941.

The Japanese did actually shuffle around and drain some men and equipment from both the Kwangtung Army in Manchuria and forces from the China theater over the Pacific War however to man the defenses in New Guinea, Burma and the Philippines however.

Would avoiding this conflict allow Japan to invade Australia?

It would not set the conditions for a successful invasion or an easy invasion. It was a logistic bridge too far and insufficient reward for the scale of effort required.

Dedicate more aircraft and troops to it's island bases?

Some, although they did do some transfers of both.

Construct more ships?

sure

How much longer can the PW go?

Not much, whatever optimization the Japanese are able to do for the Pacific War will be insufficient for Japan to still have working SLOCs after months of being at war with the United States and its industrial base.
 
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If China doesn't get invaded, there's always an outside chance it could become an ally. If Japan doesn't attack, the Soviets would likely push more on China. Conceivably Stalin could exploit warlordism to carve out SSRs in Xinjang and Mongolia, with the aim of linking up with Mao in Shaanxi. That might be a bit much, but friendly Japan could make a lot of diplomatic hay out of Chiang's anti-communism.

Getting China into the Anti-Comintern alliance would be key. Ribbentrop wanted this initially, Italy would support it, and Japan's leaders were fractious enough that somebody would definitely support it. Perhaps if it included a hefty trade package, transferring german technologies to Japan, Japanese naval tech to Italy, and industrial aid to China in a way that allows Japan enough control over trade.

A Germany/Italy/Japan/China bloc starting to form in 1936 is a perfect pod for a fascist wank. Exile in Asia would be a very productive use for German Jews. If Italy could go the Manchukuo puppet state route with East Africa, they'd start to get enough numbers to populate a Third Way International as an alternative locus of authority from the League of Nations. (Asian immigration to Italian East Africa could help italy solidify its control there, while scoring major anti-us propaganda points) China certainly has enough reason to want help protecting itself from the Western empires.

Plenty more countries could be enticed to join. Thailand would definitely be in. Sweden and Finland would both be supportive, and an Italian-backed Baltic defense union would be a counterbalance to Germany intern dominance of the axis, while bringing in sophisticated industrial and military trade potential. Franco's Spain could be convinced, particularly if Japanese aid results in a speedier nationalist victory. Without China to fight, Japan would want a place to refine doctrine and train with Europeans, and Spain is perfect. Japanese naval air support for example could wreak havoc on the republic, while imparting carrier doctrine to a modernizing Italian fleet. In addition, there's probably some country in South America or South East Europe who could be roped in. Iran and India could also be inspired into more of a thorn for the British.

If Hitler can be convinced to slow things down to stay on schedule for war, this burgeoning fascist alliance would have enough time to rationalize its economic planning, and broaden its modern military base. OTL showed Hitler can expand diplomatically by milking appeasement. The Soviet Union's reactions would be a wild card, but the US would retain its isolationist streak for a while in this scenario.

When general war does break out, a less attrited, more modernized Japan could hit Imperial possessions in South East Asia with an even bigger sledgehammer than they did OTL. Chinese numbers would make it much easier to fortify island chains while pushing on India and/or the Soviets. Japan should be able to stockpile/develop at least a decent amount of oil. The alt-East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere would be much more ideologically attractive to national liberation movements.

Would this be enough to defeat America? Probably not, nor most likely with the Soviet Union either, but it could probably let the Axis take Britain and France, at which point Mothra is already on her way.
 
4) What is China doing? I personally doubt it would start a war with Japan in 1937 to 1940, but Chiang had been forced to call off his offensive against the communists as early as 1936 to form a United Front.

The early United Front period (between Xi'an Incident and the start of the war) was very beneficial for Chiang Kai-Shek. Chiang was at the height of his popularity, and there was immense pressure among the general Chinese population and within the CCP to implement its agreement with Chiang that would have ended the end of the CCP as an independent political force with its own armed forces and autonomy. It would have been brought into alignment with the Nationalist government's norms like the other warlords. The start of the war saved the CCP since the the attention and resources of the Nationalists had to switch from pressuring the CCP to normalize to defeating Japan.

In the autumn of 1937, China was going to hold elections for its National Assembly to elect the new President (I think it was October, but can't remember the specific month). This would mark the "official" end of the Nationalist "political tutelage" period and ostensibly make China a democracy. In reality, the Nationalist semi-dictatorship would continue, but it would boost the prestige and authority of Chiang and the KMT government.

By end of 1939, China will have completed its various economic projects in its Three Year Plan of 1936 and completed all of the initial objectives of the German military mission to modernize its armed forces. At this time, it would no longer be feasible for Japan to consider conquering China. It would also make Chiang so dominate that the various warlords have no choice but allow Chiang to end their autonomy lest they be wiped out.

So we probably see a period from 1938-1942 where Chiang eliminates the warlords and give them sinecure positions. Guangxi is probably the first to reconcile themselves with Chiang's rule, then Yunnan and the CCP territories around Yenan. The Ma Clique then submits. Chiang needs to proceed more carefully in North China given Japanese interests, but can probably control Shandong and Shanxi outright and assert greater influence over Beijing. When the Nazis invade the Soviet Union, he gets his chance to assert control over Xinjiang.

After 1941, it gets interesting. While Chiang could move against Japan in Manchuria, most likely he works with Japan to extort concessions in exchange for peace. I can see Stalin agreeing that Mongolia returns to China as a result of a "plebiscite" or whatever pretext would be good. Japan likely gets any disputed border regions and expands Manchukuo slightly with certain military defensive concessions to make Manchukuo less vulnerable.

The odds of a Sino-Japanese confrontation over Manchuria increases in 1944, but I think both parties would be hesitant at being seen as the aggressor given the power of both the Soviet Union and United States by that time. There will be increasing pressure on Chiang domestically though to return Manchuria to China. Chiang likely appeals again to the world's sympathy for the 1931 invasion to force Japan to hand over Manchuria. Given world opinion and rise of China, I think Japan agrees to some kind of face saving scenario that restores Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria and preserve their investments in it rather than risk a war where the other major Pacific powers would support China. In exchange, China agrees to not cause trouble over Korea or Taiwan.

This is probably a best case scenario for China. The possibility war breaks out between China and Japan is very real in the 1939-1942 period. However, Japan will have a very difficult time and the war likely ends in a favorable stalemate to China.
 
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